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Abstract 
The level of brutality and violence against children abducted and forcefully 
conscripted by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in northern Uganda 
pricked the conscience of humanity. The suffering of the people in northern 
Uganda was described by Jan Egeland, the former United Nations Under-
Secretary for Humanitarian Affairs, as ‘the biggest forgotten humanitarian 
crisis in the world’. This study is primarily concerned with the plight of child 
soldiers in northern Uganda and how their effective reintegration and 
rehabilitation (RR) could lead to successful peacebuilding. The study is 
premised on the hypothesis that ‘the promotion of the RR of former child 
soldiers by providing psychosocial support based on traditional and 
indigenous resources may contribute to conditions of peace and stability in 
northern Uganda.’  
 
The main contribution of this research is that it explores the relevance of 
psychosocial support based on the traditional and indigenous resources to the 
RR of child soldiers and peacebuilding of war-torn societies. Psychosocial 
support based on traditional and indigenous resources as an element of 
peacebuilding has been the neglected element of peacebuilding by the liberal 
peacebuilding interventions in most war-torn societies. For example, while 
traditional and indigenous resources in northern Uganda have been 
instrumental in the RR of former child soldiers, most scholars and policy 
makers have largely paid attention to the usual official government and 
United Nations structured top-down interventions that emphasize Western 
approaches of peacebuilding. More so, the official approaches have tended to 
marginalize the plight of former child soldiers in the reconstruction and 
peacebuilding of northern Uganda. Yet, failing to pay sufficient attention to 
effective RR of child soldiers could undermine the peace dividends already 
achieved in northern Uganda.  
 
The study also analyses the limitations of psychosocial support based on 
traditional and indigenous resources in the RR of former child soldiers. It 
further examines why Western approaches of psychosocial support in the RR 
of child soldiers have remained in use in spite of the criticisms levelled 
against them. The study examines other peacebuilding interventions, both 
official and unofficial, that have been implemented in northern Uganda. 
 
In terms of key findings, the study establishes that traditional and indigenous 
resources are still popular and have been widely used in northern Uganda in 
the RR of child soldiers. Majority of former child soldiers who were 
interviewed observed that they found traditional and indigenous resources 
more helpful than the Western models of psychosocial support. However, it 
was also established that there is a significant section of former child soldiers 
who found Western models more relevant in their RR processes. Based on 
these findings, the study recommends an integrative and holistic model of 
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psychosocial support that blends good elements from both traditional and 
indigenous resources and Western approaches with greater emphasis on the 
former.  
 
Key Words: Reintegration, Rehabilitation, Peacebuilding, Child 
Soldier, Childhood, Disarmament, Demobilization, Conflict, Uganda 
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Chapter 1 : Introduction 
 
Genesis of the Research  
 
The genesis of this research stretches over 10 years of my involvement in the 
various peace processes aimed at contributing to the end of the 24 year old 
violent conflict in northern Uganda. While working with the Church of 
Uganda in 1998, I was involved in implementing a peace and human rights 
programme that involved provision of humanitarian assistance to the 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) and training church leaders and students 
about human rights. It was during the launching of the Peace and Human 
Rights Programme in Apac district in Lango sub-region, which involved a 
retreat and meditation of the Anglican bishops that I became convinced that 
the military option to end the LRA conflict that was being pursued by 
government was not the only solution that would end the suffering of the 
people. At the time an estimated 1.6 million people were living as IDPs. 
 
The bishops’ retreat was concluded by a massive public rally where two 
bishops from rival ethnic groups embraced each other as a sign of forgiveness 
and reconciliation which was punctuated by personal testimonies. From that 
day, I was convinced that national reconciliation could bring an end to the 
brutal rebellion that had exploited ethnic differences that exist in Uganda. It 
also made me realize the need to make a contribution to reconciliation and 
peacebuilding in the region. At this time, I was still limited in my 
understanding of this conflict and also lacked skills and theoretical grounding 
in conflict resolution. The opportunity to do a Masters degree in Peace Studies 
at the University of Bradford in 2000, which I completed in 2001, provided an 
opportunity for me to acquire knowledge and skills to participate in the peace 
process in northern Uganda.  
 
Since 2001, I have been involved in different peace initiatives aimed at 
contributing to the resolution of the conflict in northern Uganda. These 
initiatives include: conducting research; organizing public dialogues and 
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provision of technical backstopping to the Government and LRA peace 
negotiating teams. In 2003, while working as a Civil Society Fellow with the 
International Peace Institute (IPI), a New York based think tank; I organized 
two high level policy dialogues in New York focusing on the war in northern 
Uganda. The main objective for the public dialogues was to draw the attention 
of the policy community at the United Nations (UN) to the suffering of the 
people in northern Uganda. One such public dialogue was organized for the 
Acholi religious and traditional leaders to interact with the United Nations 
policy community. The religious leaders were drumming up support for the 
resumption of peace talks between the LRA and the Government of Uganda.  
 
In 2004, I participated in a study that detailed the peace processes in northern 
Uganda and why they always fail. The policy research report that came out of 
the study titled, ‘The Torturous Peace Process in Northern Uganda’ greatly 
helped me to understand that the 24 year conflict in northern Uganda is 
complex and deep rooted, with multiple actors and interests. These issues 
combine to make the conflict difficult to resolve. The study greatly influenced 
my interest in understaning a more scholarly work on the conflict in northern 
Uganda. It is my hope, that this research on the reintegration and 
rehabilitation of child soldiers based on traditional and indigenous resources 
will extend the frontiers of knowledge in the understanding of the conflict and 
the search for durable peace in northern Uganda.  
 
Statement of the Problem and Significance of the Study 
The coming into power in Uganda by President Museveni in 1986 sparked off 
a violent protracted conflict in northern Uganda. An offshoot of this conflict is 
the Lord’s Resistance Army/Movement (LRA/M) rebellion led by Joseph 
Kony which has caused untold suffering to the people in northern Uganda. 
Critical to gross human rights violations and human suffering caused by the 
LRA rebellion are the children who are abducted and forcefully recruited 
intothe LRA ranks. Most of the abducted girls are turned into sex slaves of 
rebel commanders. By the end of 1987, the LRA had successfully brought 
under one command the reminants of the forces of the Holy Spirit Movement 
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(HSM) led by prophetess Alice Lakwena; the defeated Uganda National 
Liberation Army (UNLA): the former  the government army (1979-1985) that 
was overthrown by the National Resistance Army/Movement (NRA/M) led by 
President Museveni. By 1994, the LRA rebellion that initially had enjoyed the 
local appeal and support of the population in northern Uganda, particularly in 
Acholi sub-region, lost the support largely   due to its brutality. This forced 
the LRA to resort to abduction and forceful recruitment of children (Lucima 
(ed.), 2002:68). It is estimated that 80% of the LRA fighters were abducted 
children. Humanitarian organisations such as the World Vision International 
estimate the number of children abducted by the LRA to be 30,000, although 
the actual figure may be much higher (World Vision Report, 2005: 17). 
Available information also implicates the Government army in the recruitment 
and deployment of rescued child soldiers in offensives against the LRA rebels 
(Human Rights Watch Report, March 2003, Vol. 15, No. 7 (A)). 
 
As a strategy for the LRA to prevent children from escaping from the bush, 
they are harshly brutalized and indoctrinated so as to instil in them fear of 
ever thinking of going back to their homes. Most of the children returnees tell 
stories of how they were forced to kill fellow children who attempted to 
escape. The guilt of having murdered their own relatives or friends using 
crude methods left permanent scars on the minds of the child soldiers 
(Anderson et al. 2005:130). 
 
After the resumption of peace negotiations in 2006 between the Government 
of Uganda and the LRA, mediated by the Government of Southern Sudan 
(GoSS), the rebels relocated to Southern Sudan, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC) and Central Africa Republic (CAR). This scenario resulted into 
the return of relative peace in northern Uganda. With the return of relative 
peace in the region, the challenge now is how to effectively reintegrate and 
rehabilitate (RR) former child soldiers as part of the overall peacebuilding 
process in the region. As most scholars (Wessells, 2006; Singer, 2006) have 
observed, unless former child soldiers are effectively reintegrated and 
rehabilitated in most war-torn societies,they can become a threat to peace and 
security and constrain the reconstruction processes. This is because former 
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child soldiers  have the potential to join criminal gangs and fuel the crime 
rate; they can be re-recruited into fresh rebellions or they can be hired by 
warlords to fight in other on-going regional conflicts, thereby threatening 
regional peace and security. With an estimated 30,000 children having been 
abducted and forcefully conscripted into the rebel ranks, it becomes apparent 
that if not effectively reintegrated and rehabilitated, former child soldiers 
could pose a serious security threat to the peace dividends already registered 
in northern Uganda.  
In this research, I argue that the effective reintegration and rehabilitation of 
former child soldiers into civilian and productive life would contribute to 
conditions of peace and stability in northern Uganda. Secondly, I argue that 
the neglect of former child soldiers in most of the RR processes causes more 
wars, increases criminality and hummpers any efforts towards building 
durable peace in war-torn societies (Singer, 2006; Honwana, 2006). The third 
argument is that the provision of psychosocial support based on traditional 
and indigenous resources which is the neglected element of peacebuilding, is 
very crucial in the RR of former child soldiers as the case in northern Uganda 
demonstrates.  
This research is premised on the hypothesis that ‘the promotion of the 
reintegration and rehabilitation (RR) of former child soldiers by providing 
psychosocial support based on cultural and indigenous resources may 
contribute to conditions of peace and stability in northern Uganda. This 
argument does not mean that other interventions in the RR of former child 
soldiers are not important for peacebuilding. Rather, it is noted that the 
provision of psychosocial support may be the most relevant in the RR of 
former child soldiers. Most crucially, psychosocial support is effective if it 
largely relies on traditional and indigenous resources rather than the Western 
approaches that have contextual and cultural limitations. This research is a 
critique of the liberal peace approach to peacebuilding which is usually top-
down, time-bound, lacking long-term financial commitment by the 
international community and governments, and overlooks local knowledge 
and resources (Pugh et al. (2007). The liberal peace approach to peacebuilding 
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is discussed extensively discussed in Chaper Three. For example, this research 
shows the resilience of former child soldiers in northern Uganda who have 
empowered each other another by establishing their own associations relying 
on local resources. 
 
The research endeavours to answer the following research questions. First, to 
what extent does effective RR of former child soldiers contribute to conditions 
of peace and stability in a war torn society? Second, what is the relevance of 
psychosocial support that largely relies on traditional and indigenous 
resources in the RR of child soldiers in northern Uganda? Third, what are the 
challenges of the traditional and indigenous resources in the RR of former 
child soldiers? Fourth, what other interventions are necessary for the 
reintegration and rehabilitation of child soldiers in northern Uganda?  
Most of the academic and policy studies on the conflict in northern Uganda 
have mainly focused on its political and ethnic dimensions as well as the 
abduction and use of children in the conflict by the LRA, without paying 
sufficient attention to their RR into society as peacebuilding. Recent 
developments in northern Uganda have raised hopes that the LRA conflict 
could be coming to an end. The developments include; the resumption of 
peace negotiations in 2006 between the Government of Uganda and the LRA 
in Juba, Southern Sudan, mediated by the Government of Southern Sudan 
(GoSS); and the relocation of the LRA rebels from the entire northern Uganda 
into southern Sudan, the DRC and CAR. Since the relocation of rebels from 
northern Uganda, relative peace has returned, paving way for the IDPs to 
return to their original homes and for reconstruction programmes to be 
implemented. Since the scars of conflict penetrate deeper into the society’s 
socio-economic and political fabric, the end of the conflict may not 
necessarily usher in durable peace in northern Uganda. Because of extensive 
evidence of societal fragmentation and collapse of the socio-economic and 
cultural sectors in northern Uganda, the plight of child soldiers, especially 
their RR, is likely to be marginalized in spite of the critical need to focus on 
them as an integral part of peacebuilding (Liu Institute et al. 2005). 
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This research is informed by the realization that in spite of the suffering child 
soldiers endure during the civil wars, in most war-torn societies they are often 
marginalized in the RR processes (Singer, 2006:183). Yet, failure to plan for 
effective RR of former child soldiers makes them pose a threat to peace and 
security in the post-conflict period (Singer, 2006; Honwana, 2006). 
Consequently, the effective RR of former child soldiers in northern Uganda is 
crucial in order to contribute to conditions of durable peace. 
The provision of psychosocial support based on traditional and indigenous 
resources in the RR of child soldiers is generally a neglected element of 
peacebuilding in most academic and policy circles. This research shows that 
in spite of the limitations of traditional and indigenous resources which 
include the fact that they have been weakened and undermined during the 
long period of the civil war and gender biases towards women, they can play a 
crucial role in the RR of former child soldiers. As the subsequent chapters of 
this research show, traditional and indigenous resources have been crucial in 
the RR of former child soldiers in northern Uganda. However, while the 
research acknowledges the relevance of traditional and indigenous resources, 
it also recognizes their limitations and the importance of Western approaches 
of psychosocial support in the RR of child soldiers. To this end, the research 
proposes an integrated approach of psychosocial support that blends both 
approaches. 
Further more, available information on child soldiering in Uganda shows that 
there is an apparent limited expertise in handling RR of child soldiers. For 
example, when the then rebel National Resistance Army (NRA) led by 
President Museveni captured power after five years of guerrilla warfare in 
1986, government attempted to demobilize, reintegrate and rehabilitate 
thousands of child soldiers from the army with limited success. Child soldiers 
were simply sent back to schools and were subsequently re-absorbed into the 
army upon completion or dropping out of schools1. 
                                                 
1 Interview with Lt. Col Felix Kuluyagye, the spokesman for Uganda Peoples Defence Forces 
and Ministry of Defence which took place in Kampala in March, 2010. 
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More so, there are reports that in northern Uganda, some of the former child 
soldiers have nowhere to turn to especially where family re-unions have 
proved difficult. Cases where former child soldiers have ended up on the 
streets of Gulu town in northern Uganda are common. This scenario is 
especially more common among child mothers who have been rejected by 
their parents because of the children they returned with from the bush 
(Interview with former child soldiers). There are also documented cases where 
rescued children who failed to put up with their families and communities had 
to run back to the LRA rebels or were absorbed into the Government army 
(Coalition Global Report, 2004). With complete breakdown of the local 
economy and the weakening of the traditional institutions in northern Uganda, 
the RR of former child soldiers is likely to become challenging. 
The research recognizes the important role played by agencies such as 
UNICEF, World Vision and Gulu Support the Children Organization 
(GUSCO) in the RR of child soldiers in northern Uganda. However, most 
organizations used Western approaches of psychosocial support in the RR of 
child soldiers such as one-on-one counseling which have cultural limitations 
and are not sustainable in the long-run (Kostelny, 2006). The study further 
explores the role of official and unofficial peacebuilding interventions, their 
limitations and challenges in the RR of former child soldiers. It is hoped that 
the study will contribute to the deeper understanding of the child soldier 
problematic and how traditional and indigenous resources are important in the 
RR of former child soldiers particularly in northern Uganda. 
Research Methodology: Use of Qualitative Research Methodology 
In order to answer the research questions and also to achieve the set 
objectives, the research used a qualitative research methodology. The decision 
to use qualitative research methodology was based on its associated 
advantages. For example, qualitative research methodology that allows the 
researcher to research about persons’ lives, lived experiences, behaviours, 
emotions, and feelings, social movements, cultural phenomena and 
interactions between societies was found relevant to the research on 
reintegration and rehabilitation of former child soldiers (Strauss, et al. 
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1997:11). Also, the qualitative research methodology was more suitable when 
conducting research as it attempts to understand the nature of experience of 
persons with related problems such as chronic illness, addiction and divorce. 
The methodology was relevant to the research on RR of former child soldiers 
in northern Uganda most of whom are emerging from very traumatic and 
tragic experiences including child abuse, drug abuse and forced murder in the 
bush. 
 
The qualitative methodology also allowed the researcher freedom of unlimited 
movement between the steps of data collection and data analysis, using new 
information to fine tune concepts, sampling and analysis (Sarantakos, 2005). 
Data for this research were generated from both primary and secondary 
sources. Primary data collection methods used are; in-depth interviews, focus 
group discussions and non-participant observation. Much of the primary data 
were generated through interviews with former child soldiers as key 
respondents.  
 
Twenty five former child soldiers who are adults meaning that they are above 
18 years of age were interviewed for this research. According to the Children 
Act 1997 in Uganda, any person below the age of 18 is considered a child. 
Out of the twenty five respondents, 15 were male while 10 were female. Other 
respondents interviewed were representatives of Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs), Community Based Organizations (CBOs); 
Government officials, representatives of United Nations (UN) agencies, 
International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs), representatives of 
faith-based organizations, traditional leaders in northern Uganda and 
representatives of the army. UN agencies included UNICEF and UNDP; while 
international non-governmental organizations included Save the Children in 
Uganda, Caritas Gulu, and World Vision International. CBOs included Gulu 
District NGO Forum, Concerned Parents Association, Ker Kwaro Acholi and 
Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative. Government Institutions included 
the Amnesty Commission, Uganda Human Rights Commission and Uganda 
Peoples Defence Forces. Oral interviews were conducted directly by the 
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researcher in northern Uganda during fieldwork that lasted from December 
2009 to March, 2010. 
 
Interviews were conducted using an interview schedule developed before 
going to the field. Interviews involved a one-on-one interaction with the 
respondents and focus group discussions with members of associations of 
former child soldiers. One focus group comprised of 15 members while the 
second group comprised of 10 members. While the one-on-one approach was 
able to get very personal and private information from respondents, the focus 
group discussion approach was able to gather useful information from a cross-
section of former child soldiers who had shared experiences, perceptions and 
understandings. The advantage with focus group discussion was that because 
of shared experiences, respondents continued to remind each other of some 
issues and facts about their lives which greatly enriched this research. 
Secondary data collection involved literature review of various academic 
publications, news bulletins and media reports, Internet materials, and 
stakeholder memoranda and government documents. 
 
Other primary data collection methods used was non-participant observation, 
unstructured interviewing, specifically in-depth interviews and focus group 
discussion with key stakeholders. Non-participant observation method was 
used because it is a purposeful, systematic and selective way of watching and 
listening to an interaction or phenomenon and recording as it takes place. 
Non-participant observation allowed the researcher to remain a passive 
observer, watching and listening to the activities of the phenomenon and 
drawing conclusions (Kumar, 2005:121). As an observer, the researcher was 
able to watch, follow and record the activities and behaviour of the 
researched. This does not mean that the method did not have limitations. The 
limitations included; the observer’s bias and the possibility of the informants 
changing their behaviour upon realization that they were being observed 
(Kumar, 2005:120). The researcher was mindful of these limitations and 
worked to ensure that they were minimized. For example, the respondents 
were informed about the purpose of the research in advance; were promised 
confidentiality and the researcher was accompanied by a trusted person, a 
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representative from a reception centre that was responsible for counselling 
some of them. The representative from one of the reception centres who 
accompanied the researcher was also fluent in the local language and English. 
 
In-depth interviewing which is repeated face-to-face encounters between the 
researcher and the informants directed towards understanding informants 
perspectives on their lives, experiences, or situations as expressed in their own 
words was used. Face-to-face interviews offered the possibility of modifying 
one’s line of inquiry, following up interesting responses and investigating 
underlying issues in a manner that postal and self-administered questionnaires 
could not do (Robson, 2002:172). Furthermore, in-depth interviewing was 
also relevant since repeated contacts and extended length of time spent with 
the informants created a rapport and enhanced confidence which resulted in 
generating accurate data. In focus group discussions, the researcher was able 
to explore the perceptions, experiences and understandings of respondents 
who had shared experiences in regard to the study issues. 
 
During fieldwork, the researcher used focus group discussions with former 
child soldiers most of them have settled in the rural areas in northern Uganda. 
Most of the former child soldiers have established associations to assist in 
their RR processes (associations of former child soldiers are examined in 
Chapter Five).   During fieldwork, the representative from the reception centre 
would introduce the researcher and brief the respondents about the purpose of 
the research. They were informed that the research was purely for academic 
purposes and that the information given was to be kept in confidence. 
Respondents were also promised that their names would not be mentioned in 
the report. After gaining consent from respondents, the researcher would 
facilitate the discussions.  The researcher facilitated discussions in a manner 
that enabled all the respondents to contribute frankly and freely. This was 
done by encouraging the shy ones especially the child mothers to speak. Focus 
group discussions yielded very useful information as respondents frequently 
reminded each other about some facts, incidents and experiences which would 
ordinarily have not come up in in-depth one-on-one interviews. 
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The main challenge with focus group discussions was that some former child 
soldiers could not speak good English while others could not speak English at 
all. This challenge was mitigated by using the representative from the 
reception centre who was fluent in English and the local language. Above all, 
the representative was a trusted person having worked as a Social Worker 
with one of the reception centres that reintegrated and rehabilitated former 
child soldiers. Another challenge was that some of the respondents were a bit 
shy and too reserved to speak freely especially child mothers. This challenge 
was mitigated by the researcher encouraging respondents to speak freely and 
appealing to the dominant ones to give equal chances to others to speak. This 
was empowering as child mothers became confident and were able to 
contribute effectively about their experiences. Generally, focus group 
discussions were very useful to the research in a sense that, the researcher was 
able to harvest a lot of useful information from a cross-section of many 
respondents with a shared experience.All the data that were collected by the 
researcher during field work, including data from observation, were 
documented as written texts. This was designed to be in harmony with the 
primary inclination of this research that used qualitative methodology. In spite 
of the limitations, documentation of reality as written text is methodologically 
invaluable for the production of knowledge using qualitative methods of data 
interpretation as textual analysis, discourse analysis and interpretivism 
(Sarantakos, 2005:308). It is worth noting that documented data can in its own 
right be treated as social constructs which are in turn capable of being used to 
produce a variety of social knowledge and theories. In order to ease the 
textualization of interview data, field work notes were made for all the 
interviews. As a general rule, all the notes taken during fieldwork contained 
essentials of the informants’ answers and basic information about the 
interview proceedings. 
 
Apart from the interview notes, the researcher’s field notes also included a 
documentation of some enriching narratives of the process of data collection 
and unique field observations. Before undertaking in-depth interviews, the 
researcher first explained to the informants the reason for conducting the 
research and the commitment to the ethical principle of confidentiality in the 
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use of the data provided and protection of the informants’ anonymity. The 
researcher was able to build confidence and trust with the help of a 
representative from a reception centre who comes from the region and speaks 
the local language and was known by most former child soldiers. After 
building confidence and trust, the researcher faced few difficulties in 
obtaining consent from the respondents including writing down their views in 
the course of conducting the interviews. Further, as part of confidence 
building, the researcher, while conducting the interviews, would repeat the 
questions and answers provided by the informant to make sure that he/she was 
in agreement before making notes. All the verbal materials were generally in a 
reported speech format. Noteworthy is that pauses, exclamation gestures such 
as ‘you know’, ‘you see,’ ‘oh yes’ were not recorded or presented in the data. 
 
Additionally, since most former child soldiers missed out on schooling and 
could not speak fluent English, the researcher relied on an interpreter for 
translation. The translation can however have its own limitations in the case of 
poor translation. This was mitigated by getting a well qualified person to do 
the translation. The person was a representative of a reception centre who was 
involved in the RR of some of the informants.  
 
Processing of data was done through thematic coding and content analysis. 
Thematic coding has been specifically developed for comparative studies and 
the underlying assumption is that within different social worlds or groups, 
different perspectives can be found on a phenomenon or a process (Flick, 
2002:185). In order to increase comparability of empirical materials, sampling 
is oriented to the groups whose perspectives on the issues of research seem to 
be most instructive for analysis, and therefore are defined in advance (Flick, 
200:185). Application of thematic coding involves a multi-step procedure 
oriented to the comparability of analyses. Content analysis is a suitable 
complement to thematic coding, being the methodological procedure for 
extracting thematic data from a wide range of textual materials or 
communications (Williamson, 1978; Silverman 2001; Robson, 2002). 
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As already noted, the research selected a sample of 25 former child soldiers. 
Out of 25, ten were females while fifteen were males. In qualitative research, 
the sample size is less important as the aim is to explore, not to quantify, the 
extent of variation for which you are guided by reaching a saturation point in 
terms of new findings (Kumar, 2005: 165). As Kumar (2005) observes, a 
study based upon the information obtained from one individual, or undertaken 
to describe one event or situation is perfectly valid. The research sample was 
subdivided on the basis of gender; age; length of time spent in the bush; 
participation in fighting; witnessed killings; married or not married and young 
mothers; passed through a reception centre; participated in cultural 
ceremonies and current employment among others. The aim was to gather as 
much information as possible about the lived experiences of former child 
soldiers especially how they were treated in the bush, how they were 
welcomed back into their families and communities, assistance provided to 
them and what they feel about it, their safety and security issues and their 
current roles in society.  
The intention behind a small sample was to have as much time as possible 
with the respondents in order to create the necessary trust and confidence with 
them which would enable them open up to the researcher.  
 
Interpretation and data analysis in this study proceeded through theory 
triangulation and interpretivism. Triangulation is a key concept used to 
describe the combination of different methods and theoretical perspectives in 
dealing with a phenomenon. Its advantage is that when coherently applied, the 
utility of each method or theory can be maximized in its greatest area of 
research or analytical strength, thereby overcoming many of the limitations 
and shortcomings that attend to a monolithic approach. Triangulation allows 
the researcher to view a particular point in research from more than one 
perspective hence enriching knowledge and/ or test validity (Sarantakos, 
2005:145). In theory, in triangulation, a premium is placed on the possibilities 
of producing knowledge in the analysis of research data by juxtaposing 
various theoretical points of view to maximize their utility and explanatory 
power (Flick, 2002:226; Mason, 2002:33). 
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In the data interpretation process, knowledge production is underpinned by a 
simplified analytical framework, which scholars have depicted as 
interpretivism. Fay (1996:112). Fay (1996:113) defines interpretivism as the 
view that comprehending human behaviour, products, and relationships 
consists solely in reconstructing the self-understandings of those engaged in 
creating or performing them. The advantage of interpretivism is that it, as 
much as possible, gives a comprehensive voice to the researched by offering a 
great deal of insight into their narratives and perspectives (Geertz, 1979; 
Rabinow & Sullivan (eds.) 1979). Nevertheless, interpretivism has also been 
criticised for being overly descriptive and for erroneously assuming that 
interpretations simply consist in grasping how others see the world. Critics 
have pointed out that some forms of interpretations such as ideology, critique 
and deconstructionism go beyond the conceptual schemes of those under 
study (Fay, 1996:119).  
 
Data analysis of child soldiers’ perceptions of their RR processes, challenges 
and experiences during the war was interpreted using relevant thematic 
summaries, paraphrased accounts and quotations from the dominant accounts 
and discourses of the respondents. From a stand point of positivistic social 
science, the entire methodological framework adopted in this research can be 
criticised as being empirically inadequate or weak because of its lack of 
incorporation of any statistical tests and quantitative analysis of variance in 
the consideration of child soldiers’ perceptions of their plight and RR 
processes. Several critics of the qualitative approach point out that because 
meaning is such an inexorable ‘site of contestation’ in most qualitative 
methods of data interpretation, the researcher is more privileged than the 
researched in discursive power relations: in terms of construction of meaning; 
the qualitative approach can potentially be a dangerous instrument in the 
hands of any researcher, who for whatever reasons, might be intent on 
manipulating representations and findings (Smith, 1998).  
 
It should be noted though that interpretivism and qualitative methodology in 
general have their own limitations. However, other analytical approaches and 
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methodologies including quantitative methodology also have their 
shortcomings. Possibilities of a researcher’s manipulation and abuse of the 
research process for example exist in all social science methodologies: 
quantitative and qualitative alike. It is worth noting that from an empiricist 
perspective, the application of some statistical tests and analysis could have 
added concreteness to some findings of this research. However, such a 
procedure, on a more critical note, could ultimately be more misleading than 
otherwise, not least because this research adopts a non-statistical study 
sample. This means that application of advanced statistical analysis in this 
circumstance could end up presenting wrong inferences and conclusions as 
hard facts. 
 
 Advanced statistical analysis could have made more sense had this study 
been based on a probability sample design, albeit not without being mindful of 
some well acknowledged limitations of both quantitative methodology and 
positivism (Smith, 1998; Flick, 2002). Consequently, in this research, the 
researcher has handled the pitfalls of interpretivism and of the entire 
methodological design by upholding high ethical standards. More so, a critical 
deconstruction model involving the interrogation of texts in order to identify 
the embedded normative and cognitive discourses has been appropriately 
incorporated to address most of the limitations of interpretivism. In the final 
analysis, contrary to classical interpretivist methodological guidelines, 
inferences and conclusions are systematically drawn based on the critical 
judgement and convictions of the researcher. 
  
From the onset, the research on the RR of child soldiers raised a number of 
ethical issues. Consequently, during the research design deliberate effort was 
made to ensure that ethical issues were considered and addressed during and 
after the field work. The first ethical issue that arose during field work was the 
issue of informed consent of the informants (Silverman, 2005:258). It was 
decided before fieldwork that former child soldiers below 18 years of age 
who, according to the Children Act 1997 in Uganda, are children would not be 
interviewed since children cannot give consent. Consequently, former child 
soldiers who were above 18 years and therefore adults were identified and 
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briefed about the importance of the research in advance to seek their consent 
to participate in the research.  
 
Because of the sensitivity of the research and the traumatic experiences child 
soldiers have gone through which made them loose trust in most people, 
consent was sought in the presence of a representative from one of the 
reception centres involved in the RR of former child soldiers who could speak 
their language. Informants were informed that the research project is an 
academic exercise. Besides having a representative from the reception centre, 
the researcher showed respondents an introductory letter from the University 
of Bradford which confirmed that the research was an academic exercise. The 
researcher also secured a letter of ethical approval from the National Council 
of Science and Technology authorizing the research exercise. 
 
The second ethical issue that this research had to contend with was the 
possibility of causing harm to the informants (Kumar, 2005:214). Most of the 
former child soldiers were forced by the LRA to kill their relatives and friends 
to prevent them from deserting the bush. Consequently, most of them fear to 
reveal such sensitive information as it could endanger their lives by triggering 
revenge from relatives of their victims. During the fieldwork, former child 
soldiers who were interviewed were first promised confidentiality in the sense 
that their names would not be revealed. That is why in the research initials 
such V.O., which are not even their initials, are used to protect their identity. 
The promise of confidentiality made respondents confident and cooperative 
during the interviews. 
 
Another ethical issue relevant to this research was the use of incentives in the 
form of providing money or any material things to respondents. From the 
research design, it was decided not to give respondents any money or gifts to 
avoid making them biased or commercializing research. Incentives motivate 
people to give biased information to please the researcher which could lead to 
inaccurate findings. During this research, informants were told that this is an 
academic research and that no money or gift would be given. The final ethical 
issue related to this research is the researchers’ bias. As Kumar (2005) 
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observes, bias is a deliberate attempt to hide what one has found in the study 
or highlight something disproportionately to its true existence. During this 
research, the researcher sought to be as objective as possible and to maintain a 
high level of professional integrity as a basis for future research. 
Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is organized into eight chapters. Chapter One focuses on the 
genesis of the research: what influenced the researcher to undertake this 
research. It also focuses on the statement of the problem which essentially is 
the child soldier problematic in northern Uganda where the LRA has been 
abducting and forcefully conscripting children into its ranks and indoctrinates 
them to kill mindlessly. Children are forced to kill their relatives and friends 
in order to alienate them from communities and prevent them from escaping 
back home. It is estimated that over 30,000 children in northern Uganda were 
abducted by the LRA. Most of these have either escaped or been rescued by 
the government army. The critical challenge for Uganda is how to effectively 
rehabilitate and reintegrate these children to regain their lost childhood and 
transit into civilian society as productive citizens rather than pose a security 
threat to peacebuilding processes. The significance of the research is that it 
explores the relevance of psychosocial support based on traditional and 
indigenous resources in the RR of former child soldiers in northern Uganda.  
 
Chapter Two examines the child soldier phenomenon at the global and 
continental (Africa) perspectives. The chapter also defines and conceptualizes 
key concepts: who is a child? Childhood; and who is a child soldier? The 
methods of recruitment, use of child soldiers and why children are preferred 
by armed groups and government forces are also discussed. Finally, Chapter 
Two examines the existing international legal mechanisms for protection of 
child soldiers in armed conflicts and their effectiveness.  
 
In Chapter Three, I discuss disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and 
rehabilitation (DDRR) of child soldiers as elements of peacebuilding. The 
Chapter also examines DDRR in the context of the neglected psychosocial 
support element of peacebuilding. Chapter Four examines the child soldier 
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phenomenon in the context of Uganda which is the focus of the research. The 
chapter traces the child soldier problem from the country’s political history 
and political economy. The chapter also analyses the causes of conflicts in 
Uganda which gave birth to the violent conflict in northern Uganda. The 
chapter traces the genesis of the LRA rebellion, the recruitment and use of 
child soldiers, and its consequences on the people of northern Uganda and the 
country as a whole. Finally, the chapter examines the available national legal 
mechanisms for protection of children’s rights in Uganda. Chapter Five 
focuses on peacebuilding interventions in the RR of child soldiers in northern 
Uganda. The chapter specifically examines the official government and 
United Nations agencies top-down approaches of peacebuilding interventions 
which in most cases do not consider local resources and local participation in 
the planning and programming of interventions. Non-official peacebuilding 
interventions; mainly by local Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), 
Community Based Organizations (CBOs) and International Non-
Governmental Organizations (INGOs) are also examined in this chapter. 
 
In Chapter Six, I discuss the importance of psychosocial resources in the RR 
of child soldiers. Emphasis is put on the neglected African traditional and 
indigenous resources/approaches as opposed to Western approaches of 
psychosocial support. Specific focus is put on the traditional and indigenous 
resources used in the RR of former child soldiers in northern Uganda which is 
the main focus of this research. Chapter Six also explores the challenges and 
limitations of reliance on traditional and indigenous resources. Chapter Seven 
focuses on the national (Ugandan) legal framework for the RR of child 
soldiers. It also examines the necessary conditions for effective RR of former 
child soldiers and proposes key areas for the future research agenda. Chapter 
Eight is the general conclusion and it summaries key findings of the research.  
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Part 1: Conceptualization of the Child Soldier Phenomenon    
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Chapter 2: Understanding the Child Soldier Problematic 
 
 Introduction  
If there is any lesson that we can learn from the experience of 
the past decade, it is that the use of child soldiers is far more 
than a humanitarian concern; that its impact lasts far beyond the 
time of actual fighting; and that the scope of the problem vastly 
exceeds the number of children directly involved—Kofi Annan 
(Singer, 2006:94). 
The practice of children’s involvement and participation in armed conflicts in 
many war torn societies around the world is not a new phenomenon. 
Historically young people are known to have been at the forefront of political 
conflicts in several parts of the world (Rosen, 2005). However, modern 
warfare where numerous children have been recruited and used to fight kills, 
maims and exploits them more callously and systematically as a deliberate 
and well crafted war strategy (Machel, 2001:1). The plight of children’s 
involvement in these civil wars has grown in magnitude such that it has 
alarmed the international community. The level of destruction and suffering 
endured by children in several civil wars, going on in most of the third world, 
both as victims and perpetrators of violence is shocking (Machel, 1996). 
Images of boys and girls carrying guns and ammunition flash across television 
screens and appear on the front pages of the newspapers.  
Many children are abducted and coerced into fighting; while others are pushed 
into it by poverty and crisis in their societies while others are motivated by 
promises of glory or excitement. Consequently, armed conflicts have 
transformed children into merciless killers, committing the most horrendous 
atrocities with apparent indifference and even pride (Francis, 2007). The 
plight of children and other non-combatants in armed conflicts has prompted 
some analysts to describe contemporary civil wars as a total societal crisis as 
the social order is almost entirely disrupted (Honwana, 2006).  
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This chapter critically examines the child soldier phenomenon at the global 
and continental (Africa) perspectives. Particular emphasis is placed on 
Uganda since it is the main focus of this research which explores how the 
‘reintegration and rehabilitation (RR) of former child soldiers by providing 
psychosocial support based on traditional and indigenous resources may have 
contributed to conditions of peace and stability in northern Uganda.’ The 
chapter is organized under five main sections. Section one examines the child 
soldiers phenomenon in the global and continental (Africa) perspectives. 
Section two focuses on the definition and conceptualization of a child, 
childhood and a child soldier. Section three discusses the recruitment and use 
of child soldiers in armed conflicts while section four examines the 
international legal mechanisms for the protection of children’s rights in armed 
conflicts. The fifth and last section analyses why in spite of the existence of an 
elaborate legal regime, there has been a failure to protect children’s rights in 
armed conflicts.   
It should be noted from the onset that the child soldiering phenomenon 
poses a serious challenge to international peace and security. Consequently, 
the research on the RR of child soldiers in northern Uganda concurs with 
scholars who argue that unless the RR of former child soldiers is effectively 
handled, they could pose a security threat and undermine efforts for 
peacebuilding (Singer, 2006:40).  
 
Child Soldiers: Global and African Phenomenon 
This section critically examines the child soldiers phenomenon at the global 
and African levels. The section examines the historical perspectives of the 
child soldiering phenomenon across various civilizations especially within 
Western civilization and African traditional societies. The intention here is 
not to try to justify the child soldiering phenomenon, but to demonstrate that 
the practice has long been part of human society which in recent times has 
gone out of control and poses a serious threat to international peace and 
security in many different ways including refugee generation and breeding 
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grounds for terrorist organizations (Singer, 2006). This section now turns to 
the historical perspectives of child soldiering phenomenon. 
 
In recent decades; children have featured more prominently in the various 
armed conflicts going on in various war zones around the world as both 
targets and perpetrators of violence. However, for one to understand the 
current child soldier phenomenon, it is important to analyse the 
contemporary developments from a historical perspective. The participation 
of children in armed conflict is a historical phenomenon and is rooted in the 
history of civilizations and traditions. According to Honwana (2006:26), in 
Europe during the Middle Ages, the upper-class young boys who wanted to 
become knights would be required to serve as Squires. Thirteen year old 
boys would be attached to knights who taught them skills with the sword, 
lance, and the duties and responsibilities of knighthood. The Squires were 
required to serve their mentors, look after their master’s horses, polish their 
weapons and armour and serve them at meals. When the Squires grew older, 
they were expected to follow their mentors to the battle to protect them in 
case the knight fell in combat.  
 
Singer (2006:11) and Cohn et al. (2003:13) concur with Honwana that 
historically children have always been involved in warfare. Singer (2006) 
for instance points out that while in European history, the exclusion of 
children from war was a general rule; some male children did play military 
roles. He notes that page boys helped arm and maintain the knights of 
medieval Europe while drummer boys and ‘powder monkeys’ were a 
requisite part of any army and navy in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. 
 
It is also observed that while historically across most of Europe, children 
were used in the military; the children who were recruited into the armed 
forces were required to serve under a few adult commanders. The children’s 
Crusades of 1212 for instance included thousands of boys and girls between 
the ages of 10 and 18 years  who joined together believing that God would 
deliver Jerusalem into their hands. As it turned out, most of these child 
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soldiers died on their long march due to exhaustion and harsh climatic 
conditions (Honwana, 2006). Further, it is noted that much of Napoleon’s 
army was comprised of young boys as young as 12 years old. Also, the 
British navy under Admiral Nelson, who fought Napoleon’s army to ensure 
that Napoleon did not step on British soil, is known to have included many 
naval cadets and midshipmen of fifteen as well as younger cabin boys 
(Honwana, 2006). 
 
Rosen (2005:4) further points out that until recently, the armies of Western 
Europe and the United States were filled with ‘boy soldiers.’ In Britain, the 
Royal Hibernian Military School was founded in 1765 for the children of 
the so-called rank and file soldiers. Among the earliest recruits were twelve 
and thirteen year-olds, who were placed in regiments and served under 
General Thomas Gage in 1774 to suppress the American Revolution. Rosen 
(2005) further notes that available data indicate the presence of young 
soldiers on the side of the American Revolutionary War. To Rosen, the Civil 
War in the United States was largely a war of boy soldiers since, throughout 
the war, thousands of youngsters followed brothers, fathers and teachers into 
the war. While the actual number of boy soldiers in the American Civil War 
is not well known, some writers estimate that out of the total 2.7 million 
soldiers, more than a million were eighteen or under; about eight hundred 
thousand were seventeen or under; two hundred thousand were sixteen or 
under; about one hundred thousand were fifteen or under; three hundred 
were thirteen or under (Rosen, 2005:5). 
 
Some scholars and analysts Rosen (2005) and Singer (2006) observe that 
during World War 1 (WW1) many children were recruited into armed forces 
and participated in battles where many of them lost their lives. Worth noting 
for example is that during WW 1, the first child soldier to die: Private James 
Martin had enlisted at Melbourne in 1915 at the age of 14 years. On the 
other hand, Albert Cohen of Memphis, Tennessee, reputed to be the 
youngest American soldier to participate in combat in World War 1, joined 
the army at the age of thirteen and died at the age of 14 years (Rosen, 2005).   
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It is also observed that during World War 11, Hitler deployed young boys 
who were ill-trained but had received quasi military training as part of a 
political programme to maintain the Nazi rule in power. These youths who 
were lightly armed were mostly sent out in small ambush squads and many 
of them were killed by the allied forces (Singer, 2006:15). In China, it is 
also noted that during the Chinese Cultural Revolution, the Red Guards aged 
between eight and fifteen carried out some of the more violent acts.  
 
Some scholars (Obote-Odora, 1999) have observed that historically across 
most of Africa, especially sub-Saharan Africa, young children would be 
organized in age sets and trained into military techniques as a transition 
from childhood to adulthood. After the training which was usually crowned 
with rituals, these children were expected to defend their societies which 
meant participation in battles. Commenting about child soldiering in Africa 
from a historical perspective, Obote-Odora (1999:12) has observed that, 
...the political, social and military situation in Africa......is very 
complex. ….In some parts of Africa 16 and 17-year-old 
children especially from pastoral cultures are expected to bear 
arms and fight....that being the only way to be initiated into 
adulthood2.  
 
Furthermore, Francis Deng observes that among the Dinka of the Sudan, 
traditionally boys were initiated into adulthood between the ages of sixteen 
and eighteen, and would be immediately given gifts of well designed spears 
symbolizing the military function of the youth (Rosen, 2005:4). The story of 
Francis Deng is not different from other traditional societies in most parts of 
pre-colonial Africa. Among the Karimajong and Pokot of Kenya and 
Banyankole in Uganda, young boys had to learn at an early age to fend off 
lions and cattle rustlers that threatened the cattle. President Museveni of 
Uganda who himself used child soldiers during the guerrilla war which 
                                                 
2 Obote-Odora, A. (1999). Legal Problems with the Protection of Children in Armed Conflict,  
Murdoch Univesity Electronic Journal of Law, Volume 6, Number 2, June. Available at: 
http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v6n2/obote-odora62_text.html  Accessed on 
25/9/2009. 
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brought his government to power in 1986 points out that children in 
traditional Africa especially among the Banyankole used to train in military 
skills. In an interview in 1985 in respect to the young soldiers that were part 
of his victorious National Resistance Army (NRA), popularly called the 
Kadogos or young soldiers, President Museveni justified the use of child 
soldiers based on the African tradition. Museveni notes that traditionally in 
most African societies, children as young as four years would be trained in 
the art of warfare but would not be allowed to participate in battles until they 
were mature enough to fight.3 However, the Government of Uganda under his 
leadership has since outlawed the recruitment and use of children in armed 
conflicts. The 1995 Ugandan Constitution and the Children Act, 1997, 
outlaws the recruitment and use of children in armed conflicts as will be 
discussed extensively in Chapter Four of this research.  
 
Suffice to say that while child soldiering is as old as warfare and has been 
going on for centuries across most civilizations, the nature of warfare and 
political violence has changed over the past decades. As Machel (2001) & 
Honwana (2006:27) have observed, the world has witnessed a shift from 
conventional warfare between states, in which soldiers fight soldiers, to civil 
wars within states. Most of these civil wars are fought mainly by proxy 
means, use of guerrillas and other irregular fighters, and target defenceless 
civilians. Children are frequently abducted and forcefully recruited into armed 
groups which was not the case before. What is also clear from the analyses of 
several scholars whose works are cited above is that prevention or complete 
stoppage of child soldiering has not been possible simply because the vice is 
rooted in cultures and traditions across the world. This is also evidenced by 
the protracted discussions that went on before the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child 1989 could be passed. But even then, the failure of the Optional 
Protocol to the Convention to generate a global consensus on 18 years of age 
as an age for recruitment into armed groups demonstrates how the practice of 
child soldiering is deeply embedded in human history (Wessells, 2006).  
                                                 
3BBC interview with Uganda’s President Museveni on the involvement of children in armed 
conflicts in Uganda. Available at: www.youtube.com/watch?.v=up1tvcxw_gk. Accessed on 
28/6/2010. 
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The section above demonstrates that, while historically child soldiering was 
practiced across most human societies and cultures it was systematically 
controlled and regulated, unlike today where the practice has degenerated into 
total anarchy and destruction of whole communities caught up in war zones. 
Worth mentioning also is that historically most armed conflicts in which 
children participated seemed to have had clear starting and ending points and 
strategic military and political objectives as compared to contemporary civil 
wars which lack any of these (Ramsbotham, et al.2005). 
 
 Contemporary Child Soldiering 
Today’s warfare is often marked by appalling levels of violence 
and brutality, from systematic rape and destruction of crops to 
the poisoning of wells and outright genocide. Ferocious assaults 
are unleashed against children and their communities..... And 
children themselves can be drawn in as fighters, caught up in a 
general maelstrom in which they are not just the targets of 
warfare but even the perpetrators of atrocities (Machel, 2001:1)  
 
The end of the Cold War has seen tens of thousands of children taking part 
in armed conflicts in Asia, Latin America, Africa and the Middle East 
(Cohn, et al.1994:24).  In the early 1990s the world witnessed a new threat 
to global security in a manner that political and policy analysts had not 
anticipated. This period saw an upsurge of civil wars taking place mostly in 
the developing world which accounted for 94% of all armed conflicts fought 
in the 1990s. Of particular interest is that from a humanitarian standpoint, 
these civil wars inflicted appalling losses on civilian non-combatants rather 
than the combatants. As Paris (2004:1) points out, attacks and atrocities 
against non-combatants including abduction and forced recruitment of 
children into armed groups became widely employed as deliberate strategies 
of warfare. Scholars point out how presently more children and youth bear 
arms in internal violent conflicts than ever before. These civil wars where 
children are key participants as combatants are characterized by guerrilla-
style warfare conducted largely by part-time participants, which inevitably 
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results in excessive civilian deaths and injuries, extensive damage to health 
and education systems and massive movements of refugees (Summerfield, 
1998:9). 
 
Kaldor (2001) has described these civil wars as ‘new wars’ to distinguish 
them from prevailing perceptions of war drawn from an earlier era. To 
Kaldor, the new wars involve a blurring of the distinctions between war 
usually defined as violence between states or organized political groups for 
political motives, organized crime which is violence undertaken by privately 
organized groups for private purposes and large-scale violations of human 
rights. Kaldor (2001:2) also observes that although most of these new wars 
are localized, they involve a myriad of transnational connections so that the 
distinction between internal and external, between aggression (attacks from 
abroad) and repression (attacks from inside the country), or even between 
local and global, are difficult to sustain. Cohn et al. (1994) and Machel 
(2001:7) also point out that young people have always been trained for 
battle throughout history, but the weight of the weapons often limited their 
involvement. These analysts observe that today arms technology is so 
advanced that even small boys and girls can handle common weapons like 
M16 and AK47 assault rifles. Consequently, children can be useful in battle 
with less training than ever before.  
 
The United Nations report, “The Impact of Armed Conflict on Children” by 
Machel 1996, captures the alarming global picture of children caught up in 
armed conflicts. The report reveals how millions of children are caught up 
in conflicts in which they are not mere bystanders, but targets. Most children 
fall victim to a general onslaught against civilians while others die as part of 
the calculated design to eliminate them (Machel, 1996:5). Other children 
suffer the effects of sexual violence and the multiple deprivations of armed 
conflicts that expose them to hunger or disease. The Machel report further 
observes that during the 1990’s more than 2 million children died as a result 
of armed conflicts and most times these children were deliberately targeted 
and murdered. The report describes the callousness of modern warfare 
resulting from the breakdown of traditional societies, brought about by 
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globalization and social revolutions. The societal breakdown has led to loss 
of distinction between combatants and civilians, horrible levels of brutality 
including systematic rape, scorched-earth policies and ethnic cleansing. 
 
According to Collins (2007:373) currently over forty five countries are known 
to use approximately 300,000 child soldiers in on-going civil wars. Collins, 
who notes that the lives of these child soldiers are highly expendable further 
observes that the majority of children are active in government armed forces 
and the youngest are often to be found in the armed groups.  Harvey 
(2003:25) concurs with Collins and notes that while most of these children are 
recruited as adolescents, the majority of the children at a very young age are 
being recruited for direct and indirect participation in armed conflicts.  
 
Despite the near-universal condemnation of child soldiering by the 
international community, hundreds of thousands of children have continued 
to fight and to die in almost every armed conflict in the World. The former 
Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, condemned child 
soldiering as a damaging and despicable practice. Pope Paul 11 called the 
use of child soldiers a ‘horrible form of violence’ (Global Report, 2004:13). 
All these international endeavours have not been able to stamp out the 
practice of child soldiering.  
 
Suffice it to say that children from well to do families in war zones are 
usually at a lesser risk of being recruited by armed groups because their 
parents can afford to buy their freedom or challenge their recruitment through 
legal means or political influence. On the other hand, children from poorer 
families are most vulnerable and at risk of being recruited into government 
forces or armed groups. Children in large cities who are living on the streets 
face a great risk of recruitment as well as those children who are internally 
displaced or are living in refugee camps (Singer, 2006). Myanmar is known to 
have the highest number of active child soldiers in the world both in the 
government army and in the armed opposition groups. According to the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) Commission of Inquiry, children as 
young as ten years have been used as porters or to sweep roads for landmines 
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using brooms and branches (Machel, 2001:8). Underpinning the increased 
recruitment and use of child soldiers in armed hostilities is the increased 
availability and proliferation of small arms and light weapons. It is observed 
that unlike older weapons which used to be too heavy and difficult to operate 
modern weapons are so light that children can use them and so simple to be 
dismantled and reassembled by a child as young as 10 years of age (Harvey, 
2003; Machel, 2001:13).  
 
In Asia, the Khmer Rouge of Cambodia and the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka 
are known for their record of using child soldiers. Children also play a 
critical role in conflicts in Kashmir, the Philippines, Burma and Afghanistan 
(Honwana, 2006: 30). In the Middle East, children are active participants in 
the conflict between the state of Israel and the Palestinians. The Coalition 
Global report (2004:19) noted that in Israel security forces shot the 
Palestinian children if they threw stones and participated in demonstrations. 
The report accuses Israel of denying Palestinian children protection rights in 
detention which are accorded to Israeli children. A study supported by the 
Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers established that Palestinian 
children were tortured by Israel in attempts to coerce them and recruit them 
as spies. 
On the other hand, the Palestinian militants recruit, indoctrinate and deploy 
children against the Israeli forces so that when they are killed, it attracts 
international sympathy and condemnation of Israel as merciless killers of 
innocent children (Global Report, 2004).  In Indonesia, it is reported that 
government was using children as informants in counter-intelligence 
activities. In Europe, the conflicts in the Balkans and Northern Ireland 
exposed many young people to violence and war. In the Middle East armed 
conflicts have drawn in children who are currently involved in fighting 
largely as part of rebel groups fighting against several regimes (Singer, 
2006:21).  Children as young as 15 years are reported to be serving in armed 
groups in Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Azerbaijan, Iraq, Lebanon, Tajikistan and 
Yemen. Iran is identified as the first country in the Middle East in modern 
times to have used children on a large scale, during the Iran-Iraq war in the 
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1980s (Honwana, 2006). Iran’s use of child soldiers at the time went against 
the Koranic sharia that forbids recruitment of children below sixteen into 
armed conflicts (Singer, 2006).  
 
Child Soldiering: The African Context  
 
Commenting on civil wars in Africa where many of children are active 
participants as victims and perpetrators, Hutchful has observed that, 
Over the last decade, Africans have been subjected to an 
extraordinary variety of sources and forms of violence: civil 
wars, ethnic pogroms, religious conflicts, political repression, 
forced migrations and upheaval associated with structural 
adjustment. The end of the Cold War has thus sharply 
undermined existing security paradigms, intensifying the 
security dilemma of some African states, and giving rise in the 
process to complex new forms and permutations of force 
within and beyond the state (Hutchful, 2000:210) 
 
While child soldiering is a universal phenomenon in the sense that the 
practice has historically been found to have taken place in most human 
societies (Collins, 2007:368), its manifestation in contemporary Africa, has 
become endemic, complex and devastating. Most analysts point out that in 
the 1990’s most of the regions on the African continent experienced violent 
civil wars which greatly affected the lives of civilians, mostly children and 
women (Summerfield, 1998:9). The distinguishing feature of the violent 
civil wars in Africa has been the use of child soldiers. In almost all the 
countries where civil wars have been fought, are still going on, or have 
ended such as Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (RDC), Congo-
Brazzaville, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Mozambique, Angola, Burundi, Rwanda, 
Uganda, Somalia and Cote d’Ivoire, children under the age of 18 have been 
abducted, recruited, coerced and manipulated into joining either government 
forces or rebel groups and militias (Francis, 2007:208). 
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The magnitude of the child soldiering phenomenon in Africa is also 
evidenced by the fact that, currently, Africa alone accounts for more than 
120,000 child soldiers who are spread across the war zones. This figure is 
about 40% of the global figure of about 300,000 child soldiers (Sesay, 
2003:9).  While this figure may be reducing based on the fact that the 
number of conflicts has also been decreasing and due to a universal 
consensus against the use of children in hostilities; according to the Global 
Report 2008, the level of child soldiering in Africa is a cause for worry and 
continues to pose a threat to international peace and security. 
 
Both the 2004 and 2008 Coalition Global Reports indicate that most 
governments in Africa involved in armed conflicts, recruit children directly 
into the official armed forces and indirectly recruit children into proxy 
forces backing the government army. The Global Report (2004) revealed 
that most armed groups involved in peace processes in Africa recruited 
children to back up their bargaining power during the negotiations. In 
Burundi for example, Burundian armed political groups recruited children 
into their ranks and this was the case in neighbouring Democratic Republic 
of Congo (DRC). In Sudan, the Global Report 2004 found out that in March 
2004, there were an estimated 17,000 children in government forces, allied 
militias and opposition armed groups in the north, east and south of the 
country.  
 
The Coalition Global Report 2008 also found out that while the Interim 
Constitution of Sudan adopted in December 2005 defines a child as anyone 
under the age 18, government continued to recruit children into the armed 
forces. The Global Report observed that military officials within the Sudan 
Armed Forces (SAF) acknowledged that children from various armed 
groups were integrated into SAF during the unification process. The report 
also found in the case of Southern Sudan, where the Child Bill 2006 which 
prohibits the recruitment and use of children in armed forces passed its first 
reading in parliament in June 2007, child soldiers were still within its forces. 
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The United Nations in September 2007 confirmed the presence of children 
associated with Southern Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA)4.  
 
The situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has not improved 
substantively in spite the arrest and prosecution of former war lords: 
Timothy Lubanga and Bemba. The Global Report 2008 estimates that there 
are about 7,000 child soldiers in government forces and armed groups, 
including foreign armed groups which are mostly found in the eastern 
provinces of Equateur, Ituri, Katanga, North and South Kivu and Maniema.5  
 
In West Africa, specifically Sierra Leone and Liberia, both theatres of 
conflict in Africa in the 1990s generated thousands of child soldiers. The 
conflict in Liberia alone is estimated to have generated 20,000 child soldiers 
while Sierra Leone produced about 10,000 (Sesay, 2003:12). Sesay (2003), 
commenting on the plight of child soldiers in Liberia and Sierra Leone, 
observed that while child soldiers in Liberia became cannibals, those in 
Sierra Leone became associated with highly unusual atrocities of hacking 
limbs and cutting off ears and buttocks. The Global Report 2004 also found 
out that sometimes the armed groups from Liberia and Sierra Leone 
recruited children from refugee camps in neighbouring Burkina Faso, Cote 
d’Ivoire and Guinea. In Chad, over 600 children were found to be still 
serving in government and opposition forces. In the case of Somalia, due to 
a complete state collapse, the level of weapons proliferation boosted the 
numbers of child soldiers. It is estimated that about 200,000 children in 
Somalia have carried a gun or have been involved with any of the armed 
groups since 1991 when the central government collapsed (Global Report, 
2004:32). 
 
 In much of Africa, the Machel Report (1996) observed, “strong martial 
cultures” no longer have rules that prohibit attacks on women and children. 
                                                 
4 Child Soldiers Global Report, 2008. Available at: 
http://childsoldiersglobalreport.org/contents/sudan-0. Accessed on 29/4/2010. 
 
5 Child Soldiers Global Report 2008. Available at: http://www.childsoldiersglobalreport-
org/content/congo-democratic-republic. Accessed on 29/4/2010. 
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The report further points out that modern war does not match the traditional 
conceptions of two opposed armies; or even of an internal conflict pitting an 
armed opposition force against the established government, in which each 
side generally abides by the rules of the game, respecting the basic 
inviolability of civilian non-combatants and the special protection due to the 
young.    
 
Honwana (2006:29) reveals that in Africa, children as young as seven years 
of age have been recruited and participated in armed conflicts. In Angola, a 
survey conducted in 1995 found that 36% of children had accompanied or 
supported soldiers, and 7% of Angolan children had fired at some-body 
(Honwana, 2006:29). Equally important to note is that as a result of poor 
boarder controls, during the civil wars in most of Africa, especially in West 
Africa and the Great Lakes Region, conflicts have been spilling over to 
other countries through contagion effect where they have produced and 
reproduced child soldiers. Consequently, child soldiers have become a 
regional security dilemma with some of them hiring their services to various 
war lords who pay better, thereby making civil wars more violent and 
protracted (Sesay, 2003:18). Sesay points out that in the case of West 
Africa; the war in Sierra Leone was augmented through contagion effect by 
the use of child soldiers from neighbouring Liberia where close logistical 
and strategic linkages between NPFL and RUF were enhanced by the 
geographical proximity with Liberia.  
 
The regional security dilemma created by child soldiers is further collaborated 
by Wessells (2006) who points out that even when the civil war in one 
country has ended, child soldiers who see no future for themselves in civilian 
life cross the boarders and become soldiers in neighbouring countries. The 
regional problem of soldiers for hire applies to adults, too, but most adults can 
fight for only a few years. Analysts such as Wessells (2006:3) note that 
children who grow up having learned fighting as their only means of 
livelihood and survival are likely to continue fighting for more years than 
adults. Child soldiering damages societies, threatens regional stability, and 
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should be a high-priority issue in building peace, which is indivisible from 
human rights (Wessells, 2006). 
 
Noteworthy, is that in spite of the state of affairs which show that children’s 
rights have been grossly violated across much of Africa’s war zones; Africa 
has also hosted significant events aimed at ending the impunity of violators 
of children’s rights. In March 2004, the Special Court of Sierra Leone 
indicted 11 people for war crimes and crimes against humanity, including 
the recruitment of children below 15 years of age. In 2004, the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) announced investigations into child recruitment and 
use in the DRC and Uganda (Global Report, 2004:33). By March 2004; only 
11 out of 46 countries in Africa had ratified the Optional Protocol to the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in 
armed conflict. The DRC signed and ratified the Optional Protocol in 2001, 
Uganda in 2002 while Burundi also signed and ratified in 2001. Ironically, 
in spite of this level of endorsement of the international law, none of these 
countries stopped the recruitment and use of children in armed conflicts 
(Global Report, 2004). One wonders what could be the missing link. How 
can the very people who sign and ratify legal instruments for protection of 
children, governments that are mandated to protect the rights of their 
citizens be the ones to violate them with impunity? This question is 
discussed extensively in succeeding sections of this chapter.  
 
Definition and Conceptualization of a Child, Childhood and Child 
Soldier  
 
In order to understand the phenomenon of child soldiering, it is important to 
understand the legal and international definitions of a child, childhood and a 
child soldier and how these relate to socio-cultural construction and 
conceptualization of a child and childhood in the African and Ugandan 
contexts.  
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Who is a child? 
A number of challenges arise when defining a child. The challenges arise 
because notions of childhood in most societies are socially and culturally 
constructed. According to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
the Child; a child ‘means every human being below the age of 18 years 
unless, under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier’ 
(Cohn, et al. 1994:6). This international definition is also upheld by the 
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. Article 2 of the 
Charter states that, ‘For the purposes of this Charter, a child means every 
human being below the age of 18 years (Human Rights Watch, 1997:120).  
 
While the definition of the child by the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child has been set at 18, its limitation in the protection of children’s rights is 
that a child is defined differently across various cultures and the convention 
simply adopted the Western notion of a child and childhood. Commenting 
on the international definition of a child and childhood, Honwana (2006:41) 
has observed that, 
 Although this notion of childhood is often generalized and 
even universalized, it derives from a Western and middle-class 
view of childhood that is not categorically shared around the 
globe.  
 
Faced with the contradictions and challenges of the definition of childhood 
based on age, Cohn et al. (1994) have settled for the Inter-Parliamentary 
Union’s recent decision after reviewing 150 of the world’s 186 sovereign 
States. It states that, 
The right to vote supposes that electors should have an age at 
which they are able to express an opinion on political matters, 
as a rule coinciding with the age of legal majority….The norm 
today is eighteen years; an overwhelming majority of 109 
States has opted for this minimum age limit, with most other 
States having a slightly higher limit (19-21 years). The lowest 
limit -16 years is practiced in four countries: Brazil, Cuba, Iran 
and Nicaragua (Cohn, 2003:7). 
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The Inter-Parliamentary Union’s definition of the age of the majority is in 
conformity with other internationally accepted standards such as the 
Convention on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (Article 2), and the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention on the Worst Forms of 
Child Labour (Article 2) No 182 (Francis, 2007: 211). 
  
Cohn et al. (1994) agree with Honwana (2006) and observe that the 
universal definition of a child is limited and conflicts with culturally and 
religiously constructed definitions. And yet it is this universal and rather 
Western-centric construction of a child and childhood that has been applied 
to Africa and other parts of the world. In most of Africa, the age of maturity 
is a social and cultural device by which societies acknowledge the transition 
from childhood to adulthood. For the purpose of participating in religious 
rituals, for example, a child may become an adult at age 13 (Cohn et al. 
1994). This is collaborated by both Wessells (2006:5) and Honwana 
(2006:53) who observe that in non-Western societies such as those in sub-
Saharan Africa, particularly in rural areas where traditional ways remain 
strong, a person is regarded as an adult once he or she has completed the 
culturally scripted initiation ceremony or rite of passage into manhood or 
womanhood. Normally such rites occur around 14 years of age. Also, many 
developing societies define childhood and adulthood in terms of labour and 
social roles, arguing that people become adults when they do adult work.  
 
In most of Uganda, like other African societies, the definition of the child 
and childhood has little to do with chronological age. Rather, the age of 
children is socially constructed and defined based on social responsibilities 
being performed by such a person in society. It is very common in Uganda 
to find households headed by 13 year olds or parents marrying away 13 or 
14 year old daughters to older men especially those poor families that 
cannot afford to support their daughters through secondary education. More 
so, in Uganda as in most African societies, a boy child of even four years 
could become a man upon being made an heir of his father in case of sudden 
death. The situation has been compounded by HIV/Aids and civil war 
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related deaths which have increased the numbers of child headed households 
in Uganda which automatically changes childrens’s status in society. 
 
 Article 34 of the Ugandan Constitution defines children as persons under 
the age of 16. However, the Children Act 1997 defines a child as a person 
below the age of eighteen years. This apparent inconsistence between the 
Constitution and the Children Act makes children vulnerable. In any case, 
both the Government of Uganda and the LRA rebels have been known to 
recruit and use children in their armed conflicts even when both parties 
know this is against the constitution and other pieces of legislation. It can be 
argued that the cultural construction of the child and childhood may be the 
contradiction that makes it difficult to uphold the rule of law. However, this 
is a subject that begs further inquiry in the quest to establish a robust legal 
protection mechanism for children’s rights in armed conflicts.  
 
In respect of the definition of a child soldier; there is no generally agreed 
international definition. However, Coalition to Stop the Use of Child 
Soldiers defines a child soldier as any person under the age of 18 who is a 
member of or attached to government armed forces or any other regular or 
irregular armed force or armed group, whether or not an armed conflict 
exists (Global Report, 2004:15). Wessells (2006:7) agrees with the above 
definition but makes some additions. To Wessells, a child soldier is ‘any 
person under 18 years of age who is part of any kind of regular or irregular 
armed force in any capacity, including but not limited to cooks, porters, 
messengers and those accompanying such groups, other than purely as 
family members. Wessells further observes that girls recruited for sexual 
purposes and forced marriages are included in the above definition.  
 
 Rosen (2005) who observes that the term soldier connotes men or women 
who are skilled warriors, defines a child soldier as a person below eighteen 
years of age. However Rosen does not believe that eighteen years represents 
the idea of who is a child. Rosen observes that it is a fact the world over; 
historically young people have always been on or near the battle field. He 
for example concurs with Francis Deng who notes that traditionally among 
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the Dinka of Sudan, boys were initiated into adulthood between the ages of 
sixteen and eighteen and they immediately received gifts of well-designed 
spears that symbolized the military function of youths. Rosen also notes that 
among the Cheyenne-Native Americans, boys joined war parties at 14 years; 
while among the Samburu and Masai of Kenya, adolescents are initiated 
into military rituals at an early age.    
 
Machel (1996:7), on the other hand, defines a child soldier as any child-boy 
or girl under the age of 18, who is compulsorily, forcibly or voluntarily 
recruited or used in hostilities by armed forces, paramilitaries, civil defence 
units or other armed forces. 
 
It is worth noting that the definitions of child soldiers by most analysts and 
scholars are useful in providing a deeper understanding about who child 
soldiers are in terms of age, which is under 18 years, the international legal 
age, whether compulsorily or voluntarily recruited; whether in government, 
civil defence, paramilitary or in armed or rebel groups. However, as Francis 
(2007:215) has observed, the definitions by most of the scholars fail to 
distinguish between the different types of child soldiering. Instead all child 
soldiers are uniformly categorized. Failure to distinguish child soldiers 
makes it difficult to design relevant reintegration and rehabilitation 
programmes suited to different categories of child soldiers.  
 
Most observers (Howana, 2006; Singer, 2006 and Wessells, 2006) point out 
that the universal definition of childhood which goes against culturally 
constructed childhood across different cultures could be behind the failure 
of the legal protection of children’s rights in armed conflicts. The analysis 
that the conflicting definition and conceptualization of a child and childhood 
is responsible for the failure by the international community to protect 
children in armed conflicts does not complete the picture. There are quite a 
number of other factors that make it difficult to protect children’s rights in 
armed conflicts including failure to enforce the existing legal instruments, 
international political calculations, double standards, and the fact that there 
is always a war to fight. Consequently, it is noted that there is a need that the 
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existing legal instruments are comprehensively enforced. There is also a 
need to support conflict resolution and peacebuilding frameworks that 
address the root causes of conflicts in a comprehensive manner. It is worth 
noting that as long as there are on-going civil wars; children will always be 
recruited into armed groups. A testimony by a former child soldier from 
Sierra Leone who was with the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) confirms 
this argument. He said, 
People blame all the bad things that have happened on the 
soldiers or the commanders. But I can tell you, the problem is 
the war itself. You...... You will never stop children from 
fighting unless you stop the war (Wessells, 2006:240). 
Recruitment and Use of Child Soldiers in Armed Conflicts: A General 
Perspective 
This section focuses on the methods of recruitment of children into armed 
conflict by either the government forces or armed groups fighting against 
government forces. 
 
There are two main methods by which children are recruited into armed 
groups or government forces: forced recruitment and voluntary recruitment. 
Voluntary recruitment has however been challenged based on the fact that 
what most violators of children’s rights- government and rebel groups alike- 
call voluntary recruitment is simply manipulative. They create an 
environment where children find that they have no choice but to join the 
armed groups or government forces if they are going to survive. The conflict 
creates an environment of death and deprivation that children find it 
impossible to survive outside the armed groups. When children decide to 
join either side as a survival strategy armed groups or government forces 
call it voluntary recruitment.  
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Motivations for Children’s Recruitment into Armed Conflicts 
This section discusses the motivations for children’s involvement in armed 
conflicts; what some analysts consider to be voluntary recruitment in spite of 
the risks involved in the practice. This is part of the debate which postulates 
that in spite of the condemnation levelled at war lords in war zones, children 
acting on their own initiative join the armed groups or government forces. 
This section now turns to the children’s voluntary involvement in armed 
conflicts. 
 
According to Singer (2006:61) available information shows that 40 percent of 
the FARC’s child soldiers are forced into soldiering while 60 percent joined 
of their own volition. Another study in East Asia found that 57 percent of 
child soldiers had volunteered. Singer (2006) further notes that another study 
carried out in four African countries found that 64 percent of child soldiers 
joined armed groups voluntarily. Also, Cohn et al. (1994:23) have argued that 
not all children are necessarily driven into conflicts. He points out that in 
Liberia and in the Palestinian intifada in the Israel occupied territories for 
example, young people are the catalysts of violence. To Cohn et al. (1994) the 
motivation of these young people in joining violent armed conflicts lies in the 
very roots of the conflicts, in the predominant macro social, economic and 
political issues defining their lives. Consequently, Cohn et al. suggest that 
confronting these larger concerns may be the only plausible option to prevent 
children’s involvement in armed conflicts. 
 
While there is evidence that some children voluntarily join armed conflicts, it 
is imperative to note that what appears to be voluntary recruitment sometimes 
is manipulated to look as such. A deeper analysis of voluntary recruitment 
provides a picture of a carefully crafted system of forced recruitment 
disguised by the violators of children’s rights to look like voluntary 
recruitment. For example, in a war situation where parents have been killed or 
are away fighting, neighbours have been displaced, crops and schools 
destroyed, most children find no alternative but to join the armed groups not 
because of self will but as a way of survival. Consequently, it is argued here 
that a majority of children are driven to make decisions to join armed groups 
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by factors that are far beyond their control. These motivational factors 
include; the fact that war comes home; personal and situational influences, 
push and pull factors, family matters, the desire for revenge, education and 
power, excitement and glamour. Other factors include political socialization, 
poverty and multiple causation. These motivating factors are discussed in 
detail below. 
 
War Environment/ War Comes Home 
Some analysts have pointed out that most young people become involved in 
armed conflicts because there is a war and the war environment has become 
part of their lives. The situation is well captured by Cohn et al. (2003:30) and 
Bracken et al. (1998:62) who observe that vast majority of young soldiers are 
not directly forced or coerced into participating in conflicts; but are subject to 
many subtly manipulative motivations including economic hardships and 
other pressures that are more difficult to eliminate than blatant forced 
recruitment. The story of a former child soldier from the DRC captures the 
picture of how ‘war comes home’ influences the decision of children to join 
the armed groups. He observed, 
I joined (President Kabira) Kabira’s army when I was 13 
because my home had been looted and my parents were gone. 
As I was then on my own, I decided to become a soldier 
(Singer, 2006:62). 
 
 Brett et al. (2004:9) who interviewed young people, found their testimonies 
about why they took part in armed conflicts complex and diverse. Most of 
those who become involved in warfare do so because there is war. War 
creates the environment for child soldiering in different ways. First, for 
young people, war rapidly becomes the normal everyday background for 
their lives. Second, the war comes to them, rather than them going to look 
for a war to fight. Third, living in a violent situation creates the need for 
self-protection and to use violence to do so. Fourth, war causes many other 
conditions that drive children to participate in war including closing of 
schools and family break ups. The testimony by Hassan, an Afghanistan 
child soldier is a case in point. He said, 
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I entered in war very early, when I was about 12 or less. (…..) 
I came to Mazarsharif for schooling and I became involved in 
war. I never wanted to use a gun and I never wanted to fight in 
my country. (….) We had to defend and fight; there was no 
way but war (Brett et al. 2004:11). 
 
Hassan’s testimony demonstrates that when war comes to children, even 
those who did not want to join the armed groups end up joining as a way of 
survival. However, the war environment is not the only explanation since 
even in a war environment there are children who never join. This means 
there are other motivating factors. 
 
Poverty and Economic Agendas 
Brett et al. (2004) and Singer, (2006:63) have argued that poverty is perhaps 
the most obvious common feature of child soldiering, which is one of the 
reasons why it is frequently identified as the cause of child soldiering. 
According to these analysts, poverty applies to both peaceful and war 
situations where armies recruit young people. Their study on demobilized 
soldiers in the DRC found that 61% of 300 surveyed said that their families 
had no income and more than half had at least six siblings at home. The 
poverty motivation factor is also supported by Bracken et al. (1998:61) and 
Wessells (2006:23) who argue that poverty, which often contributes to the 
outbreak of war, intensifies during war as it damages well-being and 
societies slide into economic collapse. Poverty pushes children to drop out 
of schools hence creating a pool of poor people who view joining armed 
groups as the only way of accessing economic resources.  
 
Commenting on poverty and economic hardships as a motivating factor for 
child soldiering, Machel (2001:9) observes that, 
As conflicts drag on, recruits tend to get younger. This is partly 
because deteriorating economic and social conditions drive 
families deeper into poverty. But also conflicts shut down 
schools. And the longer a conflict continues, the more likely it 
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is that armed forces, having exhausted the supplies of available 
adults, will turn to children to fill their ranks. 
 
A testimony by a boy from Colombia who was part of the paramilitaries 
captures how poverty drives children to join armed groups. He joined the 
paramilitaries when he was 14 years old. He pointed out that, 
After school I was a baker’s assistant. It was hard work and 
paid badly. I went to work on a farm but the work was hard 
too, so finally I joined the paras. I had friends inside. It paid 
300,000 (USD 100) a month. It seemed like an easier life 
(Wessells, 2006:54). 
 
War normally exacerbates poverty as it destroys other alternative livelihoods 
leaving soldiering as the only choice for children to make a living and support 
themselves and their families. Poverty and war are self reinforcing and 
interconnected which ultimately leads to protractedness of civil wars. 
Consequently, one can safely deduce that as long as war and poverty persists, 
it will always constrain measures for prevention of recruitment and use of 
children in armed conflicts. It should be noted however that poverty alone 
may not be a decisive factor for children’s decisions to take a risk and join the 
armed conflict. This is so because in most conflicts not all poor children 
decide to join the armed groups or government forces. In most cases a 
combination of factors work together to compel children from poverty 
stricken families to join the armed conflict.  
 
Education and Employment 
Most observers have pointed out that lack of education is a crucial factor 
that motivates children to join armed conflicts. It is observed that for most 
young people, access to education is a critical factor for preparing them for 
future employment and modern life (Peters et al. (1998:82). However, 
during civil wars, many schools and other educational institutions are 
destroyed and teachers flee for their dear lives leading to the closure of 
schools and other educational institutions. Also, during civil wars, public 
resources are diverted to finance the war effort at the expense of social 
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sectors such as education and health. With the education institutions closed 
down, destroyed or malfunctioning, most children who had viewed 
education as the only hope for a bright future become disillusioned. 
Consequently, children turn to military life as an alternative livelihood. 
 
 Additionally, not being at school or employed is a critical risk factor for 
young people. If they are not involved in either education or employment, 
what are young people going to do to fill their time, to support themselves 
or their families? This point is supported by Machel’s report (1996: 12) 
which points out that as conflict persists, socio-economic conditions suffer 
and educational opportunities become limited making soldiering the most 
viable opportunity. 
 
Education has another side of influence or motivation for young people to 
join armed groups. This has to do with the fact that education shapes the 
understanding, attitudes, and behaviour of individuals. In a politically 
charged environment, sometimes the military and political forces use the 
school curriculum as a tool to influence students to support their cause. For 
example, the practice of segregated education that existed in Apartheid 
South Africa motivated the youths who knew their education was poor 
quality to join the armed and political struggle to bring it down. Elements in 
the educational situation in South Africa were major factors in the political 
mobilization of the youth, particularly in the townships (Brett et al. 
2004:18).  
 
 In some schools, teachers have a great influence in motivating the children 
to join the armed groups. A case in point is the Madrassah schools in 
Pakistan which teach radical Islam and have become breeding grounds for 
recruitment of jihad martyrs.  In Pakistan, Madrassahs are private Islamic 
religious schools where tuition, room and board are provided free. 
Accordingly, most of these students are from poor backgrounds (Brett et al. 
2004). Brett et al. (2004:19) quotes the testimony of one of the pupils, who 
noted that,  
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We were taught in the maddrassah that one who sacrifices his 
life in jihad, is a martyr and will be rewarded generously. 
Besides he will recommend other people for Paradise in 
addition to rewarding him Paradise without judgement 
 
Worth noting is that even after the war, provision of educational 
opportunities to former child soldiers is critical in prevention of re-enlisting 
into other rebellions. The interviews that were conducted by Krijn Peters 
and Paul Richards (1998:82) among the former child soldiers in Sierra 
Leone, found that these former combatants stressed that it makes little sense 
to stand down voluntarily without a real promise of social reintegration, 
education or training. Former child soldiers noted that failure to address 
these aspirations ‘first caused and now prolongs’ the conflict. In fact, it is 
noted that when most former combatants in Sierra Leone became frustrated 
by the failure of the demobilization process, several of them who had been 
informants in the study by Peters and Richards, re-enlisted after the military 
coup of 1997. The link between education and child soldiering is convincing 
such that the provision of education, especially technical education, to 
former child soldiers becomes imperative in their RR processes. During the 
fieldwork in northern Uganda, it was established that most child soldiers 
want to go back to school to better their future. 
 
Orphaning and Separation of Children 
Wessells (2006:25) observe that orphaning and separation from parents 
motivates children to voluntarily join armed conflicts. He notes that of all the 
losses children suffer in war zones, none is more painful than the death of 
their parents, their primary sources of love and protection. The loss of parents 
not only creates heavy emotional burdens but can also begin a downward 
spiral into increased poverty and vulnerability. Failing to meet their basic 
needs and desperate to survive, orphans and separated children decide to join 
armed groups, or perform dangerous functions such as labourers or in 
prostitution. Wessells’ point is collaborated by stories told about the former 
child soldiers in Uganda. During the guerrilla war that brought Uganda’s 
current President Museveni to power in 1986, government forces used 
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scorched earth policy in their offensive against the NRA rebels. These 
offensives involved destruction of property and indiscriminate killings of 
suspected rebel collaborators which left many children orphaned.  
 
Commenting on how child soldiers came to be recruited into the National 
Resistance Army (NRA) which after capturing power was renamed: Uganda 
Peoples Defence Forces (UPDF), Kaihura observed that, 
When the National Resistance Movement (NRM) came to 
power in Uganda in 1986, there were as many as 300 child 
soldiers in the National Resistance Army (NRA).... However, 
these child soldiers, some of them as young as five years old, 
had not been deliberately recruited by the NRA to fight its 
bush war, as was widely alleged in 1986. Rather, they were 
orphaned or abandoned children, victims of the ‘scorched 
earth’ policy of the then government army the Uganda 
National Liberation Army (UNLA)..... They were children 
who had either fled to the nearest NRA camp or been found in 
the bushes by NRA patrols or fighting units (Kaihura, 
2000:11)6 
 
Consequently, it is evident that for many children who become orphaned or 
separated as a result of the war joining either side of the opposing sides has a 
lot to do with the search for protection, love and care which children at a 
tender age badly need. In the case of the child soldiers or the Kadogos 
(Swahili word for small children) in the Uganda’s NRA, the army became 
their surrogate mothers and their commanders to whom most of them were 
attached effectively their guardians. 
 
                                                 
6 Kaihura, K. (2000). Uganda: The Integration of Child Soldiers into the School System. 
Association for the Development of Education in Africa (ADEA) International Institute for 
Educational Planning. Available at: http://www.adeanet.org. Accessed on 8/10/2009.  
It should also be noted that there have been conflicting reports about the number of child 
soldiers that participated in the NRA struggle. While the official figure by government is 300, 
international agencies and human rights groups put the figure as high as 3,000 child soldiers. 
47 
 
Joining in order to Revenge 
I joined the Army when I was fourteen because, one, I was 
persuaded that the only way to get my parents back or to stop 
that from happening was to be a part of the Army and kill 
those people who were responsible for killing my parents. But 
you see, the thing that is very disturbing is that once I joined 
the Army and started fighting, I was also killing other people’s 
parents and so I was creating a circle of revenge where I killed 
somebody else’s parents, he’s going to be persuaded by a 
different group, either the RUF or the Army, saying, ‘Okay 
join the Army and kill this person who killed your parents’. So, 
it’s a circle of revenge. And the disturbing thing about it is that 
its kids that are killing kids (Singer, 2006:57).  
                                                                              I., aged fourteen  
 
War creates lawlessness and powerlessness especially among innocent 
civilians. Armed groups including the unruly government forces abuse human 
rights including wanton killings, rape and sexual slavery. Children who 
hopelessly witness the murder of their parents, rape of their sisters by armed 
gangs, summary executions and torture may be motivated to join armed 
groups or the government army in order to find an opportunity to revenge 
(Cohn et al 1998:32). The above testimony from a child soldier from Sierra 
Leone is a clear example about how some children join the armed groups to 
avenge the death of their powerless and defenceless parents at the hands of 
either the government army or the rebels.  
 
Power, Excitement and Glamour 
The situation in most war zones is characterized by lawlessness with armed 
gangs brutalizing innocent people. Because of the suffering and 
powerlessness children in war zones are exposed to at the hands of armed 
groups or sometimes government forces, most of them decide to join armed 
groups to regain their freedom. The freedom comes about because of the gun 
which joining the armed group accords to children. Besides the protection that 
accrues to children because of being members of armed groups, the gun gives 
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them a sense of power and prestige. A combination of re-humanization from 
humiliation and the pride of being able to be respected and also providing 
security to others become positive appeals to children for joining the armed 
groups. 
 
Political Socialization  
Most observers point out that the conditions in which children live determine 
their future outlook of the world (Wessells, 2006). For children whose whole 
life has been lived in a militarized environment, they also become militarized 
or politicized. Living in war torn societies under military occupation, children 
often learn to define themselves as part of the opposition to the enemy. In 
such circumstances, through political socialization, many children acquire a 
strong desire to serve and willingness to sacrifice their lives which motivates 
them into joining armed groups. The example of a former child soldier from 
the Philippines provides a vivid explanation. He said, 
I joined to serve the people in the mountains. We protected 
them from violence and harm, from the government soldiers. 
These soldiers, they were abusive; that is why we kept watch 
(Wessells, 2006:53).   
 
The above point is true in respect to child soldiers in Uganda during the 
rebellion that was led by President Museveni (1981-86). Museveni’s rebel 
forces: the National Resistance Army developed a 10 Point Programme which 
articulated the reasons for the rebellion which included restoration of 
democracy and rule of law, protection of human rights and human dignity and 
conducted political education in the areas under their control. The former 
child soldiers who were interviewed observe that they were convinced that 
they needed to fight and liberate the country from dictatorship (Interview with 
Okello)7. 
 
                                                 
7 Okello, J., a former child soldier under the National Resistance Army (NRA) that brought 
President Museveni to power in 1986 after toppling the Obote 11 Government and the Okello 
Military Junta in 1986. Okello is currently working as a Senoir Resettlement Officer with the 
Amnesty Commission. He was interviewed in February 2010. 
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Multiple Causation 
One of the motivating factors that has been identified in regard to why young 
people join armed groups or government forces is when many factors 
combine together. It is noted that children from abusive families may decide 
to join armed groups or the military because they are beaten at home, they 
earn less marks in class and teachers harass them or they are subjected to hard 
work at home. In the United States and the United Kingdom, young people of 
around 16 years mostly from poor backgrounds and marginalized groups are 
attracted to join the military in order to get free education and jobs so as to 
advance their careers and standards of living as well as a good image in the 
future (Wessells, 2006:56). In this case a combination of all these social needs 
and the possibility that all of them can be achieved in the armed forces may 
compel young people to join armed groups. 
 
Family, Friends and Peer Pressure 
The family environment has also been identified as an important determinant 
of children’s involvement or non-involvement in armed conflict (Wessells, 
2006:47). It is noted that the nature of the family and family situation into 
which children are born or grow in; has a great bearing on their decisions in 
life. In a normal family environment one finds children wanting to take on the 
professions of their parents since they are shaped and inspired by parents. In 
situations where parents are involved in the military it is normal for their 
children to join the military forces.  
 
On the other hand, the lack of a family may become a push factor for some 
young people to join the armed forces. Without a family, children become 
vulnerable to both forced and voluntary recruitment. Cohn and Goodwin-Gill 
(1998) have observed that ‘peer pressure can be very persuasive’ in 
influencing the child to join armed groups as can the child’s desire to win the 
approval of family or religious leaders. A good example is how the 
Palestinian children throwing a stone at the Israel army is said to be ‘one of 
the guys’ and this act confers on the child heroism among his/her peers. 
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Politics and Ideological Influence  
It is argued that the nature of the political environment in which people grow 
influences their decisions and course of action. For example children, who are 
born in families that oppose the authorities, become distinctive and different 
from those who are from the ruling elites. In the event that the nature of 
political opposition changes to armed opposition, children from opposing 
families are likely to join the armed groups with conviction and strong 
ideological motivation. As Brett et al. 2004:27 observe, to children with 
ideological orientation, there is a sense of need to overturn an oppressive 
regime. One child from the DRC remarked, 
Mobutu and his soldiers, they were mean, they oppressed us, 
tortured us, we were always mistreated. (….) He and his men! 
Once they had beaten me because of my boots! Till this day, I 
have hated them. When I was small, I had fashionable clothes, 
and I had boots like military boots; it was fashionable in 
Congo. But not everyone could have some because they were 
expensive. Once my mother bought me some. Once I left for 
school with my boots, I was proud. A soldier called me over 
and said to me to come to him, and he asked me, ‘who gave 
you a soldier’s boots?’ (….) The soldier told me to remove 
them. (…..) I told them that it was my mom who had bought 
these for me. They didn’t care. The guy started to strike my 
back with a cord that hurts. I bled. – Germain, -DRC. 
 
Adolescent Pressure/ Influence 
Scholars (Brett et al. 2004) note adolescence as a critical factor that motivates 
voluntary recruitment of young people into armed groups. The adolescence 
stage in human development is always a very challenging stage. During 
adolescence young people are transiting from childhood to adulthood and it is 
at this stage that human beings become too excited and hard to control across 
all cultures. According to Brett et al. (2004:29), adolescence can be a difficult 
time for young persons and the family as well as other adults who have to 
deal with them. It is noted that during this stage adolescents may become 
perpetrators of physical and sexual violence as well as its victims. They may 
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challenge authority and rebel against instructions, while at the same time they 
need support and encouragement, and moral and emotional guidance. Since 
adolescence generates feelings of power and ambition into young people, it 
makes them think that all things can be overcome, which could influence 
them to find armed conflicts attractive. In this stage of human development, 
the real dangers that the armed conflict could bring to an individual are not 
considered as the testimony by a former child soldier reveals. He said, 
It was my friends that encouraged me to become a cobra. They 
told me that it was not dangerous. I could hold a weapon, they 
said. Above all, there was a good ambience, it’s not 
complicated. When they return with money; you want to have 
some too! – Albert, Congo Brazzaville (Brett et al. 2004). 
 
Forced Recruitment of Children in Armed Conflicts 
This section discusses the methods of forced recruitment and the use of 
child soldiers in armed conflicts either by government forces or opposition 
armed groups. 
My parents refused to give me to the LTTE so about fifteen of 
them came to my house----it was both men and women, in 
uniforms, with rifles, and guns in holsters… I was fast asleep 
when they came to get me at one in the morning…….These 
people dragged me out of the house. My father shouted at 
them, saying, ‘What is going on?’ but some of the LTTE 
soldiers took my father towards the woods and beat him… 
They also pushed my mother onto the ground when she tried to 
stop them (HRW 2004b, 2). 
 
It should be noted that forced recruitment entails the threat of or actual 
violation of the physical integrity of the youth or some people who are 
closely related to the child being forcefully recruited. In practice forced 
recruitment is practiced by both the government forces and armed 
opposition groups in war-torn societies (Cohn et al. (1998:24). Forced 
recruitment has several faces: abduction, press ganging and the quota 
method. These forms of forced recruitment are explained in detail below. 
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Abduction 
Most rebel groups use abduction as the most viable method of recruitment 
of children into armed conflicts. According to Singer (2006:61) abduction is 
by definition an act of violence that rips terrified children from the security 
of their families and homes. Killings, rapes and severe beatings often 
accompany it. Children who are abducted normally have two choices 
available to them – cooperate with the kidnapers and live or resist and you 
are dead. Abduction is an illegal practice that perpetrators seek to hide 
which makes it difficult to estimate the percentage of children who have 
entered armed groups through abduction. Usually, recruiting groups are 
given targets that may change according to the groups’ needs and objectives.  
 
It is observed that UPC/RP, a militia group led by Timothy Lubanga based 
in the eastern region of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), had a 
military strategy in the area he controlled where each family was forced to 
provide a cow, money or a child to the group (Singer, 2006:59). On the 
other hand, LTTE is reported to have maintained sophisticated computerised 
population databases to direct its recruitment efforts while the Sudan 
Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) used the presence of two molar teeth to 
determine whether the child is ready to serve. There are a number of 
children’s testimonies from the various war zones which confirm the 
abduction method of recruitment as a preferred choice of most armed 
groups. One child soldier pointed out that, 
I was abducted during ‘operation pay yourself’, in 1998. I was 
9 years old. Six rebels came through our yard. They went to 
loot for food. Its called ‘jaja’---‘get food’. They said, We want 
to bring a small boy like you—we like you. My mother didn’t 
comment; she just cried. My father objected. They threatened 
to kill him..... I heard a gunshot. One of them told me, Let’s 
go, they have killed your father’. A woman rebel grabbed my 
hand roughly..... I saw my father lying dead as we passed. 
                                          -A., age fourteen (Singer, 2006:60) 
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Accordingly, camps for refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), 
street children, secondary schools or orphanages and market places are the 
most favoured areas for recruitment of children by the armed groups (Singer, 
2006:59). The reason for targeting such places, is that there are always many 
children in one place and normally these places especially IDP camps lack 
security protection. Consequently, armed groups always have a field day to do 
whatever they want without being detected or prevented. In some situations 
such as in Afghanistan abduction takes the form of a mixture of organized 
abduction and positive inducements. In Afghanistan child recruitment is 
carried out through house-to-house abductions mixed with felt loyalties and a 
sense of dignity. During the post-9/11 fight against the Taliban in Northern 
Afghanistan, Northern Alliance commanders frequently recruited by going 
from house to house. One Afghan child solider pointed out that, 
The commanders came to my house and told me to come 
with them…. If I had not gone with him, I would have 
been beaten or bad things could have happened to my 
family’ (Wessells, 2006:39). 
 
In Northern Uganda, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) recruitment 
method has always been by child abductions which involve house to house 
hunt or rounding up of school children as they sleep in their dormitories at 
night. Abducted children are then made to carry looted food and other 
supplies to safety. Most of the fighters of the LRA are child soldiers. 
Estimates indicate that between 70% and 80% of the LRA are child 
combatants (MacKay et al. 1999:26). The child abduction methods of the 
LRA are characterised by brutality and wanton killings of the children who 
fail to carry their heavy loads of the loot or get wounded and are unable to 
walk. A 13 year old boy told his story of abduction by the LRA that, 
Early on when my brothers and I were captured, the LRA 
explained to us that all the five brothers couldn’t serve in 
the LRA because we would not perform well. So they 
tied up my two younger brothers and invited us to watch. 
Then they beat them with sticks until two of them died. 
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They told us it would give us strength to fight. My 
youngest brother was nine years old (HRW 2003d). 
 
Briggs (2005:116) observes that since 1987, the LRA has waged a bloody war 
targeting civilians, mostly the Acholi community who they accuse of betrayal 
for supporting the government. With limited support from the local 
population, the LRA resorted to abduction of children and indiscriminate 
killings of suspected government allies. Briggs notes that behind child 
abduction lies a carefully crafted element of war. Abducted children are 
trained to use weapons and how to fight. This is supported by the Human 
Rights Watch report which observes that girl child soldiers besides fighting 
and providing labour are also meant to provide sex to the rebel commanders 
(Human Rights Watch, 1997). 
 
During the Angolan civil war, about 3,000 child soldiers are reported to have 
been forcibly recruited from the neighbouring countries. According to Machel 
(2001:9) in 1997 UNITA forcibly recruited an estimated 200 Rwandan 
refugee children who had been living along the boarder between Angola and 
the Democratic Republic of Congo. Also, in 1998, Rwandan boys and girls 
aged about 13 years were forcibly recruited by the Angolan Armed Forces.  
 
In Sierra Leone, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) which launched their 
armed struggle in 1991 with the backing of Liberia’s President Charles Taylor 
after failing to attract widespread local support resorted to forced conscription 
and abduction of both boys and girls in its ranks (MacKay et al. 1999:30). 
MacKay further observes that children’s rights in Sierra Leone were not 
violated by RUF alone. The Sierra Leone Government forces organized local 
militias who became known as Civil Defence Forces which recruited young 
people to support the government army in the fight against the rebels.  
 
The situation was not different in Mozambique where the civil war raged on 
from 1976 to 1992 between the FRELIMO government and the Apartheid 
South Africa backed RENAMO rebels. The civil war in Mozambique which 
left one million people dead, 45% of whom were children, was fought by 
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children forcibly recruited by both sides in the conflict (MacKay et al. 
1999:107). Commenting on the devastation of the war in Mozambique 
MacKay et al.1999:32) note that, 
The war devastated the infrastructure, with schools and 
medical facilities systematically targeted by RENAMO. Both 
sides recruited and press-ganged girls and boys into their 
forces throughout the conflict. These children were used as 
combatants, spies, slaves, ‘wives’ intelligence agents and 
porters. Families were torn apart and physical and sexual 
violence, including murder, amputation, rape, forced 
cannibalism and torture, were widespread. 
 
According to Cohn et al. (1998: 24) in El Salvador and Guatemala, 
the armed forces use round ups to fill their ranks which involve 
taking children out of buses and cars, away from market places and 
churches. Neither Guatemala nor El Salvador maintains a formal 
conscription process, and with many peasants unable to obtain 
identification cards documenting their birth dates, since births are 
not registered, it is difficult for anyone to argue the case of being 
under age for conscription.  
 
Press Ganging 
Another form of forced recruitment is press ganging. Press ganging involves 
group recruitment where armed groups conduct massive sweeps through 
streets or market places, schools or orphanages rounding up young people. A 
case in point is the LRA rebels’ raid of Aboke Girls Secondary School in 
Northern Uganda in 1996 where 139 girls were abducted. In Burundi, the 
armed groups are also known to have frequently abducted children from 
schools and forced them to carry military equipment or assist the injured 
soldiers. 
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Recruitment by Quota  
Recruitment by quota is another method of forced recruitment.  In order to 
subjugate and control people, armed groups seek to co-opt local authorities 
and force them to work as their agents. In the case of the Angolan civil war 
the rebel, UNITA, directed the village leaders to recruit a certain number of 
children if the villages were not to be attacked. Fearing the possibility of 
being attacked and the destruction of whole villages; village leaders would 
turn up with the young people as was directed by UNITA (Wessells, 2006). 
Consequently, the practice of leaders recruiting the quotas for UNITA greatly 
undermined the credibility and prestige of local leaders who instead of 
offering protection to the children simply became violators of their rights. 
Quota recruitment was also practiced by the Taliban in Afghanistan. It is 
noted that the Taliban used the quota system in the North-Eastern provinces 
where the Northern Alliance fought against them. Wessells (2006) notes that 
the Taliban commanders used to move from village to village ordering 
parents to hand over a certain number of youths of six to 10 years to enlist as 
soldiers for three to six months. This quota system of recruitment would be 
repeated from time to time by commanders. A village which failed to deliver 
its quota would be attacked. 
 
In order to protect their children from forced recruitment under this quota 
system, wealthy families in Afghanistan used to send their sons to Pakistan or 
pay poor families to send their sons to fight in their place. This emphasises 
the role of poverty as a motivating factor for poor children’s involvement in 
armed conflicts. War creates a war economy and aggravates poverty situation 
compelling children mostly from poorer families to join the armed groups to 
contribute to the welfare of their families.  
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Why Child Soldiers Are Preferred by Armed Groups and Government 
Forces 
Several reasons have been put forward to explain why children are preferred 
for recruitment into armed groups and government forces. First, it is 
observed that under-age children are highly rated by the commanders since 
they fight without a mind or any inhibition and kill without compunction; 
and sometimes as an extension of play (Peters et al. (1998:82). It is also 
noted that children are convenient to recruit. Most field commanders argue 
that they recruit children because they cannot replenish their troop losses by 
recruiting adults. In most areas that are experiencing civil wars, there is 
always a steady supply of children who in almost all cases form the majority 
of the population. In this case, rebels find it militarily expedient to recruit 
children who are readily available and in large supply.  
 
Second, it is observed that children are cheap to get and sustain in armed 
conflicts. Most recruits are promised money by their adult recruiters, 
promises which are never honoured. In this case, as Brett et al. (2004:34) 
point out, the promise of money to poor children, acts as a ‘pull’ factor. 
Most important to note is that once these children have joined the armed 
groups they may feel timid to demand for their pay as opposed to the adults 
who are confident to demand payment.  
 
The third reason why commanders recruit children is that children have 
shock value. The argument here is that while on the battlefield, child 
soldiers sow disarray and confusion by confronting the opposing troops 
without fear, since the other troops may be reluctant to kill children. 
Examples are the wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia where small-boys units 
were used to spearhead assaults and sometimes could be sent forward naked 
as a means of causing confusion and terror among the opposing forces 
(Singer, 2006). 
 
The fourth reason for recruitment of children, especially teenagers, is 
because of their ability to carry heavy loads of goods and to perform labour, 
and fight with an efficacy that rivals that of adults (Brett et al. 2004). It is 
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noted that teenagers can be effective planners of war and can even lead 
attacks successfully, develop strategies for avoiding capture in equal manner 
as the adult soldiers. Most importantly, culture places teenagers at a high 
risk of recruitment since in some cultures teenagers of 14 years are 
considered adults and fit to do the work of a man or a woman.  
 
Fifth, it has also been observed that while children make up the frequent 
shortfall in manpower suffered by both the government armed forces and 
armed groups in war zones some commanders deliberately look out for 
children in preference to adults simply because children are obedient and 
highly motivated. More so, children are said to be easily manipulated as they 
have not fully developed a sense of right and wrong and can therefore be 
trained to be brutal soldiers (Harvey, 2003). Indoctrination has been used in 
the conflict in northern Uganda where rebels would smear young recruits with 
shear butter and tell them to fight without taking cover since sheer butter 
would repel enemy bullets (Human Rights Watch, 1997). 
 
Sixth, youths are pliable which means that they are easily manipulated and 
controllable. The rebel commanders do this through brutality and spreading 
terror among child soldiers. Through use of violence and threat of violence, 
children can be trained to obey commands that adults would otherwise 
question or contest. Wessells (2006:35) observes that children in an armed 
group in ‘a new world characterized by danger and recognizing their 
ignorance of the group rules and lack of survival skills, use obedience as a 
‘survival strategy’. Recruiters are also known to play on the children’s 
cognitive and moral development. Teenagers are at a stage in their lives in 
which they are forming their own identity, achieving autonomy, and 
defining their wider beliefs and world view. Teenagers are often more 
receptive to new ideologies and systems of thought than adults are. Most 
importantly, children tend to be more idealistic than adults. Consequently, 
recruiters play on this idealism and openness by promising opportunities and 
to solve some of the problems that young people may have, in exchange for 
‘overthrowing an unjust regime and building a better social order based on 
justice and equality’ which appeals to children. 
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Seventh, children are also easily exploitable and expendable in civil wars. 
Most rebel leaders or commanders regard children as cheap resources that 
can be exploitable in many ways. The small size of children makes them 
unable to defend or protect themselves from sexual exploitation by the 
commanders and adult soldiers. More so, children have enormous capacity 
to learn new things which allows them to be deployed to perform multiple 
roles such as porters, cooks, body guards, sex slaves and spies. This was the 
situation in Angola where UNITA rebels always preferred young children as 
labourers since they could carry heavy loads of materials that could not be 
carried by vehicles. In Northern Uganda, the LRA rebels never recruit adults 
at all. They abduct children who they use as labourers, sex slaves and as 
killing machines as well as human shields as they are sent on the frontline 
while adults remain behind in safety (Green, 2009). 
 
Besides their tender age which makes children easy to manipulate, armed 
groups are known to provide children with drugs to regularly make them 
fearless and senseless in undertaking suicide missions. Most studies that 
have been conducted on these armed conflicts where children are being used 
found that marijuana was being frequently used as well as crack cocaine or a 
cocktail of local substances and gunpowder. Most crimes are committed 
under the influence of drugs. Girl combatants were found to experience 
regular rapes by fellow combatants sometimes as ‘punishment’ for losing 
ground (Peters et al. 1998:82). 
 
It is important to note that in most civil wars and civilian based conflicts, 
children become perfect cover and military assets to be used to infiltrate the 
enemy camps either as spies or on suicide missions unnoticed. 
Consequently, most armed groups and government forces prefer children 
who because of their less developed intellect are fearless, less sensitive and 
cheap military assets to exploit. In the guerrilla war that brought President 
Museveni to power child soldiers, popularly known as Kadogos, played a 
crucial role in dislodging the government army by undertaking daring 
missions for which they would be cheered upon successful completion. 
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How Child Soldiers are used  
Machel (2001) observed that children once recruited are treated the same way 
as the adults. They begin with induction ceremonies which include burial, 
killing of their friends and relatives in the case of the LRA in Uganda, RUF in 
Sierra Leone and RENAMO in Mozambique. The induction is supposed to 
make them brave, loosen relational ties with their families and communities 
and instil fear and royalty to the commanders.  
 
Collins (2007:375) points out that in Mozambique children abducted by the 
rebel RENAMO were forced to return to their villages and attack them. The 
intention was that this barbaric and shameful action would prevent children 
from ever thinking of returning home and thus guarantee the rebels’ 
allegiance to their cause. Consequently, these acts would alienate child 
soldiers from their families and communities which makes post-conflict RR 
very challenging. 
 
Children within the LRA, the main focus of this research, are used to perform 
several roles or tasks. The first and most crucial task for children under the 
LRA is participation in combat operations against the government forces or 
Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA). It is noted that almost 80% of the 
LRA rank and file are children and children are deployed on frontlines while 
the adults in command positions always remain safely in the rear (World 
Vision International, 2005:17). Other common tasks assigned to children 
under the LRA are to serve as porters, often carrying very heavy loads of 
looted food, ammunition and wounded combatants. Children who are too 
weak to carry heavy loads are often savagely beaten or killed. Mckay, et 
al.(1999), who conducted a study on the gender dimension of the LRA 
conflict in Northern Uganda which focused on former young women captives 
within the LRA, observe that the three primary roles girls reported were 
porters (41%), food producers (22%) and fighters (12%). They also note that 
although discussions regarding the roles of girls within the LRA focus on 
them as captive ‘wives’ only half (51%) reported serving as wives in either 
their primary or secondary roles.  
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Machel (2001) notes that both girls and boys are often compelled to provide 
sexual services. In the case of girls, those abducted into armed groups are 
usually forced into sexual slavery where they are distributed to rebel 
commanders as a payment or motivation. Unfortunately, most of the children 
who have been forced to provide sexual services end up contracting HIV/Aids 
and other sexually transmitted diseases. Machel (2001:13) observed that, 
Abducted girls as young as 10 have been kept as sex slaves by 
rebel leaders. Once the leader dies, the girl is typically put 
aside for ritual cleansing and then given to another rebel. 
 
Machel’s observation is collaborated by Mazurana (MacKay, 1999:72) who, 
commenting about the gender roles of girls among the LRA, found that 51 
percent of the girl captives served as wives besides working as porters, 
labourers and fighters. However, the most distressing role of children is being 
used as human shields by rebel commanders whenever the rebels are 
attacked. In case of an attack by government soldiers, child soldiers are 
usually instructed to make a ring around senior rebel commanders to protect 
them from bullets. In such encounters many child soldiers are killed. 
 
The children, besides being used as combatants, sex slaves and labourers, are 
deployed to loot food from civilians. A number of former child soldiers’ 
testimonies under the LRA confirm this role. During the field work research 
one former child soldier narrated a story how he was almost killed for looting 
little food by the LRA commander who accused him of laziness. Another 
formerly abducted child soldier remembers how he collapsed under a fifty 
kilogram bag of looted maize floor he was forced to carry non-stop by the 
rebels after his abduction while chained on a rope with other abductees.8 
 
By and large, it is evident that child soldiers in all civil wars are exploited, 
dehumanized and abused while serving with armed groups or government 
soldiers. Child soldiers serve multiple critical roles within the armed groups, 
which to a large extent explain why they are always prefered and why 
                                                 
8 Interview with one of the formerly abducted child soldiers conducted in February, 2010 in 
northern Uganda. 
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prevention of recruitment and use of child soldiers is difficult to eradicate 
(Francis, 2007:6). Children’s potential coupled with the lack of adult 
manpower as civil wars drag on compels rebel groups and government 
forces to recruit children into their forces where they are indoctrinated or 
drugged to fight without thinking. It is against this background, that the 
debate about voluntary and involuntary recruitment of child soldiers does 
not hold water. 
 
 A critical analysis of the methods of recruitment of children into armed 
groups finds that the claims that some children voluntarily enlist is nothing 
but a sham. Armed groups and governments create conditions that leave 
children with no choice but to join in the fighting. It is this disguised forced 
recruitment that is presented by armed groups and government forces as 
voluntary recruitment. Consequently, there is a need for the international 
community to craft a robust legal mechanism to protect children’s rights in 
armed conflicts. 
International Mechanisms for the Protection of Children in Armed 
Conflicts 
Introduction 
 
Throughout history, war has exacted a horrific toll on children. 
But modern warfare kills, maims and exploits children more 
callously and more systematically than ever before. Caught up in 
complex conflicts that have multiple causes and little prospect of 
early resolution, children are being sucked into seemingly 
endless endemic struggles for power and resources. During the 
1990s, more than 2 million children died as a result of armed 
conflicts, often deliberately targeted and murdered (Machel, 
2001:1) 
 
The suffering of children in armed conflicts going on around the world is 
well documented. The use of child soldiers violates widely accepted 
principles of international humanitarian law about proper behaviour in the 
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conduct of war. The human rights abuses involved, which range from 
abduction, forced conscription and rape, to torture and murder have shocked 
the conscience of the international community.  Consequently, the twentieth 
century witnessed attempts by the international community to protect the 
rights of children in armed conflicts by developing a range of international 
conventions, protocols and resolutions aimed at preventing the use of 
children in armed conflicts. Most of these international legal instruments 
have been ratified and domesticated by national governments into their 
domestic law. However, as Wessells (2006:233) has noted, in spite of the 
tremendous progress by the international community in developing 
international legal mechanisms for the protection of children in armed 
conflicts, not much progress has been achieved in enforcing them. 
 
This section examines the international legal mechanisms that have been 
developed for the protection of children in armed conflicts at the global and 
continental (Africa) levels. The section also discusses the reasons, why in 
spite of the existence of a substantive body of legal mechanisms, 
recruitment and use of child soldiers continues to be the common practice.  
 
In order to deal with the alarming levels of negative impact armed conflicts 
were having on children, the international community throughout the 
twentieth century engaged in developing a number of international legal 
instruments for protection of children’s rights. The international legal 
mechanisms for protection of children’s rights in armed conflicts can be 
broadly categorised into: international humanitarian law, international 
human rights law, international customary law and national constitutions 
and legislations. Singer (2006:140) observes that regardless of where one  
stands in the debate about the protection of children in armed conflicts, there 
is no doubt that the practice of using child soldiers violates widely accepted 
international beliefs and norms about proper behaviour. 
 
The legal mechanisms include the 1924 League of Nations Declaration on 
the Rights of the Child; 1948 UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights; 
1949 Geneva Conventions; 1950 European Conventions; 1951 Convention 
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and 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees; 1966 UN Covenants 
on Civil and Political Rights and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; 
1969 American Convention on Human Rights; 1977 Additional Protocols to 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions; the 1981 African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights; 1984 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; 1989 UN Convention on 
the Rights of the Child and 1990 OAU African Charter on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child (Singer, 2006:141).   
 
It should be mentioned from the outset, that the most influential 
international legal protection for children in armed conflicts is contained in 
two bodies of international law: International Humanitarian Law and 
International Human Rights Law (Harvey, 1997:6). To this end, the section 
below critically analyzes the main international humanitarian law and 
international human rights law instruments that have been designed for the 
protection of children’s rights in armed conflicts.   
 
International Humanitarian Law 
International Humanitarian Law is one of the bodies of legal instruments 
that have been developed by the international community to protect civilians 
in armed conflicts. International humanitarian law, also known as the law of 
armed conflict, is the body of law that seeks to regulate the methods and 
means of warfare, and the treatment of people in times of war, who are not, 
or who are no longer, participating in the hostilities. Such people include 
prisoners of war, injured soldiers and non-combatants9   
 
 
 
                                                 
9 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Available at: 
http://www.ehl.icrc.org/images/resources/pdf/what_isihl.pdf. Accessed on 29/6/2010. 
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The Geneva Conventions of 1949 
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 form one of the international legal 
instruments that provide for the protection of children in armed conflicts, in 
spite of their inadequacies. The main aim of all the four Geneva 
Conventions is the protection of the victims of international conflicts. Out of 
the four Geneva Conventions, Geneva Convention 1V was the first 
international treaty that sought exclusively to provide protection to civilians 
caught up in armed conflicts. It prohibits not only murder, torture or 
mutilation of a protected person, but also any other measures of brutality 
whether applied by civilians or military agents (Machel, 1996). It should be 
noted however, that the Geneva Convention 1V is mainly concerned with 
the treatment of civilians who are in the hands of an opposing party or who 
are victims of war rather than regulating the conduct of parties to a conflict 
in order to protect civilians.  
 
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 impose a limited number of obligations 
on parties to a particular conflict to provide special protection to children, 
including allowing free passage of food, clothing and medicine destined for 
children and to assist children who are separated or orphaned (Harvey, 
2001:8). The Convention also requires State Parties to establish hospitals 
and safety zones to protect children among other vulnerable groups. 
 
It should be noted that in respect of the Geneva Convention 1V, the majority 
of the provisions do not provide protection to all children who are below 18 
years of age. The reason for this is that at the time the Geneva Conventions 
1949 came into force after the Second World War, the concept that all 
persons below 18 years of age are children and therefore entitled to 
protection did not exist. Suffice to say that, while the Geneva Convention 
1V only provides for limited protection for children, its provisions are 
applicable to every international conflict. This is so because of the fact that 
over 190 states are parties to the convention, and also the fact that the 1949 
Geneva Conventions are now considered to be part of the Customary 
International Law. The consequence of this is that the few state parties that 
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may not have ratified the Geneva Conventions are also bound to uphold its 
obligations (Harvey, 2001:8). 
 
One of the weaknesses with the Geneva Conventions is that they were 
largely designed to protect children in interstate wars that were prevalent at 
the time. Most of the conflicts going on around the world today where most 
of the children are actively involved either as child soldiers, sex slaves, 
porters, labourers or spies are intra-state conflicts, which makes it difficult 
to apply the Geneva Conventions. This is in spite of the existence of 
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions which, in a restricted sense, 
provides for protection of civilians and by extension to children’s rights in 
internal conflicts (Machel, 1996). The utility of the Geneva Conventions 
though is that they provided a bedrock upon which future international 
agreements for the protection of children in armed conflicts are built. 
 
The United Nations Declaration on the Protection of Women and Children in 
Emergency and Armed Conflict 1974 
Another important, none-legally binding international legal instrument for 
the protection of children’s rights in armed conflict is the United Nations 
Declaration for the Protection of Women and Children in Emergency and 
Armed Conflict of 1974. This Declaration was passed by the United Nations 
(UN) General Assembly Resolution 3318 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974.10 
Most observers note that even if this declaration is not legally binding to the 
State Parties, it managed to raise awareness about the situation of women 
and children within the international community. For example the 
declaration expressed its deep concern over the suffering of women and 
children belonging to the civilian population who in periods of emergency 
and armed conflict, in the struggle for peace, self-determination, national 
liberation and independence are too often the victims of inhuman acts and 
suffer serious harm.  
                                                 
10 The UN Declaration on the Protection of Women and Children in Emergency and Armed 
Conflict was proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly under the United Nations 
Resolution 3318 (XX1X) on the 14 December 1974. Available at: 
http://www.cidh.org/Ninez/pdf%20files/Declaration%20on%20Protection. Accessed on 
25/9/2009. 
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The declaration prohibits attacks and bombings on the civilian population, 
inflicting incalculable suffering especially on women and children who are 
the most vulnerable members of the population. The declaration was able to 
draw the attention of the international community to the plight of children 
and women and the need to offer them special protection during armed 
conflicts. 
 
The 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions 
In an attempt to address the inadequacies of the Geneva Conventions, the 
international community in 1977 adopted the Additional Protocols to the 
Geneva Conventions. The Additional Protocols of 1977 were developed as a 
result of an initiative of the International Committee of the Red Cross which 
sought to update the laws governing the conduct of war and to specifically 
encourage States to recognize and accept the reality of changed warfare 
based on the several wars of liberation and the guerrilla tactics that were 
being used (Cohn et al. 1994:57). Consequently, the Additional Protocols 
included provisions that limit the permissible means and methods of warfare 
and strengthen protection for civilians and extend the applicability of 
international humanitarian law. The experience of the war in Vietnam and 
the use of new weapons of war and the extent of suffering of innocent 
civilians mobilized the international community’s resolve to strengthen 
international humanitarian law to protect innocent civilians in most of the 
wars of liberation (Hamilton et al. 2001:13). Both Additional Protocols 
1&11 have special provisions for the protection of children in armed 
conflicts as articulated below. 
Protocol 1 Additional to the Geneva Conventions 
Analysts such as Honwana (2006:35) have observed that the Additional 
Protocol 1 to the Geneva Conventions is an important international 
instrument that was developed by the international community for the 
protection of children in armed conflicts. The Additional Protocol 1 was 
able to widen the protection afforded to children in international conflict. 
Article 77 of the protocol states that, 
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Children shall be the object of special respect and shall be 
protected against any form of indirect assault. The Parties to 
the conflict shall provide them with the care and aid they 
require, whether because of their age or for any other reason 
(Hamilton et al. 2001:15)11 
 
The Protocol further sets 15 years as a minimum age for children’s 
recruitment and involvement in armed conflicts. According to Harvey 
(2001:9) the setting of 15 years as a minimum age for children’s 
involvement in armed conflicts marked the first time the issue of child 
soldiers was being addressed by a binding international agreement. The 
Protocol also provides that involved parties shall take ‘all feasible measures 
in order that children who have not attained 15 years do not take a direct 
part in hostilities and in particular they shall refrain from recruiting them 
into their armed forces’. Additional Protocol 1 has been criticised in that 
‘protection’ as provided in the protocol is, in the end, a compromise 
between humanitarian ideals and military necessity. 
 
 Hamilton et al. (2001:16) observe that any provision which allows for loss 
of civilian life, provided that the loss is not excessive in relation to the 
concrete military advantage anticipated, is essentially incompatible with the 
right to life provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
the Child. Both Hamilton and Abu El-Haj (2001) point out that the ‘right’ 
has the nature of an intransgressible norm (jus cognes) which is not reflected 
in the definition of ‘protection’ under Protocol 1, meaning that it does not 
uphold a child’s fundamental right to life or their survival. 
 
Protocol 11 Additional to the Geneva Conventions 
While Additional Protocol 11 contains similar versions of the children 
protection provisions, like Protocol 1, Article 4 (3) (c) of the protocol 
recognizes that children need protection from the possible recruitment by 
                                                 
11 Hamilton, C. & Tabatha,  Abu El-Haj. Armed Conflict: the Protection of Children Under 
International Law. Available at: http://www.essex.ac.uk/armedcon/story_id/000577.html. 
Accessed on 25/9/2009. 
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both the government and the armed groups. One of the important aspects of 
the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions is that all the four 
Conventions contain an identical Article 3 which extends general coverage 
to non-international conflicts.12 The weakness of the Additional Protocols is 
that they set a minimum age of 15 for recruitment and participation of 
children in armed conflicts considered by most International Non-
Governmental Organizations and child advocacy groups to be too young for 
a person to be involved in armed conflicts. 
 
Furthermore, the challenge with both Additional Protocols is their 
applicability in view of the fact that not many states have ratified these 
protocols (Hamilton et al. 2001).  Noteworthy also, is the fact that few 
countries experiencing internal armed conflicts have been willing to 
abandon their presumptive claim to a free hand in dealing with local threats, 
so that the applicability of Additional Protocol 11 is resisted, even where the 
objective criteria are satisfied (Cohn et al. 1994:60). 
 
International Human Rights Law 
Human rights law establishes rights that every individual should enjoy at all 
times, during peace and war. The obligations to ensure that these rights are 
protected have been placed on the State and are based on the Charter of the 
United Nations and are also reflected in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. It should be noted that human rights law also has quite a number of 
specialized treaties that provide for the protection of children’s rights in 
armed conflicts. These include; The International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights which covers several rights including the right to life, and 
the right to freedom from slavery, torture and arbitrary arrest; The 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights which 
recognizes the right to food, clothing, housing health and education. The 
Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW) of 1979 is also an important agreement of particular 
                                                 
12 A Summary of Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols. Available at: 
http://supportgenevaconventions.info/library/geneva_conventions_summary.pdf: Accessed on 
29/5/2010. 
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relevance in the protection of children’s rights in armed conflicts that fits in 
this category of legal standards (Machel, 2001).  
 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees  
The Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951 and its 1967 
Protocol is one of the important international legal protections of children in 
armed conflicts. The convention that was adopted on 28 July 1951 by the 
United Nations General Assembly seeks to protect the rights of refugees and 
stateless persons who include children. One of the consequences of armed 
conflicts is the generation of large numbers of refugees who flee their 
countries due to fear of persecution on the basis of their ethnicity, religion, 
social or political grounds. Consequently, both the convention and the 
protocol provide standards for protecting refugees. The preamble of the 
convention emphasizes the commitment by the United Nations and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights approved on 10 December 1948 and 
affirmed by the General Assembly which affirmed the Principle that human 
beings shall enjoy fundamental rights and freedoms without discrimination.  
 
The recognition that all human beings shall enjoy fundamental rights and 
freedoms without discrimination is crucial for protection of refugees 
especially children. The Convention and the Protocol have been 
complemented by regional agreements such as the Organization of African 
Unity (OAU) (now African Union) Convention Governing the Specific 
Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa of 1969 and the Cartagena 
Declaration of Refugees 1984.13 
 
                                                 
13 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees was adopted on 28 July 1951 by the UN 
Conference of  Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons Convened 
Under the General Assembly resolution 429 (V) of 14 December 1950 and entered into force 
on 22 April 1954 in accordance with article 43. To date the Convention has been ratified by 
147 countries around the world. Available at: http://www.tamilnation.org/refuges/51 
convention.htm. Accessed on 29/6/2010. 
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The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) 1989 
Most scholars observe that the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) 
is instrumental and a landmark legal protection for children in armed 
conflicts (Cohn et al. 1994; Honwana, 2006:35; Wesselles, 2006: 233) 
Singer, 2006:141). Singer (2006) has pointed out that the 1989 Convention 
on the Rights of the Child is the most comprehensive, explicit and most 
representative legal instrument for the protection of children in armed 
conflicts. Singer further notes that the Convention was the most quickly and 
widely ratified internationally by more than 190 state signatories. In 
ratifying the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the international 
community proclaimed its political, legal and moral commitment to 
safeguarding children’s rights and to ensure their protection as ‘zones of 
peace’. As Machel (2001:139) observed, the Convention obliges States to 
protect children at all times, including in situations of armed conflict and to 
ensure that children have no direct part in hostilities.  
 
Honwana (2006) concurs with Machel and observes that the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child of 1989 is a landmark agreement particularly the fact 
that all the Convention’s 54 articles reaffirm the fundamental place of the 
family in society and sets global precepts for a child’s inherent right to life, 
survival, development, and freedom of thought, regardless of race, religion, 
or gender. To date, only two countries- United States and Somalia have not 
yet ratified the treaty (Obote-Odora, 1999:12)14.   
 
Article 38 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child states that; 
1. States Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for rules of 
international humanitarian law applicable to them in armed conflicts 
which are relevant to the child; 
                                                 
14 Obote-Odora, A. (1999) Legal Problems with the Protection of Children in Armed Conflict, 
Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law, Volume 6, Number 2 (June). Available at: 
http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v6n2/obote-odora62_text.html. Accessed on 
29/6/2010. 
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2. States Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure that persons 
who have not attained the age of fifteen years do not take a direct 
part in hostilities; 
3. States Parties shall refrain from recruiting any person who has not 
attained the age of fifteen years into their armed forces. In recruiting 
among those persons who have attained the age of fifteen years but 
who have not attained the age of eighteen years States shall 
endeavour to give priority to those who are oldest; 
4. In accordance with their obligations under international 
humanitarian law to protect the civilian population in armed 
conflicts, States Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure 
protection and care of children who are affected by armed conflict 
(Human Rights Watch, 1997:111). 
 
Article 39 of CRC focuses on rehabilitation of child victims of armed 
conflict. The Article states that; 
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to promote 
physical and psychological recovery and social reintegration of 
a child victim of…..armed conflicts. Such recovery and 
reintegration shall take place in an environment which fosters 
health, self respect and dignity of the child (Harvey, 2001:22). 
 
The CRC also contains a comprehensive set of socio-economic, cultural, 
civil and political rights all of which are considered indivisible and 
interdependent. The indivisibility and interdependence nature of these rights 
demands that there should not be any hierarchy in their implementation. 
Further, as Harvey (2001) observes, four general principles underpin the 
CRC. First, is non-discrimination (Article 2); second is best interests of the 
child (Article 3); third is the right to life, survival and development (Article 
6); fourth, the right for the children to have their views heard and given due 
weight in all decisions affecting them (Article 12). These principles must be 
taken into account at all times during the implementation of the CRC. 
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The weakness of the CRC is that it generated a lot of controversy by its 
decision to make 15 years a minimum age for recruitment and participation 
of children in armed conflicts. It is this limitation that prompted several 
humanitarian organizations and pressure groups around the world which 
considered 15 years of age too young for children’s participation in armed 
conflicts to push for another international legal instrument that would raise 
the age limit to 18 years. It is against this background that the Optional 
Protocol to CRC was born.  
 
As Wessells (2006) has noted in most countries 15 year olds are not allowed 
to vote. So the issue is how do you subject 15 year olds in wars they would 
not have had any say in through voting a government into power that 
declares a war. Consequently, in 1994, the United Nations (UN) constituted 
a working group to examine the issue and the debates on the need to 
increase the minimum age of military enrolment to 18 years. The debate 
which lasted for a period of six years led to the adoption of the Optional 
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Child on involvement in armed 
conflicts. 
 
Some scholars have observed that while the CRC has been widely 
acclaimed to be a vital legal mechanism for the protection of children in 
armed conflicts; in reality it has been found lacking. For example, the 
monitoring mechanism for the CRC-the Committee on the Rights of the 
Child-is not able to respond in situations of emergency; cannot make ad hoc 
recommendations or comment on situations in countries outside its 
concluding comments on State reports; cannot hear individual complaints; 
impose sanctions on offenders or order compensation (Harvey, 2001:12).  
 
The Optional Protocol of May 2000 
 The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child was 
adopted by the UN General Assembly in May 2000 (Honwana, 2006:36).The 
protocol which applies to both national armies and non-state armed groups 
requires nations to rehabilitate former child soldiers. While the Protocol 
prohibits compulsory recruitment below the age of 18, voluntary recruitment 
74 
 
at sixteen years of age is permitted. This compromise was reached to cater for 
the interests of the United States, United Kingdom and Australia which 
insisted that 16 years for voluntary recruitment be permitted. The protocol 
however provides that while recruitment and training of 16 year olds can take 
place, such children are not supposed to serve in combat operations before 
they turn eighteen years. 
 
Most humanitarian organizations and advocates for children’s rights have 
not been comfortable with this compromise. In fact, this compromise is 
largely viewed as failure on the part of the international community to reach 
a consensus of 18 years. International organizations and pressure groups 
observe that by failing to reach the consensus of 18 years as the right age, 
governments continue to base their positions primarily on their narrow 
military interests rather than on what is best for the children (Honwana, 
2006). The Optional Protocol also has been criticized for creating double 
standards by prohibiting all recruitment of children under 18 but allowing 
the recruitment of volunteers below eighteen years.  
 
The double standard also raises the problem of trying to define the 
difference between voluntary and involuntary recruitment which is hard to 
determine. The concern here for most advocates against recruitment of 
children in armed conflicts is that this window can give a chance to errant 
governments and armed groups to recruit underage children under the guise 
of voluntary recruitment.  For example indirect and coercive measures such 
as deliberately creating unemployment in civilian jobs and creating job 
opportunities in the army could influence young people to join the military 
or armed groups. Indirect and coercive measures that persuade young people 
to join the military include intimidation and physical protection, access to 
food and shelter and opportunity for revenge. This was the case in 
Mozambique and Angola where boys were encouraged to join armed forces 
through intimidation and social pressure (Honwana, 2006:37). 
 
75 
 
International Labour Organization Convention 182 on the Worst Forms of 
Child Labour 1999 
The International Labour Organization Convention (ILO) 182 on the Worst 
Forms of Child Labour which was adopted in 1999 is considered a big boost 
in the quest for higher international standards to protect children in armed 
conflicts (Singer, 2006; Honwana, 2006:38). The ILO Convention lists 
‘forced or compulsory recruitment of children for use in armed conflict’ 
among the worst forms of child labour. Accordingly, the ILO Convention on 
the ‘Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention’ was the most rapidly 
endorsed labour convention in history, with 147 states ratifying by 
November 2003 (Honwana, 2006).  
 
The linkage between child soldiering and exploitative labour is critical in 
the sense that children in most societies are expected to work and support 
their families. The Convention draws a line between moderate, acceptable 
forms of labour in which children do chores to help their families, and 
extreme dangerous forms of labour that jeopardize children’s health and 
violate their rights (Singer, 2006:134). The criminalization of child labour in 
armed conflict is critical for the protection of children. The LRA rebels in 
northern Uganda are known to abduct children who are forcefully 
conscripted into their ranks. The LRA then deploys the children against the 
government army as well as using them as labourers by carrying looted 
goods and ammunitions as well as growing food in the camps in southern 
Sudan. The girls are used as sex slaves for the rebel commanders. The 
government army has also been castigated for recruiting and re-deploying 
rescued children against the LRA rebels which is a violation of their rights 
(Global Report 2004).15 
 
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 1998 
One of the most prominent international legal mechanisms that criminalizes 
the recruitment and use of children in armed conflicts is the 1998 Rome 
                                                 
15 Child Soldiers Global Report (2004). Available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,CSCOAL,,UGA,456d621e2,49880620c,0.html. 
Accessed on 29/6/2010. 
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Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). The ICC was established 
to become a permanent court for investigating and prosecuting genocide, 
war crimes and crimes against humanity which national courts or 
governments are unable or unwilling to prosecute (Wessells, 2006:237). 
One of the most important achievements in the global efforts to protect 
children in armed conflicts associated with the ICC is that the Rome Statute 
defined as a war crime the recruitment and use of children under the age of 
15 in armed conflicts. From the onset, the negotiators of the Rome Statute 
agreed that it is a war crime to use children, not only in combat but also in 
military activities such as spying, scouting, or serving as decoys or as 
guards.  
 
Article 8 (1) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, states 
that, ‘  
The Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes in 
particular when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part 
of a large-scale commission of such crimes. Article 8 (2) (e) 
(VII) considers  the ‘Conscripting or enlisting children under the 
age of fifteen years into armed forces or groups or using them to 
participate actively in hostilities’ to constitute a war crime 16. 
 
 Most crucially, according to the principle of complementarity, the ICC has 
jurisdiction in situations where the State is unable or unwilling to prosecute 
persons accused of committing offences. The ICC is an important 
development in the sense that some governments, especially those guilty of 
recruitment and use of child soldiers, may not be able or willing to prosecute 
criminals. At the same time, the court comes in handy to assist weak States 
lacking capacity to apprehend and prosecute strong personalities including 
Heads of States. The most recent casualty of the ICC is General Bashir, 
President of Sudan, who has been indicted for the war crimes committed by 
                                                 
16 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court available at: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rome_Statute_of _the_International_Criminal_Court. Accessed 
on 29/6/2010. 
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government forces in the on-going civil war in the Darfur region of Sudan 
(World Politics Review, 2008)17 
 
Since the establishment of the ICC in 1998, the idea of prosecuting 
individuals involved in the recruitment and use of children as a war crime 
has taken root in the UN Special Courts established by the United Nations. 
An example is the UN Special Court in Sierra Leone established in June 
2002 which indicted Charles Taylor, former President of Liberia, for 
recruitment and use of child soldiers. The ICC has also handed down 
indictments to the rebel leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army Joseph Kony 
and four other rebel commanders for child abduction, forced recruitment 
and use of child soldiers in northern Uganda (Wessells, 2006:238).  
 
The ICC can be credited for a number of achievements in the struggle to 
stop the recruitment and use of child soldiers. First, the ICC criminalizes 
and exposes the abusers of children’s rights at the international level which 
distances their supporters, especially those in the Diaspora, from continuous 
funding and publicity. This specifically affects armed groups that recruit and 
use child soldiers. The result is that this could scale down armed conflicts 
with both the government and the armed groups seeking to use peaceful 
means of resolving the conflict. In the case of the LRA in northern Uganda, 
the ICC indictments had two implications. First is that the ICC indictments 
dragged the LRA to the negotiating table in order for the indictments to be 
lifted. The second implication of the ICC indictments is that once they 
remained hanging around the necks of rebel leaders, the LRA refused to 
sign the Final Peace Agreement (FPA).  
 
The weakness of the ICC is what some observers have called pursuit of 
victors’ justice. In the case of the war in northern Uganda, the ICC 
indictments generated resentment among the Acholi people who have 
suffered most under the LRA brutality. The Acholi people point out that 
                                                 
17 World Politics Review (2008). The ICC’s Bashir Indictment: Law Against Peace 23 July. 
Available at: http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/2471/the-iccs-bashir-indictment-
law-against-peace Accessed on 29/6/2010. 
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they have their own traditional and cultural ways of handling conflict which 
have been ignored by the ICC. Also, the ICC’s decision to leave out the 
government soldiers who are implicated in children’s rights abuses and 
focus solely on the LRA angered the Acholi people who think the ICC court 
was biased against the rebels (World Vision, 2005:42). Commenting about 
the objectivity of the ICC, the World Vision report noted that, 
…the ICC has inevitably had to have a close relationship with 
the Ugandan Government, which calls into question their 
ability to conduct an objective and balanced investigation of all 
combatants. This has been reinforced by the way in which the 
Ugandan investigation was launched through a high profile 
press conference with President Museveni in January 2004 
(World Vision, 2005:42). 
 
By and large, while some people hail the efforts of the ICC in the protection 
of children’s rights in armed conflicts, others see it as being one sided and 
biased. However, it is certain that the ICC indictments of various war lords 
have sent a serious warning that the days of violation of children’s rights 
with impunity could be coming to an end. 
 
United Nations Security Council Resolutions on the Rights of Children in 
Armed Conflicts 
It is worth noting that United Nations Security Council has passed a number 
of resolutions designed to protect children in armed conflicts. While these 
UN Security Council Resolutions are not legally binding on States, they 
provide a framework of standards for protection of children in armed 
conflicts upon which child protection in country-specific situations can be 
assessed by the international community. Further, as some scholars (Harvey, 
2001:16) have observed, the yearly open debates of children and armed 
conflict in the UN Security Council, the resolutions and subsequent reports 
of the UN Secretary-General on the progress recorded in the implementation 
of the recommendations are indications that the issue of children in armed 
conflict remains high on the UN agenda.  
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UN Security Council Resolution 1261 
Security Council Resolution 1261 of 2000 stresses the responsibility of all 
states to prosecute those responsible for grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions. Security Council Resolution 1261 formally affirmed that the 
protection and security of children affected by armed conflict is an 
international peace and security issue and is therefore firmly within the 
remit of the Security Council. The resolution also highlights the harmful and 
widespread impact that armed conflict has on children and the long-term 
consequences that this has on durable peace, security and development. The 
resolution also contains a list of calls on states to take action on issues 
including the recruitment and use of children, small arms proliferation and 
access to humanitarian and UN staff18 
 
UN Security Council Resolution 1314 
The UN Security Council Resolution 1314 was adopted in 1999. This 
resolution essentially reiterated and expanded its list of concerns and calls 
for action. The resolution also noted that in situations where there were 
systematic and widespread violations of International Humanitarian and 
Human Rights Law, including those related to children in  situations of 
armed conflict, deemed to constitute a threat to peace and security, the 
Security Council could consider such situations and adopt necessary 
measures (Child Rights Information Network, 2010)19. 
 
UN Security Council Resolution 1379 
The UN Security Council Resolution 1379 of 2001 urges member states ‘to 
prosecute those responsible for egregious crimes perpetuated against 
children’ (Honwana, 2006:39). This resolution also focused on critical areas 
of concern that were not previously catered for. For example, the resolution 
focused on the link between HIV/Aids and armed conflict. Consequently, 
the HIV/Aids link was acknowledged and HIV training recommended for 
                                                 
18 UN Security Council Resolution 1261 available at: 
http://www.un.org.News/Press/docs/1999/199990825.sc6716.html. Accessed on 29/6/2010. 
19 UN Security Council Resolution 1314 available at: 
http://www.crin.org/law/instrument.asp?Inst1D=1056 Accessed on 29/6/2010. 
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peacekeeping personnel. Further, the resolution recognized the role played 
by the corporate sector in starting and sustaining conflicts. The resolution 
urges the corporate actors to refrain from doing business that does not 
protect children’s rights in armed conflicts.   
 
UN Security Council Resolution 1460 
 The UN Security Council Resolution 1460 which was adopted on 30th 
January 2003 endorsed the UN Era of Application Campaign which was 
spearheaded by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for 
Children and Armed Conflict. This resolution was aimed at ensuring a more 
robust and systematic monitoring and reporting on the recruitment and use 
of children in armed conflict and other types of abuses and violations 
against children’s rights in armed conflicts.   
 
African Mechanisms for Protection of Children’s Rights in Armed 
Conflicts 
The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child of 1990 
The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child promulgated in 
1990 is an important international agreement for the protection of children 
in armed conflicts. The Charter defines a child simply as a person younger 
than eighteen years of age. Article 22 relates to children and armed 
conflicts; Article 15 prohibits child labour and Article 16 relates to 
protection against child abuse and torture. All these articles of the Charter 
are very instructive in the protection of children in armed conflicts. 
 
The African Charter is important because it sets the upper limit of a child’s 
age. Its definition at the age of 18 years without exception and prohibition of 
recruitment and use of children in armed conflicts, have been hailed as 
instrumental and progressive.  
Article 22, which focuses on armed conflicts, states that, 
1. States Parties to this Charter shall undertake to respect and ensure 
respect for rule of international humanitarian law applicable in 
armed conflicts which affect the child. 
81 
 
2. States Parties to the present Charter shall take all necessary measures 
to ensure that no child shall take a direct part in hostilities and 
refrain in particular, from recruiting any child. 
3. States Parties to the present Charter shall, in accordance with their 
obligations under international law, protect the civilian population in 
armed conflicts and shall take all feasible measures to ensure the 
protection and care of children who are affected by armed conflicts. 
Such rules shall also apply to children in situations of internal armed 
conflicts, tension and strife. 
 
Article 22(2) of the African Charter has been found to be stronger on State 
Parties as it states that involved parties shall take ‘all necessary measures to 
ensure that no child shall take a direct part in hostilities and refrain in 
particular from recruiting any child’. Honwana (2006) has observed that the 
language in the African Charter is even stronger than the one in the 1989 
Convention on the Rights of the Child as it requires states to take ‘all 
necessary measures’ rather than just ‘feasible’ ones. 
 
Article 15 of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child on 
child labour is also crucial in the protection of children in armed conflicts 
especially on the African continent. Article 14 provides that; 
1. Every child shall be protected from all forms of economic 
exploitation and from performing any work that is likely to be 
hazardous or interfere with the child’s physical, mental, spiritual, 
moral, or social development. 
2. States Parties to the present Charter take all appropriate legislative 
and administrative measures to ensure the full implementation of this 
article which covers both the formal and informal sectors of 
employment and having regard to the relevant provisions of the 
International Labour Organization’s instruments relating to children.   
Article 16 (1) states that; 
States Parties to the present Charter shall take specific 
legislative, administrative, social and educational measures to 
protect the children from all forms of torture, inhuman or 
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degrading treatment and especially physical or mental injury or 
abuse, neglect or maltreatment including sexual abuse, while 
in the care of a parent, legal guardian or school authority or 
any other person who has the care of the child. 
 
In spite of its pragmatism by defining a child as a person below the age of 
18 years, the African Charter has not prevented the recruitment and use of 
children in armed conflicts going on in much of Africa. The charter in its 
quest to protect children’s rights faces several challenges. First, its 
restrictive definition and construction of the meaning of a ‘child’ and of 
‘childhood’ is at odds with the context-specific socio-cultural construction 
of childhood in Africa. The different perceptions and understandings of 
childhood undermine the practical implementation of the charter and other 
international mechanisms. For example, the preamble of the African Charter 
of the Rights and Welfare of the Child states that it is informed by the 
historical background and values of the African civilization. However, this 
is contradicted by the Charter’s definition of a child as a person below 18 
years. This rather Western-centric definition contradicts the perception of a 
‘child’ and ‘childhood’ across much of Africa (Francis, 2007:13). To this 
end, one wonders how the Charter can accommodate or work for people 
who do not perceive themselves as belonging to the under 18 years 
category, in particular when communities treat them as adults. 
 
Apart from the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child of 
1990 there have been other regional agreements designed to protect children 
in armed conflicts on the African continent. Critical among the regional 
legal instruments include: Cape Town Principles; Maputo Declaration on 
the Use of Children as Soldiers and the Lome Accord.  
 
Cape Town Principles 1997 
The Cape Town Principles and Best Practices on the Prevention of 
Recruitment of Children into the Armed Forces and Demobilization and 
Social Integration adopted in April 1997 set standards for the protection, 
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demobilization and reintegration of child soldiers20. These principles re-
affirm the correct age for children’s recruitment and participation to be 18 
years of age. The Cape Town initiative is credited for re-affirming the age 
limit of 18 years as the minimum age for any participation in armed 
conflicts. However, some analysts have noted, this high standard is at odds 
with the cultural and sociological construction of childhood across much of 
Africa which renders the Principles of limited practical effect (Francis 
(2007). For example, in most of Africa the age of maturity is determined by 
when one begins to take on the responsibilities of an adult.   
 
Moreso, although the Cape Town Principles were developed in Africa, and 
are claimed to be based on African experiences, the elitist and Western-
based composition of the participants at the 1997 Symposium limits the 
potential input of any ‘authentic’ and only normative standards, with no 
binding legal obligations. It is against this background that in October 2005 
attempts were made to update the Cape Town Principles in order to take into 
account the lessons learned, the advances in international customery law and 
legal standards relating to the protection of children’s rights in armed 
conflicts and how to mobilize a broader political and geographical 
endorsement. It is worth noting though that the Cape Town Principles have 
had a positive impact of raising awareness of the international community 
about the suffering of children in Africa’s conflict zones.  
 
Maputo Declaration on the Use of Children as Soldiers 1999 
In the context of Africa, the Maputo Declaration on the Use of Children as 
Soldiers of 22 April 1999 is an important instrument for protecting children 
in armed conflict.  The declaration builds on the Cape Town Principles and 
Best Practices on the Prevention of Recruitment of Children into the Armed 
Forces and on Demobilization and Social Reintegration of Child Soldiers in 
Africa of 1997, the Organization of African Unity/ Africa Network for 
                                                 
20 UNICEF (1997). Cape Town Principles and Best Practices on the Prevention of 
Recruitment of Children into Armed Forces and on Demobilization and Social Reintegration 
of Child Soldiers in Africa, April 27-30. Available at: 
http://www.unicef.org/emerg/files/Cape_Town_Principles(1).pdf. Accessed on 10/9/2010. 
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Prevention and Protection Against Child Abuse and Neglect Continental 
Conference on Children in Situations of Armed Conflict of June 1997, the 
Resolution 1659 (LX1V) on the Plight of African Children adopted by the 
Council of Ministers of the OAU in July 1996 Yaoundé, Cameroon.  
 
The Maputo declaration, among other issues, observes that the use of any 
child under 18 years of age by any armed force or armed group is wholly 
unacceptable, even where that child claims to be or is a volunteer. It calls 
upon the African States, to promote an environment that favours the safe 
and healthy development of children and to take all necessary measures to 
ensure that no child under 18 years of age takes part in armed conflicts.  The 
declaration requires states to bring to justice those who continue to recruit or 
use children as soldiers; establish thorough recruitment procedures in 
particular for determining age, ensuring the physical and psychosocial 
rehabilitation and effective reintegration into society of demobilized child 
soldiers, and ratifying without delay the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child21. 
 
Lome Peace Accord of 1999 
The Lome Peace Accord of 1999 was signed between the Government and 
the rebels in Sierra Leone to bring to an end the nine year torturous civil 
war. The violent conflict in Sierra Leone had indiscriminately killed 
innocent civilians including children. Over 10,000 children were forcefully 
recruited by the government pro-militia groups and the Revolutionary 
United Front (RUF) to take part in the armed conflict (Sesay, 2003). In the 
Sierra Leone conflict, children were both victims and violators of human 
rights. The Rome Accord became the first peace agreement in Africa that 
paid attention to the special needs of former child soldiers in disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration processes. 
                                                 
21 Maputo Declaration on the Use of Children as Soldiers of 22 April 1999. Maputo 
Declaration is available at: http://chora.virtualave.net/Maputo-declaration.htm. Accessed on 
15/5/2010. 
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The Lome Peace Agreement was however undermined by the fact that it 
traded peace for impunity by granting a blanket amnesty to the perpetrators - 
members of the armed groups who had presided over the campaign of terror 
in full view of the international community. As Machel has observed, 
 Founded on a false peace, the Lome Peace Accord proved 
unstable. The terms of the agreement were broken repeatedly 
and finally discarded when in May 2000; the RUF took 500 
UN peace-keepers hostage. The failure of the Lome Accord 
was failure of accountability (Machel, 2001:145).  
 
The failure of the Lome Accord, paved the way for United Nations together 
with the Government of Sierra Leone to establish a Special Court for Sierra 
Leone to prosecute persons accused of committing serious international 
crimes. The United Nations Special Court for Sierra Leone since its 
establishment in 2000 can be credited for issuing arrest warrants for Charles 
Taylor former President of Liberia who was subsequently apprehended and 
is currently being tried for war crimes and crimes against humanity at the 
ICC in The Hague.  
 
Reasons Why Legal Mechanisms have not prevented Recruitment and 
Use of Child Soldiers 
This section discuses the reasons why in spite of the international 
condemnation of the practice of recruitment and use of child soldiers and the 
existing body of conventions, declarations, treaties and protocols, child 
soldiering continues to be the order of the day. Singer (2006:143) observes 
that there is evidence that while there are more than one hundred signatories 
to the various conventions for the protection of children in armed conflicts, 
child soldiers are still present in roughly 85 countries around the world. To 
This section now turns to the challenges of legal mechanisms. 
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National Interests Override Children’s Rights 
One of the major challenges facing the international legal mechanisms in the 
protection of children’s rights in armed conflicts relate to the fact that most 
States Parties’ interests override the interests of children’s rights. An 
example to illustrate this point is the Optional Protocol to the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child on involvement in armed conflicts adopted by the 
UN General Assembly in May 2000. Several advocates for the protection of 
children’s rights in armed conflicts have expressed discomfort with the 
protocol maintaining sixteen years as minimum age for military enrolment, 
a position that was pushed by the United States, United Kingdom and 
Australia. Over a period of six years (since 1994) international NGOs and 
humanitarian organizations had campaigned and lobbied the UN without 
success to increase the age of recruitment to 18 years (Wessells: 234). 
 
While the campaign resulted in the adoption of the Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child which sets the minimum age at 18 
years, the protocol was watered down by state interests. A provision in the 
Optional Protocol was made to the effect that while compulsory recruitment 
below the age eighteen is prohibited, voluntary recruitment at sixteen years 
of age is permitted. The insistence by the United States, United Kingdom 
and Australia on sixteen years for voluntary non-combatant recruits 
significantly weakened the protocol (Singer, 2006:36). Interestingly, the 
United States which has not signed and ratified the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child is evidently instrumental in watering down the Optional 
Protocol which was supposed to be an improvement to the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (Obote-Odora, 1999:12).  
 
The danger with the compromise to accommodate the interests of the United 
States, United Kingdom and Australia, is that it provides an opportunity for 
other governments to continue to base their positions primarily on narrow 
military interests rather than on the best interests of children. More so, as 
Singer (2006) observes, the protocol created a double standard by 
prohibiting all recruitment of children under 18 years of age, but allowing 
the enlisting of volunteers at 16 years.  The exception raises the problem of 
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how one can draw a distinction between voluntary and involuntary 
recruitment. An observation has been made that although many young 
people do volunteer to join the military forces, not all of them truly 
volunteer in the correct sense. In many cases, indirect coercive mechanisms 
have been used to motivate young people to join the military institutions 
(Singer, 2006:37). The point being made here is that such an international 
legal instrument can be easily exploited by errant governments and armed 
groups to recruit and use children in armed conflicts.   
 
Conceptualization of a Child and Childhood: Challenge for International 
Legal Mechanisms  
The discrepancy between the restrictive definition and construction of the 
meaning of a child and of childhood undermines the practical 
implementation of international protection mechanisms (Francis, 2007:222). 
Cohn et al. (1994) observes that the universal definition of a child is limited 
and conflicts with culturally and religiously constructed definitions. It is the 
universal and rather Western-centric construction of a child and childhood 
that has been applied to the rest of the world. In most of Africa for example, 
the age of maturity is a social and cultural device by which societies 
acknowledge the transition to adulthood. For the purpose of participating in 
religious rituals, for example, a child may become an adult at age 13 (Cohn, 
et al., 1994).  
 
The example of this contradiction in the definition and conceptualization of 
a child and childhood in respect of Africa is evident in the Preamble to the 
African Charter of the Rights and Welfare of the Child which states that it is 
informed by the ‘historical background and values of the African 
civilizations’. Ironically, the same Charter defines a child in Article 2 as any 
person under 18 years, which contradicts the perception of a child and 
childhood across much of Africa (Honwana, 2006:52). Honwana, (2006) 
observes that the notions of childhood are culturally and socially constructed 
and vary across societies. While in the West a person below 18 years of age 
is viewed as a child, in most of sub-Saharan Africa, particularly in rural 
areas, where traditions remain strong, a person is regarded an adult once he 
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or she has completed the culturally scripted initiation ceremony marking the 
rite of passage into manhood or womanhood. This contradiction makes it 
difficult to implement the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the 
Child and other legal instruments for the protection of children’s rights in 
armed conflicts. 
 
The failure by the international community to adopt a mandatory 
internationally acceptable definition of the term ‘child’ partly explains the 
failure of compliance by the States Parties to international legal 
mechanisms. Consequently, this failure provides latitude to States Parties 
not to comply and to hide behind such a contradiction. This also allows 
States Parties discretionary powers to determine when to comply with the 
legal protection mechanisms for protection of children’s rights in armed 
conflicts. Most critically, the contradiction over the definition of who is a 
child makes it problematic to guarantee the protection of human rights of 
children and effective enforcement of the law (Obote-Odora, 1999).  
 
Domestication of International Law in National Legislations and its 
Applicability 
Another reason why international legal instruments have become ineffective 
especially in Africa has to do with failure by some countries to ratify and 
domesticate international treaties into domestic law.  During the 
negotiations of international legal instruments for the protection of 
children’s rights in armed conflicts, it is generally believed that when states 
ratify these international agreements they agree to implement them. 
Unfortunately, the ratification of the international agreements has not led to 
their immediate enforcement in contracting countries. Five reasons have 
been advanced why States Parties, especially in Africa, have been reluctant 
to incorporate international customary rules into domestic laws and also for 
those that have ratified and domesticated but do not enforce the laws. 
 
The first relates to failure by many states to enact national legislations to 
implement duly ratified international treaties due to state capacity limitation 
especially after the civil war that could have destroyed most of the state 
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institutions. In this situation, domestication of the international treaties to 
protect children’s rights in armed conflict may not be the first priority for a 
country emerging from a destructive civil war. 
 
The second reason is that some states enter reservations at the time of 
ratification of the treaty such as the Optional Protocol to the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child. These reservations render the ratified treaty 
meaningless and inconsequential in a practical legal sense. The third reason 
is that some governments evade international obligations by passing a 
national legislation that restricts or waters down the scope or grounds of 
jurisdiction provided in the international treaties. The fourth reason is that 
national courts have developed in their judicial practice a tendency to limit 
as much as possible the impact of international rules. As some scholars have 
pointed out, the issue of national sovereignty has been found to be a major 
challenge in the implementation of international treaties. This is most 
common in Africa with a background of colonial struggles for independence 
which makes most countries sensitive about how much power they are 
ceding to international law.      
 
The fifth reason is that most of the countries, especially the conflict prone 
ones, even when they have ratified and domesticated international treaties, 
do it to satisfy the international community. Most of these countries fear to 
implement the treaties because they are also culpable of child abuses. Most 
governments recruit and deploy child soldiers in combat. An example is 
Uganda which is the focus for this research. Government has ratified and 
domesticated almost all the international agreements for the protection of 
children’s rights in armed conflicts including the ICC. Surprisingly, the 
government of Uganda has been accused by the Coalition to Stop Use of 
Child Soldiers for recruiting and use of child soldiers (Global Report, 2008).  
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Lack of Respect or Knowledge of International Law Relating to Laws of 
Armed Conflict 
Another challenge in the implementation of international legal standards for 
the protection of children’s rights in armed conflict relates to the nature of 
the State being engaged and the nature of the armed groups. Most of the 
armed groups and governments, especially in Africa, are outlaws which do 
not observe rule of law (Wessells, 2006). It should be noted that most of the 
armed groups do not even understand international humanitarian law and 
international human rights laws governing the conduct of war since their 
forces are not professional soldiers. Rebel groups such as the Revolutionary 
United Front (RUF), former UNITA and the LRA are examples of rebel 
groups that operated, and some still operate, based on the law of the jungle-
‘survival for the fittest’. In such circumstances, most armed groups behave 
as if they are above the law. As Wessells (2006) has observed, the world 
over, non-state actors or armed groups never pay serious attention to issues 
of child soldiering, even when they are under obligation to do so under 
international law. 
 
Commenting about the inadequacy of the international humanitarian law, 
Honwana (2006:39) has observed that,  
The central challenge is how to make international humanitarian law 
understood, recognized, and enforced in places where children are 
recruited into armed conflicts on a daily basis. Even the current 
international laws and agreements requiring nation-states to prevent 
children under eighteen from military involvement are not widely 
known or observed. Beyond strengthening international laws, it is vital 
to reinforce local understandings and norms about notions of 
childhood and child protection from war… 
 
Lack of Adequate Resources and Moral Support   
Additionally, for the legal mechanisms to succeed, they need moral support 
and adequate resources from all the State Parties to these instruments. 
International politics has not allowed the ICC and other UN Special Courts 
to get the support they deserve in order to enforce international law. In 
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respect of the ICC, a number of influential countries have followed the only 
super power: United States to water down the international instrument. The 
United States that should have otherwise offered international leadership has 
refused to sign the Rome Statute and has gone ahead to sign agreements 
with some countries which undermine the effectiveness of the ICC. 
Commenting on the position of the United States towards the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child, Wessells (2006:253) observed that; 
The failure of the United States to ratify and accede to the 
CRC is a highly visible and noteworthy gap, since progress in 
protecting children’s rights requires the support of the world’s 
most powerful nation for the foundational child’s rights 
instrument. The refusal of the U.S. Congress to ratify the CRC 
reflects deep mistrust of international law and a wider belief of 
U.S. citizens that U.S. law trumps international law.   
 
Also, the Special Courts, such as the UN Special Court in Sierra Leone are 
known to be faced with many cases to handle and without adequate 
resources leading to delayed justice, which ordinarily amounts to justice 
denied. For the legal system to succeed and contribute to lasting peace, UN 
Specialized Courts such as the one for Sierra Leone and for Rwanda must 
demonstrate competence in delivering timely justice. The Rwandan 
Criminal Tribunal in Arusha has already come under increased pressure for 
being slow and biased in delivering justice to the victims of the genocide. 
The international community needs to unwaveringly support these courts to 
succeed and therefore send a firm message to the offenders against 
children’s rights that they have no hiding place in the world.  
 
Double Standards of the International Legal Mechanisms 
Another challenge for the international law in the protection of children in 
armed conflicts relates to double standards, and selective justice that is 
largely seen as the pursuit of victors’ justice. Particular criticism has been 
levelled at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) based on 
the way it has handled the prosecution of the people alleged to have been 
involved in the 1994 Rwandan genocide. It is noted that ever since the ICTR 
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was established in November 1994, it has tried only leading figures 
responsible for Rwanda’s 1994 Genocide in the previous regime and has 
failed to bring cases against the Rwandan Patriotic Front army officers 
despite having jurisdiction to pursue these crimes. In a letter to the Chief 
Prosecutor for the ICTR of June 1, 2009, Human Rights Watch observed 
that, ‘The tribunal’s failure to address the war crimes committed by the 
Rwandan Patriotic Front risks leaving the impression that it is delivering 
only victors’ justice’22.  
 
A similar accusation has been levelled at the ICC by the Acholi leaders in 
northern Uganda who would have wanted the crimes committed by the 
Uganda Peoples Defence Forces to be investigated and prosecuted. The ICC 
chose to focus on the LRA atrocities. It is argued here that the legitimacy of 
any legal system is derived from its fairness and its wide acceptance of 
those affected by it. Consequently, unless the international, regional and 
national legal mechanisms are seen to be fair to all and not one sided, they 
will not be accepted and they will not offer the protection of children in 
armed conflicts that they seek to achieve.  
 
Failure by International Mechanisms to Address Root Causes of Conflicts 
Another challenge to international law in the protection of children in armed 
conflicts arises because it fails to address the root causes of conflicts. In 
situations where civil war has become the only way of life, children will 
inevitably find soldiering the best option for their survival. The African 
situation perhaps provides the best illustration for this legal challenge to 
prevent children from participation in armed conflict. In Somalia and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo where the states have collapsed or are too 
weak to protect children, the gun is the best option for self protection or 
protection for one’s family (Obote-Odora, 1999). The argument here is that 
                                                 
22 The Letter from the Executive Director of Human Rights Watch to the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Available at: 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/163-general/47873-rwandans-
tribunal-risks-supporting victors justice.html. Accessed on 21/9/09. 
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the international law for protection of children’s rights in permanent war 
situations becomes unenforceable. 
 
The international community needs to do more beyond developing 
international legal mechanisms to protect children in armed conflicts. 
Significant investment by the international community should be devoted to 
prevention of conflicts and peacebuilding of war-torn societies where 
children’s rights are being violated.  
 
Conclusion 
The chapter specifically discussed the issue of child soldiering at the global 
and continental (Africa) levels. The chapter examined the child soldier 
phenomenon from the historical context to try and establish the genesis of the 
practice. It was established that child soldiering is a historical practice and is 
as old as warfare itself but has always been culturally controlled and regulated 
to avoid harming children in wars that were usually taken to be the domain of 
the adult men (Singer, 2006:3). This is contrasted with ‘new wars’ which are 
not regulated and do not respect the rights of children and non-combatants 
especially children. 
 
The chapter also focused on the definition and conceptualization of a child, 
childhood and a child soldier in the context of child soldiering. It is argued 
that the universalization of the concept of a child and childhood from the 
Western perspective conflicts with other cultures such as African cultures 
where the conceptualization of the child and childhood is culturally and 
socially constructed. Consequently, the apparent differences in the 
conceptualization of a child and childhood, makes the international legal 
protection of children’s rights in armed conflicts difficult. This chapter also 
discussed the methods of children’s recruitment and involvements in armed 
conflicts; why they are preferred by armed groups and government forces and 
how they are used.  The chapter further analysed the international legal 
mechanisms for the protection of children in armed conflicts and reasons why 
in spite of the existence of an elaborate body of legal protection, child 
soldiering has continued to thrive in most war zones. 
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In the final analysis, it is worth noting that whether children have historically 
participated in warfare, the contemporary civil wars in the last two decades 
have crossed the known limits in terms of destruction of innocent lives of 
civilians the majority of whom are children. The experience of Serb snipers 
during the Sarajevo siege who deliberately shot at children walking between 
their parents, to Rwanda where radio broadcasts before and during the 
genocide advised the Hutu Interahamwe militias to be sure not to forget the 
little ones (Singer 2006), to Mozambique and Angola and Sierra Leone, DRC, 
Liberia and Northern Uganda where children were indoctrinated and trained 
to become killing machines should compel the international community to act 
and protect children’s rights. The protection should not only focus on putting 
into place global, continental and national legal mechanisms, but should also 
focus on identifying and dealing with the root causes of the conflicts in the 
deepest sense where children have become the pawns. 
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Chapter: 3. Child Soldiers in the Context of Disarmament, 
Demobilization, Reintegration and Rehabilitation as 
Peacebuilding  
Introduction 
When the war ended, people said we should come out of the 
bush. But I was not going to come out with no shirt on my back 
and people looking down on me because I have no shoes… If 
there was no job and no money, no way would we come out--- 
we would go back to the bush and fight again (Wessells, 
2004:185)- Former Child Soldier in Sierra Leone with RUF 
 
Disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and rehabilitation (DDRR) 
programmes are considered standard features of post-conflict peacebuilding 
interventions. The whose objective of DDRR is to remove and dispose of 
the guns and other means of violence, disperse the fighters and facilitate 
their transition and transformation into socially and economically useful 
citizens (Jennings, 2008:157). Disarmament, demobilization, reintegration 
and rehabilitation (DDRR) programmes intended to assist former child 
soldiers in their transition to civilian life are often designed for the 
immediate containment, disarmament and demobilization of rebel forces 
(Honwana, 2006:136). However, the RR of child soldiers which forms the 
last stages in the processes of attempting to return their childhood is always 
the toughest undertaking.  
 
As Singer (2006:97) points out in the case of reintegration; reunifications 
with families often face the challenge of acceptance and willingness even 
after completing the hardest task of tracing and relocation. Rehabilitation of 
child soldiers is a difficult process due to the added psychological and 
physical scars that these children carry. Yet empirical evidence shows that 
without effective RR, former child soldiers could pose a security risk of 
more and longer wars since they can be re-recruited to fight fresh rebellions 
(Singer, 2006). Dzinesa (2007:77) concurs with Singer’s analysis and 
observes that poorly organized and managed DDRR processes always result 
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in increased violence, banditry and criminality as was the case in Angola 
and Mozambique. 
 
This research contends that the RR of child soldiers based on psychosocial 
support that relies on traditional and indigenous resources has been a 
neglected and marginalized field by the development interveners, the policy 
makers and scholars. Yet experience in war-torn societies such as northern 
Uganda, Mozambique and Angola shows that traditional and indigenous 
resources have played a crucial role in the RR of former child soldiers as the 
discussions in Chapter Six will reveal. The research is premised on the 
hypothesis that the promotion of RR of former child soldiers by providing 
psychosocial support based on traditional and indigenous resources may 
contribute to conditions of peace and stability in northern Uganda. It should 
be noted however, that by no means does this research argue that other 
aspects of peacebuilding are not important. Rather, it is observed that the 
provision of psychosocial support is very crucial in the RR of former child 
soldiers. Most crucially, psychosocial support is effective if it is based on 
traditional and indigenous resources rather than the Western approaches that 
have cultural and context limitations (Kostelny, 2006:19). 
 
This chapter explores how effective disarmament, demobilization, 
reintegration and rehabilitation (DDRR) of former child soldiers is critical 
for their successful transition into civilian life and peacebuilding. However, 
for the purpose of this research, the emphasis will be placed on reintegration 
and rehabilitation of former child soldiers. The chapter is organized in three 
main sections. Section one focuses on the DDRR of former child soldiers as 
integral elements of peacebuilding; the second section focuses on the 
conceptualization of peacebuilding while the third section analyses the link 
between DDRR of child soldiers and the neglected psychosocial dimension 
of peacebuilding followed by a conclusion.  
 
In this chapter, it is noted that failure to effectively reintegrate and 
rehabilitate former child soldiers is likely to constrain peacebuilding 
processes (Singer, 2006:183) and as such any attempts to build durable 
97 
 
peace in northern Uganda would require systematic planning and 
programming for the RR of former child soldiers. Secondly, it is worth 
noting that effective RR of former child soldiers is not an end in itself but a 
means to an end which is sustainable peace. Finally, it is also observed that 
most peacebuilding processes neglect the traditional and indigenous 
psychosocial supports to former combatants and instead focus on provision 
of the official top-down United Nations standardized one-off material 
supports that are normally short term; yet successful RR requires long term 
and committed support which resides in the local traditional and indigenous 
resources.  
 
It is currently understood by most analysts and scholars that effective 
implementation of DDRR of former combatants including child soldiers is 
crucial for successful peacebuilding of war torn societies (Singer, 2006). 
However, most literature on DDRR shows that these programmes often 
exclude soldiers under the legal age of 18 for military recruitment. What is 
also surprising is that normally these programmes exclusively focus on 
males, leaving out girls and young women who had been held captive in 
service of military forces (MacKay et al. 1999:111). The argument being 
made here is that unless former child soldiers and other ex-combatants are 
well reintegrated, rehabilitated and provided for by the DDRR processes, 
they are likely to constrain peacebuilding of societies emerging from violent 
conflicts. 
Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration and Rehabilitation of Child 
Soldiers as Peacebuilding 
As Jennings (2008:157) observes, disarmament, demobilization, 
reintegration and rehabilitation (DDRR) programmes are now standard 
features of post-conflict peacebuilding interventions in war-torn societies. 
However, in order to best understand the reintegration and rehabilitation of 
former child soldiers as integral elements of peacebuilding, it is important to 
define and conceptualize key terminologies within the context of DDRR 
(disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, rehabilitation) and 
peacebuilding. Due to the rapid proliferation of DDRR activities around the 
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world and the high level of importance attached to DDRR, a bewildering 
array of expressions and concepts have emerged used in the policy and 
practice of DDRR. As Muggah (2004:28) observes some of these concepts 
are vague, abstract and lack robust conceptual or normative foundations. 
Some of these terminologies include disarmament, demobilization, 
reintegration, repatriation, resettlement, reinsertion and reconstruction 
which are sometimes used by UN agencies, World Bank and donors 
synonymously even where these expressions have different meanings. 
According to Muggah (2004) definitions matter and unambiguous 
definitions allow for a clear and transparent understanding of the problem, 
the elaboration of measurable standards and benchmarks and determination 
of success. Consequently, for the purpose of this research, concepts of 
disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and rehabilitation are defined 
and conceptualized in the context of peacebuilding. 
 
Defining and Conceptualizing Disarmament and Demobilization 
According to Spear (2002:142), there are two types of disarmament: 
cooperative and coercive disarmament. Coercive disarmament is the form 
commonly practised by the victor or the intervention forces. Examples of 
coercive disarmament include India in Sri Lanka and the US forces 
intervention in Iraq. Cooperative disarmament on the other hand is 
commonly associated with peace agreements where there has not been a 
clear winner of the war. The success stories of cooperative disarmament 
include El Salvador and Mozambique led by the United Nations. Porto et al. 
(2007) point out that disarmament involves the collection, documentation 
and disposal of weapons, ammunitions and explosives. These analysts also 
note that disarmament is often regarded as an activity which follows the 
assembly of combatants in demobilization centres. They note that 
disarmament is central to any DDRR programme since the control of the 
quantity and type of weapons in circulation in the immediate post-conflict 
environment plays a crucial role in increasing security in the short-term, as 
well as contributing to confidence building of all the stakeholders in the 
peace process and ultimately reduces the possibility of reoccurrence of 
future conflicts.  
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Disarmament fulfils two interactive roles in civil war termination: a) the 
removal of the means by which civil wars have been prosecuted leading to 
prevention of reigniting of conflict; and, b) the creation of a stable 
environment thereby strengthening confidence and security building among 
the parties at conflict (Spear, 2002). Accordingly, there are five key 
elements that underpin successful disarmament and demobilization. These 
are; the viability and feasibility of the peace process and its aims, the 
implementation environment, the warring parties and verification. 
 
In terms of viability and feasibility, Spear (2002) observes that a crucial 
aspect of any peace settlement concerns the degree of detail provided to 
guide implementation. In regard to the implementing environment, Spear 
observes that in many ways the levels–individual, local, national, regional 
and international levels in which the DDRR are being implemented 
determine the success of the process because of their interconnectedness. By 
implementers, Spear notes that there is a need for the different stakeholders 
involved in the implementation of the peace agreement to cooporate for its 
effective implementation. The point here is that the degree of involvement 
of all stakeholders in the conflict in the implementation of DDRR 
programmes is crucial to the success of the peace agreement.  
 
Dzinesa (2007) on the other hand defines disarmament as a military 
operation concerned with the management of arms and ammunition-the 
tools of violence- in order to create secure and stable frameworks out of the 
usually volatile immediate post-conflict situations. According to Dzinesa, 
disarmament involves the collection, control, and disposal of small arms, 
light, and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian 
population.  Commenting on the danger of ineffective DDR Dzinesa 
(2007:76) observes that, 
Angola represents how ineffective DDR can easily cause 
antagonistic armies to recidivate. Failed attempts at DDR twice 
contributed to the resumption of armed conflict between the 
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Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and National 
Union for the Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA). 
 
In the case of the disarmament process in Angola, Dzinesa concurs with 
Virginia Gamba (1999) that without proper disarmament and only partial 
demobilization, any possibility of creating a unified national army or of 
reaching elections under secure conditions was precluded. The enormity of 
the task and the international pressure to hold free and fair elections as soon 
as possible without implementing prior obligations, which related mostly to 
disarmament and demobilization chores, was a time bomb for the disaster 
that ensued in Angola (Dzinesa, 2007:76). 
 
Vines (1998:191) points out how the United Nations failure to carry out 
meaningful disarmament during its ONUMOZ operation in Mozambique 
has had serious security consequences to both Mozambique and South 
Africa. He notes that while it would have been impossible for ONUMOZ to 
disarm all armed individuals, it should have efficiently destroyed those 
weapons it did obtain, especially when it became apparent that the new 
integrated FADM army would be far smaller than anticipated. In 
Mozambique, the ONUMOZ’s failure was tied to its weak mandate 
regarding disarmament which failed to spell out clearly what disarmament 
should entail and the criteria for its success. Accordingly, the mandate did 
not distinguish between disarmament and demobilization. Most crucially, 
the operation lacked resources to deal with disarmament issues of arms 
collection and decommissioning. As a result, Mozambique witnessed 
increased violence and criminality in the post-conflict stage, while South 
Africa up to this day still suffers a high crime rate and gun related violence 
as a result of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons from 
neighbouring Mozambique (Vines, 1998:205). 
  
The analysis by Spear and others is very crucial in the DDRR of ex-
combatants in war torn societies. The point that successful DDRR depends 
on the implementation environment is critical to the DDRR of former child 
soldiers in Northern Uganda in several ways. For example, the observation 
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that success in the implementation of DDRR is dependent on different 
levels: individual, local, national, regional and international levels is critical 
in respect to the conflict in northern Uganda where the rebel LRA has 
largely survived on military and financial support from the Government of 
Sudan which has been fighting a proxy war against the Government of 
Uganda.  
 
Sudan accuses the Government of Uganda of supporting the rebels of the 
Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) fighting against 
political domination and imposition of Islamic Sharia law on southern 
Sudanese who are largely Christians and animists (ICG Report, 2008:13). At 
a regional level, Sudan’s continued rearmament and financial support to 
LRA is likely to dissuade them from pursuing peace negotiations to end the 
24 year old violent conflict. Also, without political commitment to end the 
LRA rebellion through peaceful means on the part of the Ugandan 
government as well as the continued involvement and support by the 
international community, the conflict is likely to continue. More so, small 
and light weapons continue to flow into northern Uganda from war-torn 
regional countries: Somalia, DRC, Burundi and Southern Sudan which fuel 
and sustain the LRA rebellion.  
 
Suffice to say that most of the above analyses by scholars (Spear, 2002; 
Dzines, 2007; Gamba, 1999; Vines, 1998) are based on the United Nations’ 
formal and structured DDRR that normally takes place following the United 
Nations brokered peace agreement. In the case of northern Uganda, which is 
the focus of this research, DDRR programmes are being implemented 
without a formal agreement between the LRA rebels and the Government of 
Uganda. The government unilaterally set up the Amnesty Commission 
which is mandated to implement DDRR of former combatants who 
surrender or rescued abducted child soldiers. With support of the 
international agencies including the United Nations and development 
partners; the Amnesty Commission has been engaged in the DDRR of 
former combatants including formerly abducted child soldiers. 
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Consequently, Spears’ five aspects of disarmament and demobilization do 
not apply generally in the Ugandan context. 
 
Porto et al. (2007) observation that disarmament is central to DDRR since 
the control of weapons in circulation in post-conflict environments increases 
security and reduces the possibility of future wars is relevant to 
peacebuilding processes generally. However, this analysis is most valid 
when subjected to the usual United Nations sponsored processes of DDRR 
which involves peace negotiations leading to a peace agreement. It is not 
applicable to the DDRR going on in northern Uganda, the focus of this 
research. In northern Uganda, the DDRR is taking place with no peace 
agreement, no international observers and the majority of the ex-combatants 
are formerly abducted children who have either been rescued by the 
government army or have escaped from LRA captivity. Most importantly, 
the war between the government and the LRA is still going on although 
presently it is being fought on foreign soil: the DRC, Central African 
Republic and Southern Sudan where the LRA relocated in July 2006 at the 
start of the now collapsed Juba peace negotiations in Southern Sudan.  
 
Ozerdem (2002:961), drawing on the experience of DDR in Afghanistan, 
points out that disarmament does not ensure a total collection and disposal 
of arms which in most cases is the expectation. To Ozerdem, the real 
importance of disarmament is perhaps more at a symbolic level and the task 
of disarmament in war to peace transitions tends to be sensitive, testing the 
commitment of all the parties in the peace process. This sensitivity arises 
partly from its significant relationship with security. He argues that while 
disarmament is the first step in establishing a secure environment, there is 
no automatic or inherent relationship between the process of disarmament 
and the creation of a secure environment. Consequently, Ozerdem notes that 
as the cases of Liberia and El Salvador and Haiti show disarmament, 
whether voluntary or coercive, on its own is not sufficient to eradicate or 
permanently remove the means of violence in the short to medium term.  
 
103 
 
Accordingly, porous borders with countries with active weapon markets; 
lack of capacity to enforce regulations; criminal use of weapons; political, 
economic or security climates which enhance the security and economic 
value of owning and using a weapon make disarmament a difficult 
undertaking. Ozerdem advises that since peace agreements are vehicles for 
initiating disarmament, it is important that peace agreements specify the 
timing and scope of disarmament as well as procedural issues such as the 
sequence of disarmament and the extent to which it can be inspected, the 
ratio or proportion of forces to be disarmed at each stage and the disposal of 
weapons and its supervision (Ozerdem, 2002:966). Ozerdem makes a 
convincing analysis that disarmament alone cannot ensure a secure 
environment in war-torn societies. Based on this analysis, it becomes 
evident that other factors must be taken into consideration including the 
economic, political and regional security environment in which 
disarmament is taking place. Consequently, disarmament must be done 
within the holistic context of DDRR that takes care of all the necessary 
conditions. 
 
The problem with Ozerdem’s views on disarmament in the context of a 
peace agreement is that they are not relevant to the conflict in northern 
Uganda which is the focus of this study. As already noted above, DDRR 
processes are being implemented unilaterally by the Government of Uganda 
without a peace agreement with the rebel LRA. Nevertheless, the issue of 
porous borders with active arms markets in neighbouring countries which 
are also experiencing civil wars, such as Burundi and DRC and prevailing 
economic and political environments in which disarmament is taking place 
are both found to be critical factors to consider in respect to DDRR of ex-
combatants including former child soldiers in northern Uganda.  
 
It is also worth noting that achieving a stable peace in the post-war torn 
society is dependent on how well the former combatants have been 
demobilized. According to Verhey (2001:6) demobilization refers to a 
formal exercise or a variety of informal occasions. Formal demobilization, 
including child soldiers, usually follows a peace agreement but may also 
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occur as part of a military restructuring or military victory after the conflict. 
Informal demobilization may include situations where child soldiers escape 
from or are released by their armed group either spontaneously or because 
of advocacy pressure. In the case of demobilization of child soldiers, Verhey 
notes that the exercise may be involuntary for many child soldiers may fear 
the transition from military to civilian life and an unknown future. 
Consequently, he observes, that during the demobilization process, it is 
imperative to gain support and encouragement of military and civilian 
officials as well as families and communities. 
 
 Noteworthy is that former child soldiers themselves can play a variable role 
of counselling their peers (Verhey, 2001). Verhey’s point is valid in respect 
of the demobilized former child soldiers in northern Uganda where former 
child soldiers associations are providing counselling to their peers and 
members of the community who are traumatized (Focus Group discussion 
with members of KICA Ber Youth Group). Some of the former child 
soldiers have been officially demobilized by the Amnesty Commission 
which provides to them a one-off, inadequate subsistence as part of the 
reintegration package which includes transport to their homes. During the 
fieldwork, it was established that most of the former child soldiers are 
surviving by belonging to self-help associations which are providing 
counselling services and soft loans to start income generating activities.23  
 
Muggah (2004:31), on the other hand, defines demobilization as the formal 
and usually controlled identification, registration and discharge of active 
combatants from regular or irregular forces. Regular forces are used here to 
mean soldiers serving in the government army, while irregular forces refers 
to forces such as guerrilla or militia groups. Accordingly, the objectives of 
demobilization include efficient massing of ex-combatants together in 
encampment sites designed for this purpose and their registration. 
                                                 
23During the field work in northern Uganda, it was found out that several former child soldiers 
have formed associations where they are engaged in income generating activities. The 
associations also provide counselling services to their members who are experiencing 
psychological problems. Fieldwork was conducted in northern Uganda from December 2008 
to March 2009. 
105 
 
Demobilization sometimes includes disarmament although it is primarily 
concerned with registration of former soldiers as part of a security sector 
reform initiative or ex-combatants in post-conflict situations. It involves 
distribution to ex-combatants of non-transferable identification cards, the 
collection of relevant demographic and socio-economic information into a 
data base, and sometimes health screening, orientation and facilitation of 
transport to a new site (Muggah, 2004).  Muggah’s definition and 
conceptualization of demobilization is relevant to Uganda’s situation except 
that in the case of Uganda, demobilization of child soldiers has not focused 
on their disarmament.  
 
The United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Office (UNDPKO) 
observes that demobilization involves the assembly, quartering, 
disarmament, administration and discharge of former combatants, who may 
receive compensation and other assistance to support their transition to 
civilian life.24  In the case of the war in northern Uganda, the government, 
through the Amnesty Commission, has been providing resettlement 
packages and amnesty certifications to the ex-combatants who surrender 
(they do not necessarily assemble at any one particular place); hand in their 
guns and renounce violence. This means that demobilization can be context 
specific based on the prevailing realities on the ground in any particular 
conflict situation.  
 
In respect to the DDRR of child soldiers, Singer (2006:188) observes that it 
is now believed that the process of turning a child soldier back into a child 
must take place in three main phases. Phase one is disarmament and 
demobilization; phase two is rehabilitation of both the physical and 
psychological realms and the third phase is reintegration with families and 
communities. According to Singer, reintegration must include a sustained 
follow-up support including self-capacity building and long term 
                                                 
24 United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (1999). Disarmament, 
Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in a Peacekeeping Environment: 
Principles and Guidelines. Available at: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/lessons/DD&R.pdf 
Accessed on 27/10/09. 
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counselling. Analysts note that the time requirement for each phase varies 
although there is a general consensus that the overall process must be 
measured in terms of months rather than weeks or days as normally happens 
in most official DDRR processes due to lack of resources or improper 
attention to needs (Singer, 2006). 
 
 Like Spear, Singer’s analysis of DDRR is the one that is formally 
conducted based on the UN standard procedures which is not the case in 
northern Uganda. In northern Uganda some of the former child soldiers 
escaped from the LRA and simply walked directly home and reintegrated 
themselves with their families and communities. Other children are captured 
in combat and are taken to the military barracks from where they are taken 
to reception centres for initial rehabilitation and finally reintegrated with 
their families. This means that demobilization does not necessary follow a 
particular procedure which calls for flexibility and being context specific by 
the interveners in different situations. 
 
Defining and Conceptualizing Reintegration and Rehabilitation   
UNDPKO defines reintegration as measures provided to former combatants 
that would increase the potential for them, and their families, economic and 
social reintegration into civil society25. Accordingly, reintegration 
programmes include cash assistance or compensation in kind, as well as 
vocational training and income generation. On the other hand, Singer 
(2006:160) defines reintegration as a reciprocal process that includes not 
only the adoption of former soldiers but also the rebuilding of healthy 
families and communities, without which former soldiers have few positive 
roles and options (Singer, 2006:160). Singer further observes that the 
reintegration of child soldiers is the final stage in the process of attempting 
to return childhood to young soldiers. As such, reintegration of child 
soldiers involves a process of re-introducing the children back to their 
homes or communities, so that they can rejoin society on positive terms.  
 
                                                 
25 Ibid. 
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According to Jareg (2005:1) rehabilitation of child soldiers means to restore 
the child’s functioning ‘as it was’ before their experiences-but this will be a 
well-nigh impossible task in the case of those who have been with armed 
forces for many years. Rehabilitation is supposed to be an organized 
process which follows children’s demobilization, escape, or capture and 
then release by another armed force. It is a process of re-orientation with 
people who have received special training to facilitate the re-adjustment 
processes. 
 
Jennings (2008:157) defines reintegration as ‘the process by which ex-
combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable empowerment and 
income... social and economic process... primarily taking place in 
communities at local level... part of the general development of a country 
(that) often necessitates long-term external assistance’. Jennings notes that 
although reintegration programming tends to vary little from place to place, 
there is no such uniformity on what reintegration actually means and 
implies. Jennings, who critically analyzes reintegration process in Liberia, 
points out that in the absence of critical thinking on the social, economic and 
political project that the reintegration concept seems to promote, 
reintegration in Liberia essentially meant temporary removal of idleness. 
Reintegration of ex-combatants in Liberia involved the provision of 
education or vocational training, a small monthly stipend and a set of tools 
upon course completion (Jennings, 2008).  
 
According to Berdal (Berdal, 1996:39) reintegration refers to medium- and 
long-term programmes, including ‘cash compensation, training or income 
generation meant to increase the potential for economic and social 
reintegration of ex-combantants and their families’. Berdal further notes that 
in most cases there is an overlap of activities for reintegration and 
demobilization. He however observers that the extent to which their 
interdependence is recognized and incorporated into funding and 
implementation is very critical for their long-term success. 
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Porto et al. (2007) who conducted research on DDR in Angola, observe that 
there is a risk of seeing disarmament, demobilization and reintegration as 
separate processes subject to sequential implementation. They note however 
that increased international experience with DDR has exposed the 
limitations of an uncritical sequential approach to DDR, exposing the urgent 
need for a better understanding of all the components (disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration) and especially of reintegration (Porto, 
2007:17). These analysts pose the question that, ‘If one’s understanding of 
reintegration is that it is the ‘process by which ex-combatants acquire 
civilian status and gain access to civilian forms of work and income,’ a 
process considered primarily social and economic in nature and with an 
open time-frame-What could be the justification of including it as part of 
DDR processes?  They advise that the long term nature of the process and 
complexities involved should not be underestimated. They argue that 
reintegration is essentially determined by the economic situation in the 
country and by the extent of co-operation with other development 
programmes and that this long-term perspective should be reflected in the 
mandate of the institutions involved. 
 
Kingma (1999) notes that while demobilization and resettlement might have 
to be implemented quickly; reintegration is by nature a slow, social, 
economic and psychological process. Consequently, Kingma observes that 
successful reintegration into civilian life depends to a large extent on the 
initiatives of ex-combatants and their families and on the support they 
receive from their communities, the government, NGOs, or foreign 
development corporation. Accordingly, in the longer term reintegration also 
depends on the process of democratization, including the recovery of a weak 
(or collapsed) state and the maturing of an independent civil society. 
 
Kingma (1999), like Porto et al (2007), warns against enthusiasm normally 
expressed by policy makers about DDR, particularly reintegration, and calls 
for understanding the very conditions that pertain in many war to peace 
transitions. These analysts concur and point out that in the majority of cases, 
DDR programmes have been implemented in places where devastated 
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political, social and economic structures are all that have been left after the 
war. They also note that in many countries that are experiencing protracted 
armed conflicts, state weakness and decay, poverty and underdevelopment, 
discriminatory political institutions and lack of opportunities are at the core 
of violent conflicts in the first place. Consequently, it becomes confusing, 
they argue, to use the prefix (re) for reintegration.  
 
Porto et al. further observe that successful reintegration requires that 
particular attention be made to issues such as political participation, respect 
for human rights, equitable distribution of resources, security sector reform, 
democratization and rule of law which are at the core of most conflicts. This 
analysis is relevant to the RR of child soldiers in northern Uganda which is 
the focus of this research. Even if most of the child soldiers were abducted 
and forcefully conscripted into the LRA rebellion, economic 
marginalization and livelihood issues have been cited as some of the major 
causes of the conflict. Consequently, reintegrating child soldiers into the 
same conditions that obtained before the conflict would not ensure 
sustainable peace.  
 
The limitation of Porto et al.’s analysis in respect of the reintegration of 
former child soldiers in northern Uganda is that they view reintegration 
from the usual official perspective and conducted within the framework of 
UN supported processes. There are situations in various war torn societies 
such as northern Uganda where DDRR programmes can be implemented 
outside the framework of a peace agreement and without UN supervision. In 
the case of northern Uganda, RR of ex-combatants the majority of who are 
children are being implemented without formal United Nations sponsored 
peace agreement.  
 
It is worth noting that the observations by the various analysts (Muggah, 
2004; Kingma, 1999; Porto et al. 2007) about the need for proper 
conceptualization of reintegration within the framework of the DDRR are 
crucial for effective reintegration processes.  This observation is relevant to 
the conflict in northern Uganda. The DDR of ex-combatants is generally 
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poorly articulated and conceptualized in the Peace, Recovery and 
Development Plan (PDRP) for Northern Uganda, the official government 
recovery programme. A closer look at the PRDP also one finds that the 
DDR component has not been fully explained in detail compared to other 
components. More so, the funding for the overall DDR is only USD 10 
million which is not enough considering the magnitude of the task at hand. 
The Minister in charge of the reconstruction of northern Uganda agreed that 
the component on DDR in the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan 
(PRDP) of Northern Uganda is not well conceptualized since during the 
design stage government lacked expertise in that particular area (Interview 
with Minister Wakikhona)26. The DDR component lumps together all ex-
combatants as if they are a homogenous group without consideration for 
peculiar challenges and needs of former child soldiers. What this means is 
that former child soldiers are likely to be marginalized in the DDRR 
processes.   
 
Honwana (2006) like Singer (2006) observes that in most post-conflict 
recovery programmes disarmament; demobilization, reintegration and 
rehabilitation of child soldiers are either forgotten or lumped together under 
general groupings of “ex-combatants”. Honwana, who conducted a study on 
the DDR of former child soldiers in Mozambique, found that the process 
excluded girls and young women who had been held captive in the service 
of military forces. She noted that transitional aid programmes assumed that 
these demobilized soldiers could simply re-enter intact families and 
communities although many had lost kin and their neighbours and 
communities were unable to absorb them. More so, boys and girls recruited 
at an early age had missed schooling and job training which made their 
future livelihoods unpredictable. 
 
In comparison to boys and young men, the situation of former girls/young 
women combatants in Mozambique was worse. Scholars note that during 
the reintegration process younger women faced gender related problems 
                                                 
26 Interview with Minister Wakikhona was conducted in his office in Kamapala in December, 
2009. 
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ranging from their sexual reputations to marital prospects which had been 
severely compromised by their captivity (Honwana, 2006:147). In spite of 
the neglect by the official reintegration, the families in Mozambique made 
concerted efforts to reintegrate the young women once they had been 
reunited with their relatives. The reunification of young women and boys 
was immediately followed by organizing traditional cleansing and 
purification rituals performed by traditional healers and by the priests from 
local Zionist Churches. Cleansing ceremonies reaffirmed family cohesion 
and support and tended to address the emotional and psychosocial problems 
experienced by child soldiers. 
 
Commenting about the challenge of reintegration, Honwana (2006:138) 
observes that, 
Data provided by the technical unit of the UN Mission in 
Mozambique (ONUMOZ) indicates that 27% of the soldiers 
presented for demobilization were younger than eighteen at the 
time. Child combatants younger than fifteen, even after 
fighting the war for many years, could not be considered 
soldiers under international law, according to Geneva 
Conventions. Ironically, the same Geneva Conventions could 
not be enforced to preclude these young combatants from 
being recruited into the military in the first place 
 
Singer (2006) further observes that poorly reintegrated child soldiers are 
likely to join criminal gangs which could result in increased levels of crimes 
after the end of the war; they may also hire their services as mercenaries to 
on-going regional conflicts, ultimately threatening regional peace and 
security. In Sierra Leone for example, Singer (2006:185) points out that the 
United Nations earmarked $ 34 million to disarm, demobilize and 
reintegrate ex-combatants. A small portion of $ 965,000 of the already small 
figure was directed to thousands of child soldiers. Singer warns that the 
implications of neglecting child soldiers are long-lasting societal 
repercussions, including extremely high levels of banditry and crime as was 
the case in Mozambique in the decade following the end of war.   
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The observations by Singer (2006) and Honwana (2006) about 
marginalization of child soldiers in most DDRR programmes is critical and 
is relevant to the situation in northern Uganda.  In a situation where DDR 
does not specifically target former child soldiers, it becomes clear that this 
category is likely to be sidelined27. Moreover, since the LRA has not 
officially disbanded, and with the majority of the fighters still engaged in 
active combat operations, most of the ex-combatants to be demobilized are 
currently former child soldiers. Consequently, the RR of former child 
soldiers should have informed the design process of the PRDP.  Further, 
Honwana’s findings about the relevance of cultural and traditional practices 
in the reintegration of former child soldiers in Mozambique resembles the 
traditional practices that are being relied upon in the RR of former child 
soldiers in northern Uganda. In northern Uganda, while the RR of child 
soldiers is not well documented, when formerly abducted children leave the 
reception centres their families and communities, with support by the 
cultural institutions, organize traditional ceremonies and rituals to welcome 
them home.  
 
Singer (2006:200) who observes that reintegration is the final stage of 
returning childhood to child soldiers argues that the ideal outcome for the 
reintegration process is to return them to their families. Singer further notes 
that the family helps former child soldiers to recover from Post Traumatic 
Stress Disorder (PTSD).  He, however, points out that family reunification 
in most cases faces several challenges which include acceptance and 
willingness of some families to take these children in after a very difficult 
task of tracing families and relocation of children. A survey conducted in 
Africa shows that 80% of parents regarded former child soldiers a threat to 
society and did not want their children to mix with them (Singer, 
2006:2001). Consequently, Singer advises that in order to ensure 
                                                 
27 According to the PRDP, most of the reporters (reporters is a term that has been used to 
mean all ex-combatants in northern Uganda who are undergoing DDRR) were abducted 
against their will and forced to join the rebellion. Of the total number of reporters from the 
north, 5677 are children below 18 years of age. The PRDP further notes that in their captivity 
these children have been through a lot of indoctrination and violence including being forced 
to kill their own relatives (and neighbours), raping, and brutally cutting off lips and limbs of 
innocent civilians with the aim of creating public horror.  
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community acceptance which is critical for successful reintegration, a 
significant programme of sensitization should be put into place to prepare 
and educate the community on the challenges and difficulties that these 
children have gone through and the fact that they too are victims of the 
conflict. This is critical for acceptance especially in war-torn societies where 
children were forced to commit atrocities against their communities and 
families such as northern Uganda.  
 
Singer’s analysis of the challenges of reintegration especially family 
acceptance is true to most war zones particularly in northern Uganda. There 
have been reports in northern Uganda which indicate that family 
reunifications often break down resulting in some of the children living on 
the streets (Liu Institute for Global Issues et al. (2005). This has a lot to do 
with the behaviour that children acquired in the bush including the power 
that the gun used to bestow on them. When children come home they fail to 
cope with the authority of their parents who want to treat them like any 
other ordinary children. Two testimonies from northern Uganda confirm the 
risk former child soldiers pose to their families and society generally. A 
story is told about how an old man was hacked to death by his grandson (a 
former child soldier) when he asked him to demonstrate how he used to kill 
people in the bush. To demonstrate how he used to kill, the child picked up 
a pestle and smashed the old man’s head. 28   
 
Another story is about two sisters who were sent by their mother to harvest 
cassava from the garden. On their way back home the older sister told the 
younger sister who had recently been rescued from the rebels that she was 
tired and needed to rest first. The younger sister killed her with the hoe and 
proceeded home with the cassava and started peeling it for cooking as if 
nothing had happened. When their mother inquired where she had left the 
                                                 
28 Key Note Address by Hon. Henry Oryem, Minister of State for International Cooperation 
and Deputy Leader of the Government Peace Team who himself comes from Gulu, northern 
Uganda. He said that unless former child soldiers are well reintegrated and rehabilitated into 
normal life, they are a time bomb for all Ugandans as they have capacity to harm anybody. 
Hon. Oryem was speaking at a National Prayer Breakfast for the peace process organized by 
civil society organizations before the collapse of the Juba Peace negotiations at Serena Hotel, 
Kampala in March, 2007. 
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sister, the girl said that she had helped her to rest since she was tired. The 
girl was subsequently found dead some distance away from their home.29 
Consequently, Singer advises that aid workers should always ensure that 
both former child soldiers and parents are prepared for such challenges 
before reintegration by emphasizing reconciliation and healing. Another 
challenge for reintegration identified by Singer (2006) is when the children 
come home to find that they lost whole families during the war or they are 
not able to trace their families. In this case, he notes, arrangements should 
be designed to respond to such a scenario even before the need arises. 
Singer proposes that children’s homes should be established where children 
live together under the supervision of a mentor while at the same time they 
are provided with educational and vocational training programmes.  
 
Singer’s proposal for the children’s home should however be approached 
with caution and implemented as a temporary measure. Children whose 
parents have died have been found to do better if they are supported to stay 
with their close relatives than those brought up in institutionalized homes. 
Commenting on the dangers of institutionalized homes for separated 
children, Petty and Jareg (1998:150) observe that,  
...whatever circumstances of separation, for the children 
themselves, removal from family, clan, and community can 
have serious long-term consequences. Besides developmental, 
psychological and child rights concerns, that are associated 
with institutional care, ….loss of a family name and place of 
origin deprives children of the links they need in many 
societies to establish a foothold in the adult world. 
 
Singer also advises that in order to achieve successful reintegration, effort 
should be made to overcome the stigma and stereotypes that often surround 
ex-child soldiers. He advises that there is a need for society to acknowledge 
that the children were also the victims of the armed violence. Singer’s 
observation is relevant to the situation in northern Uganda, where the recent 
                                                 
29 Ibid. 
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study found that name calling and abuses directed at former young women 
soldiers is stigmatizing them and making it difficult to reintegrate fully (Liu 
Institute for Global Issues et al. 2005:35). 
 
Brett et al. (2004:99) identify several challenges associated with 
demobilization and reintegration of former child soldiers, particularly of 
girls. They observe that problems arise for girls’ demobilization and 
reintegration when the conflict ends. For example, most girl soldiers do not 
go through the official demobilization processes for a number of reasons 
including the fact that most armed groups do not consider girls part of their 
fighters. Also, most former girl combatants dodge official demobilization 
for fear of public opinion and shame that they were used as sexual slaves 
and concubines of commanders which could jeopardize future prospects for 
marriage. 
 
Since most girls do not make it through the demobilization processes, there 
is always lack of accurate figures about their real numbers and of child 
soldiers generally which affects planning for their effective reintegration. 
Brett et al. cite the example of Sierra Leone where it is reported that 8% of 
demobilized soldiers were female with only 3% of demobilized child 
soldiers being girls in the most recent phase. As part of reintegration process 
in Sierra Leone, school fees was waived for child soldiers who had a 
demobilisation number and the schools which accepted these children 
received packages of materials accessed by all students. In this case, girl 
soldiers who did not formally demobilize did not receive school fees waiver 
nor did they bring any benefits to the schools.   
 
The issue of marginalization of former girl soldiers raised by Brett et al. 
supported by Honwana (2006) and Singer (2006) is crucial and should 
always inform overall planning and programming by policy makers and 
international agencies involved in DDRR of former child soldiers. Former 
girl soldiers suffer a lot because of their gender by performing multiple roles 
during the armed conflicts. They are used as combatants, cooks, sex slaves 
and many of them end up having unwanted pregnancies and sometimes 
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sexually transmitted diseases. It is imperative therefore that former girl 
soldiers are not marginalized during DDRR processes. This analysis is true 
in respect to northern Uganda, the focus for this research, where most 
formerly abducted girls have not been successfully reintegrated forcing 
some of them to resort to prostitution in towns (Liu Institute for Global 
Issues et al. 2005:35).  
 
During the field work in northern Uganda, it was established that most 
parents are ready to receive back their abducted daughters without the 
babies they conceived and produced in the bush. Most of them are told to 
first take the children to their fathers and then come back. Faced with 
rejection of their families because of the children they came back with from 
the bush, most of these young women have ended up in towns such as Gulu 
and Kitgum doing petty jobs with some of them ending in prostitution 
(Allen et al. 2006:26). 
 
Brett et al. (2004) and McKay et al. (1999: 53) observe that during armed 
conflicts girl soldiers usually get involved in relationships, become pregnant 
and produce babies. After the war, most of these relationships break down 
due to the fact that husbands cannot afford to support their partners or lose 
interest. The presence of babies normally compounds the transition of girl 
soldiers due to economic hardships. One such a girl observed that, 
The last time when I asked him if that’s the way to treat me, he 
only told me that now the war is over; we only got married 
while the war lasted---now that the war has ended the marriage 
should be ended too (Brett et al. 2004:100)  
 
Worth noting also is that in most post conflict societies, the job 
opportunities for former young women combatants are very limited than 
those of boys. Consequently, it is imperative that reintegration and 
rehabilitation programmes should take into account the special needs of this 
category of former child soldiers within the context of their culture. 
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Wessells (2006:180) advocates for provision of livelihoods as a key to 
successful RR of former child soldiers. He points out that there is a 
worrying linkage between poverty, conflict and child soldiering.  Wessells 
notes that poverty destroys health services and the well-being of all the 
children and sometimes obstructs positive options including access to 
education as a means of earning future livelihoods. To Wessells, although 
poverty is not a cause of armed conflicts, its enabling role is visible in the 
disproportionate numbers of wars fought in developing countries, 
particularly those with failing economies. He further points out that 
available evidence shows that some children have been found to join armed 
groups with the hope of gaining the otherwise unattainable wealth and 
sending such money home to help their families. Wessells gives the example 
of Sierra Leone where a combination of stigma, fear, and lack of livelihoods 
left many former child soldiers in doubt about their ability to reintegrate into 
civilian society. One sixteen year old former child soldier remarked that, 
 
When the war ended, people said we should come out of the 
bush. But I was not going to come out with no shirt on my 
back and people looking down on me because I have no 
shoes…. If there was no job and no money, no way would we 
come out....we would go back to the bush and fight again 
(Wessells, 2006:184). 
 
After the end of war, Christian Children’s Fund (CCF) implemented a DDR 
programme in Sierra Leone which aimed at supporting the reintegration of 
former child soldiers and peacebuilding. One of the testimonies of the 
beneficiaries of the programme emphasizes the relevance of the support 
provided by CCF on the livelihood and RR of child soldiers generally. A 
former girl soldier pointed out that, 
 
I was called kolonko (prostitute) before. Now I am respected 
and held in high regard in my village because of my business 
accomplishments. I can buy food. I save money in my cash 
box (Wessells, 2006:190). 
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The nexus between poverty, conflict and child soldiering is also collaborated 
by Boothby (2006:170) who conducted a study on RR in Mozambique. 
Boothby (2006:160) notes that Save the Children, which was instrumental in 
the RR of former child soldiers, among other activities organized 
apprenticeships with local carpenters, masons and other skilled labourers for 
older boys so that they could earn basic employment and business skills. CCF 
supplemented the training with provision of microcredit loans to former child 
soldiers who were selected based on their high levels of motivation and trust 
by their colleagues. Solidarity groups of 3 to 10 people who each agreed to be 
accountable to the others received an initial loan of USD 60 to be repaid over 
a period of six months. Loans were used to purchase farming tools, sewing 
machines, fabric for dyeing among others. CCF staff provided continuous 
training and follow up to the beneficiaries. Interestingly, the loan repayment 
rate was 99%, which contrasts starkly with the frequently heard comments in 
the field that ex-combatants are bad investment for microcredit programmes 
(Wessells, 2006:189).  
 
The analysis by Boothby (2006) and Wessells (2006) is crucial in respect to 
RR of child soldiers in northern Uganda. Most former child soldiers missed 
out on their education and now lack basic skills for the job market. During the 
fieldwork, it was established that most of them are struggling to survive since 
they missed out on schooling and have been integrated among equally poor 
communities that recently returned from IDP camps where they stayed for 
over 15 years. Consequently, as part of RR programming for former child 
soldiers, it is imperative to include provision for skills training including 
technical and business education to enable them acquire skills which can 
ensure sustainable livelihoods. It should be noted however, that economic 
livelihoods should not only target former child soldiers to avoid creating 
resentment from the community members, the majority of whom suffered 
greatly including loss of livelihoods during their displacement into camps. 
Creating an economic imbalance in favour of former child soldiers, would 
lead to community resentment which could further stigmatize the former child 
soldiers and constrain their reintegration (Interview with staff of Caritas).  
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Boothby (200:170) who conducted a longitudinal study on the reintegration of 
thirty-nine former child soldiers in Mozambique who were rehabilitated and 
reintegrated by Save the Children found out that all the boys were 
successfully re-united with their families or relatives. Underpinning the 
reintegration, Boothby found that traditional ceremonies organized for child 
soldiers upon return to the villages were paramount for acceptance by 
families, communities and individual children. In addition to traditional 
ceremonies, the study found out that sensitization campaigns that were carried 
out by government officials before the actual reunifications played a positive 
role in community acceptance of former child soldiers. Sensitization 
campaigns were designed to enable the community to understand that 
children too were victims of war (Boothby, 2006:173). Boothby’s findings 
regarding the relevance of traditional rituals and ceremonies have been 
emphasized by several scholars and analysts including Machel (2001). In the 
case of northern Uganda, the Acholi cultural institution Ker Kwaro and the 
elders have been supported by international agencies to conduct traditional 
ceremonies and rituals for the RR of former child soldiers across the entire 
Acholi sub-region. A number of cultural ceremonies including stepping on the 
egg and Mato Oput are being used to promote RR of children with families 
and communities.  
 
In respect of rehabilitation of former child soldiers, Singer (2006) has 
observed that it is the most difficult task since it involves dealing with both 
the physical and emotional injuries of these persons. Commenting on the 
rehabilitation of former child soldiers, Jareg (2005:2) points out that, 
When talking with children undergoing ‘rehabilitation’ I often 
use the metaphor of crossing a bridge between the ‘military 
life’ to life in one’s home and community to capture the 
process they are going through. This journey is not straight 
forward: there will be times of good progress followed by 
periods of very slow movement....... Indeed, sometimes there 
will be a complete halt and even active retreat. Fear, grief, 
anxiety, anger, guilt and shame, lack of confidence, 
diseases.........hamper progress. Determination, good health, the 
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comfort, love and encouragement ........are the best companions 
on this journey, which in many cases will be life-long. 
 
According to Jareg (2005) the children who need rehabilitation are those who 
participated in committing atrocities; children with severe physical and 
psychological health problems including those with disabilities. Other 
categories of children that need rehabilitation are those whose families have 
been destroyed or have rejected them for various reasons; including girls who 
have been severely abused and girls who have produced children while 
serving under the various armed groups. Jareg advises that rehabilitation 
requires that such children be given a period of intensive assistance from 
trained social, health workers and teachers in some form of interim care 
before being released to their communities. 
 
Jareg further notes that children who have participated in committing 
atrocities are those most likely to be troubled with more serious post-
traumatic manifestations and at the same time are the ones who are likely to 
face rejection or are at the risk of retaliation from community members. In the 
African situation, it is also noted that such children require some form of 
ritual cleansing to rid them of contaminating evil spirits before they can be 
accepted into the community again. The emotional implications are increased 
when children have been forced to kill, maim or rape family members. Jareg’s 
observation is critical in respect to children who are traumatized due to 
atrocities committed during the war. In any case, the intention of the rebels in 
forcing children to kill their relatives or community members is to make 
children perpetually guilty and alienated from the community. Jareg rightly 
observes that rehabilitation using traditional ceremonies is crucial in the 
rehabilitation of former child soldiers. In northern Uganda, traditional rituals 
have been performed to treat psychosocial trauma of former child soldiers as 
part of the RR.  
 
Jareg suggests six programmatic areas when planning for rehabilitation and 
reintegration of former child soldiers. These include; restoring family 
relationships; relationships with the community; children’s health-physical 
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and psychological; organized learning opportunities; vocational training and 
income generation; recreation and play. Accordingly, these aspects of RR 
ought to be integrated in a holistic manner based on a child’s rights and child 
development framework. It is also observed that during the rehabilitation 
process, children should be encouraged to take active roles in the planning 
and implementation of their own RR processes. The point being advanced 
here is that by children doing this is not only their right, but it can help to 
mitigate the feelings of helplessness, distrust and estrangement often 
associated with traumatic experiences. This is thought to be important in the 
RR of child soldiers since it gives them a sense of direction, shape, and goals 
to work for. Participation in the planning and implementation of their own RR 
is also thought to have an impact of completely turning around the ways 
children have been trained to behave in the military environment where they 
received orders that were not negotiable. In this case, children are asked to 
reflect, plan, explore, discuss and even protest. Most crucially, Jareg advises 
that different approaches to address various issues need to be developed 
according to the different cultural, social and political contexts one is working 
in and also the phase of the conflict.30  
 
By and large, Jareg’s analysis is crucial for effective RR of child soldiers 
particularly of girl soldiers. Her advice of ensuring that children become part 
of the design, planning and implementation of their RR programme is very 
relevant since not only does it restore confidence, self esteem and self worth 
to the traumatized children, it also re-humanises them and ensures ownership 
of the RR processes which is critical for its success. Jareg advocates for an 
interim care of children in a particular place such as a reception centre for 
them to first undergo rehabilitation before they are reintegrated with their 
families or communities. While one would agree with the interim care of 
children undergoing rehabilitation before reintegrating them with their 
                                                 
30 Jareg, E. (2005). Crossing Bridges and Negotiating Rivers: Rehabilitation and 
Reintegration of Children of Children Associated with Armed Forces. London. Coalition to 
Stop the Use of Child Soldiers. Available at: www.child-soldiers.org/resources/psychosocial 
Accessed on 27/10/2009. 
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families, it is important to be careful about the kind of interim care that is 
being provided.  
 
In northern Uganda for example, most of the children’s reception centres 
which proliferated during the conflict were using Western approaches of 
psychosocial support especially counselling by unqualified people which has 
been found to be contextually irrelevant and sometimes harmful to children 
(Bracken, 1998:4). Consequently, it is important to make sure that the interim 
rehabilitation given to children in the reception centres is context specific and 
conforms to socio-cultural settings (Machel, 2001). 
 
 Guyot (2007), commenting on the rehabilitation of former child soldiers, 
observes that the traditional DDR programmes have been limited by the 
concentration on their external aspects such as collection of arms and return 
of combatants to their original communities. She notes that the needs of 
children and youth who are subjects of larger narratives are always subsumed 
within other issues31. Guyot notes that shifting the attention to the children as 
potential implementers and partners in endeavours would place the issues that 
affect child soldiers at the centre of dialogue. She further notes that 
participatory exploration of young people’s engagement in the processes of 
rehabilitation lends itself to a more comprehensive view of the whole 
situation and yields an understanding which may prove useful in crafting 
more effective and welcome programming.  
 
Guyot further observes that the impact of the trauma brought about by the war 
is normally experienced not only by individual children and youth, but also 
impacts on social cohesion since it undermines the trust between community 
members formerly bound by complex extended networks that comprise 
traditional affiliations. Consequently, attempts to mend the social fabric bring 
the opportunity to address issues that are relevant to the community as a 
                                                 
31 Guyot, J. (2007). Suffer the Children: The Psychosocial Rehabilitation of Child Soldiers As 
a Function of Peace-building. London. Coalition to Stop Child Soldiers. Available at: 
http://www.child-soldiers.org/psycho-social/Linked_Guyot_2007.pdf.  Accessed on 27/10/09. 
 
123 
 
whole. Consequently, Guyot advises that RR of child soldiers must go hand in 
hand with other programmes for community recovery. 
 
Guyot, like Wessells (2006), advocates for economic empowerment of former 
child soldiers as necessary for their successful rehabilitation. To Guyot, 
continued social and economic marginalization of these children can only 
make for a lingering risk of destabilization.  She argues that community based 
strategies have the potential to empower communities to exercise control over 
their collective lives and to heal together. Facilitating community 
empowerment can counteract the destructive effects of wartime upon 
communities and the emotional lives of the extended families that populate 
them. She also notes that rehabilitation of former child soldiers should be 
mindful of the fact that recruitment and training of child soldiers is a process 
whereby children were conditioned to obey without question; desensitized to 
violence and indoctrinated. Consequently, the rehabilitation efforts need to be 
as comprehensive and should provide new role models to replace the old ones 
for these children.  
 
Guyot posits that in most cases traumatic experience in war torn society is not 
only experienced by former child soldiers who are being rehabilitated but the 
entire community among whom they are being reintegrated. Consequently she 
advises that it is important that planning and programming of the RR 
initiatives for child soldiers should be mindful of this fact. This observation is 
crucial in the RR of former child soldiers. Guyot’s observation that war 
destroys people’s socio-economic well-being and livelihoods of most 
societies emerging from civil wars making them dependent on relief aid is 
true in respect to northern Uganda. The suffering endured during the years of 
internal displacement during the war, the disempowerment, hopelessness and 
shame as effects of the war often traumatize whole communities. 
 
 In the case of Northern Uganda, which is the focus of this research, 
particularly the Acholi sub-region, where over 80% of the entire population 
were internally displaced into camps, most people are still traumatized by 
over 15 years of internal displacement life subsisting in very poor living 
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conditions (Liu Institute for Global Issues et al. (2005). Ironically, it is among 
these very poor and traumatized people that the former child soldier is always 
returned for RR. In such circumstances, as Guyot observes, RR programming 
should take into consideration the needs of former child soldiers as well as the 
needs of the entire society. 
 
Conceptualizing Peacebuilding  
This section focuses on the conceptualization of peacebuiling in the context of 
RR of child soldiers.  
 
As Jennings (2007:157) has noted, disarmament, demobilization and 
reintegration programmes are now standard features of post-conflict 
peacebuilding interventions whose aim is to take away the guns, disperse the 
fighters and facilitate their transformation into socially and economically 
productive citizens. While DDRR are standard features of peacebuilding, 
there has not been a standardized understanding of peacebuilding among 
policy makers, international donors and practitioners which makes it 
difficult to achieve successful peacebuilding processes. Richmond 
(2007:287) has observed that though the importance of a social contract and 
civil peace has long been recognized, peacebuilding approaches have 
increasingly been co-opted by statebuilding agenda that reflect a predatory, 
neoliberal, ideological perspective aiming to justify and enhance the 
governance of unruly others. Richmond further observes that Lockean 
liberalism, which aimed at the social contract between subjects and rulers 
over the preservation of life, liberty and prosperity, is heavily reflected in 
the intellectual discourses of conflict resolution and liberal peacebuilding. 
To Richmond, societies, groups, identities, cultures and welfare are often 
only rhetorically part of this discourse. 
 
Following from the above observation by Richmond, it is apparent that 
peacebuilding has been conceptualized differently by various practitioners 
who are involved in the reconstruction and recovery processes of war-torn 
societies. Yet, in order for the RR of former child soldiers to contribute to 
successful peacebuilding various stakeholders involved must have a 
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common and clear understanding of what peacebuilding is all about. This 
section engages with the debate about peacebuilding as conceptualized by 
several scholars and analysts. It is hoped that this section will contribute to a 
better understanding of the concept of peacebuilding in the context of RR of 
child soldiers.  
 
As already noted, analysts (Singer, 2006; Spear, 2002:141; Brett et al.2004; 
Ramsbotham et al. 2005) concur that unless former combatants (including 
child soldiers) are successfully reintegrated and rehabilitated into civilian 
life, they could constrain the peacebuilding processes. In most war torn 
societies, peacebuilding processes overlook the RR of former child soldiers. 
The neglect of RR of child soldiers often leads to renewed insecurity and 
ultimately undermines the consolidation of peace (Singer, 2006:185). 
 
 It is noted here that in order to understand the relevance of effective RR of 
former child soldiers as part of peacebuilding, it is important to define what is 
meant by peacebuilding. There is not yet an agreed definition of 
peacebuilding. However, Pugh (2000: 2) observes that peacebuilding can be 
construed as activities intended to strengthen structures and processes with the 
main aim of preventing a return to violent conflict. Pugh links peacebuilding 
with regeneration of war-torn societies. He defines regeneration as a process 
of social, political and economic adjustment to, and underpinning of, 
conditions of relative peace in which the participants, not least those who have 
been disempowered and impoverished by violence, can begin to prioritize 
future goals beyond their immediate survival. Within this linkage between 
peacebuilding and regeneration, Pugh points out that some organizations 
participate in peacebuilding because they have a dual mandate to adapt their 
operations by providing relief to lay the foundations for development. He 
notes that other organizations specializing in development programmes may 
design projects for longer-term economic and social development. Pugh 
observes that peacebuilding occurs alongside diplomatic initiatives that lead to 
a peace agreement. Consequently, Pugh argues that conditionalities for 
securing peace and its implementation have an impact on regeneration. 
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Pugh however cautions that an emphasis on regeneration during peacebuilding 
can restore the kind of neo-liberal development policies that perhaps 
contributed to the conflict in the first place. He therefore advises that the more 
meaningful difficulty may be in recognizing flaws in peacebuilding and 
adjusting accordingly which would include sometimes accepting defeat. He 
also notes that the conceptual baggage of peacebuilding is the assumption that 
external actors wield power and moral authority to bring about the peaceful 
change that communities have failed to achieve. To Pugh, external 
intervention in peacebuilding and regeneration of war-torn societies is based 
on technical fixes in the form of disarmament, law and order programmes, 
reconstruction projects, refugee returns and elections. Such approaches, he 
argues are less concerned to interact with local norms and dynamics at the 
grassroots than to produce inventories of measurable outputs at a strategic 
level to make way for regeneration of war-torn societies into the global 
economy. Consequently, this approach creates a pattern of development that is 
determined by dominant democratic and neo-liberal, capitalist ideology. 
Pugh’s analysis is supported by Berdal (2009:19) who notes that approaches 
to peacebuilding by the United Nations and in parts of the peacebuilding 
literature have a tendency to abstract the tasks of peacebuilding from their 
political, cultural and historical context. Berdal (2009) observes that, 
All too often, the result has been an ahistorical and static view of 
the challenges posed to the outside intervention in war-torn 
societies and a consequent failure to take account of the variety 
of ways in which the past constrains, shapes and imposes limits 
on what outsiders can realistically achieve. This tendency has 
encouraged a social-engineering approach to the concept of 
peacebuilding. It also helps to explain why external actors have 
persistently failed to gauge the extent to which their own 
actions, policies and historical baggage necessarily contribute to 
shaping the ‘post-conflict environment’, whether through the 
stirring of nationalisms or through the legitimization or 
delegitimisation of indigenous power structures, or by 
empowering or disempowering what are, for better or worse, 
key local actors. 
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Pugh and Berdal’s analyses raise important issues to consider during 
peacebuilding processes which include DDRR of child soldiers. For example, 
while external support in the regeneration and peacebuilding is useful for 
societies that are emerging from war, external prescriptions and assumed 
answers which often overlook local agency always cause more problems to 
such societies. Consequently it is imperative that external support should be 
directed to empowerment of local institutions and constituencies of peace 
within the affected societies and should allow the local people to be in charge 
of their future goals and destiny.  
 
On the other hand, Cockell (2000:15) notes that peacebuilding remains subject 
to variance in definition, interpretation and execution. He observes that 
peacebuilding has been the least examined term in peace studies for almost 
two decades and has now entered the international policy lime light as a key 
plank of post-Cold War global security. Its jump into prominence has 
outpaced the development of its meaning in clearly understood policy and 
operational terms. Consequently, this has resulted in relative absence of 
consensus among governments on the question of appropriate implementation. 
Cockell observes that the difference between peacebuilding and other forms 
of international assistance such as humanitarian aid lies in its emphasis on 
addressing the root causes of the conflict within societies. Cockell agrees with 
Galtung who in 1976 argued that unlike other approaches to the management 
and resolution of conflict, peacebuilding is based on an associative approach: 
peace as the abolition of structural violence and not just of direct violence 
(Cockell, 2000:16). 
 
Cockell advises that peacebuilding should not be confused with development 
as has been advocated by some practitioners. For to do that, he argues, would 
present conflict as a development issue and would suggest that the root causes 
of protracted violent conflicts are apolitical issues of poverty, resource 
scarcity and unemployment. He notes that human needs are perceived 
differently by different groups caught up in contemporary conflicts: intrastate 
conflicts which are fundamentally political in nature. He argues that the 
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operational objective of peacebuilding should not be expressed in a way that 
can easily be expressed as regular development programming, neither should 
it be restricted to nor defined by a specific phase of conflict such as post-
conflict. He agrees with the expanded definition of peacebuilding in the 1995 
Supplement for Peace which is currently understood by the UN Department of 
Political Affairs to be ‘a continuum of activities, which may be present in all 
phases of a conflict cycle’32.  
 
By and large, Cockell’s analysis provides clarity about peacebuilding. 
Cockell’s analysis is relevant to the conflict in northern Uganda especially 
about the clarification that development should not be confused with 
peacebuilding. In fact, in respect to northern Uganda, the focus of this study, 
government’s response to peacebuilding has tended to concentrate on 
development needs while ignoring the political underpinnings of the conflict. 
A deeper analysis of the root causes of the LRA conflict places political needs 
higher on the agenda. Consequently, to respond with development per say is 
to miss the point. However the challenge with Cockell’s analysis is the 
tendency to reduce all the root causes of civil war to political needs. There is a 
multiplicity of causes of most contemporary conflicts which are intrastate in 
nature. Some causes are external such as the negative impacts of globalization 
and external interference which cannot be solved by supplying political needs: 
democratization which is internal. To believe this would assume that if you 
have good governance and marketization as promoted by the liberal peace 
thesis, the civil wars would be resolved and transformed.  
 
Further attempts to define peacebuilding have been made by the former 
Secretary General for United Nations, Boutros Ghali in the 1995 Supplement 
to An Agenda for Peace. He stated that the goal of both preventive and post-
conflict peacebuilding is ‘the creation of structures for institutionalization of 
peace’. The problem with the conceptualization of peacebuilding by Boutros 
Ghali is that he uses the term by connecting it exclusively to the post-conflict 
                                                 
32 An Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping (17 June 
1992). Available at: http://www.unrol.org/files/A_47_277.PDF. Accessed on 2 May 2010. 
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support of peace accords and rebuilding of war torn societies (Lederach, 
1997:19). Boutros Ghali tended to view peacebuilding in terms of 
implementation of the peace agreement. Lederach observes that peacebuilding 
is understood as a comprehensive concept that encompasses, generates, and 
sustains the full array of processes, approaches and stages needed to transform 
conflict toward more sustainable, peaceful relationships.  
 
Lederach further notes that the term peacebuilding involves a wide range of 
activities and functions that both precede and follow formal peace accords. 
While one would agree with Lederach that peacebuilding is a comprehensive 
concept that encompasses all the stages of the conflict cycle, he seems to 
locate some of the stages of peacebuilding within the framework of peace 
accords. Yet experience has shown that peacebuilding can be implemented 
without any peace accords. For example peacebuilding can be undertaken 
even in situations where one party has achieved military victory over the other 
party such as was the case of the Rwandan Patriotic Front in Rwanda. The 
Rwandan Government is currently implementing peacebuilding programmes 
that largely rely on the Gacaca court system, a traditional conflict resolution 
and reconciliation mechanism (Reyntjens et al. 2001:128). 
 
Ramsbotham et al. (2005:215) have observed that during the last ten years, 
literature on post-conflict peacebuilding has increased leading a number of 
scholars within the conflict resolution field to revise their thinking about the 
complex dynamics and processes of post-conflict peacebuilding. Accordingly, 
the new thinking includes the idea that sustainable peacemaking processes 
should not be based on manipulation of peace agreements made by elites but 
on the empowerment of communities torn apart by war to build peace from 
below. These scholars observe that the shift in thinking has been in three 
major areas. First, there has been recognition that embedded cultures and 
economies of violence provide more formidable barriers to constructive 
intervention in post-conflict peacebuilding than originally assumed.  
 
Second, that in the specification of the post-conflict peacebuilding and of the 
idea that formal agreements need to be underpinned by understandings, 
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structures and long-term development frameworks that erode cultures of 
violence and sustain peace processes on the ground. Thirdly, that there is a 
need to recognize the significance of local actors and of the non-governmental 
sector, and the links with local knowledge and wisdom. Ramsbotham et al. 
(2005) note that their shift in thinking about peacebuilding was largely 
influenced by Adam Curle, who as a result of his experience of the ethnic 
conflicts in former Yugoslavia concluded that, 
Since conflict resolution by the outside bodies and individuals 
has so far proved ineffective (in the chaotic conditions of 
contemporary ethnic conflict-particularly, but not exclusively, 
in Somalia, Eastern Europe and the former USSR), it is 
essential to consider the peacemaking potential within the 
conflicting communities themselves (Ramsbotham, 2005:218).  
 
The conceptualization of peacebuilding by Ramsbotham et al. emphasizing 
the empowerment and participation of communities torn apart by conflict is 
relevant and convincing for achieving sustainable peace. The conventional 
liberal peace thinking of quick fixes by imposition of external interventions 
and solutions normally complicates and protracts the conflicts. More so, 
outside interventions most times lack a clear understanding of local context 
and end up being part of the problem rather than a solution such as was the 
case of the US intervention in Somalia in the 1990s. These analysts argue that 
in the new approach of peacebuilding from below, the role of external actors 
should be to empower local people of goodwill in conflict-affected 
communities to rebuild democratic institutions, and the starting point for this 
is to help in the development of the local peacemakers’ inner resources of 
wisdom, courage and compassionate non-violence (Ramsbotham, 2005:218) 
The problem with Ramsbotham et al. is that they generalize the local agency 
and do not specifically pinpoint the particular people of ‘good will’.  
 
In most cases the people of good will are women and children who are always 
victims of violent conflicts. It looks apparent that in the short and medium 
term, empowerment of these two categories may not change the power 
dynamics on the ground. Even then, some of the so called the ‘bad guys’ such 
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as the armed opposition could have been driven to the ‘violent path’ as a 
result of the prevailing conditions at the time. It may be prudent to engage 
rather than isolate them in the post-conflict period with the intention of 
reforming and transforming them into peace makers. This mistake was made 
in Iraq where the former national army was disbanded and later had to be 
brought back when the situation worsened.  
 
Paris (2004:13) traces the origins of the concept of peacebuilding from the 
end of the Cold War in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The end of the Cold 
War and the triumph of democratization and marketization enabled the United 
Nations, which had been bogged down by the super power rivalries, to take on 
more roles beyond traditional peacekeeping operations which were limited to 
cease-fire monitoring and could only be performed by military personnel. 
Paris observes that UN operations after 1988 focused on post-conflict 
peacebuilding which allowed division of labor between the UN and other 
international agencies to assist in rebuilding post-conflict war-torn societies. 
Such agencies include; NATO, the EU, OAS with the World Bank and IMF 
taking major roles in economic reconstruction of war torn societies. 
 
According to Paris, the distinguishing features of peacebuilding with the 
multiplicity of peacebuilding agencies in the absence of a centralized 
peacebuilding authority at the time was that they all pursued the same general 
strategy: promoting stable and lasting peace in war shattered states through 
democratization and marketization. Paris notes that the general formula for 
peacebuilding includes promotion of civil and political rights including free 
speech, free press as well as freedom of association, movement; preparing and 
administering democratic elections; drafting national constitutions; training or 
retraining police and  justice officials to understand how liberal democracies 
work; promoting independent civil society; promoting transformation of 
formerly warring groups into viable political parties; promoting free market 
economies; stimulating growth of the private sector and reducing the states’ 
involvement in the economy. 
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Another important change after the end of the Cold War was that international 
agencies tended to promote liberalization as a remedy for civil conflicts 
perceived as the triumph of liberal market democracy as the prevailing 
standard of enlightened governance across much of the world (Paris, 
2004:19). Consequently, in every UN mission in the conflict torn societies, 
planning elections would always begin immediately including market reforms 
which in most cases resulted in violence and democratic reversals. Paris 
points out that the agents of peacebuilding are the United Nations and its 
specialized agencies especially the UNDP, Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe, EU, NATO, OAS, Bretton Woods Institutions, 
National Development Agencies such as USAID, and Nongovernmental 
Organizations. 
 
Paris agrees with Larry Diamond, who in 1995 offered a paean to liberal 
democracy as a panacea for so many of the world’s problems (Paris, 2004:35). 
According to Paris, the bulk of recent research on the international dimension 
of the liberal peace thesis especially on the relationship between liberalism 
and interstate conflicts has generated a consensus that market democracies 
rarely go to war against each other. Another finding is that market 
democracies are generally less prone to intrastate disturbances. Based on these 
findings, Paris concludes that political and economic liberalization would 
appear to be a sensible and promising strategy for consolidating domestic 
peace in states emerging from civil wars.  
 
The liberal peace thesis as advanced by Paris and the United Nations and most 
of the neo-liberal theorists, has come under criticism by scholars and analysts 
including Richmond who see it as merely an extension of neoliberal ideas-
another form of neo-colonialism (Richmond, 2007:287). First, it assumes that 
market democracy is a panacea for all the problems in war-torn societies and 
so if democracy was to become a world religion, there would be perpetual 
peace. Yet where this formula has been tried in societies that are just 
emerging from war, it has caused more harm than good. East Timor, 
Afghanistan and Iraq are good examples where liberal peace peacebuilding 
has not delivered sustainable peace and security. The prescriptions by the IMF 
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and World Bank on market and democratic reforms as conditionalities for 
financial assistance to most countries experiencing civil wars especially in 
Africa have always led to state failure and anarchy. So one wonders how the 
cause for the sickness can at the same time be its cure.  
 
Other critics see the liberal peace thesis as another form of neo-colonialism 
top down imposition (Herring, 2008:47) that could provide a pretext for 
foreign intervention in the internal affairs of other countries. The example of 
the US intervention in Iraq and the mess it has created is a case in point. More 
so, the liberal peace thesis focuses on the post-conflict peacebuiliding and 
leaves out other phases such as conflict management and crisis prevention 
which are crucial in preventing the conflicts from becoming violent and 
destructive. In other words, the form of peacebuilding advanced by the liberal 
peace thesis for which Paris is an advocate is likely to dis-empower the local 
actors and could in the long-run create resistance and a fresh cycle of 
violence. 
 
Richmond (2007), one of the critics of the liberal peace thesis, points out that 
peacebuilding is supposed to both create and promote a vibrant civil society. 
He argues that peacebuilding receives much of its support and legitimacy in 
war-torn societies from civil society and local actors, in a sense that the notion 
of civil society acts as a validation of peacebuilding strategies and objectives. 
He notes that the key feature of the dominant liberal peace approach to 
peacebuilding represents a neoliberal marketization of peace, rather than 
engagement with the agents and subjects of this peace. Richmond (2007:288) 
further notes that this is a particularly Western and enlightenment driven 
discourse of peace, which is far from culturally and socially sensitive, and has 
little chance of establishing a locally self-sustaining peace. 
 
Richmond is particularly critical of the liberal peace thesis for ignoring the 
welfare dimension in peacebuilding despite the experience of liberal states 
that stability is easily undermined for individuals by direct economic 
difficulties (this was the case in Iraq and East Timor), welfare support is 
institutionally absent in most conflict zones, often supplied by NGOs with 
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meagre resources. He points out that ‘peacebuilding welfare policies would, if 
supported through outside means in the short term, support the creation of 
stable polities. The argument here is that individuals in these war-torn 
societies, knowing that peacebuilding entails welfare, might be more 
predisposed towards the development of a long-term peace process. However, 
this would require the engagement of an international institution capable of 
communicating directly with locals about their everyday needs, free of 
neoliberal prescriptions (Richmond, 2007:291).   Richmond observes that 
while the liberal peace does not discount the need for such institutions, its 
gradual insertion of neoliberal strategies into peacebuilding for ideological 
reasons or following the US and Western national interests have undermined 
the crucial link between welfare and politics in a way which undermines the 
liberal peace project. 
 
Pugh et al. (2007:1) have pointed out that in contrast to the traditionally 
limited activities of peacekeeping and peacemaking, peacebuilding involves a 
raft of intrusive practices intended to ensure long-term stability after, and even 
during conflict. They also observe that international assistance for transition 
has been elevated to new levels of administration, while often largely 
disregarding local bodies of knowledge and struggles against universalizing 
presumptions of a particular liberal-capitalist economic order. These scholars 
further note that the political economy of post-conflict peace and statebuilding 
in a liberal peace framework has involved a simulacra of empowerment where 
peacebuilders transfer responsibility to societies without transferring power. 
Most crucially, populations have been subjected to calculated techniques of 
discipline under liberal agendas requiring individual self-reliance; a loss of 
public goods and uninsured ‘surplus’ population may not be an overt goal, but 
it is a function of accumulation by dispossession and predatory forms of 
capitalism associated with it (Pugh et al. 2007:391). 
 
Pugh et al. make proposals for peace agendas that should facilitate a 
paradigmatic shift in negotiation of political economies of peace. These 
proposals include among others; that peace processes and peacebuilding 
practices need political roots in local societies, and that political communities 
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should have freedom to set their economic priorities including protection of 
economic activities from negative effects of global integration. It is noted that 
a new geometry of power should be assembled with its roots in local 
community structures which enables a constant feedback of local needs to 
decision-making. They further observe that gender relations should be 
renegotiated to examine ways of eliminating the post-conflict backlash against 
women as well as an ethic of economic regulation which should aim at 
reconstituting global economic regimes away from silent complicity in 
‘conflict trade’ and freedom for capital towards moral responsibility and 
discrimination in favour of the uninsured poor and that the ‘subaltern 
geographies of political economy-informal economies. Finally, these analysts 
advise that borderlands and transnational networks such as diasporas need to 
be de-securitized and their potential role in peacebuilding realized.    
 
Commenting about the post-war backlash against women, Pankhurst 
(2007:31) points out how the post-conflict environment is not one where life 
normalizes for women. Instead, she observes that the upheaval of war in 
which women have been transformed and livelihood systems disrupted, in 
which women have assumed certain roles for the first time or come into 
contact with new ideas, has its own impact on interpersonal relationships and 
social expectations. She also notes that there is evidence from gendered 
analyses of post-war situations in Yugoslavia, sub-Saharan Africa, Latin 
America and Asia which shows that women not only face continuation of 
some of the aggression they endured during the war, but also new forms of 
violence. 
 
The observation about the plight of women during war, peace processes and 
post-conflict peacebuilding by Pankhurst is critical and should inform policy 
makers and peace builders to engender the role of women and their needs if 
there is going to be sustainable peace in post-conflict societies. The 
marginalization of women in the peacebuilding processes in northern Uganda 
was evident right from the initial stages of the failed peace negotiations. The 
government peace team did not have women representatives while the rebel 
LRA had only one woman on their team. With pressure from the civil society 
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organizations and the international community government was compelled to 
appoint some women on the peace team.  
 
By and large, one cannot simply dismiss the relevance of the liberal peace 
thesis in totality. Underpinning most civil wars especially in Africa and 
Uganda in particular, is the whole issue of political exclusion as opposed to 
political inclusion and ethnic nationalism which are governance questions. 
Most importantly, one finds it convincing that democracies rarely go to war 
with one another and this seems to have become an established truth 
(Muravchik, 1996:574). It is also true that internal grievances in democracies 
rarely degenerate into civil wars because of the availability of several 
channels to articulate and address grievances such as political parties and civil 
society. Consequently, one can safely argue that in spite of some limitations, 
the spread of liberal democracies is likely to increase the zones of peace and 
stability within and among war torn societies.  
 
It is also true that lack of democracy and the struggle for democratic 
governance including conducting free and fair elections is always among the 
root causes of conflicts in most war-torn societies in Africa. Political 
exclusion in the case of northern Uganda has commonly been articulated by 
the various rebel groups including the LRA in spite of its laughable 
democratic credentials, being a protégé of the Government of Sudan. What 
this means is that even if former child soldiers were well reintegrated by 
relying on cultural and indigenous resources, without addressing the root 
causes of conflict where democratic deficit is at the core, the possibility of re-
occurrence of a fresh conflict remain high.  
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The Neglected Psychosocial Dimensions of Disarmament, Demobilization, 
Reintegration and Rehabilitation in the Context of Peacebuilding 
To survive war is to personally and collectively deal with its 
aftermath-trauma to the body, psyche and soul, the devastation 
of communities and the effects on quality of life. The challenge 
for communities is to come to terms with what has happened 
and develop a renewed sense of present and future possibilities, 
and be able to heal as a collective. Yet, these are ‘soft effects’ 
because they are about people rather than institutions and their 
importance easily overlooked. Thinking about communities is 
seldom a priority of the international funding agencies and 
policy makers, whose efforts during the post-war period are 
typically directed towards reconstructing the physical, political, 
educational.... infrastructures (MacKay, 2004).  
 
This section examines the relevance of psychosocial support in the DDRR of 
child soldiers as a neglected dimension of peacebuilding. The section explores 
the magnitude of psychosocial support problems of children involved in 
armed conflicts, an element most often neglected in academic circles and by 
the official United Nations led DDRR and other post-conflict liberal 
peacebuilding programming (MacKay, et al.2004:33).  The central thesis for 
this research is that the provision of psychosocial support in the RR of child 
soldiers may play a crucial role in their transition to civilian life. And as 
earlier noted the research contends that provision of psychosocial support 
based on traditional and indigenous resources may be more relevant for 
successful RR of child soldiers into civilian life and peacebuiliding. Provision 
of psychosocial support based on indigenous and traditional resources in the 
RR of child soldiers is specifically discussed in Chapter Six.  
  
The realization that violent conflicts affect all aspects of child development-
mental, emotional, physical and spiritual has prompted scholars to conclude 
that successful RR of former child soldiers requires provision of 
psychosocial support (Machel, 2001:80; Wessells, 2006:39). This position is 
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supported by Article 39 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child which 
requires State Parties to take all appropriate measures to promote children’s 
psychological recovery and social reintegration. 
 
 Article 39 states that, 
State Parties shall take all appropriate measures to promote the 
physical and psychosocial recovery and social re-integration of a 
child victim of: any form of neglect, exploitation, or abuse; 
torture or any other form of cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment; or armed conflict. Such recovery and 
re-integration shall take place in an environment which fosters 
the health, self-respect and dignity of the child (Cohn et al. 
2003:131). 
 
Before discussing the magnitude of psychosocial problems that children 
affected by civil war face and the need to prioritize it in the RR 
programming of peacebuilding, it is important to define what psychosocial 
support is all about. According to Wessells (2006:190), psychosocial 
support or assistance is less about healing individual wounds or mental 
illness than enabling former child soldiers to integrate socially, to participate 
in the rhythms of civilian life, to be functional as defined in the local 
context, and to redefine themselves as civilians.  Psychosocial has also been 
defined as ‘...the dynamic relationship between psychological and social 
experience, where the effects of each are continually influencing the other. 
Psycho refers to emotions, behaviour, thoughts, beliefs, attitudes, 
perceptions and understanding of an individual. Social refers to a person’s 
external relationships and the influence of the environment on his/her well-
being (family, school, peers and local community) (UNICEF et al. 1997). 
 
Machel (2001:80) on the other hand observes that the term ‘psychosocial’ 
underlines the dynamic relationship between psychological and social effects, 
each of which continually influences the other. Psychological effects are those 
that affect emotion, behaviour, thoughts, memory, learning ability, 
perceptions and understanding. Social effects refer to relationships altered by 
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death, separation, estrangement and other losses; family and community 
breakdown; damage to social facilities and services. They also extend to the 
economic dimension, for the war leaves many families destitute, destroying 
their capacity to support themselves and maintain a standing in society. 
 
Prendergast et al. (2001:334) and Summerfield (1998:29) have revealed that 
at least 10 million children worldwide have been psychologically 
traumatized by war. Consequently, Summerfield (1998) observes that 
addressing the psychological trauma of children caused by war should be a 
cornerstone of their rehabilitation because time does not heal trauma. 
According to Prendergast et al. (2003) war related trauma experienced by 
children is divided into two categories: acute and chronic. The acute 
category is defined as a child’s exposure to single abnormal incident in 
which a child/parent relationship remains intact and the child, with the 
parents’ support, is able to adjust his/her perceptions and return to a normal, 
safe environment. The chronic trauma or Post-traumatic stress disorder–
PTSD occurs over a long period of time and includes a multitude of 
symptoms that impede a child’s ability to develop emotionally. A 
combination of circumstances such as separation from parents, combat 
participation and exposure to violence with unmet food and material needs 
result in personality and emotional alteration in many children.  
 
According to Singer (2006:194), a survey of former child soldiers in Africa 
found that 50% had severe nightmares on a regular basis, 25% suffered 
some form of mutism, and 28% experienced some form of paranoia.  
Because of children’s vulnerabilities, the experience of child soldiering 
often results in post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). According to Singer 
(2006:194) trauma is an external event that is so intense that it overwhelms 
the person’s capacity to cope or master it. In psychological terms, ‘traumatic 
stressors’ are those events that are outside the range of human experience 
and must be of sufficient intensity to invoke symptoms of distress in most 
people. Singer observes that because of children’s vulnerabilities or lack of 
coping mechanisms, the experience of child soldiering often results in post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). PTSD can result in both physical and 
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mental symptoms such as weight loss, depression, learning difficulties and 
changes in memory, severe headaches and stomach pains (Bracken, 
1998:39). 
 
Singer further notes that there is a worry that the effects of child soldiering 
may be magnified in children in the long term or that children are likely to 
suffer from what is known as the ‘exhaustion model. The exhaustion model 
is where even those who develop coping mechanisms to deal with trauma in 
the short term eventually run out of energy needed for copying with stress in 
the long term. He however notes that given the newness of the child soldier 
doctrine, it is premature and without scientific justification to conclude that 
child soldiers are forever ‘damaged goods’ or simply beyond rehabilitation. 
Consequently the need to support rehabilitation for child soldiers becomes 
imperative. 
 
Singer’s observation on PTSD among child soldiers holds true in respect to 
northern Uganda. A study conducted by UNICEF which sampled 741 males 
aged 14 to 30 years in northern Uganda found out that only three never 
experienced any traumatic events listed (UNICEF, 2006:10). The study also 
found that five percent of formerly abducted youths reported being haunted 
by evil spirits (cen) (UNICEF, 2006:10). The problem with Singer’s 
observation is that he prescribes the Western model of physical and mental 
health treatment for rehabilitation of children which has been found to be 
lacking and sometimes detrimental in other contexts such as Africa 
(Kostelny, 2006:10). 
 
Furthermore, a study conducted by Liu Institute of Global Issues et al., 
(2005: 39), found widespread psychosocial trauma in northern Uganda. 
Consequently, the study points out that communities in northern Uganda 
have adopted traditional ceremonies and cleansing rituals usually performed 
by cultural leaders to treat trauma among the former child soldiers as part of 
the RR processes. This was confirmed by Avola, the Coordinator of Ker 
Kwaro Acholi, the apex Acholi cultural institution during the fieldwork. 
Avola pointed out that most communities have been complaining of being 
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haunted by spirits of dead people in places where the rebels committed mass 
murders. Consequently, Ker Kwaro Acholi has been organizing community 
wide cleansing rituals and burying the dead to rid the region of evil spirits. 
These traditional ceremonies and rituals that involve ‘stepping on the egg’ 
and the slaughter of a goat are believed to cleanse a person, household or 
community from bad spirits (Interview with Avola). 
 
Arafat et al. (2006:111) who studied the impact of the Israel-Palestinian 
conflict on Palestinian children found most of them who had been exposed 
to fighting were traumatized. Arafat et al. (2006) observe that in order for 
children to develop normally, and be psychologically healthy certain basic 
needs must be met. He points out that children who undergo traumatic 
experiences of war usually develop special needs such as understanding, 
emotional resolution, and security, a sense of belonging and self worth.  
These scholars point out that war can damage children’s cognitive and 
affective processes and could implant emotional and physiological scars 
leading to distrustful and hostile behaviour and can prevent a child from 
developing into a productive and social adult.  
 
Through their research, these scholars found out that Palestinian children are 
under significant psychological strain as a result of violence. The situation 
of children was being aggravated by a widespread feeling that neither their 
parents nor teachers can fully care for or protect them which makes them 
less carefree children. Accordingly, teachers and parents have observed 
widespread trauma-related behaviour ranging from nightmares and 
bedwetting to increased aggressiveness and hyperactivity as well as reduced 
capacity to pay attention.  
 
According to Kostelny (2006:26) armed conflicts expose children to a 
mixture of discrete risks, such as poverty and lack of access to health care. 
Consequently, she notes that these risks can have adverse emotional, social, 
spiritual and physical effects on children. She notes for example that in most 
cases humanitarian intervention focuses its attention on ameliorating the 
impact of physical risks such as illness, lack of shelter and danger of an 
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attack. Yet most physical risks also have impact at the social, emotional and 
spiritual levels. Kostelny further notes that because war zones present 
multiple risks to children, their situation cannot be understood in terms of a 
single event such as displacement from home, stepping on a landmine or 
loss of parents. Based on the risk accumulation model, Kostelny observes 
that as risks accumulate the likelihood of damage to children increases 
exponentially. The accumulation of three or more risks can produce ten 
times, as much damage as a single risk factor (Kostelny, 2006:26).  
 
The impact of war on psychosocial well-being of children is also captured 
by Summerfield (2004:24) who noted that a study on Sudanese teenagers 
caught in fighting in southern Sudan and displaced to Juba from rural areas 
regarded as ancestral places showed the resultant loss of social identity and 
memory. No one could write a history of his or her clan and many did not 
know the names of their grandparents or the village their clan came from. 
Not one could name any traditional social ceremonies (Summerfield, 2004). 
The impact of war on the affected population is further articulated by 
Herman (1997). Herman (1997:20), commenting on the psychological effect 
of World War 1 on people in Western Europe, observes that, 
One of the many casualties of the war’s devastation was the 
illusion of manly honor and glory in battle. Under conditions of 
remitting exposure to the horrors of trench warfare, men began 
to break down in shocking numbers. Confined and rendered 
helpless, subjected to constant threat of annihilation, and forced 
to witness the mutilation and death of their comrades without 
any hope of reprieve, many soldiers began to act like hysterical 
women. They screamed and wept uncontrollably. They froze 
and could not walk....’ 
 
Based on the above analysis it is evident that psychosocial needs of war 
affected populations especially the former child soldiers who faced shocking 
traumatic experiences during the war is critical for their RR and general 
recovery of war-torn societies. It is unfortunate, as MacKay (2004) has noted 
that most post-conflict peacebuilding interventions overlook paying serious 
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attention to psychosocial support especially psychosocial support based on 
traditional and indigenous resources. The relevance and limitations of 
indigenous and cultural approaches are extensively discussed in Chapter Six. 
Conclusion 
This chapter examined the concepts of disarmament, demobilization, 
reintegration and rehabilitation of child soldiers that are commonly used by 
policy makers, donors and international organizations in regard to post-
conflict peacebuilding. As most scholars and analysts point out, most DDRR 
programming in war-torn societies have been designed using a top-down 
approach and in most cases without serious considerations for the local 
context in the affected areas. Most specifically, the DDRR programmes 
marginalize child soldiers especially the young women former combatants 
who have specific challenges and needs and therefore require special 
attention. The consequences of poorly planned, poorly resourced and 
managed DDRR programmes which are increased insecurity and criminality 
in the early phases of post-conflict were discussed. 
 
 Peacebuilding was discussed and conceptualized in respect to reintegration 
and rehabilitation of former child soldiers and rebuilding of war torn 
societies. It is evident that lack of an agreed definition of peacebuilding could 
negatively lead to poor DDRR of former child soldiers and reconstruction of 
war-torn societies. It was also noted that some scholars conceptualize 
peacebuilding that promotes the neoliberal ideas of the West: marketization 
and democratization at the expense of providing welfare support to 
communities emerging from civil war and often fails to establish conditions 
of sustainable peace. Because of its top-down approach without respect for 
local cultures and resources, conventional neo-liberal peacebuilding often 
leads to resumption of hostilities as was the case in Iraq and East Timor. The 
chapter also examined the psychosocial support of child soldiers which is the 
neglected dimension of peacebuilding.  
 
By and large, it should be mentioned that for DDRR of former child soldiers 
to be effective, there is a need for proper planning by policy makers, 
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commitment of adequate resources and commitment by the international 
community and respective governments to invest in long-term RR of former 
child soldiers. There is also a need for DDRR programming to galvanize 
support of all the stakeholders (international and local) and empower the local 
constituency and local resources which creates local support and local 
ownership that ensures sustainability in the longer-term.  
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Chapter 4: Conflict and Political Instability in Uganda: Emergence of 
Child Soldiers’ Phenomenon 
 Introduction 
Since 1990, Uganda has transcended an unenviable two-decade 
history of decline and trauma to reconstruction. When it achieved 
independence in 1962, Uganda was one of the most promising 
countries in Africa. However, twenty years of political strife, 
economic mismanagement, and armed conflicts left it devastated, 
with much of its infrastructure destroyed. Uganda’s long string 
of tragedies is legendary. Ten leaders have ruled the country in 
the four decades since independence, including Idi Amin’s 8-
year reign of terror where an estimated 500,000 people died 
(Shaw et al.2008: 214). 
 
This chapter discusses the political economy and political history of Uganda 
in the pre-colonial and post-colonial periods. It also discusses the sources of 
conflicts in Uganda with particular focus to the violent protracted conflict of 
the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in northern Uganda. The rationale for 
this chapter is to attempt to trace the origins of the socio-economic and 
political challenges that have persistently confronted Uganda’s quest for 
peace, stability and development for most of its 47 years of independence 
which are also linked to the LRA conflict and the child soldiers’ 
phenomenon, the main focus of this research. It is believed that Uganda’s 
political history and political economy are closely linked to violent civil 
conflicts that have characterized most of the country’s post-independence 
period (1962 to date), including the on-going violent conflict of the LRA. 
Consequently, a thorough understanding of the political history and political 
economy of Uganda and the sources of conflicts in Uganda would provide a 
deeper understanding of the child soldier phenomenon in northern Uganda. 
The LRA conflict has produced, sustained and aggravated the child soldier 
phenomenon in northern Uganda in proportions never witnessed before in 
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Uganda. It is this child soldier phenomenon that is the subject of this 
research.  
 
The chapter is organized into four main sections. Section one focuses on the 
political history and political economy of Uganda; section two is an analysis 
of the sources of conflicts in Uganda; section three focuses on the 
emergence of the child soldier phenomenon in Uganda and the LRA 
rebellion, while section four focuses on the consequences of the LRA 
conflict on child soldiers. To the political history and political economy of 
Uganda the subsequent section now turns. 
Political History and Political Economy of Uganda 
Uganda became a sovereign state in 1894 after the British Government 
declared it a British Protectorate. It should be noted however, that Uganda’s 
constituent parts pre-dated the British Protectorate since they were in 
existence long before that period (1894) (Kanyeihamba 2002:1). Before the 
British renamed and reconfigured the territory, what is now Uganda was an 
array of kingdoms-Buganda, Bunyoro, Ankole and Toro, and communities 
located in Lango, Acholi, Madi, West Nile, Bukedi, Bugisu, Busoga, Teso, 
Karamoja, Sebei and Kigezi regions. In other words, it was a heterogeneous 
area, with a variety of customary practices, social and political structures 
that were forcefully brought under one political rule (Moncrieffe, 2004:10).  
 
It should be noted that the different ethnic groups that were brought together 
to form the present day Uganda were at different stages of state formation. 
While most of the southern groups at the time were governed under 
kingdoms (Buganda, Bunyoro, Ankole, Toro and Busoga Pricipalities) most 
communities in the north and and east of the country were still governed 
under clan heads and chiefs systems (Moncrieffe, 2004).  
 
Commenting on the dilemma of the African post-colonial state, Francis 
(2006:38) notes that some of the states were carved  out primarily to serve 
the political, economic and strategic interests of the colonial powers and at 
independence were granted the ‘legal fiction’ of sovereign statehood. 
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Consequently, these states, especially the small ones, have demonstrated 
increasing vulnerability to security, and compounded the challenges of 
building viable regional mechanisms for dealing with peace and security 
issues.  The point being emphasized here is that because the colonialists 
forcefully brought together different ethnic groups that were at different 
levels of development without their consent to become one nation. It is this 
forced nature of state formation that continues to threaten Uganda’s political 
stability as some ethnic groups think they can be better off if they break 
away.33 
 
The British used the Kingdom of Buganda to conquer all the territories that 
now constitute Uganda and bring them under one authority: the British 
Protectorate. In return, the British colonialists rewarded Buganda Kingdom 
with conquered territories which increased her size, power and influence. 
Most crucially, Buganda was also rewarded with a special status both in the 
colonial and post-colonial Uganda for collaborating with the British 
colonists (Kabwegyere, 1995:70). This favored position of Buganda has 
remained a major challenge and threat to Uganda’s national unity and 
stability. For example, as a reward to Buganda’s support in the conquest of 
Bunyoro which had fiercely resisted colonial rule, the British gave to 
Buganda a large part of Bunyoro Kingdom comprising of several counties 
such as Buyaga and Bagangizi which were added to Buganda and that is 
how the problem of the ‘lost counties’ was born (Kanyeihamba, 2002:2). 
The problem of ‘lost counties’ was later to become a trigger of the 1966 
constitutional crisis which led to the abolition of kingdoms in Uganda and 
abrogation of the 1962 independence constitution. 
 
 
 
                                                 
33 The Independent Newspaper (2010). Mao’s Election and Secession of the Nile State, 
September 11. Avaialble at: http://www.independent.co.ug/index.php/column/guest-
column/68-guest-column/2590-maos-election-and-secession-of-the-nile-state. Accessed on 
11/9/2010. 
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The Dawn of Independence, Constitutional Challenges and Political 
Alliances as Seeds of Destruction 
Uganda became independent on 9 October 1962. Milton Obote became the 
Prime Minister with executive powers, while Freddie Mutesa, who was also 
the king of Buganda, became the first President of Uganda. The Uganda 
People’s Congress (UPC) led by Obote and Kabaka Yekka (KY) (King 
Only), a conservative traditional Movement that was pushing for the 
allegiance to the King of Buganda made a political alliance which defeated 
the leader of the Democratic Party (DP) Benedicto Kiwanuka. The 
Democratic Party was largely a Catholic Party formed to champion the 
interests of the Catholics who felt marginalized by the monarchy of 
Buganda. As such, the King was determined to neutralize the Democratic 
Party (Kabwegyere, 1995:206). Commenting on the UPC/KY alliance 
President Museveni (2007:34) has observed that this was not a true 
principled political alliance, but an attempt by both parties to use each other 
for selfish objectives. Museveni (2007:35) pointed out that, 
The UPC, which had no base in Buganda, was a protestant-
based party while the Democratic Party (DP) was largely a party 
for Roman Catholics (Baganda). The UPC and KY teamed up to 
form the first post-independence government through an 
unprincipled marriage of convenience. This was not a true 
alliance but an attempt by both groups to use each other. 
 
 The terms of the alliance agreement were that Buganda would have 
authority over other kingdoms as well as representation in the National 
Assembly (Moncrieffe, 2004: 16). Because the alliance between UPC and 
KY was based on political manipulation, apart from the short term political 
gains of denying the majority catholic party-DP electoral victory, it could 
not stand the test of time. Intrigue and counter intrigues that were inherent in 
the crafting of the UPC/KY alliance could not allow the alliance to govern 
the country. By 1966, intrigue and power struggles within the alliance 
government plunged the country into a constitutional crisis which started off 
a wave of political instability that successive governments have not been 
able to resolve. 
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The I966 Constitutional Crisis 
Political commentators on Ugandan politics describe the period between 
1962 and 1966 as the period of drama in the development of the Uganda 
Constitution (Kanyeihamba 2002: 73). Kanyeihamba has described this 
period as the transitional period in which the independence constitution 
went on trial and was found to be unworkable. The independence 
constitution created a hotchpotch form of government that was both federal 
and unitary. The constitution was vague on federal arrangement. Uganda 
consisted of five federal states (Buganda, Bunyoro, Ankole, Toro and 
Busoga). Of these, Buganda under the independence constitution enjoyed 
more powers and privileges than the other four kingdoms which had semi-
federal status.  The constitution recognized ten districts in northern and 
eastern Uganda as unitary. However, it was not clear whether these districts 
were unitary in relation to the central government or to the federal states. 
While the relationship between the central government and Buganda 
kingdom can be said to clearly federal, the same could not be said about the 
other kingdom or federal governments since the central government had 
more powers with regard to their affairs than with Buganda kingdom 
(Kabwegyere, 1995). 
 
The consequence of the confusion caused by the independence constitution 
coupled with Buganda’s favored status was political jealousy and the wish 
by people from outside Buganda to reduce its privileges and special status. 
On the other hand, the people of Buganda were ready to defend their special 
status and privileges at all costs. This coupled with the unprincipled 
KY/UPC political alliance resulted into political upheavals that have been 
called the 1966 constitutional crisis whose effects continue to challenge 
Uganda’s political stability today (Mutibwa, 2008:85). 
 
Following the UPC/KY alliance in 1962, the UPC party emerged the 
strongest and more powerful political player that would shape most of the 
early politics of Uganda. By 1965 the alliance had collapsed and KY, the 
partner had been dropped from the coalition with some of its members 
joining UPC (Sembuya, 2009:25). In spite of the fact that UPC, the ruling 
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party, was busy poaching members from KY and DP, it soon found itself in 
trouble generated from within its ranks. Traditional and conservative 
elements had penetrated UPC and acquired its active supporters leading to 
political infighting which led to the emergence of factions within the party 
with capitalist and socialist leanings.  
 
 In 1964, the ruling UPC party was torn between two factions: the Kakonge 
faction, the party’s Secretary General on one hand and Obote in alliance 
with Grace Ibingira on the other. Ibingira and Obote were ideologically said 
to be leaning to the right. Kakonge was subsequently ousted from the party 
as Secretary General in 1964 at a delegate’s conference. The alliance 
between Ibingira and Obote did not last long. Soon the alliance collapsed 
with Obote claiming to be the progressive wing of the party while Ibingira 
was now the conservative wing. Ibingira claimed Obote was pro-
communism. The political instability that ensued in the ruling UPC soon 
dragged in the army as the politicians sought to strengthen their positions 
(Mutibwa, 2008:86). In order to secure himself, Obote reshuffled the army. 
Idi Amin, who had been a deputy to Brigadier Shaban Opolot, was made 
Army Chief of Staff and overall Army Commander (Kanyeihamba 2002: 
89). This act brought the military to the centre stage of Ugandan politics and 
since then, they have remained a major player in politics and threat to 
democracy in Uganda. 
  
The political crisis in UPC coupled with the successful referendum on the 
return of the two ‘lost counties’ to Bunyoro in 1964 triggered the political 
crisis of 1966. Aggrieved that UPC had tricked them in the alliance and the 
loss of the ‘lost counties’ escalated the hatred and animosity between 
Buganda Kingdom and the Obote Government. Consequently, the 
traditionalists at Mengo, the seat of Buganda Kingdom, began to exploit 
every possible opportunity to undermine Obote. The Mengo traditionalists 
made alliances with disgruntled UPC members to remove Obote from power 
through either military or political means (Makara, 2007:55).  
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The deepening constitutional stand off culminated in the abrogation of the 
Independence constitution on 22 February 1966 by Prime Minister Obote. 
Obote abolished the post of the President and Vice President and assumed 
all the powers of government. The Lukiiko, Buganda Kingdom’s 
Parliament, tried to resist these moves by calling upon the Central 
Government to remove itself from Bugandan soil which provided an 
opportunity to Prime Minister Obote for a final showdown with the King of 
Buganda who was also Uganda’s titular President. On 24 May 1966, the 
army led by the army commander Idi Amin attacked the King’s palace and 
forced him to flee into exile (Mazrui 2001:19). Mutesa died a poor and 
heartbroken man three years later in exile in the United Kingdom 
(Museveni, 1997). The Constituent Assembly later discussed and adopted 
the government’s proposals as amended and passed a new constitution for 
Uganda in 1967 (Kanyeihamba, 2002). 
 
The Republican Constitution of 1967 was a unitary one. Besides President 
Obote being Head of State and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, 
he also became the head of Government. The constitution had combined the 
presidential and parliamentary forms of government. The constitution 
retained a multiparty system of government even though the opposition 
parties remained very weak, experiencing desertions and lacking 
organizational capacity. In the subsequent years, UPC continued to 
undermine the opposition and by 1969, Obote declared Uganda a one-party 
state. What followed was chaos as UPC’s internal contradictions intensified 
and the party degenerated into factionalism which culminated in the military 
coup of 1971 that brought Idi Amin to power. Amin suspended the 
constitution and established a reign of terror where close to 500,000 people 
were killed between 1971 and 1979 when his regime was overthrown (Shaw 
et al.2008).  
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The Rise and Fall of Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF) 
Government 
The overthrow of Amin’s dictatorship in 1979 was welcomed by majority of 
Ugandans with a lot of hope and optimism, and paved way for the UNLF to 
come to power. However, as it soon turned out, the optimism created by the 
new political order: the UNLF which was supported by the Tanzanian 
Government did not usher in the peace, stability and development. Instead 
the period following Amin’s downfall was characterized by political 
anarchy and bloodletting. The Commonwealth Team of Observers wrote in 
1979 that, 
Crops were damaged and livestock killed, houses, factories and 
public buildings were gutted; schools supplies, textiles, and 
writing materials were looted, food, furniture and clothes were 
taken from houses and shops, office records were lost or stolen, 
tools and equipment were taken from shops and thousands of 
cars and trucks were taken out of the country to Sudan, 
Tanzania, Zaire and Kenya’ (Kanyeihamba, 2002:176). 
Formed during the Moshi conference in Tanzania in 1979, the 
UNLF’s main objective was to form a political group and present it as 
a credible anti-Amin Ugandan front other than former president 
Obote, whom other Ugandans thought, was a liability both inside and 
outside Uganda (Museveni, 2007:109). By the end of the Moshi 
conference, delegates elected Professor Yusuf Lule as chairman of a 
new, broad-based movement. Consequently, upon the fall of Idi Amin, 
Lule formed the first UNLF Government in Uganda. It is under the 
watchful eye of Lule that Uganda degerated into factionalism and 
political intrigues that led to his sudden downfall.  
Revengeful killings and assaults of any one imagined to be an enemy, 
supporter or associate or relative of the enemy became common 
practices in the period after the collapse of Amin’s dictatorship. In 
West Nile, Amin’s home region, the UNLF army turned their guns 
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against civilians causing a massive flight and displacement of people 
into former Zaire now the DRC. Most of these people remained in 
DRC as refugees until 1987 when they were returned by the Museveni 
Government. Political observers note that the UNLF Government 
lacked strong leadership and a sense of direction and degerated into 
several political factions which resulted into its eventual collapse 
(Kanyeihamba, 2002).  
President Lule was subsequently, replaced by Godfrey Binaisa. 
Commenting about the removal of Lule from power which was 
furiously resisted by his tribe’s mates, Museveni noted that, 
When it became clear that Professor Lule would have to 
be removed, some quiet, informal discussions took place 
among us to try to find a successor. We decided that we 
should support Godfrey Binaisa, a Muganda, since we 
knew that the reactionaries on all sides would use tribal 
arguments to divide the people (Museveni, 2007:116).  
The appointment of Godfrey Binaisa as President by the UNLF did 
not improve the political situation either. As observers have noted, 
Binaisa was more interested in business deals than managing the 
affairs of the state (Kabwegyere, 1995). It is noted that Binaisa turned 
the State House into a business centre where businessmen frequently 
flocked to look for business deals. Corruption, suspicion, intrigue and 
rummour-mongering became rampant yet the country greatly needed a 
committed leadership to champion the reconstruction process after the 
war. The deteriorating security, rampant corruption that characterized 
Binaisa’s government combined with political forces that were 
working for the return of Milton Obote were responsible for Binaisa’s 
sudden exit from power. The removal of Binaisa from power marked 
the demise of the UNLF and the ascendance to power of the Military 
Commission led by Paul Muwanga (Mutibwa, 2008) 
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The demise of the UNLF also marked the return of old political parties 
and the second Obote Government to power. Paul Muwanga the 
Chairman of the Military Commission and a close confident of Milton 
Obote organized the 1980 elections which most observers note were 
massively rigged in favour of Obote’s Uganda People’s Congress 
(UPC).  
At the close of elections, the Chairman of the Military Commission 
announced the creation of a new law which prohibited ‘anyone’ 
whether chairman, secretary, agent of the Electoral Commission, or 
private citizen ‘to announce results’. The Military Commission 
warned that anyone caught doing so would be commiting a crime and 
would be fined the sum of Shs. 500,000 or imprisonment for up to five 
years (Kanyeihamba, 2002:200).  
Ali Mazrui commenting about Obote’s second government notes that, 
Under both the administration of Idi Amin (1971-79) and the second 
administration of Milton Obote (1980-85), Uganda experienced, 
simultaneously, some of the worst excesses of both tyranny and 
anarchy (Kanyeihamba, 2002). With most political groups accusing 
UPC of rigging elections, President Museveni and other political 
groups decided to launch guerrilla warfare against the Obote 
government mainly from central Uganda. Obote’s government 
responded by using the most crude methods of fighting the insurgence 
which resulted into the death of many innocent civilians in Luwero 
Triangle. 
It should be noted that the atrocities in Luwero triangle committed by 
the military under Obote government greatly influenced the civil war 
in northern Uganda which is the focus of this research. After the fall 
of the second Obote government and the military junta led by General 
Okello, the victorius National Resistance Army led by Museveni 
carried out revenge attacks in Acholi which prompted many soldiers 
who had initially surrendered to resort to a rebellion (ICG Report, 
2004:2). 
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Nature of Domestic Politics in Uganda: An Overview 
Since Uganda got its independence in 1962, the army has remained a 
dominant player in the countries politics. Almost all successive regimes in 
Uganda have relied on the military to rule and to exclude others from power. 
Consequently, the army in Uganda invokes sad memories among the 
citizens who since colonial times have suffered at the hands of the army. 
The army is associated with gross violation of human rights in Uganda. The 
army’s brutality, wanton killings, rape and robberies of innocent civilians 
with impunity is fresh in the minds of Ugandans. The highest level of 
military brutality was witnessed during Amin’s reign of terror and in 
Luwero Triangle where the Obote II government used a ‘scorched earth 
policy’ of indiscriminate killings while battling Museveni’s rebels of the 
National Resistance Army (NRA) in the early 1980s. An International Crisis 
Group (ICG) report (2004:2) reveals that massacres in the Luwero Triangle 
during Operation Bonanza, perpetrated by Obote’s mainly Acholi and Langi 
troops are estimated to have cost at least 300,000 lives, mostly of Baganda 
people, which continues to cast a shadow over attempts to solve the North-
South problems. 
The bulk of the army in Uganda has historically been dominated by people 
from northern Uganda. This was no historical accident. Rather, it was a 
British colonial design of governing the colonized people. Before the 
Second World War, Ugandans from both south and north were equally 
recruited into the British colonial force: the Kings African Rifles (KAR). 
The British changed this policy after 1945 when majority of veterans of the 
Second World War from southern Uganda started to agitate for the 
independence of Uganda from colonial rule. In response to the threat these 
well trained soldiers from southern Uganda posed to the colonial state, the 
British colonists decided to recruit soldiers mainly from northern Uganda 
(ICG Report, 2004:2). The colonists then developed a theory that would 
justify military dominance of people from northern Uganda. The theory was 
that the people of northern Uganda were more ‘martial’ and ‘warlike’ while 
southerners from the centre and west and most of the east of the country 
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were ‘soft’ because they ate a staple diet of matooke (green bananas), 
compared to the northerners’ staple diet of millet which is supposed to be 
more hardy (Museveni 1997:39). This was not true of southern Uganda. On 
the contrary, pre-colonial history shows that the more advanced social forms 
had evolved in southern and western areas of what is now Uganda. 
Advanced forms of social organization had evolved in Buganda, Bunyoro, 
Ankole and Toro which were formidable kingdoms with standing armies. It 
is thought that the colonial rulers feared the military tradition and 
advancement in these southern kingdoms and set out to undermine it and the 
higher forms of social organization (Museveni, 1997:39). 
Commenting about the evolution of the army in Uganda which was 
inherited at independence, Kabwegyere (1995:224) has observed that   the 
purposes, organization and progress of the army in Uganda were all in 
accordance with the entrenchment and achievement of the objectives of the 
colonial power.  A question that begs an answer is what kind of army did 
Uganda inherit at independence? The Ugandan army was constructed along 
colonial designs to serve the colonial interests or those in power. Taller 
soldiers were considered more qualified than shorter soldiers. Those who 
were believed to be innately martial were considered best qualified to be 
fighters. 
As Kabwegyera (1995) further notes that the colonial army which later 
became the Uganda Army was made up of people selected on dubious and 
superstitious grounds and trained to achieve the dictates of their masters. 
That is how Idi Amin, known for his brutality, had excelled in the KAR and 
was promoted to a rank of a captain by 1962 at the dawn of independence, 
the highest rank to be given to an African (Sembuya, 2009:32). As the ICG 
report (2004) has observed, the post-colonial governments of Milton Obote 
and Idi Amin inherited the colonial policies about the military since they 
suited their political interests and this has created a challenge of building a 
unified nation-state since independence in 1962. Amin’s subsequent 
promotion in the military by the Obote Government was not based on his 
excellence as a soldier but because he was considered to be insufficiently 
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intelligent to have interest in taking over political power (ICG Report, 
2004). 
Personal loyalty of the army to the Head of State from 1964 onwards has 
become the norm in Uganda. Surprisingly one of the ironies in history is that 
the more the army personifies the head of state, the more likely he will be 
overthrown by the army (Kabwegyere 1995: 225). Indeed this is illustrated 
by the overthrow of Obote two times by his army commanders; first by Idi 
Amin in 1971 and second by General Tito Okello in 1985 yet he thought 
they had personal loyalty to him. 
Under the Idi Amin and Obote 11 regimes (1971-1979 and 1980-1985 
respectively, thousands of people were killed by the military. The brutality 
of the army extended to the economy, stretching from ‘Kondoism’ (armed 
robberies) in late 1960’s to military businesses (mafuta mingi) in the 1970’s 
to rapist-looters in the early 1980’s. In politics, Amin destroyed so much life 
that his overthrow in 1979 seemed to be the end of a century of misery 
(Kabwegyere, 1995). When Museveni’s National Resistance Army (NRA) 
under Museveni overthrew the Okello military junta in 1985 which had also 
overthrown Obote’s second dictatorship, it looked like the end of militarism 
in Uganda. But did it end? This question is discussed in the subsequent 
section. 
The Advent of the National Resistance Movement: A Fundamental 
Change or Mere Change of Guards?  
In our view, the period between January 26th 1986, when the 
NRM took power in Uganda, and 1995 when the country, 
promulgated a new constitution, the Movement can be credited 
with a number of spectacular successes…... Many of these 
changes have been welcomed by the entire population and are 
likely to remain permanent features of governance in Uganda 
(Kanyeihamba 2002: 238). 
159 
 
To most Ugandans especially the people in Buganda sub-region who had 
suffered greatly under the Obote 11 Government, the NRM victory meant 
total removal of the military apparatus that had enabled one section of the 
Ugandan population that came from one part of the country to impose a 
military/political hegemony on the rest of the country (Mutibwa, 2008, 222). 
According to Mutibwa (2008), for the first time, the soldiers serving in the 
Uganda Army were perceived and really seen as belonging to the population 
of the country they were protecting. This confirms the optimism that was 
ushered in by the victorious NRA led by President Museveni among the 
southern population. What is also true is that the victorious NRA was being 
perceived differently in northern Uganda, the base of Obote 11 Government. 
In fact, the NRA in most of northern Uganda were being perceived as 
foreigners or Banyarwanda which is partly responsible for the LRA 
rebellion that was initially supported massively by the local population 
(Olupot, 2010).  
When the National Resistance Movement (NRM) came to power after 
waging a five year guerrilla war (1981-86), it inherited a near collapsed 
state. The economy was in shambles, the infrastructure such as roads, 
industries, telephones and the railway was in a state of disrepair (Mugyenyi, 
2001:62). People lacked basic goods including soap, sugar and salt. These 
commodities under the Obote II government were being rationed and one 
had to be closely linked to a political heavyweight to get a coupon in order 
to access these essential commodities.  
Ironically, in comparison to other African countries, at independence in 
1962, Uganda’s economy was in excellent form. It was one of the strongest 
economies in Black Africa (Kanyeihamba 2002: 206). Given the economic 
mismanagement and the political turmoil that characterized the first Obote 
government, the economy became the first casualty (Mugyenyi, 2001). 
Economic mismanagement was one of the reasons given by Amin for 
overthrowing the Obote I Government.  Obote’s first government adopted 
and preached socialism and the move to the left while at the same time 
cabinet ministers and political elites and security operatives were busy 
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grabbing national assets for themselves. Commenting on the economic 
mismanagement by the Obote 1 government, Kanyeihamba (2002:207) has 
observed that, ‘This was the kind of move to the left, while I take everything 
on the right’. 
The second Obote government which succeeded the Military Commission 
did not help improve the economy in spite of the massive donor support the 
government received after the 1979 liberation war. In order to win 
international recognition and the badly needed foreign exchange, the Obote 
11 Government accepted all the conditionalities imposed by donor countries 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). A study that was commissioned 
by Sweden revealed that such money did not benefit the common people 
who would have to bear the burden of paying it back (Mugyenyi, 2001). 
Besides poor economic policies prescribed by the IMF and economic 
mismanagement, most of the economic support that was received by the 
Obote II Government was wasted on the internal wars and conflicts. During 
the Obote II period, roads and streets in the country were in disrepair and 
full of potholes. There were chronic shortages of clean water, electricity, 
medicine and trained personnel in all Uganda’s institutions including the 
educational system which had become corrupt with falling standards 
(Museveni, 2007). It is this state of affairs that was inherited by the NRM 
when it came into power in 1986.  
As part of the democratization agenda, the NRM introduced a ‘Ten Point 
Programme’ as a basis for social, economic and political reconstruction of 
the country. The programme would also become a vehicle to deliver the 
NRM’s promises to the people; a fundamental change that was intended to 
set it apart from the past rapacious governments that had ruled Uganda. 
Njuba (2001:210), commenting about the fundamental change, observed 
that the NRM/A revolution in Uganda was aimed at carrying all the people 
or at least a great majority through purposive and positive mobilization 
programmes. To Njuba, the main thrust of the ideology of NRM/A was 
aimed at doing good for Uganda which was true nationalism. Njuba, who 
served as a Minister for Constitutional Affairs, has since fallen out with 
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President Museveni, who he accuses of abandoning the ideals of democracy, 
and joined the opposition FDC.  
In order to deliver on its commitments, the NRM built a fairly credible 
coalition, comprised of representatives from former political parties, Bantu 
southerners and Baganda supporters. Also, the NRM had built a strong army 
which in principle was not permitted to abuse or kill any member of the 
public which boosted its image. Museveni’s immediate move helped him to 
build some legitimacy beyond his heartland area in the south and south-west 
and, importantly, to raise expectations of broad public participation, 
government accountability and improved welfare (Moncrieffe, 2004: 18). 
This was done through the introduction of the Resistance Council (RC) 
system of governance starting from the national level to the village level that 
allowed people to make decisions that directly affected their lives 
(Nsibambi, 2001:279). 
 In line with the democracy, security and unity objectives outlined in the 
‘Ten Point Programme’, the NRM expanded the Resistance Councils (RCs) 
to the entire country. RCs had previously been established in the areas under 
the NRA/M guerrilla control based on the principle that decision-making 
power, authority and policy making responsibilities should also be located at 
the local levels and that citizens should be able to reach and influence 
representatives and hold them accountable. The overarching question after 
almost 24 years in power is has the NRM administration under President 
Museveni delivered the fundamental change?  
During the last two decades that the NRM has been in power, Uganda has 
managed to maintain an impressive annual economic growth rate of 6.4 per 
cent, largely because of improvement in the policy environment; restoration 
of peace and stability in most parts of the country; and rehabilitation of 
infrastructure and increased capacity utilization (Shaw et al., 2008:214). The 
picture though is different in northern Uganda where the LRA rebellion 
which has been raging since 1987 has made it almost impossible for 
government to rehabilitate the infrastructure and implement any meaningful 
development programme (PRDP, 2007). Another factor for economic 
162 
 
growth has been due to increased inflow of capital and technology from the 
private sector involving both foreign and local investors, economic 
liberalization of the 1990’s and donor aid assistance.  
Donors pronounced that Uganda was indeed, ‘a pioneer of macroeconomic 
stabilization and structural adjustment in sub-Saharan Africa’, while even 
the most strident of critics acknowledged that the Movement’s political 
system deserved to be credited for improving and sustaining peace and 
security in most parts of the country, allowing a fairly free press and 
encouraging citizen’s participation through a democratically elected 
government (Moncrieffe, 2004: 18). 
The dividends of policy reforms that have largely been financed by 
international donors through foreign aid is evidenced mainly by the 
expansion in construction, manufacturing-the case of textiles which have 
tapped into the AGOA (African Growth and Opportunity Act), sugar and 
UHT milk; telecommunications, water, education and poverty reduction. At 
a broader level, fiscal discipline has ensured macro-economic stability while 
liberalization, deregulation and privatization have created a relatively ‘new 
nation’ (Shaw et al. 2008).  There has also been a marked increase in access 
to safe water from 49% in 1998 to 57% in 2000. HIV prevalence has 
declined from 30% in the late 1980’s to 6.5% in 2001. The number of 
women in parliament rose from 18.6% in 1996 to 26% by 2002 thus 
bringing more women into positions of decision making. Perhaps the most 
striking development under the NRM government is in the area of 
education. Since 1997 when government introduced Universal Primary 
Education (UPE), primary school enrolment increased from 920,000 pupils 
to 7.2 million in 2002 (Shaw et al. 2008:217). 
At Makerere University, the country’s prestigious university, the total 
student enrolment has since 1986 increased from the mere 5,000 to over 
than 25,000 which is more than 450% increase in 15 years (Kwesiga, 2000; 
Musisi and Muwanga, 2003). What is even most interesting is that the 
female enrolment at Makerere University has more than doubled as a result 
of affirmative action in favor of women introduced in 1989. 
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The NRM can also be credited for the enactment of the 1995 Constitution 
which was hailed by most observers as a very progressive constitution, re-
enfranchising the people by holding regular and periodic elections, and 
decentralization. The constitution devolved power to the lower levels to 
increase popular participation of citizens especially those formerly 
marginalized such as women, persons with disabilities, workers and youths, 
and political accountability provided for under Article 178 of the Ugandan 
Constitution.   
In spite of the impressive achievements, on the social, economic and 
political scene, Uganda still faces serious challenges that if not addressed 
could easily reverse such achievements (Shaw et al. 2008). For example, 
northern Uganda has been experiencing a violent protracted conflict conflict 
of the LRA for over two decades (1986-2006) (PRDP, 2007). Even when 
relative peace returned to the region in 2006 with the resumption of peace 
negotiations between the government and the rebels, the people still live in 
fear that the rebels may strike again from their bases in DRC and Southern 
Sudan. More so, because of the conflicts in northern and eastern Uganda, 
both regions have lost out on the NRM’s socio-economic advances. 
Northern Uganda specifically has not benefited significantly from the 
macro-economic achievements that the country has witnessed since 1986 
when NRM came to power (Shaw, et al. 2008). 
Poverty levels in northern Uganda are still unacceptably high especially so 
in the rural areas and amongst the children. While the colonial legacy can be 
blamed for creating economic imbalance between northern and southern 
Uganda, the current high levels of poverty are largely attributed to the 
rebellion of the Lord’s Resistance Army which for over two decades now 
has been fighting the government of President Museveni using terror 
techniques aimed at civilians (McKay et al. 1999). This conflict has led to 
gross violation of human rights especially of women and children, and has 
destroyed infrastructure, paralyzed economic activity, led to social and 
cultural break down and disrupted economic and human development of the 
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region. The LRA rebellion forced over 1.6 million people into Internally 
Displaced Peoples Camps (IDPs) which made people dependant on relief 
aid. Generally speaking northern Uganda remains the poorest part of the 
country in spite of its huge economic potential (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 
2003).  
The stuck reality of the development gap between northern and southern 
Uganda has prompted some scholars to define Uganda in terms of two 
Ugandas. Shaw et al. (2008) have observed that while the two Ugandas’ 
always co-exist in tenuous ways; in the new century, the division has 
become wider with profound implications for prospects of development and 
democracy, human rights and human security in both parts of the country. 
While the description of the two Ugandas’ has been dismissed by the ruling 
elites in Uganda, the fact of the matter is that there are glaring development 
disparity gaps between northern and southern Uganda which stretch from 
the colonial past (Moncrieffe, 2004) which any serious developmental state 
should try to address.34 Unless the economic imbalance is urgently 
addressed, it could continue to be a major fault line for future political 
instability and conflict in which children are being recruited and used as 
combatants in violation of their human rights. The regional economic 
imbalance in development was also the focus of peace negotiations between 
the LRA and Government in the failed Juba Peace Process and it constituted 
agenda number two of the Draft Peace Agreement.35 
When the NRM captured power in 1986, it quickly banned all the political 
parties accusing them of being sectarian (tribal and religious based), narrow, 
and responsible for the past woes that had afflicted the country. It 
introduced the Movement political system-a no party system arguing that it 
was the most suitable political system for Uganda; a society without a 
                                                 
34 During fieldwork, the issue of two Ugandas was put forward by senior government people 
who requested anonymity. They agree that the there exists regional economic imbalance that 
needs to be addressed although they blame this on the LRA rebellion and the colonial design. 
Interviews with government officials were conducted in Kampala in March 2009. 
35 RLP, HURIPEC, Faculty of Law, Makerere University, Agreement on Comprehensive 
Solutions Between the Government of Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army/Movement, 
Juba, Sudan. Available at: http://www.beyondjuba.org/peace_agreements.php. Accessed on 
3/2/2011. 
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sizeable middle class necessary for multipartism. The Movement system 
espoused the principles of individual merit by all political leaders which 
meant that one had to be elected on his/her suitability rather than party 
affiliation; broad-basedness and popular participation. Ironically, while the 
NRM continued to ban political parties, it operated like a political party. On 
many occasions during elections, the NRM sponsored Movement supporters 
and campaigned against candidates known to promote the return to a multi-
party system (Makara, 2007).  
After 20 years of political monopoly, the NRM government faced with 
increasing internal and external pressure to free political parties grudgingly 
organized a national referendum that allowed the return of multipartism in 
2005. The 2006 general elections that were marred by irregularities and 
malpractices and contested by the opposition as rigged in favor of the ruling 
NRM presidential candidate were organized under a multi-party system 
(Kibandama, 2008:143). 
The return to a multiparty system did not automatically solve Uganda’s 
democratic challenges. Instead, some new democratic challenges were 
created. For example, as part of the constitutional reforms that paved the 
return of multiparty democracy, government influenced the parliament to 
change the constitution and remove the two term presidential limit that had 
been provided for by the 1995 constitution. The removal of term limits has 
ensured that the incumbent President Museveni who has ruled for 24 years 
can continue to stand for re-election indefinitely. To most observers, the 
removal of presidential terms limits poses a major threat to Uganda’s future 
stability (Kategaya, 2006). As Museveni’s popularity continues to nose dive, 
his cling to power has become very costly on the country. Most worrying is 
that in both the 2001 and 2006 presidential elections, the outcomes were 
challenged by the opposition as rigged in favour of president Museveni and 
the outcome had to be decided by the Supreme Court rulings and not the 
electorate (Gloppen et al. 2008:78). 
 In the 2006 elections, all the Supreme Court Judges agreed that the 
elections were not conducted according to the law and that there was 
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election rigging, election violence and involvement of security forces in the 
election malpractices. Based on the majority decision of judges of four out 
of seven, the Supreme Court concluded that the effects of election 
malpractice could not substantially have affected the electoral outcome 
(Mwesige et al. 2006). Consequently, the court upheld the election results 
and declared Museveni the winner. The point being made here is that the 
country’s failure to organize free and fair elections traps the country into 
political violence as the politicians who think their victory was stolen from 
them as Museveni did in 1981 will always resort to violence (Daily Monitor 
September 4, 2009). More so, the continued scenario where the outcomes of 
presidential elections are always decided by the court is likely to erode the 
citizen’s confidence in electoral processes which ultimately undermines 
democracy. 
Other fundamental challenges facing Uganda under the current political 
dispensation of President Museveni include rampant corruption in public 
service (Daily Monitor September 8, 2009) an over bearing Executive that 
has successfully undermined the other arms of government-Judiciary and 
the Parliament through the ruling party caucus which in effect renders 
useless the principle of separation of powers as envisioned by the framers of 
the 1995 Ugandan Constitution (Kanyeihamba, 2002). Unprecedented levels 
of corruption and increasing public administration expenditure that have 
now become the major landmark of President Museveni’s ageing regime are 
feared becuase they could lead to political uprising and its attendant 
consequences. 
It is also interesting to note that Uganda under the ‘reformist’ NRM has 
failed to remove the threat of the military to democracy. President 
Museveni’s grip on power and the survival of the NRM administration 
largely depends on the army and his ability to direct it against any threat to 
his power (Mudoola, 2001:237; Makara, 2007). Like other governments 
before him, Museveni relies on the army. Yet experience has shown that the 
army has always turned against the very people who use it as an instrument 
of repression against their citizens’s human rights. Most important to note is 
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that suppression of citizen’s freedoms and human rights soon result into 
revolutions and anarchy. It is feared that Museveni’s reliance on the military 
is likely to ditch the country into political instability.  
Also, under the NRM, the country has witnessed the rise and the fall of a 
free press and vibrant civil society generally. While in the early years of 
NRM in power, the media and civil society generally enjoyed relative 
freedom to participate in nation building including being critical of 
government actions upon which the NRM administration was able to attract 
massive donor support; recent trends show a change of policy (Kjaer et al. 
2008: 180). The recent past has witnessed closure of several media houses, 
arrests and detention of critical journalists. Government also in 2006 
enacted a draconian law to control the NGO sector amidst demonstrations 
by civil society. These government actions have severely cowed down the 
vibrancy of the civil society sector, yet a free press and vibrant civil society 
are the tenets of a democratic society (Walubiri, 2004:86-99).   
Some analysts have observed that while there has been tremendous 
improvement in all spheres of development there are fundamental 
challenges that face the future stability and progress of Uganda. These 
challenges include: the economic disparity between the north and the south; 
the urban and rural; the overbearing Executive which dwarfs both the 
Parliament and Judiciary; failure to organize free and fair elections and the 
poor government-opposition relations that exist including high levels of 
corruption and patronage politics which raise the question of the country’s 
future stability and sustainability of the achievements. 
Conflict Analysis in Uganda  
This section critically analyzes the sources of conflicts in Uganda generally. 
The rationale for this section is to establish the link between the LRA 
conflict in northern Uganda and Uganda’s troubled political history. In this 
section, I argue that the LRA rebellion which has produced and reproduced 
the child soldier problematic is closely related to other conflicts in Uganda 
that have either been resolved or are latent and those that are still on-going 
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in other parts of the country such as the one of the Allied Democratic 
Alliance (ADF) with bases in the DRC. It is noted here that a thorough 
understanding of the sources of conflicts in Uganda would contribute to the 
identification of appropriate interventions for conflict resolution, conflict 
prevention and peace building.  
In order to understand the sources of conflicts in Uganda, it is important to 
define what is meant by the term ‘conflict’. Conflict has been defined 
variously by several scholars. However, according to Ramsbotham et al. 
(2005:13), conflict is an intrinsic and inevitable aspect of social change. It is 
an expression of the heterogeneity of interests, values and beliefs that arise 
as new formations generated by social change come up against inherited 
constraints. Conflict can also be defined as the interaction of different and 
opposing aspirations and goals in which disputes are processed but not 
definitively resolved. Most scholars note that conflict is a necessary part of a 
healthy democratic debate and dialogue provided it remains within the 
boundaries of the commonly accepted rules of a democratic game.  
Harris and Reilly (1989:32) note that conflict itself is not necessarily a 
negative process. Rather, they argue that conflict is one of the most 
powerfull positive factors for change in a society. They further observe that 
conflict tells us that something is wrong; conflict is the generator of change 
and improvement. To these scholars, without conflict society would suffer 
stagnation. While, it is true that conflict can lead to social transformation, 
intra-state conflicts in Africa and Uganda in particular have been very 
destructive and disruptive to development making it difficult for people to 
appreciate their positive side. However, since conflict is part and parcel of 
human life, people need to learn to live together with their differences and 
incompatible goals, interests and aspirations. The subsequent section 
analyses the sources of conflict in Uganda. The section begins by providing 
a brief overview of several violent conflicts that are either resolved on-going 
or latent to show how prone to conflicts Uganda is.  
Uganda is a war prone country and most of its 48 years of post- independence 
history have been characterized by political anarchy and bloodletting 
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(Mutibwa, 2008). This is evidenced by the fact that even under President 
Museveni’s leadership (1986 todate) during which period the country 
witnessed impressive socio-economic and political growth, the country has 
been experiencing a violent protracted war in northern Uganda and some parts 
of western and eastern Uganda. In recent times, the situation has been 
compounded by President Museveni’s declining legitimacy due to overstaying 
in power (Museveni has been in power for the last 24 years), increasing 
poverty levels among the population; high levels of unemployment among the 
youths; growing economic inequalities among regions especially northern 
Uganda, high level of corruption and the high cost of servicing a patronage 
system. 
 
Uganda’s political troubles started in 1966, four years after gaining 
independence when the country was plunged into a constitutional crisis which 
led to the overthrow of President Mutesa, abolition of the 1962 independence 
constitution and establishment of a republic (Mutibwa, 2008). The political 
crisis that followed the 1966 resulted into a military coup that brought Amin 
to power and the ills of his regime. 
 
After the Tanzanian supported liberation war overthrew Idi Amin in 1979, the 
Military Commission under Paul Muwanga returned Obote to power through 
a rigged election in 1980 which prompted several disgruntled political groups 
to declare armed struggles against the regime. Prominent among these groups 
was the National Resistance Movement/ Army (NRA/M) led by the current 
President Yoweri Museveni. Facing eminent defeat by the rebels, the 
Ugandan army in 1985 overthrew the second Obote Government and 
established a military junta which was subsequently overthrown by the 
NRM/A in 1986 (ICG Report, 2004:2). 
 
In spite of the credit accorded to President Museveni by most observers for 
restoring peace in most parts of the country since 1986; Uganda has been 
experiencing violent civil wars in the north, south-west and north-eastern 
regions. In northern Uganda, the rebellion of the Lord’s Resistance Army 
(LRA) has been very violent and destructive especially to innocent civilians, 
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mostly children, who are abducted and forcefully recruited into the LRA 
(World Vision Report, 2005:16). Cattle rustling by the Karamajong in north-
eastern Uganda, fuelled and sustained by the availability of illegal guns has 
caused untold suffering to the people in Karamoja and the neighbouring 
communities, exacerbating environmental degradation, famine and poverty in 
the north-eastern parts of the country. 
 
The rebellion of the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), an Islamic 
fundamentalist group led by Jimil Mukulu and supported by the Government 
of Sudan with bases in the DRC, was militarily suppressed in 2002 but their 
remnants are reported to have been regrouping planning to launch fresh 
attacks on the country in future (IRIN Special Report, 1999).  In West Nile, 
although the former rebels of the National Rescue Front, associated with 
former military dictator Idi Amin recently returned home from Sudan after 
reaching a peace settlement with the government, an aura of anxiety still 
prevails. These former rebels have been demobilized and others reintegrated 
into the national army and into civilian life, which is a very delicate process. 
Available information indicates that the senior officers of this group benefited 
most from the peace agreement at the expense of rank and file soldiers. More 
so, these former rebels complain that government never honoured some of the 
elements of the agreement that brought them out of the bush (Makerere 
University Refugee Law Project, 2004). Such complaints indicate that durable 
peace has not yet been achieved since these elements can easily start a fresh 
rebellion out of frustration. 
 
The prevailing socio-economic conditions in Teso sub-region also continue to 
pose a security threat to the country.  The violent Teso rebellion of 1987-92 
by the Uganda People’s Army (UPA) led by Peter Otai left behind a ravaged 
and dislocated society in Teso prone to more conflicts (Makerere University 
Refugee Law Project Report et al. 2008). The region has since been 
experiencing severe poverty and famine as a result of loss of cattle during the 
rebellion. Cattle keeping used to be the main economic activity for the people 
of Teso before the rebellion. After the rebellion, government failed to 
implement a successful post-conflict reconstruction programme for the region 
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as funds meant for cattle restocking were embezzled by the politicians and 
technocrats (Makerere University Refugee Law Project Report et al. 2008). 
 
Since 2001, the Government of Uganda has alleged the existence of a new 
rebel group known as Peoples Redemption Army (PRA) linked to the leading 
opposition leader of FDC, Rtd. Col. Dr. Kiiza Besigye. PRA is reported to be 
based in the DRC. Although the PRA has never launched any known military 
attack, former soldiers-Colonels Samson Mande and Kyakabale, currently in 
exile believed to be the leaders of the rebel group, declared their intentions to 
oust President Museveni through armed means. The presence of these two 
army deserters in Rwanda was central to the hostilities between President Paul 
Kagame of Rwanda and President Museveni of Uganda (ICG Report, 2001). 
The possibility of the existence of PRA rebels creates a sense of uncertainty 
and fear among Ugandans who seem to be tired of civil wars. To date, the 
opposition leader of FDC Dr. Besigye is still facing treason charges associated 
with the PRA rebels which most observers think are politically motivated 
(Makara, 2007:70). It is against this background that this research is interested 
to establish the sources of conflicts in Uganda. 
 
The sources of conflicts in Uganda can be traced to the colonial legacy, bad 
governance or democratic deficit, imbalance in economic development, 
natural resources scarcity (land) and abundance (oil discovery), regional spill 
over, proliferation of small arms and light weapons. These sources of conflicts 
are discussed in detail below. 
 
One of the sources of conflicts in Uganda that is at the core of the LRA 
conflict in northern Uganda is economic marginalization and economic 
imbalance in development which has created the two Ugandas: the 
underdeveloped north and developing south (Shaw et al. (2008:214). This 
point has also been underscored by the PRDP, the official Government of 
Uganda reconstruction programme for northern Uganda. The PRDP (2007) 
indicates that government development agenda has led to reduction in poverty 
nationally, and that welfare indices indicate that Ugandans who are unable to 
meet their basic needs declined from 56% in 1992 to 38% in 2003 and further 
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to 31% in 2006. However, the PRDP also observes that welfare indices for 
northern Uganda have not improved at the same pace as the rest of the country 
(PRDP, 2007). Poverty income in northern Uganda remains high, literate rates 
are low and access to basic services poor. The PRDP attributes the high levels 
of poverty to the violent conflict which made it difficult to implement 
development programmes, destruction of the infrastructure and internal 
displacement of over 1.6 million people. The regional economic imbalance in 
development which is at the centre of conflict in northern Uganda is linked to 
the colonial legacy. Several scholars attribute the contemporary civil wars 
going on in most developing countries such as Uganda to the effects of 
colonialism. 
 
 According to Mazrui (2008:36), while the most lethal civil wars in Africa 
have been fought between blacks, the roots of these wars lie in the white 
legacy. Mazrui argues that the seeds of the post-colonial wars themselves lie 
in the sociological and political mess which ‘white’ colonialism created in 
Africa. This is true in the case of Uganda where the British divided the 
country into economic zones; the north was considered unsuitable for 
plantation agriculture. Most of the sugarcane, cotton and coffee plantations 
and better infrastructure (roads, schools and industries) were introduced in the 
south. Northern Uganda was used as s reservoir for supplying cheap labour to 
the plantations in the south and later soldiers to the army. The consequence of 
this economic zoning was that it resulted into imbalance in economic 
development with the south developing at the expense of the north. One of the 
underlying causes of the conflict in northern Uganda is the grievance by 
people that they have been economically marginalized by the government of 
President of Museveni. 
 
Moncrieffe (2004:15) concurs with Mazrui and observes that during the 
British colonial rule in 1925, the new Director of Agriculture started to 
encourage cotton production in northern Uganda but was summarily advised 
that the ‘policy of government’ is at present to refrain from actively 
stimulating the production of cotton or other economic crops in outlying 
districts on which it is dependent for supply of labour for carrying out 
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essential services in the central producing districts. This economic zoning of 
the country perpetuated the neglect of, and underdevelopment in northern 
Uganda and this has always fermented regional tensions based on economic 
imbalance in development. Unfortunately, the post-independence leadership 
in Uganda has never focused their attention to address the regional economic 
imbalance. It is no wonder that most observers are currently pointing out the 
existence of two Ugandas (Shaw et al., 2008:216). It should be noted 
however, that after 48 years of independence, Ugandan leaders should not 
hide behind the claims of colonialism for undervelopment. In the case of 
northern Uganda, it is apparent that no single post-colonial government has 
attempted to correct the economic imbalance in regional development. As will 
be discussed extensively in Chapter Five, even the so called development state 
in Uganda under President Museveni has failed to prioritize the development 
of northern Uganda as a conflict management mechanism. The PRDP which 
most observers thought was going to be a Mashall Plan for northern Uganda 
has been politicized; is under funded, top-down, short-term in nature and lacks 
political commitment.36 
 
While this economic imbalance that gives an outsider the impression of the 
existence of two Ugandas has been widened in the last two decades by the 24 
year old violent conflict, it is the creation of the British colonial rule which is 
one of the major grievances for the rebellion of the LRA. 
 
Another source of conflict that is also linked to the colonial legacy is that the 
British colonialists used divide and rule method of administration which 
polarised the country and deepened ethnic hatred. Moncrieffe (2004:15) 
observes that the British ascribed a ‘martial tribes’ thesis that prioritized the 
Nilotic and Sudanese (Nubians) tribes of northern Uganda. Accordingly, these 
groups were considered satisfactorily fit for the theory that soldiers should be 
of a different race, geographically distant and even hostile to the main groups. 
                                                 
36 Interview with Nobert Mao, Chairman Local Council 5 Gulu District. Interview was 
conducted in Gulu in December, 2009 Mao who is also a presidential candidate for the 
Democratic Party doubts Museveni’s commitment to develop northern Uganda which does 
not support him politically. In two successive presidential elections (2001& 2006) Museveni 
got the least votes in northern Uganda compared to his closest political challenger Dr. 
Besigye.  
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The Acholi were thus recruited into the African Kings Rifles with the mandate 
to ‘take action’ against the local groups in the Protectorate who engaged in 
active opposition to the colonial policies. The British colonialists also 
encouraged the people in the south to take on education and work in the civil 
service since they were soft but intelligent and therefore suitable for the tasks 
(Museveni 1997:39). Consequently, most Ugandans including people from 
northern Uganda came to believe that only groups from the north had the right 
to bear arms. The immediate post-independence leaders particularly Milton 
Obote and Idi Amin, both from the north, emphasized this myth and exploited 
it to become the source of the bitterest legacies of colonialism in Uganda 
(Moncrieffe (2004:15; Henderson, 2008:56).  
 
The divide and rule technique of administration used by colonists produced 
inferiority and superiority complexes among Ugandans with the people from 
the north thinking that they are militarily superior while those in the south 
think that they are more civilized and intelligent. The military myth of people 
from northern Uganda was challenged in 1986 when the National Resistance 
Army (NRA) led by President Museveni which was largely dominated by 
soldiers from southern Uganda defeated Uganda Liberation Army, a national 
army dominated by northern. One of the grievances advanced by the LRA is 
lack of respect and dignity by people from the south who call them abusive 
names such a ‘koko’ or animals. 
Another source of conflict in Uganda is the Buganda question. The British 
colonialists accorded a special status to Buganda Kingdom because of its 
collaboration role and the military assistance it rendered to bring the entire 
Protectorate under British rule (Mutibwa, 2008). The unequal relationship 
between Buganda and other regions was created by the 1900 Buganda 
Agreement and subsequently legitimized by the 1962 independence 
constitution. The 1962 constitution in essence institutionalized ethnic 
tensions and conflict in Uganda. This problem has become entrenched in 
Uganda’s politics and is a constant source of political tension. 
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Mamdani (1976:242) has observed that although the independence 
constitution was called ‘federal’ only one region-Buganda was given 
separate and substantial powers independent of the centre. The Buganda 
Lukiiko controlled public services, local government, and its public debt and 
had separate powers of taxation and its revenue was supplemented by grants 
from the state as specified in the constitution. Buganda had its own court 
system and, subject to the control of the Uganda Inspector-General, its own 
police force. Buganda selected its twenty one representatives to the National 
Assembly indirectly, through the Lukiiko, rather than by popular vote. The 
constitution provided that none of these powers could be altered by the 
Ugandan Parliament without the two-thirds concurring vote of the Lukiiko. 
In effect, the 1962 constitution became very difficult to implement and by 
1966 Buganda Kingdom had fallen out with the central government 
(Mamdani, 1976) leading to a bloody conflict and the abolishion of 
kingdoms. 
Museveni reintroduced the kingdoms in 1993 hoping that they will be 
controllable, conform to the constitution and contribute to peace, stability 
and national development. However, currently President Museveni is facing 
a standoff with the Buganda Kingdom which is demanding the full 
restoration of the special status of 1962. In a recent standoff between 
Buganda Kingdom and the government in September, 2009, over 30 people 
were killed while over 100 were hospitalized. Commenting on the 
September 2009 riots in Kampala, President Museveni observed that, 
 We need to strictly enforce the principle of separating cultural 
institutions from politics through enacting the cultural law (Daily 
Monitor September 15, 2009). 
Another source of conflict in Uganda is religion. Religious induced conflicts 
too are linked to the colonial legacy. The religious conflicts in Uganda date 
back to the 19th century, when Captain Lugard armed Protestants secretly 
(Kabwegyere 1995:67). Lugard was assured of the Protestant support, since 
the Church Missionary Society were British competing with White Fathers 
who were French and the Moslems who were mainly Arab. The alliance 
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won the war, and since then the protestant Christians have always 
dominated politics in Uganda especially the topmost position of the 
president. There is a growing feeling in Uganda that the Catholics who are 
the majority have been marginalized in politics since there has never been a 
Catholic president. It is no wonder that President Museveni, throughout his 
24 years in power, has been trying to balance religious representation in his 
cabinet and reserving the slot of Vice President solely for the Catholics. 
Recently, a Minister of State for Local Government accused the Vice 
President of Uganda Professor Bukenya of using the Catholic Religion to 
come to power.37 The Muslims have also been fighting against what they 
perceive as political marginalization. In fact the rebellion of the Allied 
Democratic Front (ADF) is partly motivated by what they perceive as 
political marginalization of Moslems and their desire to establish an Islamic 
state in Uganda (IRIN Special Report, 1999). 
Additionally, Uganda faces the problem of the availability of so many 
illegal small arms and light weapons in the country which are fueling and 
sustaining conflicts. The problem of easy availability of small arms and light 
weapons is compounded by the regional spill over of more guns and refugee 
movements from the various war zone that surround Uganda including 
Somalia, Sudan, Burundi, Rwanda and DRC. Mazrui (2008: 39) has pointed 
out that a combination of modern weapons and less modern armies has 
proved to be a menacing and destabilizing one to most of Africa. Collier 
(2009:103) concurs with Mazrui and notes that cheap and plentiful guns 
may increase the risk of violence but also points out that the availability of 
guns may also reduce violence since people will be careful with each other. 
Experience in Uganda has shown that most political groups easily resort to 
armed violence whenever there is a political difference due to the easy 
availability of arms and this has trapped the country in a vicious cycle of 
political violence. 
                                                 
37 The Monitor (2010). Bukenya Denies Using Religion to Get Power. Available at: 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201011170105.html. Accessed on 3/2/2011. 
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Furthermore, Uganda faces the problem of resource driven conflicts. As 
most analysts point out, natural resource abundance and natural resource 
scarcity can pose a serious problem for developing countries whose 
economies are natural resource dependent (Indra de Soysa, 2000; Francis 
2008:5) such as Uganda. Uganda faces two forms of natural resource 
induced conflicts. The first form of resource based conflict is due to land 
scarcity aggravated by poor farming systems, fast increasing population 
growth in some parts of the country especially in Kigezi which has forced 
people to migrate into other areas causing ethnic tensions over land 
(Kisamba-Mugerwa, 2001:311). The areas most affected by land driven 
conflicts are Bunyoro, Kasese, central Uganda (Buganda sub-region) Teso, 
Karamoja and Acholi sub-region in northern Uganda. In Bunyoro sub-
region particularly in Kibale district, the land conflict between the 
indigenous Banyoro and the immigrant Bakiga has already claimed several 
lives.  
In an attempt to resolve the land conflict in Kibale, President Museveni 
recently proposed that the immigrants should not participate in the politics 
of the area for the next 20 years and that top electoral positions in the 
district should be preserved for the indigenous people - the Banyoro. The 
letter by President Museveni to this effect caused a lot of confusion and 
drew condemnation from the general public which viewed the President’s 
advice as divisive, sectarian and fueling tribalism in the country. In northern 
Uganda, a region that is slowly recovering from a violent conflict of the 
LRA, land is becoming the major fault line of conflict (World Bank Report, 
2008)38. Local politicians including Members of Parliament from the region 
have accused government of planning to grab their land and give it to 
foreign investors; and further marginalize the communities (Sunday 
Monitor, August 30, 2009). The situation is even worse in Buganda sub-
                                                 
38 World Bank Report (2008). Analysis of Post Conflict Policy and Land Administration: A 
Survey of IDP Return and Resttlement Issues and Lessons in Acholi and Lango Regions. 
Available at: http://www.oxfam.org.uk/resources/leaving/land 
right/downloads/northern_uganda_land_study_acholi_lango.pdf. Accessed on 1/7/2010. 
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region where the Kingdom of Buganda threatened violence if government 
went ahead to formulate the National Land Policy and amend the Land Act 
1998 and give land to squatters (Tebajjukira, 2009).  
The second aspect of natural resource based conflict in Uganda and perhaps 
the most threatening aspect of natural resources is the discovery of huge oil 
deposits. Already, Bunyoro Kingdom where most of the oil deposits have 
been discovered is demanding 65% of the oil revenue share even when no 
single drop of oil has been drilled. The situation has been made worse by the 
rush of the political and military elites to acquire large chunks of land in 
Bunyoro in anticipation of oil being discovered on their land. Civil society 
organizations in Uganda accuse the government of pursuing a policy of 
secrecy in the whole process of oil exploration (Oketch, 2009). 
Consequently most analysts point out that unless the oil governance regime 
in Uganda is made more transparent and allows civil society and parliament 
to provide oversight over the prospective oil boom; oil could turn out to be a 
curse rather than a blessing. This fear is not far fetched given the experience 
of other oil producing countries such as Nigeria, Chad and Angola 
(Bainomugisha et al. 2006:2). 
More so, conflicts in Uganda are closely associated to bad governance or 
democratic deficits. Some scholars note that among the political, economic 
and cultural factors most consistently implicated in civil wars are those 
related to a states regime type ( Henderson and Singer, 2000), its level of 
economic development (Collier 1998; Collier and Hoeffler, 1998; 
Henderson and Singer 2000), and its cultural composition (Auvinen, 1997; 
Collier, 1998). These analysts further observe that the consolidated 
democracies are more protected from large-scale domestic conflict due to 
the availability of legitimate channels for conflict resolution (Henderson 
2008:55; Muravchik, 1996:573; Harris and Reilly, 1998). The observations 
are relevant to Uganda’s peace and stability in several respects. First, the 
nature of the state in Uganda is a conquest and repressive state. The state 
was created by British colonialist through conquest and it sustained itself 
through repressive policies. It this very state that was inherited by the 
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independence leaders in Uganda and have not reformed it into a democratic 
state that is accountable to the citizens. 
Noteworthy also is that most post-independence leaders in Uganda have 
always come into power through conquest and are removed by force which 
traps the country into violent politics (Kabwegyere, 1995). The point being 
advanced here is that the nature of the state in Uganda which is repressive is 
a source of several conflicts that have either been resolved, are going on or 
are still latent. One of the reasons for the conflict in northern Uganda that 
has been advanced by the LRA is that they are fighting against Museveni’s 
dictatorship in order to establish a democratic government. While this 
reason is laughable given the LRA record of brutality and human rights 
abuses, one cannot discount the fact that poor governance is a source of 
conflicts in Uganda since it has been advanced by several other armed 
groups. 
The second dimension of the nature of the state in relation to the LRA 
conflict is that because the state in Uganda was created through conquest 
any body who wants to rule has attempted to capture state power through 
forceful means by and not through democratic means. This has almost 
become institutionalized way of coming into power in Uganda. 
Consequently, almost all political groups that want to come to power always 
opt for use of force. It is against this background that this research suggests 
that democratization that involves reforming the nature of the state in 
Uganda should to be part of the conflict resolution and peacebuilding 
processes in northern Uganda in order to establish conditions for durable 
peace. 
Another source of conflict in Uganda that is linked to the democratic 
transitional process from the Movement System to a Multiparty System 
currently underway in Uganda. As Dahl (2000) has observed, democratic 
transitions are always tricky, fragile and conflict ridden, a situation where 
Uganda currently finds itself. Most observers note that the transition process 
is very delicate to the extent that some countries suffer democratic reversals 
or democratic stagnation. The situation is made worse because the current 
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government in Uganda faces legitimacy issues having come into power 
through two successive elections are generally believed to have been rigged 
in favour of President Museveni (Mwesige et al. 2006).  
In 2001 and 2006 general elections, presidential election outcomes were 
decided upon by the Supreme Court ruling. With another general election 
approaching in 2011 and with declining political popularity of Museveni, 
most observers fear that unless these elections are conducted very well, they 
could plunge the country into political instability. This is based on the 
threats by the leader of the main opposition party, Forum for Democratic 
Change (FDC) that he will never go back to the court in case the 2011 
presidential elections are rigged again.39 The history of poorly conducted 
elections has always been a source of political instability in Uganda. 
A letter to President Museveni by Bidandi Ssali, the leader of the opposition 
Peoples Progressive Party (PPP) warned that the country could be headed 
for the worst, come the 20II elections (The New Vision June 21, 2009). 
Henderson (2005) observes that dissidents in semi-democracies rarely have 
their demands effectively addressed through government channels available 
to them and consequently are more apt to mobilize their dissidents and 
pursue insurgency. This has been a course of politics in most of Uganda’s 
47 years of independence and is positively linked with the on-going conflict 
of the LRA in northern Uganda and several other civil wars that have been 
fought in Uganda. 
Finally, lack of respect for the constitution and constitutionalism has also 
been identified as a major source of conflict which traps Uganda into a 
vicious cycle of conflicts. Since independence, almost all heads of state in 
Uganda have not respected the sanctity of the national constitution. They 
instead have treated the constitution as a document to be changed to suit 
their interests. Commenting on how Obote abrogated the 1962 independence 
                                                 
39 The Monitor (2010). War Talk- NRM Officials Criticise Besigye, Available at: 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201001290270.html. Accessed on 4/2/2011. 
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constitution and introduced his tailor made constitutions of 1966 and 1967, 
Kabwegyere (1995:230) observed that,  
That the head of state could abrogate a constitution and replace it 
with one of his choice was the severest blow at the working of 
the state. It showed that the constitution was not a sacred and 
respected document, and that the power of the president was in a 
sense limitless. The 1967 Obote constitution is not only colored 
by the immediacy of the situation at the time but also by Obote’s 
personal interests and ambitions.  
When Idi Amin toppled Obote in 1971, he too suspended certain parts of the 
1967 constitution. Under a Proclamation, Articles 1, 3, 63 and Chapters 1V 
and V of the Constitution of 1967 were suspended. The suspension meant 
that the Ugandan Constitution of 1967 was no longer the supreme law of the 
land. Its provisions and indeed, those of any other law could be overridden 
by decrees passed by the military government (Kanyeihamba, 2002:139). 
Consequently throughout his eight year reign of terror, Amin ruled the 
country by decrees. 
The situation has not been any different under President Museveni’s era of 
‘fundamental change’. When the NRM came to power in 1986, the 
government quickly embarked on a constitution making process which 
lasted from 1989 to 1995 when it was promulgated. 
As Kanyeihamba (2002) has observed, the 1995 Ugandan Constitution was 
hailed as the most progressive constitution Uganda has ever had. Its strength 
was based on the consultative nature the constitutional making process 
undertook, the gender responsiveness, and sensitivity to other marginalized 
groups such as persons with disability, workers, minority groups and youths. 
Most critically, the framers of the 1995 constitution were informed by the 
country’s political history and set out to make a constitution that would 
avoid the ‘bad old days’. The preamble of the Constitution states that, 
182 
 
We the people of Uganda, recalling our history which has been 
characterized by political instability………Do hereby, in and 
through this Constituent Assembly solemnly adopt, enact and 
give to ourselves, our posterity, this Constitution…..this 22nd 
day of September, in the year of 1995. 
Barely 10 years down the road, the NRM government presided over a 
constitutional reform process which overhauled the entire 1995 
Constitution. It is more disturbing that the two term presidential limit was 
removed. This paved way for President Museveni to run for a third term. 
Professor Kanyeihamba (2002:271), himself a founder member of NRM and 
former Attorney General and Minister for Constitutional Affairs, has 
observed that, 
Since 1996, the National Resistance Movement has unveiled 
many facets which few Ugandans expected from it. It can be 
stated that since the promulgation of the 1995 Constitution 
which was arguably the finest hour of the NRM administration, 
the leadership has appeared to concentrate more on political 
games of how to stay in power and exclude others from it 
longest.  
Eriya Kategaya, widely considered as number two to President Museveni in 
the NRM administration, was shocked by the constitutional change. He 
noted that, 
In my naïve thinking, I believed that President Museveni will 
live up to the stature of a statesman and be the first President of 
Uganda to retire as per the Constitution and thereby set a 
constitutional precedent. I strongly believe that this should be 
done for the sake of the future stability of this country. I have 
spent most of my youth running up and down and even went 
into exile because of bad politics and I don’t wish my children 
to experience the same problems (2006:121).  
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The current state of the 1995 Constitution is being contested. In fact one of 
the key democratic reforms that civil society and the political opposition 
parties are demanding include; the re-instating of the two presidential term 
limits which many think would solve the problem of life presidency in 
Uganda and the problems associated with it.  
Emergency, ‘Production’ and ‘Reproduction’ of Child Soldiers 
Phenomenon in Uganda 
Because of the magnitude of the suffering of children in northern Uganda, 
where the Lords’ Resistance Army (LRA) has forcefully recruited thousands 
of child soldiers through abduction, most of the academic studies and policy 
analyses have tended to present the problem as though it is limited to northern 
Uganda. It should be noted that the child soldier phenomenon is not new in 
Uganda’s political history and did not start with the LRA conflict. Child 
soldiering can be traced as far back as 1972 during the first war against Idi 
Amin’s reign of terror through to the 1978/79 Uganda National Liberation 
War which finally ousted Amin. The war that was largely fought by the 
Tanzanian army and Ugandan exiles, massively recruited young people in an 
effort to beef up the Ugandan armed forces once the Tanzanian army had 
withdrawn. Former child soldiers who were part of the liberation struggle and 
have since become prominent personalities include; General Salim Saleh, 
President Museveni’s brother and a celebrated general in the National 
Resistance Army (NRA) bush war which brought President Museveni to 
power in 1986 and the late Major General Fred Rwigyema, the first leader of 
the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF/A) who was killed in the early 1990’s 
during the war to liberate his country Rwanda. These were recruited by 
President Museveni in their teens to join the Front for National Salvation 
Army (FRONASA) which fought alongside the Tanzanian army during the 
Uganda Liberation war of 1979 (Museveni, 2007).   
 
The above observation is confirmed by President Museveni in his book, 
Sowing the Mustard Seed: The Struggle for Freedom and Democracy in 
Uganda. He stated that,  
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In August 1971, we brought some boys into Uganda and 
positioned them on Mt Elgon without any arms, in the hope of 
buying some later; but the boys were not sufficiently disciplined 
and soon gave themselves away. A boy called Wafula went into 
the market in Bumbo where he was arrested and made to talk 
about his activities. Amin’s soldiers then arrested the rest of the 
group, including Raiti Omongin, and took them to Makindye 
Maximum Security Prison in Kampala (Museveni, 1997:55). 
 
President Museveni has also confirmed how and why he recruited his younger 
brother General Salim Saleh, a teenage, then of 16 years, into the liberation 
struggle when he visited him in exile in Tanzania.  He noted that,  
I was very worried about the safety of my family in Uganda… I 
decided not to send him back, especially as he was the only 
brother I had. I thought that one day Amin would kill my family 
simply because they were my relatives….. I argued that now was 
not the time for him to concentrate on studies. It was better to 
keep alive and make a contribution to the liberation of the 
country. …I encouraged him to join the group I had sent to train 
in Mozambique. As a 16 year-old, he was of course delighted at 
the prospect. Young people are easily excited by guns, although 
they may not always know the political implications (Museveni, 
1997:91). 
 
It is not surprising therefore that during the National Resistance Army (NRA) 
guerrilla war (1981-86) which brought President Museveni into power, child 
soldiers popularly known as ‘Kadogos’ played a critical role in toppling both 
the Obote 11 government and Gen. Okello’s military junta in 1985 and 1986 
respectively. The NRA justified its recruitment of child soldiers as the best 
way for protecting orphans whose parents had been killed by government 
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forces and had no where to turn to except the army (Interview with 
Kulayigye)40.  
 
According to Kaihura (2000:14), in February 1981 Yoweri Museveni began a 
guerrilla war against the government of Milton Obote who had come to power 
through rigged elections in 1980. This war was based in Luwero Triangle 
central Uganda. Consequently, the government army launched a campaign to 
dislodge the National Resistance Army (NRA), Museveni’s rebel group, from 
its bases in Luwero Triangle which was densely populated. In the process, the 
army attacked villages, destroyed homes and indiscriminately killed innocent 
men, women and children (Human Rights Watch, 1997). Many children 
especially orphans and those whose parents could not be traced, remained 
with the NRA. 
 
Kaihura (2000:15) further observes that since the war in Luwero Triangle had 
no frontline, it was essential that the children be prepared to defend 
themselves as inevitably they would be caught up in fighting between the 
NRA and UNLA (national army). When the NRA/M captured power in 1986, 
child soldiers were briefly demobilized and enrolled into primary schools. 
Subsequently, most of them were re-absorbed into the army (Interview with 
Kulayigye).  
 
The numbers of children among the NRA have never been clearly known. 
After the end of the war, The Uganda Group of Human Rights based in 
London wrote to the Ugandan Government and demanded demobilization of 
child soldiers who were alleged to constitute 15%, about 3,000, of the total 
number of the national army (Kaihura, 2000:13). The Uganda Government 
points out that the number of child soldiers at the time were only 300 and not 
3,000 as claimed by Non-Governmental Organizations and the international 
community. According to official information of government, by the end of 
1986, a total of 300 Kadogos had been registered for demobilization of whom 
40 were girls. They ranged between seven and sixteen years of age. Ten of 
                                                 
40 Interview with Lt Col. Kulayigye, F., Spokesperson for Ministry of Defence and Uganda 
Peoples Defence Forces in Kampala in March, 2010. 
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them were under seven years old; the youngest was four years. The Kadogos 
were registered in Bombo barracks and by June 1987 when the Kadogos were 
moved to their new School in Mbarara barracks, the number had increased to 
638 (Kaihura, 2000). 
 
The difference between the NRA and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) is 
that the NRA did not have a policy or military strategy of recruitment and use 
of child soldiers and soon after the war, they were sent to school with some of 
them being re-absorbed into the army after their studies. What is also clear is 
the admission by government that the reintegration and rehabilitation of 
former child soldiers had limited success. Comparatively, the LRA adopted a 
strategy of recruitment of child soldiers by abduction and forced conscription 
(Green, 2008:9). Also, the LRA made children the principle target for its 
attack and its survival is based on child abduction and use and not ideological 
appeal for liberation of their country as was the case of NRA. In fact, it is 
noted that most of the child soldiers that became part of the NRA were 
looking for security among the rebels who became their guardians, parents 
and protection since their parents had been killed by government soldiers 
especially in Luwero Triangle (Kaihura, 2000:15). 
 
It is worth noting though that there are other former child soldiers that were 
recruited by the Museveni’s NRA who were enabled to advance in their 
educational and military careers. Today, some of them are in important 
positions in the army. For example, the current head of pharmacy in the 
Uganda Peoples Defence Forces is a former Kadogo (Interview with Lt. Col. 
Kuluyagye).41 According to Kuluyagye, many former Kadogos who 
completed university and other studies were absorbed into the army and some 
are currently serving in very senior positions in the army. 
 
It should also be noted that besides the NRA led by Museveni, several other 
armed groups that were fighting to overthrow President Obote’s second 
government (1980-85) recruited and used child soldiers. One example is 
                                                 
41 Lt. Col. Kuluyagye, Op Cit., 
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Captain Semujju, 35 years old a former Kadog now with a bachelor’s degree 
in Education. Semujju was 10 years old when together with his two brothers 
and other children he joined Dr. Andrew Kahira’s FEDEMU in 1981. He later 
joined Museveni’s NRA upon reintegration of FEDEMU into the victorious 
NRA (Interview with Captain Semujju in Kampala)42.  
 
In spite of the fact that most of the children voluntarily joined the NRA for 
protection especially in the war zone, some of them, especially girls, 
witnessed traumatizing experiences that they will live with for the rest of their 
lives. An example of a former child soldier under the NRA is China Kaitesi. 
Kaitesi speaks about how she cannot forget the systematic rapes she suffered 
and the violence she was forced to commit under the NRA care; a charge 
fiercely denied by the Museveni government as a hoax (BBC News 25 May 
2004). Kaitesi represents several other ex-child soldiers who suffered under 
the NRA under Uganda’s tragic history but have no forum to express their 
feelings. Noteworthy, is that the NRM leadership seemed never to have been 
interested in the RR of former child soldiers into civilian life. Most of the 
former Kadogos who were interviewed point out how they were simply re-
absorbed into the army after schooling or dropping out of school even when 
the army was not their preferred option (Interview with a former child soldier 
in NRA).43  
The Lord’s Resistance Army/ Movement Rebellion: Recruitment and Use 
of Child Soldiers 
It was six in the afternoon. We were in the field. My mother and 
I went home to prepare the food. I saw some strangers, and my 
mother said that may be they were rebels so I went out to warn 
the other girls in the field. On the way I met the rebels, and they 
                                                 
42 Captian Semujju is in charge of Finance and Administration, in the Public Relations Office 
of UPDF. He was interviewed in Mbuya in March, 2010.   
43 Interview with a former child soldier who recently was retired from the army with bitter 
memories. He talked about his abduction and forceful recruitment by the victorious NRA, his 
suffering in the army as a child soldier and the discrimination since he did not come from the 
correct ethnic group. He did not want his name disclosed since this can cause him problems 
with the army leadership as he is still a member of the reserve force. The interview was 
conducted in February, 2010 in Kampala. 
188 
 
made me lead them to the other girls - Iris (Save the Children 
Report, 1999:21). 
This section discusses the background and genesis of the LRA conflict. It also 
discusses the methods of recruitment and use of child soldiers by the LRA 
and the consequences of the LRA conflict on child soldiers. 
  
Northern Uganda and the Acholiland in particular has been a scene of a 
bloody and protracted rebellion since 1986 when the NRM government led by 
President Museveni came into power. The LRA rebellion led by Joseph Kony 
has been characterized by wanton and indiscriminate killings, child 
abductions and rape with impunity. Hundreds of people have been killed and 
maimed while others until recently were forced into internally displaced 
peoples camps (IDPs) in their thousands. It is estimated that over 1.6 million 
people, were made IDPs living in appalling unhygienic conditions for over 10 
years. The United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF) figures show that over 
20,400 children have been abducted since 1990 and forcefully conscripted 
into the rebel ranks where girls are turned into sex slaves for rebel 
commanders (World Vision, 2005).  
 
The Human Rights Watch (1997), on the plight of children abducted by the 
LRA in northern Uganda revealed how the abducted children are subjected to 
unimaginably brutal methods to become soldiers and slave labourers by the 
LRA. In order to keep the child soldiers in the bush, the LRA subjects them to 
cruel punishments including forcing some to kill their friends and relatives 
who attempt to escape. The girls are distributed to the rebel commanders who 
turn them into concubines and effectively kept as sex slaves (Lucima 
2002:13).  What even makes the rebellion more complex is its regional 
dimension where Uganda and Sudan have through this conflict been fighting a 
proxy war (ICG Report, 2004) which makes attempts at conflict resolution 
and peacebuilding extremely difficult. The conflict is linked to other regional 
conflicts in the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes regions and is also known 
to provide a conduit for gun trafficking to regional countries that are 
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experiencing civil wars. The regional dimension makes LRA rebellion pose a 
national, regional and international threat to peace and security. 
 
The grievances for the LRA rebellion have never been very clearly 
articulated. What is well known though is that the LRA has been advocating 
for Uganda to be ruled according to the Biblical Ten Commandments (Green, 
2008:9). Ironically, the rebels have committed gross human rights violations 
including indiscriminate killings, rape, abductions and forced recruitment of 
children into their ranks. Kony at times claims to be fighting to restore 
political pluralism in Uganda and for the economic marginalization of the 
Acholi people by the current government in Uganda. The conflict made it 
almost impossible for the government and development agencies to carry out 
meaningful development and reconstruction programmes in the region. The 
rebellion has had far reaching consequences on the people of northern Uganda 
and the entire country. These consequences include; massive human 
displacement, abject poverty, insecurity and economic stagnation of the 
region, and continues to stifle the country’s democratization process.  
 
The origins of the conflict lie in the complex religious traditions of the Acholi 
people and the deeply-rooted mistrust between the people of northern Uganda 
and other ethnic groups in southern Uganda (Briggs, 2005:113). This mistrust 
is rooted in the colonial distortions by the British colonial administration 
which concentrated development in the south and left northern Uganda to 
provide cheap labour for the plantations in the south and military servicemen 
(ICG Africa Report, 2004:2). People from northern Uganda were encouraged 
to join the army and consequently dominated the military and politics in the 
post-independence period.  
 
The guerrilla war which brought President Museveni, a southerner, into power 
in 1986 marked the end of two decades of political and military domination by 
northerners. The worst effect of this change was that people from northern 
Uganda lost their traditional military jobs and therefore their source of 
livelihoods (Amnesty International Report, 1999:39). In 1986 when President 
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Museveni overthrew Gen. Okello, a popular revolt was fomented by the 
ousted troops who formed the Uganda Peoples Democratic Army/ Movement 
(UPDA/M). Upon defeat of the UPDA by government forces, their remnants 
were re-organized by a ‘priestess’, Alice Lakwena to form the Holy Spirit 
Movement (HSM). Lakwena’s HSM massively recruited civilians mostly 
pporly armed youths to fight against a professional army which led to many of 
them being killed in battles (Finnstrom, 2005:102).  
 
Inspired by Lakwena, the soldiers of the Holy Spirit Movement inflicted a 
number of embarrassing defeats on the National Resistance Army who were at 
first overwhelmed by the sight of thousands of poorly armed soldiers 
streaming forward, making no attempt to take cover (Green, 2008:9). By 
1987, the Holy Spirit Movement’s soldiers made it as far as Jinja, only sixty 
miles from Kampala. At this point, superior technology on the part of 
government forces won the day. With countless dead, the military wing of the 
Holy Spirit Movement appeared to be utterly destroyed (Human Right Watch 
1997:68). After the defeat at Jinja, Lakwena fled to Kenya where she recently 
died in a refugee camp.  
 
The LRA leader, Joseph Kony, a cousin of Lakwena, joined the rebellion of 
the UPDA in 1987 as a spiritual mobilizer (Human Rights Watch 1997:69). 
Kony re-organized the remnants of the HSM to form the LRA. The primary 
motivation of the LRA is the conviction that their struggle against the 
government is a divine call sanctioned by God through his “prophet” Kony. 
This ideology is systematically implanted into the minds of the abducted 
children. 
 
Sudan has since 1994 been central to the survival of the LRA. Sudan has 
provided to the LRA a safe haven, arms and training (ICG Report, 1997:7). 
Sudanese support to the LRA is allegedly in retaliation for the Ugandan 
government support to the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army 
(SPLM/A) insurgency (Woodward, 2001:180). The SPLA/M has been 
fighting against the imposition of Sharia Law, misrule and socio-economic 
and political marginalization by the government of Sudan. 
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The Lords Resistance Army’s Recruitment and Use of Child Soldiers in 
Northern Uganda 
This section discusses the LRA’s recruitment and use of child soldiers in 
northern Uganda. 
 
Kony has since 1987 waged a bloody war targeting civilians, mostly his 
Acholi community, who he accuses of betrayal having initially blessed the 
war and later abandoning him.  Without support from the local population, the 
LRA resorted to abduction of children as a method of recruitment and 
indiscriminate killings of suspected government allies to terrorize the 
population (Briggs, 2005:116; Olupot, 2010). Behind child abductions is a 
carefully crafted element of war strategy. Children and specifically girls are 
meant to provide labor and sexual comfort to the rebel commanders as well as 
serving as targets of terror against their families and communities. 
Accordingly, this is intended to create a sense of hopelessness and hatred for 
the government. When children are killed, parents mourn their death and 
condemn the army for the failure to protect them (ICG Africa Report, 2004:6).  
 
Whenever the LRA planned raids into Uganda to abduct children and for 
supplies from their bases in Sudan, they would divide themselves into small 
bands. In towns and trading centres, they would loot medicines from health 
centres. In the rural areas, they would loot food and often kill adults and 
abduct the children (Human Rights Watch, 1997:13). Abducted children 
would be tied up and forced to carry looted goods. Children who failed to 
keep up the pace would be killed outright including those who tried to escape. 
 
Once in the camps inside Sudan, both boys and girls would be trained on 
how to use weapons and how to fight. During the battle, children are often 
sent to the front lines, while the commanders remain safely in the rear to 
avoid being killed.  The LRA uses spiritualization of violence as a powerful 
psychological tool against child abductees. Children are told that they can 
overcome bullets and that the spirits will confuse them if they try to escape 
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(Anderson et al. 2005:13). The LRA strategy to abduct children is well 
designed to ensure that young people who are easily controllable and easy to 
indoctrinate form the bulk of its forces. Older people are not preferred 
because they are hard to control, indoctrinate and may question some of the 
excesses of the LRA, such as wanton killings and destructive behaviour.  
Consequences of the LRA Conflict on Child Soldiers 
This section focuses on the consequences of the LRA conflict on child 
soldiers. 
 
Children who survive armed conflict have to deal with the 
horrors they have witnessed. War undermines the very 
foundations of children’s lives, destroying their homes, 
splintering their communities and shattering their trust in adults. 
Children spared the direct experience of violence in armed 
conflict still suffer deep emotional distress in the face of the 
death or separation of family members and loss of friends 
(Machel, 1996:80).  
 
Commenting on the consequences of armed conflicts on former child 
soldiers, Wessells (2006:126) has observed that war creates long-lasting 
wounds, both visible and invisible. The most visible ones are the physical 
wounds. Less visible wounds are the hidden ones of the mind, heart and 
soul.  The LRA conflict in northern Uganda has not been exceptional. Not 
only have large numbers of children been killed and injured, but countless 
others have grown up deprived of their material and emotional needs, 
including the structures that give meaning to their social life. 
 
The report by Human Rights Watch (1997:36) revealed how rebel 
commanders used the children as shields. When the battle approaches, the 
children are sent to the frontlines, while the commanders remain in safety 
behind and watch as the government army guns down the children. Stories 
have also been told how the children are ordered by their rebel commanders 
not to take cover, and they are beaten if they attempt to duck down or 
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crouch behind trees or buildings. Consequently, many children have lost 
their lives during battles with the government army. 
 
The consequences of war on young women combatants in northern Uganda 
are worth noting. McKay et al. (1999) reveal how child mothers who were 
former fighters and the babies they gave birth to during fighting had become 
very vulnerable upon return from the bush. Faced with the evidence of rape 
(their children) and the violation of cultural taboos, combined with the 
responsibility of caring for babies and societal resentment, most young 
mothers have become stigmatized. McKay’s story about the child mothers 
in northern Uganda has been corroborated by the report by the Liu Institute 
for Global Issues, et al, (2005:73). The report points out that child mothers 
who are former fighters, find it difficult to reintegrate fully with their 
families due to rejection by the parents because of the children they returned 
with. This was confirmed during the fieldwork. It was established that 
parents are ready to welcome their daughters back but without their children 
born to LRA commanders in the bush.44 Consequently, many of these young 
mothers have ended on the streets of towns as sex workers (Liu Institute for 
Global Issues, et al. (2005). 
 
 
Another consequence of the LRA conflict on former child soldiers is 
poverty. It is worth noting that some of the former child soldiers returned to 
poverty since almost all of them lost out on schooling which would have 
accorded them a secure future livelihood. More so, some of them are 
returning home as total orphans since their parents were killed by the rebels 
or died from other natural causes.  Consequently, most former child soldiers 
have returned to no homes and to chronic poverty exacerbated by the years 
of an unending conflict (Liu Institute for Global Affairs et al. (2005:36). It is 
this state of affairs that could make most of them fail to transit fully into 
                                                 
44 Most child mothers who are former child soldiers that were interviewed during the 
fieldwork revealed that their children have been rejected by their parents who demanded that 
they first take them to their biological fathers. The interviews were conducted in northern 
Uganda between January and February 2010. 
194 
 
normal civilian life and they could be easily driven into criminality or fresh 
rebellions hence constraining reconstruction and peacebuilding processes. 
 
Furthermore, former child soldiers in northern Uganda generally return to a 
society that has been socially and economically disrupted and dislocated. 
The war resulted in what has been described as ‘the world’s biggest 
neglected humanitarian crisis’ (World Vision Report, 2005:30).  More than 
80% of the population in Acholi sub-region estimated at 1.6 million were 
displaced into ‘internally displaced peoples’ camps. Available information 
indicates that internally displaced people are the most vulnerable to 
insecurity, poor quality of life and psychological trauma (Liu Institute for 
Global Affairs et al. (2005:36).45 It seems that reintegration of former child 
soldiers into an already traumatized society could become a serious 
challenge for children who are themselves traumatized. Consequently, it is 
crucial that the reintegration processes of former child soldiers should go 
hand in hand with the economic regeneration and reconstruction of the 
entire society in northern Uganda. 
 
Also, former child soldiers in northern Uganda face resentment by their 
families and the community. During fieldwork, it was established that there 
cases where family re-unions have broken down with former child soldiers 
ending up on streets. This is largely due to the fact that most former child 
soldiers are not used to the dictates of a normal family life with a father as a 
head of a family or household. The bush life prepared them to obey the 
armed rebel commander. Some former child soldiers end up questioning the 
authority of their parents and guardians who they see as civilians and 
therefore powerless before them. Such behaviours result in quarrels and 
fights leading to family break ups (World Vision, 2005:16). 
 
                                                 
45 During fieldwork most of the associations of former child soldiers pointed out that they 
have since established that there were members of the community who needed psychosocial 
support such as counselling. Consequently, these associations are offering counselling 
services to both their members and the community which has also improved their relations 
with the communities among whom they are reintegrated. 
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Another consequence of the LRA conflict on former child soldiers is the 
high prevalence of HIV/AIDS especially among girls and young women 
who were used as sex slaves by rebel commanders. Most former child 
soldiers who have been tested have been found to be infected by HIV/AIDS 
(World Vision, 2005; PRDP, 2007; McKay, et al. 1999:62). 
 
Emotional stress and social disorder has also been found to be one of the 
consequences of the LRA conflict on former child soldiers. Because of 
indoctrination and brutality that former child soldiers were exposed to by 
the LRA, some of them became seriously affected.  A study conducted by 
Liu Institute for Global Affairs et al. (2005) found out that some former 
child soldiers were emotionally distressed. The testimony by one of the 
rescued child soldiers confirms this point. He said, 
I have nightmares and bad dreams. I dream about the bad things 
they (LRA) used to do, like killing people by cutting them into 
pieces with pangas (machetes). This normally happens at night 
then I fail to catch sleep and eventually end up sitting in the 
night… I think even during the day more, especially when I think 
about them trying to kill me, so even if I am with friends, I think 
about what happened to me and to my friends (long silence). 
Sometimes when I sit alone, I think about the machete they used 
to kill people with and other bad things the rebels did. That 
haunts me to an extent that I don’t want to see any one next to 
me when I think about it (Liu Institute for Global Affairs et al. 
2005:15). 
 
Furthermore, it has also been noted that formerly abducted children upon 
return or escape from the LRA captivity have been forcefully recruited into 
the national army - Uganda Peoples Defence Force (UPDF). Chris Dolan 
(2000) pointed out that the trauma of abduction does not end with return; 
some are kept in the UPDF barracks for weeks of questioning while others 
are incorporated directly into the army and redeployed to fight the rebels. 
The point here is that the war has robbed these children of their childhood 
and that even UPDF which is supposed to protect them instead looks at 
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them as additional forces to fight the rebels. This constitutes a violation of 
children’s rights under the Ugandan Constitution under Article 17 which 
prohibits recruitment of children into the army. 
 
One of the disturbing consequences of the LRA conflict on abducted 
children is that most of them die in captivity. According to Dolan (2000), if 
all the accounts of children dying or being killed on forced marches or when 
seeking to escape are true, then several hundreds must have died during 
their captivity. Hundreds more are thought to have been killed in skirmishes 
with UPDF and SPLA while hundreds are alleged to have been sold into 
slavery in Sudan by the LRA. This makes it unlikely that most of the 
abducted children are still surviving.  
 
National Legal Mechanisms for Protection of Children’s Rights in Armed 
Conflicts in Uganda  
This section examines the existing legal framework for the protection of 
children in armed conflicts in Uganda. 
 
The 1995 Constitution 
The Constitution of Uganda as the supreme law in the land provides for 
protection of children’s rights in armed conflicts.  Article 17 of the 
Constitution provides that it is the duty of every Ugandan citizen “to protect 
children and vulnerable persons against any form of abuse, harassment or 
ill-treatment”. The Constitution also states that children under the age of 16 
years “are entitled to be protected from social or economic exploitation and 
shall not be employed in or required to perform work that is likely to be 
hazardous or to interfere with their education or to be harmful to their health 
or physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social development (Article 34). 
Further, the Uganda Constitution under Article 51 establishes the Uganda 
Human Rights Commission (UHRC) whose major function is to promote 
and protect human rights which include children’s rights. 
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Ironically, while the spirit of the Ugandan Constitution is very explicit on 
the protection of children’s rights in armed conflicts, it has not been 
matched by the practice. Both the LRA and the government army the 
Uganda Peoples Defence Forces, stand accused of recruitment and use of 
child soldiers (Global Report, 2008). Noteworthy also, is that  UHRC a 
body established to protect human rights including children’s rights, has 
never brought up any single issue of human rights abuse in respect to 
recruitment and use of child soldiers in northern Uganda in spite of the wide 
spread international condemnation. An interview with the Director of 
Education and Training at UHRC revealed that the commission lacks 
adequate financing and staffing to execute its mandate including legal 
representation of former child soldiers. It was also learnt that UHRC has left 
most of the issues of former combatants including child soldiers to the 
Amnesty Commission. 
 
The Amnesty Act, 2000 as Amended in 2006 
Another piece of legislation designed to protect children’s rights in armed 
conflicts in Uganda is the Amnesty Act 2000. The Amnesty Act 2000 
provides a blanket amnesty to all Ugandans including child soldiers who 
have participated in various rebellions against the Government of Uganda 
since 1986 (Amnesty Commission Report, 2008) when the current 
government of President Museveni came into power. The Amnesty Act 
establishes the Amnesty Commission whose major task is to promote the 
Amnesty law, grant amnesty, demobilize and disarm former combatants and 
resettle combatants including former child soldiers and reintegrate and 
resettle them into their respective communities (Allen et al. 2006:37).  
Under the Amnesty Act, a number of former child soldiers in northern 
Uganda were granted amnesty and resettled. As will be extensively 
discussed in Chapter Five, the Amnesty Commission has not performed to 
the expectation of its framers due to a number of reasons including lack of 
adequate financing and lack of professional staff to handle DDRR 
(Interview with the Public Relations Officer). In fact during fieldwork, it 
was found that there are many former child soldiers who have never been 
assisted by the Amnesty Commision. Most of these former child soldiers 
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who were not formally reintegrated by the Amnesty Commision revealed 
that they live in constant fear of possible arrest and prosecution by the 
government as rebels since they lack amnesty certificates that were provided 
to others. 
 
Children Act 1997 
The Children Act 1997 is another legal mechanism for the protection of 
children’s rights in armed conflicts in Uganda. The law provides for the 
care, protection and maintenance of children. The Act defines a child as a 
person below the age of 18 years. Section 89 (1) states that, ‘where a child is 
arrested, the police shall under justifiable circumstances caution and release 
the child.’ Section 89 (3) states that, ‘As soon as possible after arrest, the 
child’s parents or guardians and secretary for children’s affairs of the local 
government council for the area in which the child resides shall be informed 
of the arrest by the police. Further, the act provides in section 89 (4) that, ‘ 
The police shall ensure that the parent or guardian of the child is present at 
the time of the police interview with the child except where it is not in the 
best interest of the child. 
 
 The problem with the Children Act is that it legislates for peacetime rather 
than war time conditions and as such has not benefited the former child 
soldiers in northern Uganda. The children normally report to the army and 
not to the police before being taken to the reception centres yet the act 
provides for the police. The interrogation for information is normally carried 
out by soldiers of the Child Protection Unit in the barracks without parents, 
guardians or police. Nevertheless the law is an important development in the 
protection of children’s rights and can be utilized by child mothers who 
have been rejected by their parents together with their children. It can also 
assist to re-unite former child soldiers who have failed to cope with their 
parents and ended up on the streets. Noteworthy is that the Children Act can 
be more useful if it is widely disseminated to communities in northern 
Uganda and other parts of the country.  
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Uganda Peoples’ Defence Forces Act 2005 
The Uganda Peoples’ Defence Forces Act, 2005 is another piece of 
legislation that provides for the protection of children’s rights in armed 
conflicts. The Act prohibits recruitment and use of children in armed 
conflicts and sets the minimum age for recruitment into the army at 18 
years. Section 52 (2) (c) states that,‘no person shall be enrolled into the 
defence forces unless he or she is at least 18 years of age and has attained 
such level of education as may be prescribed’. Ironically, the Uganda 
People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) has been widely accused of recruitment 
and deployment of child soldiers, especially the former child soldiers who 
escaped or it rescued from the rebels of the Lords’ Resistance Army, an 
accusation that the army vehemently denies. The army accepts that 
sometimes the army recruits people below 18 years mistakenly since most 
of the young people in Uganda do not have birth certificates and may appear 
older than their real age (Interview with Kuluyagye).46 
 
In terms of ratification of the international legal instruments, Uganda has 
made significant progress.  For example, Uganda ratified the UN 
Convention on the Rights of Child on September 16, 1990 and did not enter 
any reservations. Uganda also ratified the Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child in November 2001. Uganda also 
ratified The Geneva Conventions and Protocols of August 12, 1949. The 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Courts was ratified in June 2002 
as well as the International Labour Organization Convention No 182 on the 
Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of 
Child Labour. Uganda also ratified The African Charter on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child in August 1994. Ironically, while the Government of 
Uganda has done well in terms of ratification and domestication of 
international law, its record of recruiting former child soldiers rescued from 
the rebels of the Lord’s Resistance Army and re-deploying them in 
offensives against the same rebels (Global Report 2004) makes most 
observers doubt its commitment to its international obligations.  
                                                 
46 Interview with Lt. Col. Felix Kulayigye in Kampala in March, 2011. 
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International Criminal Court Act 2006 
The International Criminal Act 2006 which came into force in April 2010 is 
an important piece of legislation for protection of children’s rights in armed 
conflicts. This legislation paves way for the Uganda War Crimes Court to 
try people accused of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. 
This is in line with the Rome Statute of 1998 which establishes the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) that Uganda ratified in June 2002. While 
at the moment, the International Criminal Act 2006 is largely focused on 
trying the LRA leader Joseph Kony and his commanders: Okot Odhiambo 
and Dominic Ongwen, the legislation is likely to work as a future deterrent 
against recruitment and use of children in armed conflict in Uganda 
(Mufumba, 2010).47 In so doing, this legislation could end the cycle of 
impunity of violation of children’s rights which has been a characteristic of 
most armed political groups in Uganda. However, this optimism is possible 
only if the court remains objective. Already, the ICC has come under 
criticism for its bias aganist African leaders. For example David Hoile 
(2010) who describes the ICC as Europe’s Guantanamo Bay observes that, 
 
The ICC’s double standards and autistic legal blundering in 
Africa has derailed delicate peace processes, thereby prolonging 
devastating civil wars. The ICC does not have Africa’s welfare 
at heart, only the furtherance of Western....European foreign 
policy and its bureaucratic imperative to exist, to employ more 
Europeans and North Americans.48  
 
By and large, no matter how the ICC is perceived, the indictments of several 
war lords accused of committing crimes against children’s rights has sent a 
                                                 
47 The Independent Newspaper (2010). ICC Bill: Why did Mps trap Museveni and Save 
Kony? 31March. Available at: http://independent.co.ug/index.php/column/insight/67-
insight/2702-icc-bill-why-did-mps-trap-museveni-and-save-kony. Accessed on 18/6/2010. 
 
48 The Independent Newspaper (2010). International Criminal Court: Africa beware of ‘new’ 
legal colonialism, 14 June. Available at: 
http://independent.co.ug/index.php/column/opinion/86-opinion/3032-international-criminal-
court-africa-beware-of-new-legal-colonialism-. Accessed on 18/6/2010. 
 
201 
 
clear signal that the international law will follow them and punish them. This 
is likely to act as a deterrent to recruitment and use of children in armed 
conflicts in Uganda and other regions of the world. 
Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the political history and political economy of Uganda 
to try to understand the basis for the political woes that have afflicted the 
country most of its post-independence period that led to emergence of the 
child soldier phenomenon. The chapter also discussed the sources of 
conflicts in Uganda which include regional imbalance in economic 
development or economic marginalization especially of northern Uganda 
which stems from colonial economic distortions and lack of political 
commitment to address colonial economic distortions by the leaders; the 
nature of the state and bad governance; natural resources scarcity mostly of 
land resources and natural resource abundance based on the prospects for 
huge oil resources recently discovered; regional spill over and proliferation 
of small arms and light weapons in the Great Lakes Region among others. 
The chapter also discussed emergence of the child soldier phenomenon in 
Uganda, the LRA recruitment and use of child soldiers as well as the 
consequences for involvement of children in the LRA conflict. The chapter 
further explored the existing national legal mechanisms for the protection of 
children in armed conflicts in Uganda. Like most war-torn societies, Uganda 
has an enabling legal regime to protect children in armed conflicts which 
unfortunately has not been effective.  
 
Children in Uganda continue to be recruited and used in armed conflicts by 
several armed groups such as the LRA and the Allied Democratic Forces 
(ADF) as well as the national army. All in all, the chapter presents a picture 
of a conflict prone country. It can be pointed out that although violent 
conflicts are not a permanent condition of society; conflicts can be resolved 
and transformed.  Deepening democratic governance by promoting rule of 
law, respect for the constitution and constitutionalism, undertaking 
democratic reforms, curbing corruption, tackling economic inequality and 
effective implementation of the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan 
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(PRDP) in northern Uganda are some of the interventions that could lead to 
sustainable peace and stability in Uganda. 
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Chapter: 5. 
Peacebuilding Interventions in the Reintegration and Rehabilitation of 
Child Soldiers in Northern Uganda 
Introduction 
This chapter analyzes the official peacebuilding interventions that have been 
implemented by the Government of Uganda and Inter-governmental agencies 
of the United Nations (UN) in the reintegration and rehabilitation (RR) of 
former child soldiers in northern Uganda. The chapter also examines 
unofficial peacebuilding interventions that have been implemented by 
International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs), national Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Community Based Organizations 
(CBOs) in the RR of child soldiers. These interventions are critically analyzed 
to assess their effectiveness and relevance in the RR of child soldiers in 
northern Uganda. 
 
It should be noted from the onset that peacebuilding interventions in northern 
Uganda are unique in the sense that they are taking place outside the formal 
peacebuilding processes that are normally implemented by United Nations 
that follow standard procedures. Peacebuilding interventions in northern 
Uganda are being implemented without a formal United Nations brokered 
peace agreement between the LRA and the Government of Uganda. Peace 
negotiations between the LRA and the Government of Uganda that were 
mediated by the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) collapsed in 2007 
following the refusal by the leader of the LRA Joseph Kony to sign the Final 
Peace Agreement (FPA). More so, the the situation in northern Uganda cannot 
be called a post-conflict peacebuilding, since the LRA remains militarily 
active in the DRC, Central African Republic and Southern Sudan and is 
poised to attack Uganda given the opportunity (International Crisis, 2007:4).49  
                                                 
49 International Crisis Report (2007). Northern Uganda: Seizing the Opportunity for Peace. 
Africa Report N0 124-26 April. Available at: 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/horn-of-africa/uganda/124-northern-uganda-
seizing-the-opportunity-for-peace.aspx. Accessed on 15/5/2010. 
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The official peacebuilding interventions have been initiated and implemented 
by the Government of Uganda with the support of United Nations agencies 
such as UNICEF, UNDP and bi-lateral development partners, the World Bank 
and EU. What is common between the usual official UN led peacebuilding 
interventions and the on-going official Government of Uganda led 
interventions in northern Uganda is the top-down approach in terms of 
planning, design and implementation with the target communities being 
passive recipients of peacebuilding programmes.50 As such, the official peace 
intervention in northern Uganda like in most contemporary conflicts has 
tended to focus on short-term assistance rather than on the root causes and 
underlying issues of the conflict which adversely affects the quality of the 
assistance provided (Berdal, 1996:9). Consequently, as this chapter reveals in 
the subsequent discussions, most of the official government peacebuilding 
interventions have not been successful in meeting their stated objectives.  
Official Peacebuilding Interventions: The Top-Down Approaches 
The Peace, Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP) 2007-2010 
The official Government of Uganda peacebuilding intervention is the Peace, 
Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP) for Northern Uganda (2007-2010). 
The PRDP was designed to be implemented for a period of three years and 
depending on the evaluation and outcomes, government would make a 
decision on the longer term development programme for northern Uganda. 
The overall goal of the PRDP is to consolidate peace and security and lay a 
foundation for recovery and development. Because of lack of funds, political 
squabbles between government and politicians from northern Uganda and 
misunderstandings between donors and government have led to delayed full-
scale implementation of the PRDP which prompted government to extend its 
implementation up to June 2012 (Interview with the Undersecretary Office of 
Prime Minister in charge of PRDP).51 
                                                 
50 Namuyonjo, J.  (2004). Conflicts, Poverty and Human Development in Northern Uganda. 
Paper presented at the WIDER Conference on Making Peace Work in Helsinki, June. 
Available at: http://62.237.131.23/conference/conference-2004-1/conference%202004-1-
papers/Nanyonjo-3105 
Accessed on 15/5/2010. 
51 Interview with Flavia Waduwa, Undersecretary Office of the Prime Minister in charge of 
the implementation of the PRDP. The interview was conducted in Kampala  in January 2010. 
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The Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) that is charged with the overall 
monitoring and implementation of the PRDP attributes the slow pace of 
implementation on the donors’ failure to commit their pledged contribution. 
Accordingly, government is supposed to raise 30% while donors are expected 
to contribute 70% of the overall budget for the PRDP.52  
 
The PRDP investment which is estimated to cost Ug Shs 1,091,734,169 
(equivalent to USD 606,519,297) plans to achieve its overall goal through 
four strategic objectives that are mutually reinforcing (PRDP, 2007). These 
objectives are: 
a) Consolidation of state authority: 
Under consolidation of state authority, government seeks to ensure cessation 
of hostilities, provision of security and re-establishment of the rule of law in 
the region. 
b) Rebuilding and empowering communities: 
Through this objective, government seeks to contribute to community 
recovery, promote improvement in the conditions of quality of life of 
displaced persons in camps, completing the return and reintegration of 
displaced populations, initiating rehabilitation and development activities 
among other resident communities and ensuring that the vulnerable are 
protected. 
c) Revitalization of the economy 
Under this objective, government seeks to re-activate the productive sectors 
within the region, with particular focus on production and marketing, services 
and industry. This would require rehabilitation of critical infrastructure in the 
region and ensuring sound management of the environment and natural 
resources. 
d) Peacebuilding and reconciliation 
Under the peacebuilding and reconciliation strategic objective, government 
seeks to ensure continuous prevalence of peace in northern Uganda. The 
                                                 
52 Ibid. 
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PRDP observes that peacebuilding and reconciliation processes require 
increased access to information by the population, enhancing counselling 
services, establishment of mechanisms for intra/inter communal and national 
conflict resolution, strengthening local governance and informal leadership 
structures and reinforcing the socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants. 
 
Beyond the four strategic objectives, PRDP has fourteen priority programmes. 
These are: Facilitation of the Peace Agreement Initiatives; Police 
enhancement; Prisons enhancement; Rationalization of auxiliary forces; 
Judicial services enhancement; Enhancing local government; Emergency 
assistance; Return and resettlement of IDPs; Community empowerment and 
recovery; Production and marketing; Public Information, Education and 
Communication; Sensitization and Counselling, Amnesty; Demobilization and 
Reintegration.  
 
The OPM is officially mandated to spearhead the implementation of the 
PRDP and is also the coordination office of all the reconstruction and 
development programmes being implemented by government, UN agencies 
and civil society in northern Uganda. A Minister of State for Reconstruction 
of Northern Uganda is the focal person in the implementation of the PRDP. A 
Policy Committee and a PRDP Coordination and Monitoring Unit at national 
level oversee the implementation of the PRDP activities. The Policy 
Committee is comprised of representatives from sector ministries, donors, UN 
agencies and representatives from Non-Governmental Organizations.  
 
As a result of two decades of a violent conflict between the Lords’ Resistance 
Army (LRA) and Government of Uganda, northern Uganda has fallen far 
behind in terms of socio-economic development compared to the rest of the 
country (PRDP, 2007). The rebellion resulted into over 1.6 million people 
being forced into internally displaced persons camps (IDPs) where they stayed 
for over ten years living in appalling poor standards of living (World Vision 
International, 2005:25). The Government of Uganda has been under intense 
pressure from the international community and political opposition to close 
down the IDP camps and improve the living conditions of the people in 
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northern Uganda. Since the return of relative peace in 2006, following the 
start of peace talks between Governmrnt and the LRA in Juba Southern 
Sudan; people left the camps and returned to their original homes. 
 
The PRDP observes that since 1990s, the Government of Uganda has been 
implementing a development agenda that has led to a reduction in poverty 
nationally, with visible improvement in many of the welfare indices. It 
indicates that the number of Ugandans who are unable to meet their basic 
needs declined from 56% in 1992 to 38% in 2003 and further to 31% in 2006 
with simultaneous improvement in other indices relating to access to health, 
education, and water and sanitation. However, the welfare indices for northern 
Uganda have not improved at the same pace as the rest of the country. Income 
poverty remains significantly high, literacy rates are low and access to basic 
services is poor (Shaw, et al, 2008:217). Government blames the state of 
poverty and economic underdevelopment and human suffering that has been 
experienced by the people of northern Uganda on the prolonged conflict that 
has lasted for a period of over 20 years now (PRDP, 2007). 
Table 1: Showing Economic Costs of Conflict in Northern Uganda 
No Cost Item Percentage 
(%) 
Total cost in millions (US 
$) 
1. Direct Military Expenditure 27.58 367.2 
2. Loss of Income from crops 15.96 212.5 
3. Reduction in tourism 13.90 185.0 
4. Increased medical costs 10.38 138.2 
5. Loss of output due to ill health 7.47 99.5 
6. Loss of income from sale of livestock 4.80 63.9 
7 Loss of livestock (cattle) 2.61 34.3 
8. Loss of life- 2.58 34.3 
9. Costs related to West Nile District 2.42 32.2 
10. Loss of foreign exchange earnings 2.27 30.3 
11. Loss of houses 1.46 19.4 
12 Loss of tax revenue 1.42 18.9 
13 Loss of donor funds due to conflict 1.01 13.4 
14 Loss of crops due to forced move to camps 1.00 13.3 
15 Loss of household goods and tools 0.98 13.1 
16 Loss of investments  due to conflict 0.50 6.6 
17 Loss of production/income due to illiteracy 0.50 6.6 
18 Cost of externalising debt 0.26 3.5 
19 Impact of war- related to Lira district 0.24 3.2 
20 Environmental and land degradation costs 0.13 1.7 
21 Frozen investments in IDP camps 0.11 1.5 
22 Roads and Bridges destroyed 0.10 1.3 
23 Outmigration 0.03 0.4 
24 Cost of government offices destroyed 0.01 0.1 
Total  100% $1,331.3 
Source: World Vision International Report, 2005, 2nd Edition. 
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The design of the PRDP and its eventual launch by President Museveni in 
October, 2007 was largely influenced by the increased optimism and 
prospects for the return of peace in northern Uganda. This optimism was 
based on the peace negotiations between the Government of Uganda and the 
LRA mediated by the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS); in Juba; and 
the relocation of the LRA rebels from northern Uganda to DRC, Southern 
Sudan and Central African Republic which left northern Uganda relatively 
peaceful. 
 
The PRDP and Reintegration and Rehabilitation of Child Soldiers 
The PRDP provides for the RR of former combatants under strategic objective 
four: Peacebuilding and Reconciliation. Under this objective, the PRPD notes 
that, 
Government of Uganda has established a clear national policy 
framework for demobilization and reintegration of non-
government forces operating in and outside Uganda. The 
Amnesty Reintegration Programme (ARP) implemented by the 
Amnesty Commission is based on the framework of the 
Amnesty Amendment Act (2006) that was amended in 2006 
(PRDP, 2007:100) 
 
The RPDP provides three ways by which ex-combatants including child 
soldiers can access the Amnesty Reintegration Programme (ARP). This can be 
through a political framework such as the peace agreement; through a legal 
framework such as voluntary reporting and through defence framework where 
these forces surrender to the government army. The PRDP observes that 
irrespective of the framework the reporters use to access the ARP, they are 
eligible for amnesty and programme assistance. 
 
While the PRDP provides for the DRR of ex-combatants both by promising to 
grant amnesty and resettlement assistance, a number of challenges arise in 
respect to former child soldiers. First, like most official peacebuilding 
interventions in war-torn societies, the PRDP follows the liberal 
peacebuilding approaches of top-down quick fixes, time table bound or short-
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term based programming that never consider that the local actors have 
anything to offer in rebuilding their lives. Yet as Richmond (2008:288) has 
observed, peacebuilding receives much of its support and legitimacy in war-
torn situations from civil society and local actors meaning that the notion of a 
civil society acts as a validation of peacebuilding strategies and objectives. 
Apart from the PRDP which is the official government/international 
community supported programe being a top-down intervention; it outrightly 
marginalizes former child soldiers in the demobilization, reintegration and 
rehabilitation processes. 
 
The PRDP’s demobilization and reintegration programme treats ex-
combatants as one homogeneous group; yet they are varied with different 
problems, needs and aspirations. First, most of the former child soldiers were 
abducted and forcefully conscripted into the rebellion by the LRA. Second, 
most former child soldiers were tortured and traumatized as part of the 
training including forcing some of them to kill their friends and relatives in 
order to prevent them from escaping from captivity. Third, the abducted 
children missed schooling and lack life skills to earn a living. Fourth, most of 
the abducted girls were sexually abused and turned into sex slaves and 
concubines of rebel commanders. Some of them returned with unwanted 
children they have to look after for the rest of their lives as single mothers. 
Most of these young mothers or child mothers as they are commonly called 
have been rejected by their parents and told to return children to their fathers 
(Interviews with M.J a child mother)53. This has led to most of the child 
mothers resorting to prostitution in order to survive (Liu Institute for Global 
Issues et al. 2005). Jennings (2008:165) has warned against homogenizing 
DRR based on the experience in Liberia and Mozambique where both foot 
soldiers and commanders were treated as an undifferentiated mass with same 
interests, resources and opportunities. In both cases, officers offended at being 
treated the same as foot soldiers chose to orient their organizational skills and 
                                                 
53 Interview with M.J. 25, a child mother with three children. During the fieldwork interviews 
for this research, most child mothers revealed that many of them were living in towns 
particularly Gulu town with their children where they do petty jobs such as washing houses 
and cleaning clothes of other people for a small pay. Most of them were worried about the 
education for their children. The interview was conducted in February 2010. 
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networks towards criminal rather than licit enterprises. Consequently, for 
government through the PRDP to have treated former child soldiers in the 
same way as other ex-combatants makes it difficult to effectively rehabilitate 
and reintegrate them into society.  
 
The other challenges to effective RR for the former child soldiers and those 
that are still in captivity of the LRA relate to rampant and wide scale 
corruption that characterised earlier reconstruction programmes to PRDP. The 
effectiveness of the PRDP’s predecessor Northern Uganda Reconstruction 
Programme (NURP1) and Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF) 
were severely affected by corruption and mismanagement by government 
officials, yet no serious measures have been put into place to prevent 
corruption and mismanagement (Tebaijukira, 2008).54  
 
Commenting on how the funds meant for NUSAF, the predecessor to PRDP 
were embezzled, Prime Minister Nsibambi while appearing before Parliament 
observed that, 
...some cases are in courts of law while others are being handled 
by the police. But it is of great importance for the members of 
parliament to get copies of the alleged corruption.55  
 
 Embezzlement of NUSAF funds took all kinds of forms. In some cases 
members of the Community Project Management Committee (CPMC) 
connived with contractors to produce shoddy or incomplete work. In other 
instances, the supplier would be paid for goods that were never delivered.  It 
was also found that in most cases funds were withdrawn from the bank by 
CPMC executives and diverted for personal use (Interview with a senior 
officer with OPM). Based on previous experience, it leaves one wondering 
how funds under the current PRDP will not be embezzled or mismanaged. 
 
                                                 
54 Tebajjukira, M.  (2008). Shs 2.5 Billion NUSAF Funds Missing. New Vision 10 July. 
Available at: http://allafrica.com/stories/200807110006.html. Accessed on 14/5/2010. 
 
55 Ibid. 
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Another challenge facing the PRDP that relates to the RR of former child 
soldiers is its politicization by politicians both in government and opposition 
at local and national levels. The politicization of the PRDP in form of 
politicians trying to claim advantage from the programme is confusing to the 
target communities who are emerging from a destructive civil war. In fact, 
there are reports of some districts which failed to submit district work plans 
which are a basis for release of funds by the Office of the Prime Minister, 
simply because local leaders cannot agree on distribution and location of 
projects (Interview with Under Secretary, OPM).56 Politicians struggle to have 
juicy projects located in their constituencies in order to impress the electorate 
for political advantage. More so, the Museveni Government that has 
consistently been losing elections in northern Uganda is eager to use the 
PRDP to win political support in a region considered an opposition strong 
hold (Interview with Mao).57 
 
In such circumstances, political expediency takes precedence over objective 
reconstruction and peacebuilding interventions. The evidence of the above 
observation is that the PRDP’s geographical area which initially covered 18 
districts has now been expanded to cover 40 districts in the areas that were not 
directly affected by the conflict.  Government has defended the expansion of 
the PRDP coverage on the grounds that the spill-over effects of the conflict 
through the IDPs and small arms proliferation in the neighbouring districts 
need to be addressed(Interview with Minister, Wakikhona).58 This position 
has been criticised by leaders from northern Uganda who have interpreted 
government’s action as aimed at gaining political advantage in the new PRDP 
districts (Interview with Okot Ogong)59. The point being made here is that 
                                                 
56 This statement was made by the Permanent Secretary Office of the Prime Minister at a 
workshop organized in partnership between Advocates Coalition for Development, Arua 
Local Government, Greater North Parliamentary Forum and OPM in Arua, West Nile in 
January 2010. The workshop was organized to assess the progress and challenges in the 
implementation of the PRDP. 
57 Interview with Mao Norbert, Local Council V Chairperson, Gulu District, in February, 
2010. 
58 Wakikhona, D.  is a  Minister of State for Northern Uganda in charge of the PRDP. He was 
interviewed in December, 2009 in Kampala. 
59 Okot Ogong is a Member of Parliament and Chairman of the Greater North Parliamentary 
Forum. The forum, whose membership comprises all members of parliament from northern 
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politicization of the PRDP activities is causing confusion among the 
communities that are slowly rebuilding their lives and this could negatively 
affect the pace of recovery including RR of former child soldiers. 
 
Additionally, there is a challenge of lack of awareness of the PRDP by most 
of the beneficiary communities in northern Uganda. During the field work in 
northern Uganda, it was found that most of the formerly abducted child 
soldiers are ignorant about the PRDP and how they can benefit from it. Most 
of them are not able to differentiate the PRDP from the usual government 
programmes such as the much publicized ‘Prosperity for All’ which was 
President Museveni’s campaign slogan during the 2006 presidential elections 
now being implemented across the country. The implication for this is that 
communities including former child soldiers are not able to hold their leaders 
or government accountable for a programme they do not understand 
(Makerere University, Refugee Law Project et al. 2008:8).  
 
Furthermore, the PRDP effectiveness in the RR of the former child soldiers 
faces the challenge of the way it was designed. The design of the PRDP was 
largely a top-down approach although the officers at the OPM claim the 
design enlisted participation of the target communities (Interview with 
Othieno a Commissioner in OPM). The overwhelming lack of awareness 
about the PRDP among the beneficiaries, especially the former child soldiers, 
during the fieldwork interviews, indicates that they were not adequately 
consulted during the design stage. Lack of adequate consultations and 
participation of the target communities and the local civil society, in the 
planning and design of the PRDP, makes the programme become more like 
the usual UN official externally driven peacebuilding processes that seek 
quick fixes and neglect local knowledge and local resources that are necessary 
for local ownership and future sustainability (Richmond, 2007). It is no 
wonder that former child soldiers who should be key beneficiaries are not 
specifically targeted for support by the PRDP. Had they been consulted, it is 
                                                                                                                               
Uganda, was created to monitor the implementation of the PRDP. He was interviewed in 
January, 2010 in Arua. 
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most likely that their unique needs and challenges would have featured more 
prominently than is provided for in the PRDP. 60 
 
Another crucial challenge to the PRDP effectiveness relates to the hostile 
attitude towards civil society that largely exists at the local government level. 
Most local leaders interviewed accuse civil society of criticising their 
programmes yet civil society organizations are also not transparent with their 
own funding and programming (Interview with Mao).61 During the field work, 
it was found out that most district local governments now demand that all 
NGOs and Community Based Organizations must submit their work plans to 
the district authorities to assist in easy coordination of their activities (The 
New Vision, 29 June 2010).62 While on the face of it one would think that 
local governments are doing a good thing to streamline coordination of 
peacebuilding interventions, a deeper analysis shows that it is designed to 
control and silence critical NGOs and CBOs.63 Yet without a strong and 
vibrant civil society, the powerlessness and vulnerability that exist, especially 
among former child soldiers and women, would make it difficult for them to 
benefit maximally from the PRDP. Prendergast et al. (2002:329) who 
advocate for strong local civil society involvement in peacebuilding processes 
observe that,  
...the greatest comparative advantage that CSOs possess in 
peacebuilding is local knowledge and deep contextual 
understanding of barriers and opportunities to making peace at 
                                                 
60 During the field work exercise in northern Uganda which took place from December 2009 
to March 2010, most people interviewed including former child soldiers did not seem to know 
what was in the PRDP for them and how they were going to benefit. In fact most people 
confused the PRDP with President Museveni’s election Manifesto programme of 2006 called 
Prosperity for All which is more of an aspiration than a development programme. 
61 A presentation on the roles and challenges of civil society in the implementation of the 
PRDP in Arua in January 2010 during a workshop organized by Advocates Coalition for 
Development and Environment and Office of the Prime Minister generated a heated 
discussion with each side pointing out the weaknesses of the other. The meeting observed that 
civil society should be transparent in their operations. It was also noted that local 
governments should allow civil society to perform their watch dog role if PRDP was to be 
implemented successfully. 
62 The New Vision, Tuesday June 29, 2010, Northern Uganda NGOs Face Prob. Government 
is putting pressure on NGOs in northern Uganda to account for the PRDP money, yet they do 
not get funding from Government. This action could seriously constrain civil society work in 
the region. 
63 Interview with the General Secretary, Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative during the 
field work in Arua, January 2010. 
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the local level. This local knowledge translates into a set of 
roles that CSOs can play to foster the implementation of peace 
agreements and long-term peacebuilding: as transmission belts 
between communities and national governments, international 
NGOs ... and as advocates for local communities in national 
policy debates. 
 
The other challenge is what the politicians from northern Uganda call lack of 
political will to reconstruct and develop northern Uganda by the Museveni 
Government. Lack of adequate funding and delayed implementation of the 
PRDP has been interpreted as lack of political will to develop the region that 
has been hostile to the current government in Uganda. Commenting on 
government’s commitment to reconstruct northern Uganda, Nobert Mao, 
Chairman Gulu district which was the centre of the LRA conflict who is also 
the presidential candidate for the opposition Democratic Party (DP) observed 
that, 
There seems to be no will to rebuild the north. This started 
with the slovenly way in which the shs 18.6b emergency fund 
was used. In the 2008/2009 budget, money was allocated 
towards the PRDP but the money is unseen. Recently, the 
finance ministry said about shs 120b will be allocated towards 
the PRDP. We expect the money will be allocated in response 
to the need and indicative figures disclosed to local 
government in time........Some government officials talk as if 
the money meant for SACCOS, NAADS and similar national 
interventions are all part of the PRDP...........The confusion 
over the PRDP is a gross betrayal of the people. It is 
unacceptable that there is no money for PRDP (Mao, 2009). 64 
 
                                                 
64 Mao, N. (2009). Has the Government Moved a Vote of No Confidence in Itself? The New 
Vision Newspaper of 9 February. Available at: 
http://www.friendsforpeaceinafrica.org/norbert-mao/345-has-the-govt-moved-a-vote-of-n. 
Accessed on 14/5/2010. 
 
215 
 
Based on the above analysis, it becomes evident that the demobilization, 
disarmament and reintegration of former child soldiers in northern Uganda 
were not given any serious consideration by the official peacebuilding 
intervention. Yet as Berdal (1996:9) has observed, only with clearer 
appreciation of the context of such attempts at disarmament, demobilization 
and reintegration can some features that have made success so ‘inherently 
difficult’ be identified and their negative influence on the peace process be 
mitigated. Neverthless, the PRDP still stands a chance to strategically plan 
and target the former child soldiers since it provides for periodic review 
(Interview with Waduwa).65 During the field work, the Minister of State for 
Reconstruction of Northern Uganda, Hon. David Wakikhona acknowledged 
that during the design of the PRDP government lacked technical expertise on 
DRR which explains why the component is not well conceptualized. He 
however pointed out that government is willing to take advice from civil 
society organizations with expertise in the field of DRR. It is against this 
background that the need for involvement of civil society in the successful 
implementation of the PRDP becomes imperative. 
 
Northern Uganda Reconstruction Programme (NURP 1) 
The Government of Uganda in 1992 designed and implemented the Northern 
Uganda Reconstruction Programme (NURP 1). The main objective of NURP1 
was to address the social economic problems in northern Uganda with the 
exception of the districts of Kotido and Moroto in Karamoja.66 The 
programme was essentially an emergency operation aimed at restoring basic 
economic and social activities in the region. Although the implementation of 
NURP 1 was estimated to cost USD 600 million, only USD 93.6 million was 
realized and utilized. NURP 1 did not have any specific projects on the RR of 
former child soldiers. The main focus for NURP1 was to upgrade the 
infrastructure of the region in the form of roads, water supplies, health 
                                                 
65 F. Waduwa is an Under Secretary in Charge of the implementation of the PRDP in the 
Office of the Prime Minister. Waduwa was interviewed in March 2010 in Kampala. 
66 Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (2003) Post-conflict Reconstruction: The 
Case of Northern Uganda. Discussion Paper 7 (Draft). Available at: 
http://www.finance.go.ug/docs/Post-conflict%20Reconstruction.pdf. Accessed on 13/5/2010 
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facilities and schools with support of IDA loan (Robinson, 2000).67 Even if 
the social and economic projects would have indirectly benefited the former 
child soldiers, the programme faced serious challenges that made it almost a 
failure. Some of the key challenges that NURP 1 faced include massive 
embezzlement of project funds by officials and insecurity in the region. 
 
It is noted that most of the money meant for the communities in northern 
Uganda ended up in Kampala, the capital city of Uganda benefiting people 
who did not deserve it. Secondly, projects implemented under NURP 1 were 
greatly hampered by the insecurity, since it was too risky to reach certain 
areas in northern Uganda where the LRA were very active. The third 
challenge is that the design of NURP 1 followed a top-down approach which 
lacked community participation and ownership (Interview with officials in 
OPM). This was largely responsible for its failure. Some of the components of 
NURP 1 that were considered successful such as the Soroti District 
Development Programmes, the Community Action Programme (CAP) in 
West Nile region and the Arua District Development Project were developed 
and implemented with participation of the target communities (Uganda Debt 
Network, 2004). 68   
 
Another major weakness of NURP 1 as a peacebuilding intervention is that it 
pursued the economic dimension of peacebuilding, a liberal thinking which 
assumes that giving people an economic stake in peace rather than war is 
sufficient to make make war less likely (Herring, 2008:48; Selby, 2008:16). 
Consequently, NURP1 focused on investing in infrastructure development, 
health, water etc which would improve economic development and deliver 
peace in northern Uganda. Over emphasis on the economic dimension of 
peacebuilding by NURP1, when the root causes of the LRA conflict are 
                                                 
67  Robinson, M. (2000). Community Driven Development in Conflict and Post-Conflict 
Conditions: The Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF) Project. Available at: 
http://www.google.co.uk/#hl=en&source=hp&q=World+Bank%2C+April+2000%2C+Northe
rn+Uganda+Reconstruction+Project%3A+Performance+Audit+Report%2C+Operations+Eval
uation+Department.+Report+No.20664&btnG=Google+Search&aq=f&aqi=&aql=&oq=&gs_
rfai=&fp=74aa98f7d3a65fd7. Accessed on 8/5/2010. 
 
68 Uganda Debt Network (2004). Will NUSAF Deliver Northern Uganda out of Poverty? 
Policy Review Newsletter Vol: 4, Issue 3. 
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complex and diverse including political inclusion, bad governance, historical 
grievances and regional dimension of the conflict, was central to its failure. 
 
Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF) 
NUSAF is another Government of Uganda programme which started in 2003 
and ended in March 2009. NUSAF was funded to the tune of US$ 133.5 
million of which US$ 100 was a loan from the World Bank and US$ 13.3 
million came from the Government of Uganda, while US$ 20.2 million was a 
contribution from local communities. The programme covered 18 districts 
spanning the northern region which included the districts of Pallisa, 
Nakapiripirit, Kumi, Soroti, Katakwi, Kaberamaido, Kitgum, Lira, Apac, 
Pader, Moroto, Kotido, Gulu, Yumbe, Nebbi, Adjumani and Arua. The 
targeted community has a population of about 6.3 million people (Uganda 
Debt Network, 2004). The design of NUSAF was widely acknowledged as 
being participatory and consultative involving stakeholders from the central 
government and local communities (Uganda Debt Network, 2004). Its design 
was coordinated by the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) which included 
senior government officials who were representatives of line ministries. The 
resultant design document was described by observers as highly appropriate to 
the conflict and post-conflict conditions in northern Uganda (Interview with 
NUSAF officials). 
 
NUSAF was designed to fulfil several objectives: to eradicate poverty; to 
promote sustainable development and to create conditions for higher levels of 
investment in agriculture and rural development; and to complement efforts of 
other projects the government was implementing in northern Uganda. NUSAF 
was based on the realization that the majority of the rural farmers in northern 
Uganda are small scale farmers with the barest means of survival which had 
been greatly undermined by the protracted violent conflict of the LRA. 
Consequently, it was envisaged that if NUSAF was going to be the vehicle for 
poverty eradication in the region, it must enable the extreme poor to become 
productive and generate incomes to enable them to afford the basic needs of 
survival including food, shelter and clothes. 
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NUSAF had five components: a) Community Development Initiative with a 
range of targeted project options covering education, health, water supply and 
sanitation, economic infrastructure, agriculture and environment; b) 
Community Reconciliation/Conflict Management; c) Vulnerable Group 
Support; d) Institutional Development; and; e) the Northern Uganda Youth 
Rehabilitation Fund.  For the purpose of this research, the focus will be placed 
on two components of NUSAF which are closely related to the RR of former 
child soldiers: Youth Opportunities Project and Community Reconciliation 
and Conflict Management. Particular emphasis will be put on the relevance of 
NUSAF’s Youth Opportunities Project, Uganda in the RR of former child 
soldiers since it was focused on the youth, a category where former child 
soldiers fall. 
 
Northern Uganda Social Action Fund Youth Opportunities Project 
 The Youth Opportunities Programme (YOP) of NUSAF had three main 
objectives: 1) to provide youths with specific vocational skills and tool kits to 
enable them earn incomes and improve their livelihoods; 2) to contribute 
towards community reconciliation and conflict management; and 3) to build 
capacity of NGOs, CBOs, and Vocational Training Institutes (VTIs) to 
respond to the needs of youths. In order to accomplish the objectives set out 
for YOP, NUSAF developed a highly decentralized community and district 
driven system of youth vocational training. Organized small youth groups 
would identify vocational skills of interest and apply to the NUSAF District 
Technical Offices (NDTOs) for funding. Youth groups whose proposals were 
approved would receive cash transfer of up to US$ 10,000 through a 
community bank. These funds were used to enrol in VTIs, buy training 
materials, and equip graduates with the tools and start-up costs for practicing 
the trade after graduation. NDTOs were supposed to supervise and provide 
technical assistance. 
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 YOP began with US$ 1.6 million grant from the Japanese Social 
Development Fund in 2003. In March 2005, NUSAF decided to scale up the 
funding and committed about US$ 6 million (Blattman et al. 2009).69 
 
While the YOP programme seems to have been a good idea where former 
child soldiers could have benefited, it faced a number of challenges. First, the 
criteria by which youth groups’ proposals were selected for appraisal and 
approval in the districts remains unclear. There have been reports of 
corruption, mismanagement, and fraud levelled at many NUSAF, district, and 
community officials (Blattman et al. 2009).  Secondly, the impact evaluation 
of YOP found it unclear how districts were able to successfully target the 
youths to benefit from the programme. Instead, the evaluation found signs that 
urban and peri-urban youth, educated youth, and well-connected youth were 
more likely to receive funds than the rural, uneducated and dislocated youths, 
a category where most former child soldiers fall. Third, it was established that 
the demand for the youth programme at the community level has been much 
greater than the supply of funds and staff. Thousands of proposals were 
received in Districts offices that could not be funded (Blattman et al. 2009).  
 
Fourth, a large number of individual youth projects suffered from poor 
planning, mismanagement and accountability (Uganda Debt Network, 
2004:3).  In these circumstances, it was difficult for youth groups of formerly 
abducted child soldiers most of whom missed out out on schooling to access 
funds under NUSAF’s YOP for their successful RR in communities as 
productive citizens. 
 
Community Reconciliation and Conflict Management 
Another NUSAF component that was closely linked to the RR of former child 
soldiers is the Community Reconciliation and Conflict Management. The 
main aim of this component was to improve peace and security in the region 
                                                 
69 Blattman, C. Fiala, N. & Martinez, S. (2009). Impact Evaluation of the Northern Uganda 
Social Action Fund Youth Opportunities Project, Uganda. Available at: 
http://www.iza.org/conference_files/ELMPDC2009/martinez_s4899.pdf. Accessed on 
8/5/2010. 
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affected by the LRA conflict. The Community Reconciliation and Conflict 
Management component was designed as a cross cutting component among 
the other NUSAF components. It included: traditional justice mechanism; 
cultural ceremony support; community dialogue and peace training or peace 
education. 
 
While NUSAF implemented these activities with relative success, information 
on the ground reveals that most of the communities and groups that received 
funds from NUSAF misused the funds. There are reports of widespread 
corruption and lack of awareness among the communities that benefited from 
NUSAF funding. It is noted that most beneficiaries confused NUSAF money 
with Government micro-finance funds commonly known as ‘Entandikwa’ that 
was misused as most people who accessed this money across the country 
thought it was a gift from President Museveni for political support (Debt 
Network, 2004). Despite the fact that NUSAF was well funded, it did not 
achieve much for the target communities in northern Uganda. It is common 
practice to find several sign posts on the same spot for non-existent projects 
(Interview with Mao). Commenting on the level of corruption and nepotism 
that characterised NUSAF projects, Gulu District Chairperson Mao observed 
that,  
This project has been hijacked by the local elites making people 
victims, not beneficiaries. We continue to receive complaints 
that NUSAF and district officials pressurize people to give 
kickbacks to benefit from NUSAF project (The Weekly 
Observer 6 March, 2008). 
 
Based on the level of corruption that characterised NUSAF and the fact that 
former child soldiers were not officially planned for by NUSAF, they were 
not able to get tangible benefits. Most youth groups, not necessarily former 
child soldiers did not get funding due to the bureaucratic nature of the system 
and the overwhelming number of applications that were received by districts. 
The groups that benefited lacked proper management and oversight from the 
fund and ended up squandering the resources. A case in point is Tempwoyo 
Youth Community Carpentry and Joinery Project in Paicho sub-county, 
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Kitgum district where the executive members disappeared with Shs. 10 
million (Tebajjukira, 2008).70 By and large, NUSAF did not benefit the 
former child soldiers in their RR processes. If NUSAF benefited former child 
soldiers in their RR process at all, it was in an indirect manner that is difficult 
to pin point under this research. Worth noting is that NUSAF has been 
incorporated as one of the components of the PRDP. 
 
Northern Uganda Rehabilitation Programme (NUREP) 
Northern Uganda Rehabilitation Programme (NUREP) is funded by the 
European Union for a period of four years (2006-2010) to the tune of 20 
million Euros. It aims at strengthening self reliance and protection of local 
populations in the region and rehabilitation of social infrastructure and 
improvement of the capacity of Ugandan stakeholders to respond to conflict 
and disasters. NUREP, which is in the process of being incorporated into 
PRDP, is a needs-based, demand-driven initiative that seeks to narrow the 
economic, social and political disparities between northern Uganda and the 
rest of the country (Interview with Othieno, Commission OPM).71 
 
The overall objective of NUREP is ‘Increased potential for the restoration and 
preservation of peace and the creation of an enabling environment for 
development in northern Uganda’. In order to achieve its objectives, NUREP 
is supporting the following activities: conflict resolution and peacebuilding 
initiatives; livelihoods of conflict affected people and returnees; service 
delivery by local governments; strengthening respect for the enforcement of 
human rights and the rule of law and support of the OPM to coordinate PRDP 
implementation. NUREP is working in Acholi, Lango, Teso and Karamoja 
sub-regions and Adjumani district in West Nile region. The programme is 
based on the premise that there cannot be peace without development and vice 
versa. 
 
                                                 
70  Tebajjukira,  M. Shs 2.5 Billion NUSAF Funds Missing. New Vision 10 July 2008. 
Available at: http://allafrica.com/stories/200807110006.html Accessed on 6/5/2010.  
 
71 Interview with Othieno, R., a Commissioner in the Office of the Prime Minister working on 
the implementation of the PRDP in Kampala in March, 2010.  
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In the course of 2008, a total of 126 projects were implemented under NUREP 
spread across Acholi, Teso, Karamoja and Lango sub-regions and Ajumani 
district in West Nile. NUREP is supporting national and international 
organizations to implement a number of projects. Some of the organizations 
that have been funded by NUREP include; Concerned Parents Association, 
GUSCO, War Child Holland, International Rescue Committee, St Monica 
Women’s Group, Oxfam and AVSI some of which are involved in the RR of 
former child soldiers. Key projects supported by NUREP that are linked to RR 
of former child soldiers are: the reintegration of ex-combatants and returnees, 
conflict resolution and peacebuilding, empowering youth through training in 
vocational training, income generating projects, construction of school 
classrooms and psychosocial support to ex-combatants.  
 
NUREP has been helpful in the RR of former child soldiers in several ways. It 
has supported their RR processes through income generating projects, 
vocational training, and support to primary schools where some of the former 
child soldiers have enrolled. However, it remains to be seen how NUREP, 
which is being folded into the mainstream PRDP which is facing funding 
problems, politicization and lack of clarity on the DDRR of former child 
soldiers, can still deliver on its objectives. 
 
Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme (KIDDP) 
2007-2010 
Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme (KIDDP) 
has been integrated into the PRDP. The overall goal of KIDDP is to contribute 
to human security and promote conditions for recovery and development in 
Karamoja. The proposed interventions of the KIDDP aim to achieve this goal 
through the implementation of a comprehensive and coordinated disarmament 
programme that will enhance peace building and development in Karamoja. 
Weapon collection activities are being undertaken within the context of peace 
building programmes where efforts to remove weapons from society are 
linked with initiatives to address the root causes of the conflicts including 
development activities that reduce poverty.  
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KIDDP does not directly focus on the RR of former child soldiers since this is 
not a problem in Karamoja sub-region which is the major focus of the 
programme.72 However, a gun free Karamoja, an area which has always 
destabilized northern Uganda through cattle rustling, is likely to create a 
peaceful environment for carrying out peacebuilding including the RR of 
former child soldiers. 
 
The Amnesty Commission 
The Amnesty Commission (AC) is a body that was created by the Amnesty 
Act of 2000 amended in 2006. The AC has two key objectives: to persuade 
reporters to take advantage of the amnesty and encourage communities to 
reconcile with those who committed the offences; and to consolidate the 
progress so far achieved through the implementation of the amnesty and 
ensure that more insurgents respond to the amnesty and that the community is 
ready to receive them (Hovil et al. 2005:7).73 The Act provides a blank 
amnesty to all Ugandans who have participated in various rebellions against 
the Government of Uganda since 1986 (Amnesty Commission Report, 2008). 
Besides granting amnesty, the Amnesty Commission through its 
Demobilization and Resettlement Team is supposed to demobilize, disarm, 
reintegrate and resettle former combatants, including child soldiers, into 
communities. According to the Amnesty Commission, there have been 27 
different rebel groups who have taken advantage of the Amnesty Act since it 
came into force in 2000, including the rebels of the Lord’s Resistance Army, 
the majority of who are formerly abducted child soldiers upon surrender and 
renunciation of armed violence (Interview with Draku).74 
 
Accurate numbers of former child soldiers and LRA fighters who have so far 
benefited from the Amnesty Act are not readily available. However according 
                                                 
.72  Republic of Uganda (2007) Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development 
Programme 2007/2008-2009/2010. Available at: 
http://www.ugandaclusters.ug/dwnlds/0204Karamoja/KIDDP.pdf. Accessed on 10/5/2010. 
 
73 Hovil, L. & Zachary L. Z. (2005). Whose Justice? Perceptions of Uganda’s Amnesty Act 
2000: The Potential for Conflict Resolution and Long-Term Reconciliation. Refugee Law 
Project, Faculty of Law Makerere University, Working Paper N0. 15 February. 
74 Interview with Draku, M., Public Relations Officer; The Amnesty Commission at their 
offices in Kampala in February, 2010. 
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to Draku, the Public Relations Officer, Amnesty Commission, between 5,000- 
7,000 former child soldiers to-date have been granted amnesty and 
reintegrated with their families75. Apart from offering immunity from 
prosecution and community sensitization, the commission provides amnesty 
certificates and resettlement packages to all returnees including child soldiers 
who surrender their weapons and renounce violence (Interview with 
Okello).76 
 
The Amnesty Commission provides a basic personal assistance kit, including 
cooking utensils, a mattress, bed clothes, flour, seeds and fuel. A cash 
equivalent to three months of the salary of a police officer or teacher, around 
US$150; US$ 10.50 for medical expenses and US$10 for transportation 
expenses; and information and counselling on available reintegration options 
are provided to ex-combatants by the commission.77 Beyond the resettlement 
packages to returnees, the commission has conducted sensitization workshops 
as well as radio outreach programmes to educate the population about the 
amnesty law and how they can take advantage of it (Interview with Draku).  
 
Since the commission does not have expertise in counselling, it outsources 
other partners, especially NGOs, to provide counselling to demobilized and 
reintegrated combatants. The commission prepares the communities to receive 
their children. Accordingly, the commission sensitizes the families and 
communities that children are also victims of the conflict and if these children 
are not well received and catered for by the communities; the conflict is likely 
to go on endlessly (Interview with Draku). 
 
According to the staff of the Amnesty Commission, the institution faces the 
challenge of inadequate funding. They pointed out that Government’s annual 
funding of Ug Shs. 1.6 billion is not enough to enable the commission to carry 
out its mandate. For example it is noted that by 2005, the commission had a 
backlog of reporters or ex-combatants who had not received funds for re-
                                                 
75 Draku, M. Ibid., 
76 Interview with Okello, J., a Senior Resettlement Officer with the Amnesty Commission in 
Kampala in March, 2010. 
77 Interview with Draku, M. Op.Cit., 
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insertion whose numbers had climbed to 11,200. However, this was eased 
when the commission received a grant of $ US 4.2 million funding from the 
World Bank in May 2005 (Mallinder, 2009). At the time of conducting this 
research, the commission was largely dependent on a World Bank grant that 
was slated to end in June, 2010. The second challenge faced by the Amnesty 
Commission relates to the fact that ex-combatants including former child 
soldiers are being reintegrated into poor communities which makes people 
resent these ex-combatants who are largely accused of commiting human 
rights abuses and yet are being given ‘special treatment’.  
 
While the AC has demobilized and reintegrated former combatants including 
child soldiers, most people interviewed, especially former child soldiers, have 
heard about it but few have benefited from its services (Interview with former 
child soldiers). It rarely conducts follow up visits to the children and other 
former combatants which would increase its visibility. Even then the 
commission does not have a functioning website for disseminating 
information about its work. During the fieldwork interviews, the Public 
Relations Officer promised that they were working on the website. A study 
conducted by Allen et al. (2006:37) found out that only about 25% of the 
formerly abducted child soldiers who have gone through the reception centres 
confirmed having received an amnesty card; applied for amnesty or even 
heard about the Amnesty Commission. In spite of its dismal performance in 
the RR of former child soldiers, fieldwork findings indicate that child soldiers 
who have received amnesty certificates feel more secure than those who don’t 
have certificates.78 
 
Child Protection Unit (CPU) of Uganda Peoples Defence Forces (UPDF) 
The Child Protection Unit (CPU) of the Uganda Peoples Defence Forces 
(UPDF) was always the first stop centre for the formerly abducted child 
soldiers in northern Uganda. Whenever children escaped from the LRA into 
                                                 
78 The interviews with former child soldiers revealed that children who were formally 
reintegrated by reception centres with the certificate from the Amnesty Commission have 
been better received by communities than those who came straight from the bush to their 
families. This certificate is a proof of innocence to the former child soldiers who were 
abducted by the LRA and without it some feel unsafe. The interviews were conducted in 
northern Uganda between January to March 2010 in northern Uganda. 
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the villages local leaders or religious leaders would bring them to the barracks 
(Interview with Draku). The reception centres also would bring the children 
first to the barracks so that they are officially released to them (Interview with 
Owor)79. At the barracks, children would be handed over to the CPU 
personnel who are trained in human rights to handle the children. Most of the 
children interviewed during the field work said that they initially feared the 
army was going to kill them since the LRA had warned them that the UPDF 
are non-Ugandans and eat people80. However, the warm welcome in the army 
barracks where returnees would be given water and soap to bathe and wash, 
first aid to treat the wounded, biscuits and porridge, created trust among them 
towards the army. V.O. a former child soldier said,  
They (army) told me that since I was now out, God has helped 
me and will continue helping me in the future....they were 
telling me not to be worried... I am not the only one with such a 
problem, and that I did not choose to go to the bush... We should 
also not worry because there is nothing that will happen to us. 
 
The CPU was created within the army specifically to handle returning former 
child soldiers who were either rescued by the army or escaped from the LRA. 
The CPU received the children and made them feel safe by promising them 
security from the LRA (Interview with Captain Kakurungu)81. The CPU was 
also responsible for questioning the children to obtain security information 
about the LRA. It is this questioning which scared most former child soldiers 
since at times child soldiers would be required to lead the army into the bush 
to locate the caches of weapons hidden by the LRA. Most child soldiers who 
were interviewed during the fieldwork pointed out they were too terrified by 
the experience to consider going back to the bush with the possibility of being 
                                                 
79Owori, A., is a social worker who worked with Gulu Support the Children Organization 
(GUSCO) to rehabilitate and reintegrate former child soldiers. Interview with Owori was 
conducted in northern Uganda in January, 2010. 
80 Interview with V.O one of the members of WACA in Gulu northern Uganda in February 
2010. 
81 Kakurungu is a spokesperson for Uganda Peoples Defence Forces for Northern Uganda. He 
was interviewed in Gulu in Febraury, 2010. 
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re-abducted by the LRA who would have killed them for escaping and 
betrayal.82  
 
The UPDF through the CPU has been blamed for recruiting formerly abducted 
child soldiers and redeploying them against the LRA; a charge they deny 
(Interview with Kulayigye).83 However, during the field work, one of the 
former child soldiers said that after his escape from the LRA, he was 
persuaded by the army officers to join the UPDF where he served for 10 
years. He recently deserted the army after his brother was murdered by an 
LDU (Local Defence Unit).84 He pointed out that if he had stayed in the army 
where he had access to a gun, he would have been prompted to take revenge 
on the person who killed his brother. After questioning the child soldiers, the 
CPU would hand them over to any of the reception centres for RR. The 
duration of stay at the CPU was supposed to be 48 hours, however some 
children deemed to have vital security information would stay longer than 48 
hours. 
 
In spite of the criticism levelled at the CPU, it was the first point of 
psychosocial support provided to former child soldiers since they were 
assured of security, given first aid, food and clothing which made them trust 
adults again. Some of the children observed that while in the barracks they 
were allowed to watch films together with soldiers which changed their 
perception about the UPDF which had been depicted as killers and foreigners 
(focus group discussion with former child soldiers of KICA Ber Youth 
Group). Secondly, since the CPU was working closely with the Amnesty 
                                                 
82 The use of former child soldiers as guides to locate weapons buried by the LRA has always 
been resisted by most child rights organizations. A Child Rights Advocacy Officer with Save 
the Children Uganda observed that it was acts like this that led to disagreement between the 
army and child rights organizations since it amounted use of children in the armed conflict. 
This interview was conducted in Kampala in March, 2010.  
83 Interview with Lt. Col. Kulayigye, F., Op Cit., 
84 This former child soldier escaped from the bush only to be lured to join the government 
army: UPDF. He served in the UPDF for 10 years but when his brother was killed by a Local 
Defence Unit personnel, he decided to desert the army fearing that he may use the gun at his 
disposal to revenge the killing. He looks a very bitter and traumatized person who needs 
psychosocial support. This interview was conducted in northern Uganda in February 2010. 
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Commission these children were able to access amnesty certificates which 
entitled them to reintegration packages (Interview with Draku).85  
 
Uganda Human Rights Commission 
The Uganda Human Rights Commission (UHRC) was established by the 1995 
Constitution of the Republic of Uganda under Article 51. The decision to 
establish a permanent body to monitor the human rights situation was 
informed by Uganda’s violent political history characterised by arbitrary 
arrests, detention without trial, and torture with impunity on the part of 
security organs of government (Interview with Director of Education and 
Training). 
 
Article 52 (1) of the Ugandan Constitution lays down the functions of the 
UHRC. Some of the functions that directly relate to the RR of former child 
soldiers are a) To investigate, at its own initiative or on a complaint made by 
any person or group of persons against the violation of any human rights; b) 
To establish a continuing programme of research, education and information 
to enhance respect of human rights; c) To recommend to Parliament effective 
measures to promote human rights including provision of compensation to 
victims of violations of human rights, or their families; d) To create and 
sustain within society the awareness of the provisions of the Constitution as 
the fundamental law of the people of Uganda; e) To educate and encourage 
the public to defend this Constitution at all times against all forms of abuse 
and violation; f) To formulate, implement and oversee programmes intended 
to inculcate in the citizens of Uganda awareness of their civic responsibilities 
and an appreciation of their rights and obligations as free people; and g) To 
monitor Government’s compliance with international treaty and conventions 
on human rights. 
 
Article 52 (2) requires the UHRC to publish periodic reports and submit 
annual reports to Parliament on the state of human rights and freedoms in the 
country. The commission has two regional offices in northern Uganda. The 
                                                 
85 This was confirmed by Draku, M. Op Cit.,  
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major pre-occupation of the commission has been the investigation of human 
rights violations committed by individuals and government security forces 
(Interview with an officer of UHRC).86  The Commission has also been 
involved in conducting human rights education in the region targeting largely 
the security forces: UPDF and UPF; school children, health workers and local 
leaders. 
 
The UHRC has not been directly involved in the RR of former child soldiers 
in northern Uganda. The commission seems to have left the major task of RR 
of former child soldiers to the Amnesty Commission which is legally 
mandated to implement DDRR of former combatants who include the 
formerly abducted child soldiers.  
 
However, of particular interest to RR and this research, the UHRC has 
consistently conducted human rights education targeting the Uganda Peoples 
Defence Forces (UPDF) and the Uganda Police Force (UPF).  Both UPDF and 
UPF have been directly involved in the conflict in northern. The UPDF has 
been particularly involved in the DRR of child soldiers through CPU. The 
training of the army, police, local leaders, students and school children in 
human rights has been done through workshops (Interview with the Director 
of Education and Training). However radio outreach programmes have also 
been used to reach a wider audience. In 2006 alone, at the time when many 
abducted children were escaping or being rescued by the army, a total of 20 
workshops were organized (UHRC Report, 2006). Most crucially, the UHRC 
worked closely with the army, the Amnesty Commission, UN agencies and 
international organizations to lobby the army to establish the Child Protection 
Unit within the army to handle the returning child soldiers. 
 
The UHRC also continued to be critical of the child soldiering problem in 
Uganda. The commission, through its mandatory annual reports to Parliament 
exposed the army’s involvement in the recruitment and use of rescued 
                                                 
86 Interview with an officer of Uganda Human Rights Commission who did not want his 
identity revealed. Interview was conducted in Kampala in March 2010. 
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children and other children in auxiliary forces. The UHRC Annual report of 
2006 observed that, 
Child soldiering continues to be a serious problem in Uganda. A 
report by the Uganda Parliamentary Form on Children (UPFC) 
in Northern Uganda estimates that 5,000 children are serving in 
the UPDF. This report.... rejected by Uganda’s Minster of State 
for Defence Hon. Ruth Nankabirwa.... that the UPDF 
recruitment policy does not allow the recruitment of those under 
the age of 18. However, UNICEF also reported that no action 
was taken by the UPDF to release the 1,128 children identified 
in the LDUs in the year 2005 (UHRC Report, 2006:100). 
 
Besides conducting human rights education for UPDF and police, the 
commission has been pressuring the Government of Uganda to comply to 
international legal commitments including the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child and United Nations Security Council Resolutions particularly UN 
Security Council Resolution 1612. The resolution calls upon all parties 
concerned to ensure that the protection, rights and well being of children 
affected by the armed conflict are specifically integrated into all peace 
processes, peace agreements and post-conflict recovery and reconstruction 
programming. Following exposure by the UHRC and other agencies of the 
plight of children, the UPDF took steps to implement UN Security Council 
Resolution 1612. Compliance by the UPDF has been in the form of 
monitoring human rights violations through its own Human Rights Desk 
(Interview with Director of Education and Training).  
 
The UPDF Human Rights Desk monitors the human rights of soldier-to-
soldier and soldier to civilian. The UPDF also established the CPU which 
assists in the reintegration of former child soldiers and works to rid the army 
of any children in the ranks of auxiliary forces (Interview with a staff of Save 
the Children Uganda). The UPDF has also reportedly stopped re-integrating 
LRA returnees into its ranks since the beginning of 2006 (UHRC Report, 
2006). Most crucially, the UHRC, working with UNICEF, Save the Children 
and United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, have 
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set up a country-wide Monitoring Task Force for monitoring the use of child 
soldiers in Uganda. 
 
It is worth noting that the UHRC’s work in northern Uganda faces a number 
of challenges which range from understaffing and underfunding (Human 
Rights Watch, 2005:54). Besides, UHRC suffers from great political influence 
by the government. All the UHRC’s commissioners are appointed by the 
president of Uganda and approved by Parliament and have no right of tenure 
which leaves them vulnerable. At the same time, the war in northern Uganda 
seems to be controversial which makes the staff of the commission tread 
carefully. As Human Rights Watch has observed, the UHRC has made a 
number of awards of compensation (not for child soldiers though) against the 
state where but that 90% of such awards have not been paid by government 
(Human Rights Watch, 2005). The point being made here is that lack of 
compliance and enforcement of the UHRC’s reports makes the commission’s 
work, including RR of child soldiers, difficult.    
  
Northern Uganda Commonwealth Youth Centre 
Northern Uganda Commonwealth Youth Centre is a Government of Uganda 
initiative supported by the Commonwealth Youth Programme located in Gulu 
District. The centre which opened with a start up funding of 500,000 Euros, 
provides vocational and life skills training in brick laying, welding, arts and 
crafts, tailoring, agriculture and entrepreneurship development; and peace and 
conflict management skills. Others are HIV/Aids, gender and environment 
mainstreaming and basic education. According to Tebare, an officer with the 
centre, the focus of the centre is on young people between 15-25 years mainly 
from Gulu district but plans to eventually cover the entire northern Uganda 
sub-region. The aim is to enable young people outside the school system, 
especially those from 15 years onwards, to acquire vocational skills.87 While 
the centre is expected to benefit former child soldiers, it does not necessarily 
look out for them. Instead, the centre seeks to serve all the young people in the 
                                                 
87 Project Hope: Northern Uganda Youth Development. Available at: 
http://www.thecommonwealth.org/Internal/152816/152834/177193/project_hope__northern_
uganda_youth_development_ce/ . Accessed on 10/5/2010. 
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region since they were all negatively affected by the conflict (Interview with 
Tebare).88  
 
The project was designed to address the challenges of rebuilding northern 
Uganda after two decades of a violent conflict which greatly retarded 
development of the region. It is premised on the understanding that the 
conflict has affected the youth in many ways: young people in the region have 
missed the opportunity of formal education; the poverty levels are very high 
among the youth and the entire population generally and that many of the 
youths especially former child soldiers are traumatized by the experience of 
the war (Interview with Tebare). 
The project targets the following categories of people for training: 
a) Youth that have missed out on formal education; 
b) Youth that have stopped in primary seven; 
c) Youth that have stopped in senior four; 
d) Youth that have stopped in senior six; 
e) Youth that was not able to complete their university education. 
The centre which at the moment is still operating below capacity faces a 
number of challenges. The challenges include lack of adequate funding from 
both the Government of Uganda and the development partners; lack of 
electricity and Internet connectivity and lack of transport. The centre also 
lacks accommodation for the students who are poor which has forced most of 
them to stay in the deserted semi-permanent houses left behind by the IDPs89 
Finally, the centre is facing an overwhelming demand from many youths who 
want to acquire vocational skills.90 The centre which opened its gates in 2007 
hopes and that former child soldiers and other youths, all victims of the 
conflict, will be able to get life-long skills which will help them rebuild their 
lives and become agents of peace and not agents of destruction (Interview 
with Tebera). It is against this background that a course in peace education 
was included on the curriculum for the centre. The centre also provides 
                                                 
88 Interview with Tebare, L., staff of  Northern Uganda Youth Centre in Gulu in February, 
2010. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid. 
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counselling services which they have outsourced to Watoto Church due to 
lack of expertise. In terms of enrolment, the centre in 2008 had 70 students; 
148 in 2009 while in 2010 the number increased to 300. 
 
While the centre operates below capacity, it is a ray of hope for many youths 
in northern Uganda who missed out on education as a result of the conflict. 
The challenge for the centre is that it is not well funded and lacks 
infrastructure to meet the current demand. Most of the former child soldiers 
interviewed view vocational education as the best avenue of bettering their 
lives. Consequently, a fully operational Northern Uganda Youth and 
Development Centre is likely to answer the dreams of many desperate youths 
including former child soldiers. 
 
United Nations Development Programme (UNPD) 
The UNDP support for the RR of ex-combatants and IDPs human security and 
peacebuilding in northern Uganda is being implemented under the Country 
Programme Action Plan (2006-2010). The Country Programme Action Plan 
2006-2010 for Uganda is a five year framework defining mutual cooperation 
between the Government of Uganda and the UNDP. Through the Conflict 
Prevention, Resolution and Recovery component of the country programme, 
the UNDP is supporting three major areas that if well implemented would 
enhance effective RR of former child soldiers and other ex-combatants. 
 
The first one is Human Security, peacebuilding and reconciliation. This 
component is expected to contribute to human security and promoting the 
conditions for recovery and development. This activity supports DDRR of 
former combatants in northern Uganda. UNDP is also supporting the 
Government of Uganda to address the proliferation of illicit small arms and 
land mines contamination as well as the Uganda Human Rights Commission’s 
work. UNPD is also supporting traditional, religious leaders and civil society 
organizations in northern Uganda to implement peacebuilding and 
reconciliation activities.  
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Furthermore, the UNDP is supporting Community-Based Reintegration of 
IDPs and Ex-Combatants. At the national level, the UNDP is providing 
technical support to the Office of the Prime Minister to implement the IDP 
policy and is also assisting in the formulation of an integrated framework for 
recovery in northern Uganda. At the local level, UNDP is providing technical 
assistance to the conflict affected districts to ensure that the RR of ex-
combatants and IDPs is included in their recovery and development plans 
based on participation from communities. UNDP is also working closely with 
the affected communities to implement skills development, income generation 
and reintegration programmes for ex-combatants and IDPs. Of particular 
interest is the UNDPs support for the gender dimensions of conflict. The 
UNPD has realized that gender concerns of women and girls in the 
reconstruction and recovery processes are critical.  
 
Consequently, the UNPD is working with the Ministry of Gender, Labour and 
Social Development, UNIFEM, UNHCR and UNFPA, UHRC and OHCHR to 
respond to widespread sexual and gender based violence in northern 
Uganda91. It is worth noting that women and girls in the war zones suffer 
disproportionately compared to their male counterparts. More so, as Pankhurst 
(2007) has observed, even when the war ends women continue to be 
marginalized and discriminated in post-conflict peacebuilding processes. 
Consequently, there is a need to ensure that reconstruction programmes focus 
on addressing peculiar challenges, needs and issues of women and girls. By 
and large, UNPD’s work in the RR of former child soldiers remains at policy 
level and providing funding to other actors directly involved in RR of former 
child soldiers. 
 
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) 
UNICEF is an agency of the United Nations whose major responsibility is to 
support programs that aid education and the health of children and mothers in 
developing countries. In Uganda, UNICEF works through collaboration and 
                                                 
91 United Nations Development Programme (2006) Programme Action Plan 2006-2010 for 
Uganda. Available at: http://www.undp.or.ug/aboutus/8. Accessed on 11/5/2010. 
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creating linkages with government ministries, donors, World Bank and local 
NGOs with similar objectives to support children in areas affected by conflict 
(Interview with Nsanzugwanko).92 
 
In Northern Uganda, UNICEF does its work through: 
• Collaboration with government ministries at policy level like the 
Office of the Prime Minister, Ministries of Gender, Labour and Social 
Development, Education and Sports, donors and other international 
agencies that are mandated to handle former child soldiers.  
 
• UNICEF works with World Bank and other agencies like Save the 
Children Uganda by coordinating all the child protection agencies and 
liaising with Uganda’s Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social 
Development which is responsible for child affairs to ensure that 
social support is provided to the former child soldiers. 
 
• UNICEF has provided funding to local NGOs and CBOs like GUSCO 
and Kitgum Concerned Women’s Association (KIWA) that have been 
involved in child reception and RR of former child soldiers. 
 
• UNICEF acts as a focal point for child refugees from other countries 
that neighbour northern Uganda such as the DRC, Southern Sudan, 
Chad, and Central Africa Republic. In this case UNICEF links up 
with MONUC to ensure that child refugees are repatriated and 
reunited with their families. 
 
• UNICEF, through the Amnesty Commission, ensures that former 
child soldiers get amnesty and are reintegrated with their families, 
offered health care, education, protection, food, water and other social 
care provisions. 
 
                                                 
92 Interview with Nsanzugwanko, V., Head of Children Unit at the UNICEF Offices in 
Kampala in April 2010. 
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• UNICEF has also provided funding to District Local Governments to 
coordinate the activities of NGOs and CBOs involved with the RR of 
former child soldiers. 
  
According to Nsunzungwanko, UNICEF in Uganda has keen interest to 
ensure that after the RR of former child soldiers, government supports their 
recovery. UNICEF has been deeply engaged in the RR of child soldiers 
largely through provision of funding and technical support to organizations 
directly involved, funding government and coordinating other children’s 
rights focused international organizations to ensure that government fulfils its 
obligations on protection of children’s rights.  
Unofficial Interventions by International Organizations and Local Non-
Governmental Organizations 
If there is one overarching lesson to be drawn from the 
decidedly mixed record of post-conflict interventions since the 
early 1990s it is that stability cannot be imposed on war-torn 
societies from the outside (Berdal, 2009:97) 
 
The return of relative peace in northern Uganda attracted very many 
organizations which are involved in different peace intervention activities. 
Research conducted by ACODE found that there are over 2,000 organizations 
in northern Uganda93. The challenge with such large scale proliferation of 
organizations (local and international) which are largely externally funded and 
driven whose programming largely promotes contemporary liberal 
peacebuilding approaches could further disempower communities that have 
been traumatizing by two decades of violent conflict. Aware of such a 
challenge some analysts (Pugh et al. 2008:390) have observed that 
peacebuilding practices need political roots in local societies, and political 
communities should have the freedom to set their economic priorities 
                                                 
93 Bigirwa, E & Komakech, L., Profiles of NGOs and CBOs Involved in  the Implementation 
of the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP) for Northern Uganda. ACODE Policy 
Research Series (Forthcoming). 
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including protection of economic activities from negative effects of global 
integration. 
 
This section focuses on the unofficial peacebuilding interventions in respect to 
RR of former child soldiers in northern Uganda that have been carried out by 
international organizations, local NGOs and CBOs. The section begins by 
examining the interventions of international organizations. 
 
International Organizations 
World Vision Uganda and Children of War Rehabilitation Centre 
World Vision Uganda is part of the World Vision global partnership and 
therefore functions in partnership with World Vision offices across the world 
(Interview with Obilu Akol).94 World Vision is a Christian relief, 
development and advocacy organization dedicated to working with children, 
families and communities to overcome poverty and injustice. Its work in 
Uganda started in 1986 at the time when the rebels of the National Resistance 
Army (NRA) were fighting the government in Luwero Triangle central 
Uganda (1981-86) which brought President Museveni to power.95 World 
Vision moved to northern Uganda in 1988 to provide relief to the IDPs at the 
time the LRA rebellion was starting.  
 
Following an upsurge of abducted children escaping and others rescued by the 
army, World Vision established The World Vision Children of War 
Rehabilitation Centre in 1995. The centre has two components: the Children 
Rehabilitation Centre and the Community Sensitization Programme. At the 
height of insurgence, the centre had a maximum of 520 children staying there. 
When the centre opened; its aim was to help de-traumatize and enhance the 
psychosocial status of children and young people returning from LRA 
captivity.  According to Obilu-Akol, the opening of this centre was a 
pioneering work of World Vision on an international scale since there was no 
                                                 
94 Interview with Obilu Akol, B., Manager, World Vision Children of War Rehabilitation 
Centre in Gulu in Janaury 2010). 
95  World Vision in Uganda. Available at: 
http://www.worldvision.org.uk/server.php?show=nav.1652 Accessed on 11/5/2010. 
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blue print anywhere else to copy from.96 Whenever children were received, 
their records would be made and entered in a confidential manner for 
purposes of helping in the family tracing processes. Parents would be notified 
and invited on the radio to come and meet their children and talk to them in 
confidence in temporary huts that were built at the centre. 
 
The centre has the following objectives: to provide accommodation to 
formerly abducted children away from the conflict; to provide health 
rehabilitation to war-affected children through provision of medical care, 
nutritional rehabilitation, provision of safe drinking water and basic clothing 
and bedding; to provide psychosocial support, partly through counselling to 
help overcome their emotional and psychological negative experiences; to 
contribute to their psychological and emotional recovery by offering 
recreational activities; provide vocational training in such locally marketable 
skills as bicycle repairing, tailoring, carpentry and farming; and to resettle the 
children after the completion of their term at the centre, a process preceded by 
family tracing, community preparation and training of community  voluntary 
counsellors for follow up and care (Interview with Obilu-Akol).   
 
Accordingly, World Vision realized from the onset that it would not be 
possible to counsel children who were tired, sick and hungry. Consequently, 
food, clothes and medical care were provided to children as soon as they came 
in.  
 
According to the staff of World Vision, the treatment of physical wounds of 
the children was instrumental in winning their trust. Whenever children 
arrived at the centre they would be given full medical check up at Lacor or 
Gulu Hospital or at a health clinic. It was noted that some of the children had 
broken bones or open wounds from gun shots. Others were undernourished, 
tired, and weary and with no hope at all. It is noted that returing children 
looked scared, would be quiet and did not look to be free. Consequently, 
World Vision sought to make them feel free, loved and cared for. Some had 
                                                 
96 Interview with Obilu-Akol J. B., an officer with World Vision Uganda. The interview was 
conducted in Gulu in March, 2010.  
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diarrhoea and scabies which had to be treated. They were also given health 
education to care about their hygiene. Most girls who had spent a long time in 
the bush had sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) (World Vision, 2001)97. 
 
The centre provided psychosocial support using several means. Art and 
talking therapy are some of the psychosocial supports that were used. This is 
where children were encouraged to share their stories through drawings and 
talking. Interpersonal therapy is another psychosocial support World Vision 
used. This is a sixteen week therapy for groups of children aged between 14-
17 years assisted by a counsellor and is done in schools.  After 16 weeks, a 
general assessment of trauma is conducted facilitated by a facilitator. Here 
children are helped to come up with their own plans. This is one-to-one 
counselling where a counsellor engages the child to talk about his/her 
experiences. This helps the child to re-establish their sense of self and 
interests. Another method used is the Post Cards Therapy. This was done by 
arranging correspondence between one group of former child soldiers in 
Uganda and a group of students in Boston in USA through exchanging post 
cards. This was done to help establish friendship and for others to appreciate 
what problems these children went through. At the moment, twinning is done 
between schools in Gulu municipality and those in the villages.  
 
World Vision has a future plan of using this approach to start exchange visits 
between schools in western and central Uganda and those in the north. Prayer 
therapy was also used at World Vision. At the World Vision Children of War 
Rehabilitation Centre, children were exposed to the Christian teachings which 
emphasised love and forgiveness of Jesus Christ.  Emphasizing Christian 
values of forgiveness helped to restore trust, hope and confidence among the 
former child soldiers who had committed crimes such as killing their friends 
and relatives in the bush (Interview with World Vision staff).98 Other 
psychosocial supports involved use of traditional music, dance, drama, 
watching selected videos and drawings. 
                                                 
97 World Vision (2001). Peace and Reconciliation for the Children of War: Healing Wounds 
in Northern Uganda. 
98 Interview with officials at the World Vision Children’s War Rehabilitation Centre in Gulu 
in January 2010. 
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According to Obilu-Akol, most children that passed through World Vision 
were brought in by the army. In order to improve the situation of the children 
in the hands of the military, World Vision worked with other civil society 
organizations to influence the army to create a special unit to receive child 
soldiers. Consequently, the Children Protection Unit (CPU) was created which 
worked closely with reception centres in the RR of former child soldiers. 
World Vision had a first aid clinic with nurses but would refer serious medical 
cases to Lacor, Gulu Independent and Gulu hospitals. World Vision also 
reached an agreement with Kampala International Hospital for specialized 
treatment.  
 
Since these children had missed schooling, World Vision felt that for them to 
reintegrate fully in society, they needed some life skills. Consequently, World 
Vision identified vocational schools to train children who passed through the 
centre. Agreements were entered with vocational training schools and tuition 
paid. Courses offered included brick laying, carpentry and joinery, and 
tailoring among others. These would last up to 6 months. Graduates were 
awarded certificates and tools procured for them. Young children were 
enrolled for formal education in primary schools (Interview with Obilu-Akol). 
 
At World Vision, counsellors carried out regular assessments of former child 
soldier’s progress. Once the centre was convinced that children were ready 
physically and psychologically, a preparatory visit would be made to their 
families and the communities to prepare them receive their children. As part 
of re-unification with families, children were given bedding, clothes, 
foodstuffs, seeds and farming instruments. World Vision worked closely with 
the Amnesty Commission to enable these children get amnesty certificates. 
Obilu-Akol, observed that follow up visits are organized to find out how the 
children are coping. However, most former child soldiers interviewed 
complain of lack of follow up by reception centres. One former child soldier 
A.J. 21 years observed that, 
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I was abducted in 2003 together with my brothers. The rebels 
killed my brothers in front of me claiming this would make me a 
brave soldier. I escaped when we were attacked by the UPDF 
and came back home. The rebels followed me back home and 
burnt our house when we were sleeping. I escaped with serious 
burns on my body. I was referred to World Vision where I spent 
six months undergoing counselling. When they finally took me 
back home they promised to come back to assist me since I 
needed a specialized operation at Mulago Hospital. They have 
never come back. 
 
In the course of RR of former child soldiers, World Vision has faced a number 
of challenges. First there is the problem of parents’ rejection of their daughters 
who came back with children fathered by rebel commanders. After being 
rehabilitated by the centre these young mothers and their children were 
rejected by their families who say are ready to receive their daughters and not 
their children. An example of such young mothers is A.R. 29 years with five 
children. A.R. was abducted in 1994 and spent 14 years in the bush as a wife 
of a rebel commander. She escaped with four children and has since coming 
back produced a fifth child. Her family refused to take her in with her 
children. She is currently living in Gulu town where she is struggling to bring 
up her children as a single mother. 
 
 The second challenge relates to funding the education of children who were 
enrolled in vocational and primary schools since some have no parents while 
others have parents who are very poor. Most former child soldiers want to 
study and they look at World Vision as their parent.  World Vision also faced 
the challenge of reintegrating children whose parents were killed and whose 
relatives sold off their land. Obilu-Akol observed that, 
 Some former child soldiers came back and found that their parents had 
died and their land had been sold off by relatives and as such these have 
nowhere to go. We decided to refer such cases to the local leaders and 
the traditional leaders. 
 
242 
 
World Vision rehabilitated and reintegrated a total of about 14,034 former 
child soldiers (World Vision, Report 2001) and because of its Christian 
orientation it could not support traditional rituals and ceremonies although 
they were never opposed outright (Interview with Obilu-Akol). 
 
 
Box 1:  Overview of Counselling Approaches in Reception Centres 
 
World Vision 
- Guilt and shame seen as signs of low self-esteem 
- Group counselling; discussion on peace; reconciliation; and forgiveness 
- Individual counselling; non-judgemental, allowing emotions to surface 
- Christian teaching 
- Talking therapy 
- Use of music, dance and drama 
- Use of games and sports. 
GUSCO 
- Mental well-being assessed through observation of interaction: withdrawal is seen as 
sign of trauma 
- Length of stay at the centre much debated: no consensus on desirable length, decided 
on case by case basis 
- Time spent at GUSCO is influenced by the child’s physical, social and emotional 
well-being 
- Children encouraged to talk to social workers about any problems 
- Staff try to create a non-judgemental atmosphere of trust. 
CPA 
- Take away feelings of guilt, suggesting that time with LRA was in a different life 
- Clients are told that even after all that happened, they still have the capacity to have 
a good life 
- Girls tend to keep quiet during group sessions 
- Counsellors find it difficult to assess the individual’s progress in group sessions 
- Group counselling is playful/using games 
- Child soldiers taught basic behavioural skills because these are adults who have the 
capacity of children. 
 
Save the Children in Uganda 
Save the Children in Uganda is part of the world wide Save the Children. It is 
an independent children’s charity. Save the Children in Uganda started 
supporting the RR of child soldiers in northern Uganda in 1994. According to 
Mucurezi, a Child Rights Advocacy Officer, Save the Children was not 
directly involved in the RR of former child soldiers. Rather, its involvement 
was in the form of support to Gulu Support the Children Organization 
(GUSCO), a community based organization based in Gulu. Save the Children 
provided technical and financial support to GUSCO. It also supported the staff 
of GUSCO to get training in counselling. Technical experts were brought into 
the country from Denmark and other countries to assist GUSCO to receive, 
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treat, rehabilitate and reintegrate former child soldiers at the peak of their 
return.  
 
The organization also engaged a consultant to conduct an assessment of 
trauma and how trauma was being addressed. The consultant discovered a 
number of weaknesses including the fact that clinical aspects of trauma were 
not being treated. The findings were useful in reviewing the psychosocial 
support that was being offered to children in northern Uganda (Interview with 
Mucurezi). Save the children raised funds that were used to build the office 
block of GUSCO and provided approximately 90% of GUSCO’s overall 
budget.  Beyond the support to GUSCO, Save the Children in Uganda was 
involved in lobbying and advocacy for children’s rights at policy level. For 
example, working with other organizations Save the Children lobbied the 
army to establish the Children Protection Unit (CPU) to professionally handle 
the returning children.  
 
Mucurezi also noted that Save the Children in Uganda, in partnership with 
other institutions such as UNICEF, UHRC and UNDP, influenced the army to 
provide first aid treatment to children at its military hospital. Save the 
Children Uganda also lobbied the army to conduct questioning of rescued 
children in the presence of a social worker and that such questioning should 
be done outside the barracks to provide a friendly environment to the children. 
The work of Save the Children in Uganda was sometimes risky. It was for 
example noted that some soldiers who developed interest in the young women 
who were returning from the bush would at times want to retain them in the 
barracks. Mucurezi for example noted that,  
There was an incident involving a former high ranking LRA 
officer who surrendered and was absorbed in the government 
army called Brigadier Banya. Banya picked a girl among the 
returnees and took her into the barracks claiming she was his 
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wife. The matter went to the President and finally Save the 
Children went into the barracks and brought out the girl. 99 
 
Save the Children Uganda faced a number of challenges in their support for 
the RR of former child soldiers. First, it was risky since it involved dealing 
directly with the army’s handling of children’s rights. Secondly, its support to 
GUSCO which was directly involved in the RR of former child soldiers 
caused resentment by communities (Interview with Mucurezi). GUSCO used 
to give former child soldiers a package of farm implements, seeds and 
bedding as part of the reintegration process. 
 
At the moment, Save the Children in partnership with UNICEF, GUSCO and 
World Vision Uganda have developed a standby project for the RR of child 
soldiers who are still in the bush. The organization has also trained staff in RR 
who would be used to conduct the RR process should the LRA release 
children. 
 
Caritas Gulu and RR of War affected Children/Child Soldiers 
Caritas Gulu is part of Caritas International, which is a Social Services and 
Development Department arm of the Catholic Church. Through Caritas, the 
Church plays a pertinent role in advocating for and promotion of social justice 
and positive change (Interview with Rubangakene).100 Caritas Gulu has three 
main areas of focus: Provision of Social Services; Relief and Rehabilitation 
and Livelihoods and Development. 
 
According to Rubangakene, Caritas Gulu opened up a reception centre in 
2001 and started training communities to prepare them to receive the abducted 
children who were escaping or were being rescued by the army in large 
numbers. Caritas also started a Community Psychosocial Based Approach 
programme to train community leaders. This was done through the Church 
structures throughout Acholi sub-region. Caritas focused mainly on re-
                                                 
99 Interview with Mucurezi, D., a Child Rights Advocacy Officer, Save the Children at their 
offices in Kampala in March, 2010. 
100 Rubangakene, is a Manager of Caritas- Gulu and was interviewed in Kampala in April 
2010. 
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unification issues of children with their families dealing with issues of stigma 
and resentment of children. The trained community leaders were and are still 
responsible for follow up on re-unification challenges and report to Caritas. 
Caritas also provided medical care to sick children by partnering with 
established hospitals with whom they signed Memoranda of Understanding. 
These hospitals are Dr. Ambrozori Hospital; St. Joseph Hospital in Kitgum 
and Locor Hospital in Gulu.  Caritas RR process included family tracing; 
preparation of the children and community for re-unification; re-union; and 
follow up visits. 
 
Rubangakene noted that some children were brought to Caritas by the army, 
cultural leaders and religious leaders. Some children walked directly from the 
bush to the centre. Rubangakene observed that,  
On arrival, the staff would welcome children and assure them of 
safety from any harm. They would be given soap for bathing 
and washing, food, tooth paste, a mattress, a blanket and a place 
to sleep. Caritas deliberately avoided setting rules for the 
children in order to build trust and confidence. 
 
Caritas provided food to child soldiers and in order to avoid suspicion of 
poisoning since they were programmed like that in the bush, their staff would 
also eat with them. As part of RR programming Caritas Gulu realized that 
systematic follow up visits to the reintegrated children was crucial for 
effective re-union with families and communities. Through these visits, 
Caritas is able to assess how the reintegrated former child soldiers are coping. 
Major RR activities implemented by Caritas include; provision of education 
support which involved establishment of Pajule Vocational Training School 
supported by the Austrian Government; facilitating dialogues at community 
level to improve community relations between returnees and communities, 
which had been severed by the conflict; support to agricultural livelihoods 
where social support groups are supported. These groups dig together as it 
was in the olden days; supporting community healing practices to handle 
post-traumatic stress disorder. This is done by supporting traditional 
ceremonies such as Mato Oput and stepping on the egg. Caritas has facilitated 
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the burial of 400 bodies and construction of monuments where mass murders 
took place. This has helped the perpetrators to ask for forgiveness. 
 
According to the staff of Caritas Gulu, a number of challenges confront 
effective RR of former child soldiers in northern Uganda. The first challenge 
relates to the guilty consciences among former child soldiers since most of 
them were forced to committed atrocities against the communities among 
whom they have been reintegrated.101 The second challenge is that most 
former child soldiers lack a cultural base since they missed out some stages of 
development where they would be grounded in the cultural norms. The third 
challenge is that most of the children think they belong to institutions which 
are providing them with assistance and not the families and communities. This 
makes the communities feel that organizations like Caritas Gulu are 
undermining their traditional roles. The fourth challenge is that special 
interventions to assist these children are creating divisions and resentment of 
former child soldiers by the society where over 70% of the population were 
internally displaced (Finnstrom, 2005:110) and are equally needy. 
 
The Caritas staff recommended that the RR interventions should target all the 
disadvantaged persons in the community rather than singling out former child 
soldiers. Caritas staff further recommended that child mothers have a unique 
problem and should be specifically targeted for RR. Caritas staff also noted 
that there is a need to coordinate and regulate NGO and CBO interventions 
that are causing divisions and duplication of services. Finally, Caritas staff 
observed that interventions should be designed in a way that does not create 
perpetual dependence of former child soldiers and target communities on 
external assistance. It was noted that at the moment some people have made 
charity a business with some belonging to more than one group. Caritas 
reception centre received, cared for, reintegrated and rehabilitated 3056 
formerly abducted child soldiers (Interview with Rubangakene).  
 
                                                 
101 Interview with Rubangakene, Op Cit., He said that guilt experienced by these children was 
a major obstacle to their RR processes since they think that society knows the crimes they 
committed.  
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Local NGOs and Community Based Organizations 
It should be noted that there are almost over 2,000 local NGOs and CBOs in 
northern Uganda implementing peacebuilding initiatives which have both 
direct and indirect impact on the RR of former child soldiers (Bigirwa et al. 
(2009). 102 Key local organizations considered relevant for this research are 
examined below. It should also be noted that while these organizations are 
considered local, they are funded by external donors and their programmes are 
externally influenced. Most crucially, because of external donor dependence, 
most of these local organizations lack long-term sustainability as the 
proceding discussion shows. 
 
Gulu District NGO Forum 
Gulu District NGO Forum is an umbrella organization for Non-Governmental 
Organizations, Community Based Organizations and Faith-Based 
Organizations operating in Gulu District in northern Uganda. Gulu District 
NGO Forum is a member of the National NGO Forum, which is the national 
umbrella organization based in Kampala. Gulu District NGO Forum has been 
implementing several peacebuilding initiatives including the RR of former 
child soldiers. These projects and activities are discussed below. 
 
The Justice and Reconciliation project which started in 2004 was 
implemented in partnership with Liu Institute for Global Issues. Through 
research and advocacy Gulu District NGO Forum worked to create 
understanding among the policy makers about the interests, needs, concerns 
and views of the communities: particularly the youths (including former child 
soldiers), IDPs, traditional leaders and women that have been affected by the 
conflict. Through this project the organization was able to give a voice to the 
affected people to influence policy makers in government and the 
international community to respond to their needs. Key areas of advocacy that 
have been articulated under this project include: issues and difficulties of RR 
of former combatants; understanding the traditional justice practices; 
documenting the experiences of communities who suffered major atrocities 
                                                 
102 Bigirwa, E. & Komakech, L., Op Cit., 
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and investigating the moral and judicial complexities of abductees who are 
both victims and perpetrators. 
 
The research under this project was intended to foster the attainment of justice 
and reconciliation. The research publications under this project have been 
widely disseminated through policy dialogues and workshops, radio debates 
and on the Internet (Interview with Okello).103 
 
Since 2006, the organization has also been implementing The Youth 
Leadership Project which aims at addressing the challenges faced by the 
youth in northern Uganda. The project also seeks to build the capacity of 
young people to constructively engage in policy discussions on rebuilding 
their society by supporting leadership training and capacity building to 
strengthen grassroots youth groups. The project has implemented the 
following activities: 
a) Provision of University Scholarships to disadvantaged war affected 
youth in Acholi sub-region.  
Since its inception, the project secured 50 scholarships for students to pursue 
university education. These scholarships are given to the very needy students 
who would never have joined the university without such support. 
b) Grants to Youth Groups and other Organizations 
The organization realized that several youth groups of either former child 
soldiers or civilian youths that have been formed in the district were not 
attracting funding from government or donors. Under this project, these 
groups have been empowered by provision of grants to implement their 
activities. About 90 million shillings has been sub-granted to 20 youth groups 
in the districts of Gulu, Amuru, Kitgum and Pader. 
c) Capacity Building of Youth Groups and Other Organizations 
This component of the project is aimed at equipping youths with life skills in 
leadership and governance issues, project planning and management, and 
                                                 
103 Interview with Okello, R., Programme Officer, Gulu District NGO Forum conducted in 
Gulu in February 2010. 
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rights based approach to development. Currently, over 40 youth groups have 
benefited from this training. 
 
Another project that is being implemented by Gulu District NGO Forum is 
The Acholi Youth Strengthening Strategy Project. The project goal is to 
promote the rights of Acholi youth and ensure their participation in decision 
making in reconstruction processes. The project has mobilized youths into 
groups; has trained youth groups including former child soldiers in conflict 
management, human rights, leadership skills and record keeping. The 
organization has also built office premises for two youth groups in Gulu and 
Amuru districts. It has also established a live radio debate platform on Radio 
King for the youth to champion their issues including the plight of former 
child soldiers (Interview with Okello). 
 
Gulu Support the Children Organizations (GUSCO) 
GUSCO is an indigenous NGO established in 1994 working to promote the 
well-being of war affected children in northern Uganda through provision of 
psychosocial support, capacity building of communities, education, advocacy 
and peacebuilding. With support from Save the Children and DANIDA, 
GUSCO established its first reception centre in 1997. GUSCO has been 
running a programme on RR of former child soldiers since its inception as a 
reception centre. In the RR of former child soldiers, GUSCO employs two 
broad strategies: Reception Centre based rehabilitation for the formerly 
abducted people/children where they are received, provided with the physical 
needs (food, medical treatment, clothes, a blanket and a mattress) and 
psychological rehabilitation and community based reintegration which 
strengthens the capacity of communities to support RR processes. 
  
According to Owor, a social worker at GUSCO, child soldiers would be 
received from the Child Protection Unit of the army. Medical treatment for 
those who were sick or with bullet wounds would be provided. GUSCO also 
provided them food, clothes, a blanket, mattress and eating utensils. They 
were assured that the LRA will not be able to re-abduct them and harm them 
again. While at GUSCO, children were given counselling which was mainly 
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based on a Western model of one-on-one counselling, talking therapy, playing 
games, music dance and drama. GUSCO was also open to both models of 
psychosocial support: Western and traditional rituals and sometimes the 
approaches would be used in combination (Interview with Owor). The 
duration of the stay at the centre depended on the period the child would have 
spent in captivity.104 According to Owor, the returnees who had stayed in the 
bush longer had serious psychosocial problems and had to stay longer at the 
centre undergoing rehabilitation. In addition to counselling of former child 
soldiers, GUSCO provided the following support: basic skills in tailoring for 
girls; basic skills in bicycle repair, carpentry and bricklaying for boys and 
young men. 
 
According to Okeny, Programme Manager, GUSCO, the re-unification of 
children with their families and communities was always systematically 
organized. The first step was family tracing which relied heavily on use of 
radio announcements and programmes where parents would be invited to 
meet their children at the centre. This was followed by sensitization of 
families and communities to create a conducive environment for reintegration. 
Families would be advised how to relate to and to support children rather than 
stigmatizing them. Former child soldiers were given some package to take 
home during the reintegration processes. The staff at GUSCO observed that 
following the RR of former child soldiers, GUSCO staff has continued to 
organize follow up visits to their homes and IDPs to assess how they are 
managing. However, during the fieldwork most of the former child soldiers 
who were interviewed complained that most reception centres including 
GUSCO and World Vision no longer visit them.  
 
Concerned Parents Association (CPA) 
Concerned Parents Association (CPA) is a child advocacy organisation with 
activities in Gulu, Amuru, Kitgum, Oyam and Lira. It was established in 1996 
by a group of parents after the abduction of 139 students from Aboke Girls 
Secondary School. CPA has four main programmes: 
                                                 
104 Interview with Owor, A., who worked as a Social Worker with GUSCO, Op Cit. 
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1. Livelihood Programme 
According to Simon Okello, a programme officer, through the Livelihood 
Programme, CPA supports parents and youth groups of former child soldiers 
to start income generating activities to improve their livelihoods. CPA also 
provides grinding machines, oxen and ox-ploughs, goats and pigs. Follow up 
visits are carried out to monitor and provide technical support to youth and 
community groups. 
 
2. Child protection Programme 
This programme involves RR of former child soldiers in social aspects using 
music, dance drama and training in cultural practices. CPA works closely with 
Ker Kwaro Acholi, the Acholi cultural institution to organize cultural festivals 
as well as radio programmes on issues of reconciliation and forgiveness 
(Interview with Okello). 
 
3. Peace building Programme 
Under this programme, CPA uses elders to speak on matters of culture on 
radio stations. It also organises dialogues on topical issues facing RR and 
peace in the region. CPA works with government child protection committees 
and Secretaries for Children’s Affairs at the local government levels to 
advocate for children’s rights. 
 
4.  Parent Support Programme 
CPA supports Parent Support Groups through a community structure using 
people who have been trained to provide psychosocial support to formerly 
abducted child soldiers. The organization also provides counselling and 
follow-up activities to the children who were rehabilitated and reintegrated 
(Interview with Okello). CPA has trained parents groups in psychosocial 
support skills such as trauma handling, basic counselling, and training on non-
violence and conflict management. The parents replicate these trainings and 
carry out follow up and referrals in some cases especially for those former 
child soldiers with bullet wounds and splints on their bodies (Interview with 
Okello).  
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CPA uses both Western and traditional approaches of psychosocial support.  
Where aggression is a problem with a particular case, CPA counsellors use the 
Western approach. Traditional mechanisms are applied to enhance healing. 
Comparatively, Okello observed that they have found traditional psychosocial 
support in the RR of former child soldiers to be more relevant than the 
Western approach because people identify with it culturally. He also noted 
that sometimes there is a conflict between parents and children over which 
approach to use. He however, pointed out that most children with Christian 
influence prefer Western approaches. Okello gave an example where a 
particular child had a strong disagreement with the parents over what 
psychosocial approach should be applied on her. While the child preferred the 
Western counselling and a Christian prayer, the parents wanted Mato Oput.  
About 7,000 children have benefited from CPA’s interventions.  
 
War Affected Children Association (WACA)  
WACA was formed in 2002 and registered as an NGO in 2004. It operates in 
three Sub-Counties of Awach, Lalogi and Patiko in Gulu district. The main 
objective of WACA is to provide economic empowerment to the formerly 
abducted children through training in resource mobilization, project planning 
and management (Interview with O.N. a programme officer of WACA). The 
specific objectives of WACA are: to improve the quality of life of former 
child soldiers by providing resources and opportunities; to provide 
psychosocial support to children/youth formerly associated with armed 
groups; helping former child soldiers to achieve their potential through 
provision of education. Founded by former child soldiers, WACA realized 
that the external assistance provided to them for their RR was not enough and 
not sustainable. WACA also realized that most of their members who were 
trained in vocational skills lacked business skills, yet economic empowerment 
is important for their successful RR (Interview with O.N).  
 
WACA mobilized its members into groups where they make weekly savings. 
Groups meet weekly where each member contributes Ug.shs.1, 000. At the 
time of conducting the field work, there were three active groups of 30 
members each. Since 2007 when the Savings and Credit Scheme started the 
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association has bought three ox-ploughs and 12 oxen which have been 
distributed in three sub-counties in Gulu. The association has also provided 
seeds such as groundnuts, maize and beans to the groups (Interview with 
members of WACA). Groups draw a weekly time table to follow for their 
meetings and write down the minutes which were accessed by the researcher.  
 
According to the group leaders, WACA got funding from the ICC Trust Fund 
for Victims channelled to them through Care International to start a project 
called HOPE. HOPE project has two components: economic empowerment 
and vocational training. According to V.O. a member of WACA the 
association has used this support to train 50 war victims mostly child mothers 
and young men in tailoring, carpentry, catering and brick making. Some of 
them are still undergoing training in various vocational schools in northern 
Uganda. 
 
WACA is providing psychosocial counselling to former child soldiers in the 
three sub-counties. According to V.O. counselling focuses on domestic 
violence; group counselling for women who came back with children; peer 
counselling and child counselling. The association uses the following methods 
of psychosocial support: drama which involves the victims dramatizing the 
effects of the civil war and traditional dances. The traditional dances involve 
mixing victims and non-victims together in performance. This is expected to 
give victims a sense of being loved, togetherness and belonging to the society. 
 
WACA is currently offering psychosocial support to 300 former child soldiers 
and 600 community members. Accordingly, WACA has found out that some 
people who were not abducted but suffered in different ways during the war 
are also traumatized and need assistance. Consequently, the association has 
opened its doors to reach out to a wider community beyond its members.  
Targeting the community as a whole has helped create harmony between 
former child soldiers and the community and fostered smooth reintegration 
(Interview with V.O).  
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Members of WACA observed during fieldwork that most of them are engaged 
in economic activities where they are earning some income. One of the 
members, O.D. 24 years, observed that, 
These days we no longer beg for school fees, food and clothes as 
we used to do.105 Since we have money we can even afford to 
change our diet. I mean we can afford to buy meat or fish on 
some days.  
 
During the group discussion members also noted that their dressing has 
changed since they can afford to buy new clothes. They no longer save Ug. 
Shs 1,000 per week as they used to do. Instead, each person saves Ug. Shs 
2,000 since their incomes have increased (Interview with members in a group 
discussion).  
 
WACA is supporting some of its members in secondary and vocational 
schools by paying school fees and accommodation. The association plans to 
establish war documentation centres in Gulu, Teso, Lango and southern Sudan 
to remind people about the horrors of war so that the future generations can 
avoid war (Interview with WACA members). 
Ker Kwaro Acholi   
Ker Kwaro Acholi is the Acholi Cultural Institution which is the custodian of 
Acholi cultural values and practices (Interview with Avola).106 Ker Kwaro 
Acholi has been actively engaged in various peace processes in northern 
Uganda. In respect of the RR of former child soldiers, Ker Kwaro has been 
centrally involved in organizing traditional rituals and cleansing ceremonies 
such as Mato Oput and stepping on the eggs to reintegrate children into 
society. As an apex Acholi cultural organization, Ker Kwaro Acholi is 
responsible for spearheading the revival of traditional approaches of conflict 
resolution and reconciliation in the RR of former child soldiers.  
 
                                                 
105 Interview with a group member of WACA, an association of former child soldiers 
conducted in Gulu in February 2010. 
106 Avola, M., is the Coordinator of Ker Kwaro Acholi, the Acholi apex cultural institution. 
Avola was interviewed in his office in Gulu in February 2010.  
255 
 
According to Avola, traditional ceremonies are credited for psychologically 
enhancing children’s acceptance by society. Ker Kwaro Acholi has organized 
traditional ceremonies where traditional leaders and children in a particular 
community take part. The endorsement of traditional cleansing ceremonies by 
Ker Kwaro Acholi made it possible for other traditional leaders at the lower 
level to perform these ceremonies for the returning children. Ker Kwaro has 
been funding traditional ceremonies performed by cultural leaders across 
Acholi sub-region. 
 
Ker Kwaro has organized high level traditional ceremonies presided over by 
the Paramount Chief Ben Acan which have helped returnees to know that 
their leaders care (Interview with Avola). Ker Kwaro has also organized 
training for Community Volunteer Care Givers. With funding from NUTI 
(Northern Uganda Transition Initiative), Ker Kwaro has been organizing 
ceremonies and rituals to cleanse returning children, for purifying areas that 
were polluted by mass killings which included reburying the remains of the 
people who were killed during the war but could not get a decent burial to 
transit peacefully to the next world (Interview with Avola). These rituals and 
ceremonies entail slaughtering of sheep, goats and chicken as sacrifices to 
appease the dead. According to Avola the cultural ceremonies commonly 
performed by Ker Kwaro Acholi are: stepping on the egg and Mato Oput 
ceremonies. These are examined in detail in Chapter Six.  
 
Ker Kwaro Acholi is still a weak institution having been restored in 1993 
when the current government in Uganda restored cultural institutions that had 
been abolished in 1966. Most important to note is that the institution has been 
severely weakened by the two decades of a violent conflict which makes it 
difficult for it to respond appropriately to community needs. The traditional 
leaders who are supposed to be the custodians of culture, the Rwods, were 
also internally displaced and became poor like everybody else which made 
them lose respect in society. In an effort to boost the role of traditional 
leaders; government has provided iron sheets, hydra form machines as well as 
cement for construction of their houses (Interview with Avola). 
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 During fieldwork, it was established that reception centres and CBOs were 
using both the traditional and indigenous resources and the Western 
psychosocial approaches in the RR of former child soldiers. In order to 
understand the relevance of each in the RR processes, the researcher asked the 
Coordinator of Ker Kwaro Acholi the apex cultural institution to provide his 
own assessment. Avola pointed out that the traditional and indigenous 
resources were more culturally relevant and sustainable than the Western 
approach. He, however, noted that since society in northern Uganda has 
significantly changed overtime partly as a result of the conflict which has 
undermined the cultural values and Western values, it would be good to blend 
both the traditional and Western approaches. He for instance observed that the 
advantage with the Western approaches of psychosocial support is that they 
have a variety of skills that can be applied while the traditional approaches are 
limited in options. 
 
Gulu War Affected Children Training Centre 
Gulu War Affected Children Training Centre was started in 2005. The main 
objective of the centre was to assist young women who are former child 
soldiers acquire life time skills to improve their welfare. According to Laham, 
the Director, the centre started with only five young mothers who were trained 
in tailoring. By 2006, the centre had enrolled 60 trainees 12 of who were 
funded by World Vision Uganda. The rest of the trainees were trained free of 
charge. With the money from the 12 trainees, the centre was able to buy 
furniture and uniform for the trainees to ‘look smart like other students’. 
Laham, who is a professional designer, used to work alone in the centre for no 
pay. In 2008 the South African Ambassador visited the centre. The officials 
were impressed by the work of the centre and decided to donate 10 sewing 
machines. They also donated a container for storing the sewing machines. The 
Ambassador also promised to link the centre with a South African company, 
Eskom to construct a classroom block.  
 
Consequently, Eskom provided funding which was used to build a training 
centre which currently accommodates offices and four classrooms.  Besides 
training the war affected girls and young women in tailoring skills; the centre 
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also offers training in catering, hair dressing and languages - French, Swahili 
and Luo. To date the centre has trained over 250 formerly abducted girls and 
plans to open up rural outreach branches to reach many girls. The Director of 
the centre Laham who is 32 years old is herself a victim of the LRA conflict. 
Both of her parents were killed by the LRA. She first worked with GUSCO as 
a trainer and when her contract with GUSCO ended, girls followed her to her 
home and that is how the centre was born. The centre still lacks reasonable 
funding to pay the teachers’ salaries, which makes it dependent on the founder 
and a few volunteers (Interview with Laham). 
 
KICA Ber Youth Group (Forgiveness is Good) 
KICA Ber Youth Group is one of the vivid examples that demonstrate the 
relevance of traditional and local resources in the RR of former child soldiers 
which is the focus of this research. KICA Ber Youth Group was formed by 
seven formerly abducted child soldiers. The overall objective of the group is 
to unite all formerly abducted youths to rebuild their lives and develop 
themselves. The group runs a savings and loan scheme for its registered 
members. It also assists members who are HIV victims by digging, planting 
crops and building houses for them. The group members are also involved in 
music dance and drama which is intended to mobilize the members and 
sensitize communities about the plight of former child soldiers and fight 
stigma (Interview with O.G member of KICA Ber). The group carries out 
training on sexual and gender based violence to promote peaceful co-
existence and harmonious living. The group also conducts mine risk education 
among the community having received training from a Canadian Organization 
called CIPA (Canadian, Physicians for Aid and Relief) (Interview with O.D 
one of the founder members of KICA Ber).107 
 
During the interview with group members they pointed out that the group 
received assistance from the Window Trust in the form of sponsorship for six 
members to pursue secondary school education. Some of the members were 
trained in tailoring by World Vision Uganda. O.D., one of the founder 
                                                 
107 Interview with O.D a founder member of KICA Ber Youth Group at their offices in Gulu 
in February 2010. 
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members of KICA Ber, is married with 3 children, runs a retail shop and a 
piggery project with 10 pigs. He was abducted when he was in primary seven. 
Since his return from the bush, he returned to school and completed his 
Ordinary Level Certificate. 
 
In a focus group discussion with the members of KICA Ber Youth Group who 
are 61 in number, it was noted that that they have greatly benefited from the 
group. They explained that the group has been able to shelter members from 
stigmatization by community members. Members have been able to start 
businesses with loans provided by the group. Members also observed that 
belonging to the group earns them respect in society since they are seen as 
being productive. Through the group, some members have been trained in 
counselling and are helping other members who are still traumatized to cope. 
Fifteen members of KICA Ber Youth Group participated in a group 
discussion. The group had about ten male and five female. We made an 
appointment with the Coordinator of the group two days in advance and told 
him exactly the categories of former child soldiers we needed for the 
interview. The interview took place at their association’s offices which gave 
them confidence to participate freely. 
 
On the negative side, the members of the group pointed out that the 
community sees them as beneficiaries of violence since they have attracted 
some funding which other community members do not have. The group 
reported that they are still traumatized by the community who call them 
demeaning names such as rebels, wives of rebels and returnees. Some young 
women who are married complain that community members tell their 
husbands that ‘you are married to a rebel’ which sometimes leads to marriages 
breaking down. Also, several abductees came back with children and most of 
these children face resentment from the young mother’s parents which affects 
their mothers psychologically as they cannot discard their children. 
 
During the focus group discussion, it was revealed that former child soldiers 
who passed through the reception centres face less resentment by their 
families and communities than those who came directly home. The reason is 
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that the reception centres organized re-unions and traditional ceremonies 
which become a basis for community acceptance. Most of the group members 
felt that traditional ceremonies were more effective than Western counselling. 
Commenting on the problems of the Western counselling that involved one-
on-one conversation with a counsellor, G.O. 20 years old observed that, 
In the case of Western counselling, counsellors treat you like a 
child which is humiliating to someone. 
 
A small number of former child soldiers during the interviews felt that 
Western counselling was more helpful to them while others felt a combination 
of Western and traditional ceremonies worked well for them.  
 
Can Rwede Peke Group 
Can Rwede Peke Group comprise of 25 former child soldiers who are now 
adults. The group operates a village credit and savings scheme. The group 
meets every Sunday afternoon to discuss issues that affect them and matters 
related to their credit and saving scheme. Each member of the group 
contributes Ug. Shs. 200 every Sunday as a welfare fund.  In addition, each 
member contributes a minimum of Ug. Shs 500 per meeting which takes place 
once every week. A maximum of Ug.Shs 2, 500 is payable per week by 
members who are able. Members are allowed to borrow money at an interest 
rate of 10% per month (Interview with members during the group discussion). 
 
During a facilitated group discussion, the members raised a number 
challenges they face. These challenges include: lack of school fees for 
members who want to undertake vocational training courses in tailoring, 
bricklaying and carpentry. Child mothers who came back with children from 
the bush are worried about the future of children’s education since they lack 
money to pay school fees. Some members complained that many people come 
to them promising assistance, take their photos and never come back. Some of 
the child mothers are still bitter about the experience of forced marriages in 
the bush which ruined their lives. Some members observed that they still live 
in fear of being re-abducted and killed by the LRA while others pointed out 
that they experience bad dreams about killings they witnessed in the bush. 
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One of the testimonies was given by A.M, 22 years old and a mother of two. 
Her rebel husband died in the bush. A.M. complained of being haunted by the 
bush memories especially the killings she witnessed. She pointed out that 
whenever these memories come back, she develops a feeling that she should 
hide from other people. 
 
It was also established that most of the child mothers’ new marriages’ to break 
down as new husbands claim ‘that we are mad people from the bush,’ one 
child mother said.  Another child mother complained that some community 
members insult her children since they were born in the bush. During the 
focus group discussion most of them pointed out that poverty was their major 
obstacle for successful RR in society. They appealed to government and 
donors to assist and capitalize their credit and saving scheme as well as paying 
school fees for their children. 
 
Comparative Analysis of Official and Unofficial Peacebuilding 
Interventions 
This section makes a comparative analysis of the official and unofficial 
peacebuilding interventions in the RR of former child soldiers in northern 
Uganda. 
 
To begin with, both the official and unofficial peacebuilding interventions in 
northern Uganda are based on liberal peacebuilding approaches. They are top-
bottom in a sense that the interventions have been designed without the 
participation of the affected communities hence overlooking the local 
capacities and contribution of the affected people in addressing their 
problems. Also, both approaches are externally funded and implement 
projects and programmes that are time-bound. Most NGOs and CBOs are 
funded by donors for specific period of time after which they would simply 
live. The government official peacebuilding programme: the PRDP was 
designed to last for three years (2007-2010) although due to failure to attract 
donor funding in time, the programme has been extended to end in June 2012. 
More so, 70% of the PRDP funded is expected to come from donors while 
government will contribute 30%. In both cases, over dependency on 
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externally funding makes it difficult to implement successful projects. Most 
crucially external funding that overlooks local resources and contribution 
creates dependence among the target communities and prolongs the period for 
recovery and self-reliance. 
 
Furthermore, both the official and unofficial approaches are poorly 
coordinated and this is causing duplication of interventions which makes it 
difficult to have a lasting impact on the ground. Duplication of intervention by 
many CBOs and NGOs that currently populate northern Uganda is likely to 
cause more harm than good to the communities emerging from a torturous 
civil war. Already there are reports where a number of former child soldiers 
belonging to several CBOs in order to maximize on the assistance. This is 
creating a dependency syndrome. 
 
It is worth noting that the unofficial peacebuilding interventions have been 
able to reach more people in very remote areas that are list served by 
governments. To this end, unofficial interventions can be credited to be 
playing a very crucial role of reaching the communities that would have 
otherwise not be easily targeted by the official peacebuilding interventions. 
 
By far, both official and unofficial interventions have played a complementary 
role in the RR of former child soldiers in northern Uganda. However for both 
interventions to be effective in building of a durable peace, it is important to 
improve coordination, transparance and aim at supporting capacity building of 
local resources to ensure future sustainability.  
Conclusion 
This chapter examined the various peacebuilding interventions - official and 
non-official that have been implemented in northern Uganda in the RR of 
former child soldiers. In the case of the official government and UN agencies 
peacebuilding interventions, it was established that most of them are top-down 
in nature based on liberal peace principles of timelines and quick fixes, and 
therefore lacking community participation and local ownership. The research 
findings indicate that the main government peacebuilding intervention - the 
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PRDP lacks proper conceptualization of the DDRR of ex-combantants 
specifically former child soldiers who are bundled together irrespective of 
their varied experiences, needs and interests. The PRDP was also found to 
suffer from inadequate funding, politicization and poor coordination which 
are affecting its effectiveness. PRDP’s predecessor official interventions: 
NURP1 and NUSAF suffered gross mismanagement and massive 
embezzlement of funds which made them fail to achieve their set objectives. 
 
The unofficial peacebuilding interventions that were examined are largely 
being implemented by international organizations, local NGOs and CBOs 
whose operational objectives espouse liberal peace ideas. Research findings 
established that these organizations depend on external donors for funding 
which raises the issue of sustainability and foreign dependence by the 
beneficiary communities. The recent story about loss of jobs by the youth in 
northern Uganda as NGOs leave the region in The New Vision of May 15, 
2010 confirms the sustainability issue of peacebuilding interventions in 
northern Uganda. In the final analysis it was found that both interventions 
have some striking similarities and challenges including pursuing a neo-liberal 
peacebuilding agenda that is top-down, short-term and externally driven. It is 
worth noting that if the official and unofficial peace interventions are going to 
build durable peace in northern Uganda, they must aim at rebuilding local 
capacities by enlisting local ownership and participation in the design, 
planning and implementation of peacebuilding programmes. They must also 
invest in ensuring proper coordination and transparence in the implementation 
of the reconstruction programmes.  
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Chapter 6  
Examining the Importance of Psychosocial Resources in the 
Reintegration and Rehabilitation of Child Soldiers: Conceptual and 
Practical Analysis 
Introduction 
I was abducted by the LRA together with my two brothers. They 
tied us on a rope with other children and walked us several miles 
in the bush without resting. While in the bush the rebels killed 
my brothers in my presence and said that this experience will 
make me a good soldier. These memories have refused to go 
away. A.R., a mother of five. 
 
Violent civil wars in developing countries in which thousands of children 
have been victims either as bystanders or active participants as child soldiers 
have profound negative psychosocial effects on their well-being. A study 
conducted on refugee children who have sought asylum in Europe, found that 
60% of them had been exposed to violence (Kostelny, 2006:1). Kostelny 
(2006) observes that in Rwanda, after the genocide in 1996, a survey found 
that 96% of children interviewed had witnessed violence; 80% had lost a 
family member while 70% had seen some one killed or injured. In Liberia, 
many child soldiers were counselled for the psychological impacts of the civil 
war (Sendabo, 2004:80). UNICEF estimates that in the decade from 1990 to 
2000, 10 million children suffered from war trauma (Prendergast et al. 
2002:335).  
 
During the field work for this research, in northern Uganda, it was established 
that most former child soldiers who had witnessed killings and had been 
forced to kill their friends who attempted to escape from the LRA captivity, 
continue to experience bad dreams and nightmares of being pursued by the 
LRA.108 A study conducted by UNICEF in northern Uganda in 2006 on the 
                                                 
108 During the field work conducted in northern Uganda in January and February 2010, in 
northern Uganda, I interviewed 25 former child soldiers. It was established that all of them 
said they experienced traumatic incidents including being forced to kill their friends or 
relatives, beaten senselessly as part of training, participation in fighting with the government 
army and walking long distances carrying heavy loads of looted food. These traumatic 
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state of youth also found that some youths affected by the war have 
psychosocial problems (UNICEF, 2006:10). 
 
This chapter explores the relevance of psychosocial support in the RR of 
former child soldiers in war-torn societies especially in Africa and specifically 
in northern Uganda. Particular focus of the chapter is however placed on 
examining the importance of the neglected psychosocial support based on 
traditional and indigenous resources in the RR of former child soldiers in 
northern Uganda. The chapter also discusses the limitations of traditional and 
indigenous resources/approaches in the RR of child soldiers. This is based on 
the realization that in spite of the highly prized values placed on them 
including achieving peace through forgiveness, consensus and restorative 
justice (Osaghae, 2000:217), they too have serious limitations such as gender 
insensitivity and biases towards women and girls, and the fact that in most 
war-torn societies traditional resources/approaches are greatly undermined by 
the conflicts and legacies of colonial domination.  
 
Traditional and Indigenous Approaches to Peacebuilding in the RR of 
Child Soldiers and Peacebuilding  
African traditions and philosophical approaches have continued 
to survive despite attempts at marginalization by colonialism, 
Christianity, and apartheid. Ubuntu is an understanding of 
African philosophy peculiar to South Africa. It represents the 
embodiment of the political, cultural, economic, and social 
dynamics of African society......Moreover, Ubuntu has presented 
formidable and at times contradictory challenges to European 
discourses of dominance and understandings of the African 
reality (Masina, 2000:169). 
 
Several scholars observe that while the traditional and indigenous 
resources/approaches play a crucial role in the RR of child soldiers and 
                                                                                                                               
experiences have not left most of them several years after they were rehabilitated by reception 
centres and reintegrated with their families and communities. 
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general peacebuilding and reconstruction of war-torn societies, they have been 
neglected in both academic and policy circles (MacKay, 2004). This section 
examines the significance of the traditional and indigenous 
approaches/resources in the RR of child soldiers and peacebuilding.  
 
International initiatives aimed at promoting preventive diplomacy, 
management, resolution of conflicts, reconstruction of war-torn societies and 
promotion of development in Africa, have traditionally neglected and 
marginalized the indigenous resource capacities for peacebuilding and 
reconstruction (Murithi, 2008:16). This is in spite of the existence of Article 
39 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child that guarantees the right of 
children to psychosocial recovery and social reintegration following armed 
conflict to which most countries are signatories (Machel, 2001:80).  In most 
UN official peacebuilding psychosocial support aimed at addressing war 
trauma in children, the emphasis has been placed on use of Western 
approaches whose adherents of the medical model seek to treat mental illness 
using approaches such as individual or group counselling. As scholars 
Bracken (1998:55) and Summerfield (1998:30) observe that the 
universalization of the Western approaches of psychosocial support at the 
expense of local cultures can be potentially harmful.  
 
The example of this is Rwanda after the 1994 genocide. It is noted that many 
NGOs implemented psychosocial programmes driven by the assumption of 
mass traumatisation, despite little familiarity with local culture and conditions 
(Prendergast, 2002:335). Ironically, as Prendergast (2002) observes, much of 
the distress that was diagnosed as trauma was in fact normal coping 
mechanisms in operation. Consequently, scholars (Wessells, 2006:188; 
Braken et al. 1998) have observed that while the Western approach of 
counselling is useful in the RR of former child soldiers, in certain 
circumstances it has been overused and misapplied in many emergencies as 
was the case in Rwanda. 
 
The physical difficulties that people face daily to survive are an integral part 
of their psychosocial suffering. Lack of housing, schools and jobs embody and 
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symbolize the plight of people emerging from civil wars and these rob them of 
a sense of hope and well-being. Consequently, it would be inappropriate to 
offer counselling assistance as a singular intervention to individuals with 
psychosocial problems. Instead, a more holistic approach based on 
interrelations between children’s physical, cognitive, emotional, socio-cultural 
and spiritual development would be ideal (Wessells, 2006). Kostelny 
(2006:22) commenting on the relevance of psychosocial support in the RR of 
child soldiers and peacebuilding has observed that concepts of mental health 
and mental illness vary across cultures. Western psychology mainly focuses 
on mental illness and concepts of trauma and post traumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD). Kostelny concurs with Honwana (1997); Wessells (2006) and 
Marsella et al. (1996) that  while the PTSD (Post Traumatic Stress Disorder) 
concept has been validated and has value in some contexts, a focus on trauma 
alone can marginalize other effects of war such as mistrust, hopelessness, 
social exclusion and the current stresses of daily life.  
  
Kostelny (2006) further observes that psychosocial support for children in war 
zones would be best provided through holistic, culturally grounded, family-
based and community-based methods. To Kostelny (2006), in order to 
construct culturally relevant approaches, it is essential to use and learn from 
local approaches, placing culture at the centre of psychosocial work. Cultural 
and indigenous psychosocial resources include traditions, human resources, 
community processes and tools. Accordingly, since these resources reflect 
values, beliefs and cultural traditions, they give voice to and honour to local 
people and thus are more sustainable (Kostelny, 2006:29). Murithi (2008:17) 
concurs with other scholars on the relevance of use of indigenous and 
endogenous resources. He observes that indigenous and endogenous peace 
and conflict resolution approaches are not generally recognized by 
governments as viable alternatives to promoting peace at the grassroots level 
after the end of conflict. More so, in the aftermath of conflicts, indigenous and 
endogenous principles are rarely considered in terms of constitutional and 
legal frameworks to oversee the transition to democratic governance. Murithi 
(2008) proposes a hybrid approach that relies on a combination of best 
practices from official and indigenous values, principles and norms. 
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Consequently, scholars such as Bracken (2006) and Kostelny (2006) 
recommend an integrated approach of psychosocial support that combines 
both the best practices from the Western approach and traditional and 
indigenous values. Accordingly, this approach should be holistic in nature in 
the sense that it links emotional and social supports which meet the basic 
needs of war affected children including food, shelter and physical 
reconstruction. The holistic approach also addresses the needs of whole 
communities as well as providing vocational training, literacy classes and 
linking trainees with the job market.  
 
The discussion above demonstrates that psychosocial approaches are 
important in the RR of children affected by civil war. More so, psychosocial 
support approaches vary across cultures and therefore the dominance of 
Western approaches in the provision of psychosocial support to child soldiers 
and communities affected by war in other settings could harm them further. 
The section however, recognizes that there are important aspects of the 
Western approaches that could be blended with indigenous resources to get a 
hybrid approach that is context relevant.  
 
Advantages of Psychosocial Support in the RR and Peacebuilding Based 
on Traditional Approaches in the African Context 
 
Peacemaking and peacebuilding in Africa are...still 
predominantly being taught and practiced through models 
developed from Eurocentric traditions. The mainstream and 
dominant literature in peace studies works on the premise that 
the values, resources and institutions that have been developed 
by Eurocentric Western tradition, broadly defined as the Judaeo-
Christian heritage, have a universality and can be transposed on 
to other societies. The Judaeo-Christian Western traditions have 
developed their own notions of peacemaking and reconciliation. 
The greater part of academic research on peacemaking has a 
distinctly Western and Eurocentric bias (Murithi, 2008:18) 
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This section examines the relevance of provision of psychosocial support in 
the RR and peacebuilding based on traditional and indigenous approaches in 
the African context. 
 
Several scholars (Osaghae, 2000; Summerfield, 1998; Muruthi, 2008; Machel, 
2001) have observed that violent protracted conflicts that have been 
experienced in Africa and other regions in the developing world, divide 
populations, undermine interpersonal relations and social trust and destroy 
social norms and values that have always regulated societies and held them 
together. Yet, recovery and sustainable peacebuilding is only possible if 
international humanitarian intervention is aimed at rebuilding indigenous 
resources to ensure local ownership and sustainability (Liu Institute for Global 
Issues et al. 2005:1). Murithi (2008:17) who defines indigenous resources as 
that which is inherent to a given society but also that which is innate and 
instinctive observes that indigenous and endogenous processes have been 
internalized by years of tradition and consequently the values and practices 
they propose do not seem alien to the affected communities.   
 
While the aim of this chapter is to examine the role of traditional and 
indigenous resources in the RR of child soldiers in northern Uganda, evidence 
from most of Africa shows that most societies that have been affected by wars 
have indigenous values, institutions and resources for peacemaking and 
peacebuilding. As scholars have noted, notwithstanding the differences in 
socio-political organization and levels of development, the nature of conflicts 
and the strategies devised to deal with conflict management and reconciliation 
in traditional African societies present striking similarities (Osaghae, 
2000:205). Accordingly, these traditional and indigenous approaches of 
conflict management and reconciliation developed overtime among most 
African traditional societies can be relied upon to transition from war to peace 
including the RR of child soldiers since they also have widespread support 
among the populations. Commenting on the relevance of African traditional 
conflict management and reconciliation approaches Osaghae, (2000:203) 
observes that, 
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Tradition is all too clear in present-day African politics and this, 
in itself, is sufficient reason to consider traditional sources of 
conflict management. After all, traditional strategies of conflict 
management are employed at the subnational level in most 
countries, especially in those where so-called traditional rulers 
are still respected. Little (1967: 185) discovered from his study 
of the Mende of Sierra Leone that the authority of the Poro 
society (as well as the Sande and Humui, other secret societies 
that serve as cultural arbiters) is still widely used to resolve 
conflicts. 
 
The Rwandan experience provides a good example in respect to the relevance 
of the African traditional indigenous resources for conflict management, 
reconciliation and peacebuilding including DDR of ex-combatants who 
included child soldiers. Following the 1994 genocide which devastated the 
country, including the judicial system, the new Rwandan Patriotic Front 
(RPF) Government that captured power had to reinvigorate the Gacaca 
traditional justice and reconciliation system. Despite its weaknesses, including 
some people using it to settle political differences, this community-based 
conflict resolution and reconciliation system helped to promote peaceful 
settlement of disputes and to reduce the number of cases submitted to the 
formal judicial structures (Reyntjens el al. 2001:128).  
 
In South Africa, the African National Congress (ANC) Government 
established the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 1995 to assist in the 
healing and reconciliation process after centuries of a repressive apartheid 
system of governance (Masina, 2000:177). The Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC) relied on the Ubuntu, an African traditional restorative 
justice and reconciliation system common among most South African 
societies to conduct its work. Commenting on his own experience as 
Chairman of the TRC, Archbishop Desmond Tutu observed that he constantly 
referred to the notion of Ubuntu when guiding and advising witnesses, victims 
and perpetrators during the Commission hearings (Masina, 2000). The TRC 
was instrumental in the DRR processes of both the former national army and 
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ex-combatants of the ANC who included young fighters. There are several 
other examples of traditional approaches across Africa, including 
Bushingantahe, a justice and reconciliation system in Burundi, the Jir 
Mediation Forum of the Tiv of Nigeria and the Shir Council of Elders in 
Somaliland (Zartman, 2000).  
 
In spite of the limitations associated with the African traditional and 
indigenous approaches, including gender biases towards women and its 
disruption by civil wars discussed extensively in the subsequent section, they 
are credited with several advantages which can be relied upon in the RR of 
former child soldiers and peacebuilding in general.  
 
The first advantage is that since the indigenous approaches have been in use 
for generations among most societies affected by conflicts, they are familiar, 
acceptable and have a local appeal to the communities where they are being 
applied. In any case, these indigenous approaches appeal to people’s local 
cultures, social norms and values making them acceptable and available in the 
long-term (Deng, 2000).  
 
The second advantage relates to the fact that traditional and indigenous 
approaches are inclusive in a sense that they are based on the African concept 
of collective responsibility and togetherness (Masina, 2000). Besides being 
inclusive, African traditional approaches promote public participation and 
always endeavour to seek consensus among the parties at conflict in 
addressing the root causes of the conflict. Public participation of the affected 
people enlists community support and ownership of the processes and the 
outcome. The example of traditional approaches that enlist public 
participation and have been used in RR of child soldiers is the Mato Oput 
justice and reconciliation system among the Acholi people in northern Uganda 
(Interview with Bishop Ochora). Mato Oput is discussed in detail in the next 
section.  
 
The third advantage of indigenous approaches is that they are sustainable 
since they depend on local resources, which is necessary to ensure sustainable 
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peace (McCallin, 1998:70). Unlike international humanitarian assistance 
which is always top-down, externally driven, time bound and financially 
constrained in the case of United Nations led post-conflict peacebuilding, 
indigenous resources are resident among the affected communities. And since 
regeneration and recovery of war-torn societies including RR of child soldiers 
takes a long time, reliance on indigenous resources ensures long term 
commitment. This does not mean that external assistance is not relevant. As 
Kostelny (2006) has pointed out, the role of external assistance should be 
largely to assist in rebuilding and empowerment of local capacities and 
resources to support psychosocial support and peacebuilding of the war 
affected societies. 
 
The fourth advantage is that indigenous approaches are cost effective to the 
extent that they rely on the community’s own internal resources rather than 
the infusion of funds from external sources. This helps to build self 
confidence and re-humanisation of communities and individuals whose sense 
of humanity and self-worth would have been wounded and undermined by the 
war. More so, the reliance on indigenous resources/approaches reduces the 
possibility of dependence that characterizes most societies emerging from 
civil wars. The above point has also been advanced by Caritas Gulu in 
northern Uganda. According to Rubangadeke a staff of Caritas Gulu, external 
assistance is creating a dependence syndrome among the communities which 
could perpetually undermine community resilience.  Moreso as the subsequent 
discussions show, indigenous resources such as families, youth and women’s 
groups have been useful in RR of former child soldiers in northern Uganda. 
 
The fifth advantage is that indigenous approaches put emphasis on mediation 
and reconciliation processes as opposed to retributive justice. The emphasis of 
African traditional approaches on mediation of disputes and going beyond 
mediation to reconcile conflicting parties and build peaceful relationships is 
considered more appropriate compared to Western judicial approaches which 
emphasise retributive justice that does not repair broken relationships. In 
northern Uganda, Mato Oput, which is an Acholi traditional justice system, 
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has been relied upon to reconcile former child soldiers with communities and 
families (Interview with Bishop Ochora). 
 
While the African traditional and indigenous approaches embody a number of 
advantages, they also have limitations. These limitations are discussed in 
detail in the concluding section of this chapter.  
 
Psychosocial Support Based on Traditional and Indigenous Resources in 
the RR of Child Soldiers in Northern Uganda  
 
War affects every aspect of a child’s development - physical, 
emotional, intellectual, social and spiritual. Children who have 
lived through conflict need psychosocial support (Machel, 
2001:80). 
 
This section examines psychosocial support based on the traditional and 
indigenous resources that have been used in the RR of child soldiers in 
northern Uganda. Most of the RR of former child soldiers was implemented 
and is still being done by reception centres which include; GUSCO, 
Concerned Parents Association, World Vision’s Children of War 
Rehabilitation Centre and associations of former child soldiers formerd after 
they were reintegrated with their families and communities. The reception 
centres were the first places where child soldiers found a place to physically 
heal by providing medical assistance for the sick, counselling, family tracing 
and advice on how to cope in society outside the bush life. Annan et al. (2006) 
have pointed out that the crucial role played by reception centres is that they 
became a place in which to transition between two worlds: that of the bush 
and that of the village. 
 
 It should be noted though that not all former child soldiers came back through 
reception centres. While the majority of the 25 former child soldiers that were 
interviewed for this research returned through the reception centres about five 
of them said that they came directly to their homes after escaping from rebel 
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captivity. Findings from fieldwork reveal that most reception centres provided 
counselling, medical treatment, clothes, vocational training, family tracing 
and re-unions with families. The final journey which is the family re-union 
was in most cases concluded by traditional rituals and ceremonies performed 
by traditional leaders.  
 
Before examining the traditional and indigenous approaches that have been 
relied upon in the RR of child soldiers in northern Uganda, it is important to 
explore the spirituality of the Acholi people who are the main actors in the 
LRA conflict. The reason for exploring the spirituality of the Acholi people is 
because the traditional and indigenous rituals and ceremonies used in the RR 
of former child soldiers in northern Uganda are anchored in their spiritual 
beliefs. Traditionally, the Acholi people believe that good health and 
happiness are situated in the context of the harmony and the well-being of the 
clan. The ancestral and religious spirit worlds provide guidance to the Acholi 
people, maintaining the unity of the clans (Interview with Bishop Ochora). 
Consequently, conflicts, misfortune and poor health were historically 
interpreted to have been sent by the angry spirits, and affected not only the 
offender or violator of the moral codes but his/her family and clan. 
 
Because, in Acholi culture, one person’s offence affects other people, it 
demands collective responsibility to deal with the problem (Liu Institute for 
Global Issues et al. 2006:3).  A communal society, the Acholi people have a 
special value for the clan system. Historically, each member of the social unit 
was expected to fulfil different yet complementary productive, reproductive 
and cultural roles. The spiritual and religious world among the Acholi which 
functioned through spiritual and human representatives enforced people’s 
behaviour. While colonial, modern influences and conflict have greatly 
impacted on their cultural beliefs, most Acholi people believe in the spiritual 
world (Latigo, 2008). The Acholi believe in Jok, a divine spirit, as well as the 
presence of other ancestral and foreign spirits. Traditionally, each clan had its 
Jok or Jogi (plural for Jok) which was depended upon for blessings, hunting, 
good harvest and in times of war. Sacrifices were always made to ask for 
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blessings, favour or prevention of calamity. The elders were taken to be close 
to Jok and were responsible for offering sacrifices in shrines.  
 
According to elders, ‘Cen,’ an angry spirit is sent to a person for committing a 
crime against the dead. Such crimes include murder, stealing and abandoning 
a close relative to die in a demeaning manner. Cen manifests itself for a period 
of time by attacking the family, sub-clan or the entire clan. In this case, the 
responsibility for setting things right does not rest on the offending individual 
alone but the entire family and elders within a clan. The types of rituals for 
chasing or appeasing Cen depend on the affected clan and the act which led to 
the attack by Cen. However, in most cases, a goat or sheep is slaughtered to 
chase away the bad spirits (Liu Institute for Global Issues et al. 2006).  
 
During the two decade LRA conflict many of the shrines for Jok and witch 
doctors were targeted and destroyed by the rebels especially the Holy Spirit 
Movement led by Prophetess Lakwena and by the LRA (Human Rights 
Watch, 1997:66). The traditional approaches for peacemaking and 
peacebuilding among the Acholi people are premised on a set of principles: 
voluntary nature of the process; truth telling as a basis for mediation; 
acknowledgement of wrong doing; compensation and reconciliation through 
symbolic acts and ritual appeasement.  
 
Depending on the crime committed, compensation was always made in the 
form of cows, bulls or goats or a virgin girl where murder had taken place109. 
According to Odama, the Acholi traditional justice was guided by the desire to 
restore the broken relationship rather than punishment. The system never 
handed down a death sentence for a person accused of intentional or 
accidental murder.  The Acholi traditional approaches of justice and 
reconciliation are examined in detail below. 
 
                                                 
109 Archbishop Odama, J. B. (2008). Reconciliation Process (Mato Oput) Among the Acholi 
Tribe in Northern Uganda. Available at: http://www.npf.or.jp/peace_prize_f/21/speech_e.pdf. 
Accessed on 23/6/2010. Odama is also the Chairperson of the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace 
Initiative (ARLPI). 
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 Mato Oput Justice and Reconciliation Approach 
Most former child soldiers who were interviewed during the field work 
confirmed that they were assisted in the RR processes by the traditional rituals 
that were organized for them by traditional leaders and their families to 
receive them back home. Some of them reported that their fears and sadness 
were relieved due to the traditional rituals that were performed during the re-
unification with families. Some child soldiers who came straight from the 
bush to their homes and missed out on these ceremonies blame their continued 
trauma in form of bad dreams and suffering especially due to lack of secure 
livelihoods on not taking part in traditional ceremonies. According to Avola, 
Coordinator of Ker Kwaro, Acholi, Mato Oput and other cultural rituals have 
been revived and widely used to support RR of former child soldiers in the 
entire Acholi sub-region.  
 
The Acholi believe that a person is a sacred being whose blood should not be 
spilled without a just cause. If a person killed another person from the same or 
different clan intentionally or by accident, the killing would provoke the anger 
of the deities and ancestral spirits of the victims (Interview with Bishop 
Ochora).110 It is believed that the angered spirits of ancestors would permit 
and even invite evil spirits to invade homesteads and harm the inhabitants. 
Moreover, the killing creates a supernatural barrier between the clan of the 
killer and the clan of the killed person. After the murder, the two clans stop 
eating and drinking from the same bowl. Communication and any healthy 
interaction also break down. This separation and lack of cooperation remains 
until the killing has been atoned for and a religious rite of reconciliation 
performed to appease the spirits (Interview with Bishop Ochora). During this 
time, the killer is ostracised and treated as an unclean person. Consequently, 
the offender is prohibited from entering any homestead other than his/her own 
                                                 
110 Interview with Bishop Ochora, the retired Anglican Bishop of Kitgum Diocese who is the 
Vice Chairman of the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative and a strong advocate of the 
Acholi traditional justice system. He is himself a victim of the conflict. His wife was killed by 
a landmine, while his daughter committed suicide after being gang raped by the LRA rebels. 
The Bishop says he has relied on his Acholi tradition and his Christian faith to forgive the 
rebels. In interviewed Bishop Ochora many times over a period of three years since i have 
been working with him on the peace process in northern Uganda since 2006. However in 
respect for this research i interviewed him in September 2009.  
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for fear that he/she is a companion of the evil spirits which would pollute the 
soil and the homesteads (Latigo, 2008).  
 
In the case of accidental or deliberate killing, the clan of the offender is 
required to pay blood money as an indemnity to the clan of the dead person. 
In the meantime, a council of elders appoints a mediator who normally would 
be a respectable elder from neither of the feuding clans. The mediator is 
supposed to be impartial and is expected to coordinate the process of paying 
the compensation. Underpinning the Mato Oput approach is that no killing is 
paid for by another killing.111 This is based on the belief that killing another 
person simply means loss of manpower by society which is not beneficial to 
either party at conflict. The payment of compensation which was always in 
the form of cows, bulls or goats was preferable since these would be used to 
marry another woman who in turn would produce children to replace the dead 
person.  
 
After the payment of compensation, the elders arrange for the customary rite 
of reconciliation to take place in order to bring the estranged clans together to 
resume a normal working relationship. The reconciliation ceremony always 
takes place in an uncultivated field usually located somewhere between the 
villages or communal settlements of the two clans, away from any footpath or 
any path commonly used by women and children. The clan of the offender 
provides a ram and a bull while the next of kin of the dead person provides a 
goat. Normally new unused utensils are required for the Mato Oput ceremony 
including large quantities of local brew prepared for the occasion. On the 
appointed day, the appointed master of ceremony, conciliators and elders from 
both clans assemble at the chosen site and stand facing westwards in a solemn 
silence. The master of ceremony leads the two parties in a ritual as follows:  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
111 Archbishop Odama, Op Cit. 
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Box 2: Example of Mato Oput Ceremony 
The Master of ceremonies: 
 
‘You our ancestors and the children of the Supreme Deity! I now plead with you and ask you to realize 
that sin is part of man’s life. It was started by those who ever lived before us. This man whose fault 
brought us here has merely repeated the perennial SIN which man has hitherto failed to discard since 
time immemorial. He killed his own brother. But since then he has repented of his evil deed. He has 
paid blood money which may be used to marry a woman who will produce children who, in turn, will 
keep the name of his killed brother for our posterity. We now beseech you our ancestors to let the two 
families resume a brotherly relationship...’  
 
All the assembled elders join in and chant together by saying: 
Let a man who will be given money to marry a wife be sharp and pick on a vivacious woman... a virgin 
woman who will produce many and healthy children to grow up well and take over the empty home.’ 
Another master of ceremonies from the clan of the killed person responds to the solemn invocation in 
the following terms: 
We are not the first clan to suffer premature death of this kind. The killer has repented his misdeed. He 
has paid for it. We now supplicate you our ancestors to bless the blood money given to the family to 
marry a wife to produce a replacement for our killed brother...’ 
 
All the assembly elders join the invocation and chart together: 
Let us accept the blood money and wash our hearts clean, and begin to live and work together as we 
have been doing in the past... Our enemies who have heard of this reconciliation and are not happy that 
it will now bring peace and prosperity to our two clans.... Let their ill will be carried away by the sun 
to the west, and sink with it down, deep and deep down...’ (Source: Latigo, 2008). 
 
The master of ceremonies using a calabash mixes the pounded extracts from 
the bitter roots of the oput tree with an alcoholic drink and asks the killer and 
the next of kin of the killed person to kneel down and drink the herb 
simultaneously from the same calabash facing each other with their hands 
behind their backs. It is at this stage in the ceremony that the members of the 
two clans join to drink from the same vessel for the first time112. The master 
of ceremonies at this point cuts off the head of the ram brought by the killer’s 
clan and the head of the goat from the killed person’s clan. The rams head is 
then handed over to the next of kin of the dead man while the goat’s head is 
given to the killer’s clan. Meanwhile, the bull is speared, killed and butchered. 
The meat is cooked and eaten together symbolizing fellowship again. At this 
point elders from both sides mix freely and the two clans re-establish a 
healthy and normal relationship (Latigo, 2008:105).  The bitter roots of the 
Oput tree symbolize the bitterness of the conflict that end in bloodshed. 
According to Archbishop Odama, the role of the girl as a compensation for 
premeditated murder was understood as salvation and readiness for the clan to 
sacrifice their daughter to affirm commitment to peace and co-existence. 
 
                                                 
112 Odama, Ibid. 
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The ritual of stepping on the egg (nyono tong gweno) 
Another Acholi traditional approach that has been used in the RR of child 
soldiers is the ‘Stepping on the Egg’ or ‘nyono tong gweno’ in Acholi. The 
stepping on the egg ritual is a firm belief among the Acholi aimed at 
preserving the sacredness and stability of their homesteads and society. It is 
used to welcome home members who have been away from the homesteads 
for a long period of time (Interview with staff of Concerned Parents 
Association). It is believed that being away from home, people could come 
into contact with spirits which if not cleansed would adulterate and/ or bring 
misfortune to the entire society. The ritual is therefore performed to restore 
severed relationships and to demonstrate commitment on the part of the 
community and the affected person to stay together in a harmonious 
relationship. 
 
Accordingly, stepping on the egg ceremony or ritual is performed at the 
family or clan level. However, because of the magnitude of the problem in 
respect to massive abduction of children by the LRA, the ceremony has been 
organized on a large scale where several formerly abducted children 
collectively step on eggs in one ceremony. Available information shows that 
over 12,000 formerly abducted persons have undergone the stepping on the 
egg ceremony conducted and supported by Ker Kwaro Acholi 
(Latigo:2008:106). The use of the egg represents innocence. The egg is 
delicate and mouthless. According to Avola, the egg has no mouth to speak 
words that sometimes cause conflict. By stepping on this delicate egg that is 
mouthless and innocent the offender becomes purified and innocent again. 
The stepping on the egg ceremony became very popular to the extent that at 
one time, northern Uganda experienced a shortage of eggs (Interview with 
Mao).113 
 
Cleansing the Body Ritual (moyo kum)  
Moyo Kum or Cleansing of the Body ritual is another traditional approach 
that has been used in the RR of former child soldiers in northern Uganda. The 
                                                 
113 Mao, N., is Chairman Gulu District Local Government, Op Cit. 
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ritual is complicated and can often last for several days. It is usually 
performed by elders who come together to bless the returned persons by 
washing away their misdeeds, chase away the evil spirits and appeal to the 
ancestors for their blessing. The ceremony involves the act of spearing the 
goat and dragging it across a compound to rid the clan of Cen (evil spirit) that 
the returning person comes back with. According to Rubangakene, Caritas has 
supported several cleansing the body rituals in its area of concentration.  
 
Cleansing of an Area (moyo piny) 
Moyo piny or cleansing of an area is another ritual that has been used in the 
RR of former child soldiers. Moyo Piny involves sacrifice of goats to appease 
the ancestors and cleansing the area of evil spirits that are believed to dwell in 
places where mass massacres took place during the war. Most IDPs have been 
reluctant to return to their original places or plough fields where mass killings 
took place. The performance of this ceremony by the traditional leaders has 
facilitated the return and resettlement of communities to their original places 
which also paved the way for RR of former child soldiers (Interview with staff 
of CPA). 
 
Bending the Spear, also known as Gomo Tong 
Gomo Tong is a ceremony where the two conflicting or warring parties agree 
to permanently end their violent conflict by bending spears facing the opposite 
direction of the perceived enemy signalling the end of use of the spear against 
the enemy. Gomo Tong is regarded as sacred which normally invokes the 
ancestors and once performed it is supposed to mark the end of bloodshed.  
There exists an historical account where this ritual was used and it worked 
successfully to prevent war between the Acholi and their neighbours in West 
Nile (Latigo, 2008).  
 
Apart from the Acholi, other ethnic groups that have been affected by the war 
in northern Uganda have their own traditional and indigenous approaches for 
RR of persons involved in the conflict including child soldiers. Some of these 
approaches are recognized by the Draft Juba Peace Agreement, 2007 which is 
pending signatures of the LRA leader, Kony, and President Museveni. The 
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Langi people have what is called Kayo cuk meaning ‘biting of charcoal’. This 
ritual is performed to reconcile parties formerly in conflict and has been used 
in the RR of child soldiers in Lango sub-region. In West Nile among the Madi 
people, Tonu ci koka traditional ritual has been performed to reconcile parties 
at conflict especially ex-combatants who include child soldiers. In Teso, 
where the LRA also abducted a significant number of children, ‘ailuc’ 
traditional ceremonies have been performed to receive children back.  
 
By and large, the Acholi traditional justice and reconciliation approaches are 
guided by the principle of restoration of broken relationships and voluntarism. 
Reconciliation is not possible unless the offender accepts responsibility. The 
voluntary nature of the offender is driven by the fear of ‘Cen’ the evil spirit. 
Most elders interviewed describe the traditional justice approaches as 
collective and transparent since they are organized in open courts with 
specific roles of elders and representatives of royal clans and the feuding 
clans. Research conducted in northern Uganda reveals that the Acholi people, 
including the political elites, have strong belief in their traditional rituals and 
in the spirit world (Interview with Oryem).114 The decision for the negotiating 
teams in Juba to include agenda number three on Accountability and 
Reconciliation was in response to the pressure from the majority of the Acholi 
people who insisted that they are ready to forgive rebels based on their 
traditional culture115.  
 
Most crucially the conflict in northern Uganda has brought to the fore the fact 
that there exists a rich body of traditional systems in Africa that reflects the 
principles of conflict management and conflict resolution where the objective 
is to reintegrate the perpetrators into their communities and reconcile them 
with their victims. Noteworthy also is that the justice aspect of these 
                                                 
114 Interview with Hon. Oryem, O.H.; Op Cit., Oryem, an Acholi and a son of the former 
president of Uganda, General Tito Okello Lutwa confirmed that he worships the spirits of his 
ancestors and has no business with Christianity. The interview was conducted in December, 
2009. 
115 Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation between Government of Uganda and 
Lord’s Resistance Army/Movement provided for use of traditional customary approaches of 
conflict resolution to end the conflict in northern Uganda. Available at: 
http://www.beyondjuba.org/peace_agreements/Agreement_on_Accountability_And_Reconcil
ition.pdf. Accessed on 24/5/2010. 
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traditional approaches is distinct from the adversarial one inherent in Western 
justice or modern formal judicial system used by the courts in Uganda. While 
the Western justice system produces a clear winner and a loser, the Acholi 
traditional system produces only winners: both the victim and the offender 
become winners through the restored relationship that rehumanizes both 
parties. 
 
Research findings show that the traditional approaches have helped in 
fostering family re-unions as the families have been made aware that it is their 
cultural responsibility to accept the children back and reintegrate them as 
members of society (Interview with Avola). Further, traditional rituals have 
fostered community acceptance that children belong to them and it is their 
responsibility and role to deal with the problem. In fact, during the field work, 
the staff of Caritas, a Catholic Church organization revealed that the 
communities have complianed that NGOs are undermining their roles of 
raising community children as most former child soldiers now think they 
belong to NGOs and not the community. Besides the traditional approaches of 
conflict management and reconciliation, other local resources in northern 
Uganda have played a crucial role in the RR of child soldiers. These local 
resources include: religious institutions, education institutions, youth and 
women groups/associations and families. The contribution of these institutions 
is examined below. 
 
Role of Religious Institutions in the RR of Child Soldiers 
Religious institutions, especially the Catholic Church, the Anglican Church 
and Pentecostal Churches, have played a crucial role in the RR of former child 
soldiers through preaching forgiveness and unconditional love of Jesus Christ 
and provision of humanitarian and development assistance. The preaching is 
said to have enabled some child soldiers to come to terms with their situation 
and achieve acceptance by the communities they had terrorised to accept them 
back. O.G., 19 years pointed out that his Church has helped him overcome his 
troubled mind. He observed that, 
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I was abducted with two brothers who are still in the bush. I was 
forced to kill my friends, I saw innocent children being killed. 
When I came back, it was difficult for me to sleep. I would 
dream i was being pursued by the LRA and would wake up 
screaming. Through prayers and counselling by fellow church 
members I no longer get bad dreams. I am now praying that my 
brothers will one day come back alive. 
 
Watoto Community Church, one of the biggest Pentecostal Churches in 
Uganda, opened a special branch called Watoto Church Gulu in 2008. 
Through a partnership arrangement with Laroo School of War Affected 
Children, Watoto is assisting in the rehabilitation of 460 former child soldiers 
(Interview with Ochen).116  
 
Role of Schools in the RR of Child Soldiers 
A crucial local resource for RR and peacebuilding in northern Uganda is 
schools (primary, secondary and vocational training) which are educating and 
offering training to former child soldiers. Most reception centres were quick 
to realize that most former child soldiers needed to be given opportunities for 
schooling since schooling is critical in addressing psychosocial problems 
among young people affected by war (Arafat et al. 2006:120). World Vision 
Uganda for example, negotiated six months placement for older returnees and 
enrolled the young ones in primary schools (Interview with Obilu-Akol). 
While not all former child soldiers have accessed schooling opportunities, 
most of them that were interviewed during field work who are studying 
appear to be more optimistic and positive about their future.  
 
O.B., 28 who is offering a bricklaying course in a vocational school observed 
that his ambition is to become an accountant. O.B observed that, ‘My plan is 
to continue upgrading until I join a university to do a course of my dream’ 
 
                                                 
116 Ochen, C., is a Social Worker with Watoto Community Church. According to Ochen, 
Watoto provides counselling and material support to former child soldiers at Laroo School of 
War Affected Children. Ochen was interviewed at Watoto Church in Gulu in March, 2010. 
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Role of Women and Youth Groups  
Women’s groups and youth groups in northern Uganda have been instrument 
in the RR processes of former child soldiers. Women’s organizations such as 
Concerned Parents Association (CPA), Kitgum Concerned Women’s 
Association (KIWA) received, counselled and reintegrated former child 
soldiers. Beyond reintegration, women’s groups have continued to conduct 
community sensitization programmes to foster community acceptance of 
former child soldiers.117 
 
Role of Associations of former Child Soldiers 
During field work, it was established that after reintegration and rehabilitation 
by reception centres and NGOs former child soldiers formed their own 
associations through which they could champion their needs and get a 
belonging. Field work findings reveal that these associations have been crucial 
in consolidating RR of former child soldiers in their communities. Most of 
these associations are providing psychosocial support to their members 
through counselling and credit facilties. KICA Ber Youth Group and War 
Affected Children Association (WACA) are examples of associations of 
former child soldiers that offer counselling, credit and savings services and 
scholarships to their members as part of RR activities.118 Research findings 
also show that these associations have shielded former child soldiers from 
community stigmatization since they provide a belonging. Also, the credit and 
saving schemes, training in business management provided by these 
associations have enabled former child soldiers to start income generating 
businesses which have earned them respect in society.119 
 
Role of Families in the RR of Child Soldiers 
While the Child Protection Unit of the army was the first stop centre of 
returning child soldiers, the families have been the final destination for the 
returning children.  Most reception centres would first prepare the families 
                                                 
117 Interview with the staff of Concerned Parents Association conducted in Gulu in February, 
2009. 
118 Interviews with members of KICA Ber Youth Group which took place at their associations 
offices in Gulu in February, 2009. This group comprise both male and female former child 
soldiers who are now adults. 
119 Ibid. 
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through sensitization to accept their children back and urge them to give 
children all the support they need to recover from the trauma. Findings from 
the field work reveal that most former child soldiers (with the exception of 
child mothers who have been rejected by parents because of the children they 
returned with) were helped by the warm reception from their families to settle 
down. It was also found that most former child soldiers who have high levels 
of traumatic symptoms such as uncontrolled crying whenever one asks about 
their bush experience are child mothers who were rejected by families and 
now live in towns in very difficult conditions.  
 
Commenting about the centrality of families in the RR of child soldiers, 
Singer, (2006:201) observe that, 
...successful reintegration is as much about whether the families 
and communities are prepared for acceptance as about whether 
the children have been properly rehabilitated. .....in one survey 
in Africa, 80 percent of adults did not want their children to mix 
with children who had once served as child soldiers.  
 
Challenges of Traditional and Indigenous Approaches in RR and 
Peacebuilding  
The use of psychosocial support based on traditional and indigenous 
resources have played a crucial role in the RR of former child soldiers 
particularly in northern Uganda. However, in spite of the relevance of 
traditional and indigenous resources in the RR of former child soldiers, 
findings from both field work and literature by scholars show that they have 
serious limitations.   
 
During fieldwork, it was found out that most of the traditional approaches 
were not designed to respond to large scale human rights violations that 
were committed during the war in northern Uganda. For example, Mato 
Oput was meant to promote reconciliation and restoration of relationships 
between clans for an intentional murder or accidental killing of one person 
by a member of another clan and was always mediated by a neutral person 
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from a different clan. The current Mato Oput ceremonies have had to be 
improvised to conduct rituals for mass killings where bodies have been 
buried in mass graves. What is also challenging is that reconciliation which 
underpins Mato Oput cannot take place since the perpetrators - LRA leaders 
are still in the bush and have not yet accepted responsibility nor asked for 
forgiveness which are some of the principles for the Mato Oput justice and 
reconciliation approach. Moreover, it is this improvisation of the traditional 
rituals among the Acholi that is being challenged by some fellow Acholis as 
a sham (Interview with Bigombe).120  
 
The above point was confirmed by an official of Ker Kwaro Acholi who 
said that modifications have had to be made on cultural rituals and 
ceremonies to address the magnitude of the problem.  The point being made 
here is that these traditional rituals may not be sufficient to address the 
psychosocial needs of children because they have been simply repackaged 
and improvised. Mark Avola agrees that while Ker Kwaro Acholi has been 
instrumental in the RR of former child soldiers, it has some weakness and 
noted that it is necessary to supplement traditional psychosocial supports 
with Western approaches since the latter use several techniques.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
120 Bigombe, B., an Acholi and former Minister for Pacification of Northern Uganda who led 
two failed peace negotiations between Government and LRA dismissed Mato Oput as a recent 
invention among the Acholi. She said that people don’t know Mato Oput. Bigombe was 
interviewed in Kampala in August 2009. 
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Box 3: Informants Views about Traditional and Western Psychosocial 
Approaches 
 
Traditional Approaches 
 Advantages: 
a) Have a cultural basis; 
b) Known by most people in northern Uganda; 
c) They are locally available and sustainable; 
d) Widespread community acceptance; 
e) Institutionalized with the reinstatement of Ker Kwaro Acholi. 
Disadvantages: 
a) Have been weakened by the civil war, Christianity, and legislation; 
b) Gender insensitive towards women and girls; 
c) Perpetuate male domination; 
d) Blood sacrifices invoke bad memories among former child soldiers about LRA 
human sacrifices; 
e) Lack of national appeal, only limited to Acholi sub-region; 
f) Approaches have been repackaged with their validity being questioned; 
g) Have failed to protect child mothers and their children. 
 
Western Approaches of Psychosocial Support  
Advantages: 
a) Talking to someone kind to you; 
b) Getting attention and being listened to; 
c) Teaching in life skills; 
d) Counselling gave us hope of new possibilities; 
e) Taught to be respectful to our parents and old people; 
f) Forgiveness; 
g) Teaching Christian values- love, repentance and forgiveness,  
Disadvantages 
a) We were treated like children; 
b) Sharing secrets to strangers; 
c) Cultural differences. 
 
 
The second limitation of traditional approaches in the RR of child soldiers in 
northern Uganda relates to persistent trauma and stigma among former child 
soldiers in spite of the fact that most of them underwent traditional rituals 
and cultural ceremonies performed by Ker Kwaro Acholi. Most former child 
soldiers interviewed for this research confirmed they had been purified by 
traditional rituals sponsored by the reception centres or Ker Kwaro Acholi. 
However, it was also found that most of them complained of being 
stigmatized by name calling, by members of the community, lack of secure 
livelihoods, loss of parents, uncertain future and family rejection in the case 
of child mothers. One former child soldier said that whenever they call him 
a rebel, he feels like fighting back but when it is by an old person, he simply 
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cries.121 Also, it was found out that most female former child soldiers’ were 
traumatized by failed new marriages which they blame on community 
perception of them.  
 
A.A, 28 years, is a mother of three. She was abducted at 14 years and spent 
seven years in the bush. Her LRA husband was killed during fighting in the 
bush. She returned with two children and remarried. A.A. said that some 
people have been advising her husband to leave her since she is a risk who 
can kill him at any time. This is one of the reasons why most female former 
child soldiers have had run to towns where they end up in prostitution. This 
finding is also confirmed by a study by Liu Institute et al. (2005:35) which 
lists name calling and abuses as major causes of stress and stigmatization 
among the former child soldiers and a challenge to reintegration. The 
argument being advanced here is that traditional rituals have not helped 
former child soldiers to fully overcome trauma; neither have they 
empowered society to forgive and support their RR processes. 
 
Thirdly, a study conducted by Allen et al. (2006:18) found that the role of 
local healing in the RR of former child soldiers has been overstated or 
misunderstood in many reports in respect to northern Uganda. The study 
found out that some formerly abducted children are upset by violence in 
sacrificial ceremonies, and dislike the ritual ablutions because they remind 
them of the healing rites that were performed by the LRA rebels in the bush. 
This point was collaborated by Okello, a Programme Officer with 
Concerned Parents Association (CPA) during fieldwork. He observed that 
CPA has handled cases where former child soldiers refused traditional 
rituals in favour of a Christian prayer or Western counselling when their 
parents favoured the former. Okello noted that in such situations, CPA 
settled for a compromise where both approaches were used. 
 
                                                 
121 Interview with a former child soldier whose name remains confidential but is a member of 
KICA Ber Youth Group or Forgiveness is Good Youth Group in northern Uganda in February 
2010. 
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The fourth challange is that becuase of massive internal displacement by the 
civil war, most traditional and indigenous resources that would have been 
useful in the RR of former child soldiers were severely weakened including 
the role of elders, traditional leaders and the family in society (interview 
with Bishop Ochora, interview with Avola). Because of massive internal 
displacement, people’s livelihoods were greatly undermined; most fathers 
became poor and desperate with some resorting to excessive drinking of 
alcohol and could not provide for their families as is traditionally expected 
of a head of a household (Human Rights Focus Report, 2007:24). Families 
depended on handouts from the World Food Programme and Government.  
 
More so, most of the traditional leaders who were also internally displaced 
lost respect and authority due to poverty in the camps where they lived a 
dependent life like everybody else. With the return from the camps, most of 
them did not have houses to live in which prompted Government to build 
houses for them (interview with Avola). Consequently, it has become 
difficult for traditional leaders and elders to spearhead the RR of child 
soldiers and peacebuilding when most people look at them as ordinary 
citizens.  
 
Furthermore, reliance on customs, spirit mediums, witchcraft and secret 
societies by traditional approaches to justice and reconciliation has greatly 
been weakened by modern influences such as Christianity and formal 
education which characterise such practices as backward and satanic 
(Osaghae, 2001:2009). It is not surprising that some of the former child 
soldiers in northern Uganda disregarded traditional rituals in preference to 
Christian prayer (interview with Awor).122 
 
Another limitation of most African traditional and indigenous justice and 
reconciliation resources is that they are slow in delivering justice and 
reconciliation (Murithi, 2008:28).  This is because most African traditional 
reconciliation and justice systems are predicated on the principles of 
                                                 
122 Interview with Owor, A., who worked with GUSCO as a Social Worker. Op Cit. 
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voluntarism and willingness of the parties to achieve consensus which can 
make the process indefinite. Yet, in a modern society based on rule of law, 
justice delayed is considered justice denied. For example in Mato Oput in 
the case of the conflict in northern Uganda, a perpetrator is encouraged to 
acknowledge responsibility for wrong doing, following the presentation of 
evidence by the witness a perpetrator is also encouraged to repent and 
demonstrate genuine remorse; the perpetrator is encouraged to ask for 
forgiveness from the victims while the victim is encouraged to show mercy 
and grant forgiveness to the perpetrator. This painstaking process can take 
ages to complete and this could constrain peacebuilding. 
 
In the case of the war in northern Uganda, the chief perpetrator Kony and 
his commanders have consistently backtracked from several peace 
processes. This means that reconciliation and accountability may go on 
endlessly. The over reliance on such a mechanism can be frustrating 
especially on the part of victims who need justice in order to rebuild their 
shattered lives.  
 
More so, as scholars Denov (2007) and Pankhurst (2008) have observed 
most peace processes tend to marginalize women and this is most apparent 
in indigenous approaches to conflict management across much of Africa. 
Gender insensitivity towards women and girls should be seen as a 
continuation of another form of violence even after the official conflict has 
ended. Noteworthy is the fact that some of the cultural practices demean 
women or violate their human rights. In the case of Mato Oput for example, 
the process of compensation on top of blood money where a person has 
been killed, a virgin girl is supposed to be given to the clan which lost a 
person to produce children to replace the dead person (Archbishop Odama).  
 
Even if the ‘modernized’ Mato Oput rituals have removed the compensation 
of the virgin girl and other negative elements, it has prompted some sections 
among the Acholi society to say that the practice is diluted while others are 
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opposed to it.123 While it is true that there exist progressive values within the 
African traditional approaches, some elements violate the human rights of 
women. It would be absurd to rely on a system that seeks to deliver justice, 
peace and reconciliation to some sections of society while abusing the rights 
of others at the same time - women and girls’ rights. Consequently, Devon 
(2007) observes that because of the historical exclusion and other injustices 
towards women and girls, psychosocial cultural practices should be 
pluralistic and sensitive to gender and the dangers of both Western and local 
practices that perpetuate and reproduce stereotypes and inequalities. 
 
Another limitation is that while most African traditional conflict 
management approaches have similarities and broad principles; in most 
cases they are culture and context specific and not flexible which makes it 
difficult to apply them in other cultures among people who do not subscribe 
to that culture (Osaghae, 2000:216). For example while the conflict in 
northern Uganda is a national conflict and has affected all Ugandans, though 
differently, the traditional approaches being used are largely from the 
Acholi people and may not appeal to other ethnic groups. As Osaghae 
(2001) has observed, any attempt to apply traditional strategies of one ethnic 
group to modern conflicts across the board, is likely to arouse suspicions of 
ethnic domination and hegemony in a multi-ethnic post-colonial state such 
as Uganda and this could cause new tensions. This is a serious limitation on 
the part of traditional conflict management approaches that have been used 
in the RR of child soldiers across Africa. This is true of the conflict in 
northern Uganda.  
 
While Mato Oput and other traditional rituals are popular in Acholiland 
other neighbouring groups affected by the LRA conflict opted for their own 
traditional approaches as provided for in Agenda Item 3: Accountability and 
                                                 
123 Interview with Bigombe, B., Op Cit. Bigombe who led two failed  peace negotiations 
between Government and the LRA dismissed Mato Oput as a traditional system that is not 
known by most Acholi people, being fabricated to suit the moment. Interview was made in 
December 2009 in Kampala. 
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Reconciliation of the Draft Juba Peace Agreement124. In this case, while the 
conflict is a national issue, no single traditional approach commands a 
national appeal. This limitation calls for rethinking the appropriateness of 
traditional approaches from a national perspective.  
 
Critics of the traditional justice system especially the one in northern 
Uganda point out that it promotes a culture of impunity. Its emphasis on 
restorative justice rather than the Western formal judicial system tends to be 
very soft on the offenders who commit human rights violations. For 
example, most leaders and elites in northern Uganda have been advocating 
for a general amnesty for the LRA rebels arguing that ‘they are our children 
and it is us they killed (interview with Bishop Ochora). In fact most of them 
blame the International Criminal Court (ICC) for failing the peace process 
in northern Uganda after it issued arrest warrants for Kony and his top 
commanders.125 In northern Uganda there are key people who have 
benefited from the Amnesty Act 2000 and traditional justice such as 
Brigadier Banya and Onen Kamdulu who were some of the top commanders 
within the LRA that surrendered. Banya surrendered to the government 
army and was reintegrated and allowed to stay with a wife who was a 
formerly abducted child soldier. During the field work it was established 
that on several occasions Banya has battered his wife violently with 
impunity and it was feared he may one time kill her (Interview with Captain 
Kakurungu).126 
 
 Kamdulu, himself a former child soldier who rose through the ranks of the 
LRA to become a Director of Operations of the LRA, was captured by the 
government army, forgiven and reintegrated into the army. He was 
subsequently arrested, together with another former rebel commander Major 
                                                 
124 Agenda Item 3 on Accountability and Reconciliation of the Draft Juba Peace Agreement of 
29th June 2007. Available at: http://www.resolveuganda.org/peaceagreement. Accessed on 
24/6/2010. 
 
125 The New Vision, ICC Failed the Kony Talks, Says Oulanya. Available at: 
http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/13/721001. Accessed on 28/5/2010. 
 
126 Interview with Captain Kakurungu, a Uganda Peoples Defence Forces Public Relations 
Officer for Northern Uganda conducted in northern Uganda in Janaury 2010. 
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Thomas Opiyo, with semi-automatic rifles and 146 bullets as they attempted 
to rob local fish sellers in Apac.127 It is also noted that before Kamdulu was 
arrested, he had been involved in a string of other robberies. One of the 
victims of LRA brutality, Celementina Akoko commenting on the behaviour 
of former child soldiers accused of robberies, lamented that,  
...the packages should have made the former rebels grateful. 
How much do these rebels want from us? I am unable to fend 
for myself because of bodily harm they inflicted on me, yet they 
want me to forgive them. But how many times should I continue 
forgiving someone who intentionally hurts me.128  
 
Kamdulu and his colleague are currently serving their sentences in jail. 
 
The point being made is that the romanticization of traditional justice and 
reconciliation approaches which are too soft on punishment may 
institutionalize a culture of impunity and trap a society into a vicious circle 
of violence (Olupot, 2010)129. More so, most of these traditional practices 
are based on oral agreements as opposed to written agreements which makes 
them dependent on the commitment and goodwill of the offender.  There is 
therefore, a need to document these traditional approaches so that they are 
understood by everybody and are used the same way rather than in a chaotic 
manner as they are being used today in northern Uganda. It may be 
imperative to complement the traditional justice and reconciliation system 
with the modern judicial system to handle serious violations such as crimes 
against humanity to break the culture of impunity and build a civic culture 
based on the rule of law. Short of that conflicts in Uganda and in most of 
Africa have become a lucrative enterprise where rebel leaders are lured back 
                                                 
127 Ayugi, C. (2007). Pardoned Former LRA members, who allegedly hid their weapons from 
authorities, are being blamed for a series of gun crimes across northern Uganda. Institute of 
War and Peace Reporting, Norwegian Council for Africa, Oslo, Norway, 06 December. 
Available at: http://www.afrika.no/Detailed/15590.html. Accessed on 27/5/2010. 
128 Ibid., 
129 Olupot, M. (2010) Aliker raps Otunnu Over LRA War Case, The New Vision Newspaper. 
Available at: http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/12/722921. Accessed on 17/6/2010. 
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with 4WD Pajeros, bungalows and huge sums of money as resettlement 
packages.  
 
Another challenge of traditional approaches in northern Uganda is their 
failure to reintegrate child mothers and their children who have been 
rejected by parents. A fair traditional system should not fail to realize that 
both the child mothers and their children are victims of the conflict. One 
wonders why a valued traditional system based on the principles of 
restoration and forgiveness cannot accommodate the child mothers and their 
children. 
 
Finally, most observers wonder why in spite of the criticisms levelled 
against Western psychosocial approaches, they continue to be used in most 
war-torn societies. The reality is that while most of the former child soldiers 
interviewed said that they were helped by the traditional rituals, there exist a 
significant number of them who said they found the Western psychosocial 
support of counselling and other therapies more fulfilling than the traditional 
ones. Owor who worked with GUSCO as a Social Worker pointed out that, 
GUSCO was open to both the traditional and Western models of 
psychosocial support in terms of counselling. I found the 
Western approach more effective especially for those who were 
born again Christians. The traditional approach was mainly 
advocated by the parents and guardians of the children.130  
Nevertheless, the traditional and indigenous approaches should not be simply 
dismissed since they have helped in the RR of child soldiers not only in 
northern Uganda but also in other war-torn societies such as Mozambique, 
Angola and Sierra Leone (Honwana, 2006). Most crucially, they have helped 
to rebuild societies shattered by decades of violent civil wars and remain a 
basis for rebuilding such societies. As Kostelny (2006) observes, it is local 
communities using their cultural resources and supports that are central to the 
psychosocial well-being of former child soldiers. Despite the fact that 
traditional approaches/resources would have been disrupted during the war, 
                                                 
130 Interview with Owor, A., Op Cit.  
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the role of outsiders should be to help restore traditions by assisting in 
community empowerment and building local capacities through facilitation 
and training including provision of technical assistance.  On the other hand, it 
would be unrealistic to dismiss the values of Western approaches based on the 
findings of this research. Instead, an integrative approach that blends both 
approaches by picking good elements from either of the two approaches 
would be ideal for the RR of former child soldiers. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the importance of psychosocial support in the RR 
of former child soldiers in war-torn societies. The chapter also explored the 
relevance of psychosocial support based on traditional and indigenous 
resources in the RR of child soldiers in the African context which is a 
neglected element of peacebuilding both in policy and academic circles. The 
chapter specifically discussed the traditional and indigenous resources that 
have been relied upon in the RR of child soldiers in northern Uganda 
including Mato Oput, stepping on the egg and bending spears. The chapter 
also discussed the advantages and challenges of the traditional and indigenous 
approaches of conflict management and reconciliation.  
 
In the final analysis, empirical evidence in northern Uganda shows that 
neither of the two psychosocial supports - African traditional and indigenous 
approaches and Western approaches alone can effectively reintegrate and 
rehabilitate former child soldiers. It is against this background that an 
integrated approach that blends positive elements from both approaches and is 
holistic is recommended. However, such an approach should be gender 
sensitive and should as much as possible seek to maximize local participation 
and cultures. 
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Chapter 7: National Legal Framework for Reintegration and 
Rehabilitation of Child Soldiers in Uganda 
Introduction  
This chapter examines the relevant national legal framework for the RR of 
child soldiers in Uganda. It should be noted from the onset, that while Chapter 
Four examined the existing national legal mechanisms for protection of 
children’s rights in armed conflicts in Uganda, this chapter specifically 
focuses on the national legal framework for the RR of former child soldiers in 
northern Uganda. The chapter also discusses the necessary conditions for RR 
of child soldiers in northern Uganda and proposes a future research agenda 
followed by a conclusion. 
 
The most elaborate legal instrument in Uganda for the RR of child soldiers is 
the Amnesty Act 2000, amended in 2006. The Amnesty Act provides for the 
establishment of the Amnesty Commission (AC), a body whose major 
responsibility is to handle RR of ex-combatants who include former child 
soldiers (Afako, 2002). The Amnesty Act was mainly enacted to end the 
vicious circle of armed conflicts in the country particularly in northern 
Uganda where the LRA rebels have wreaked havoc across the region 
(Makerere University, Refugee Law Project, 2005:6).  
 
Article 2 (1) of the Amnesty Act states that, An amnesty is declared in respect 
of any Ugandan who has at any time since the 26th day of January, 1986, 
engaged in or is engaging in war or armed rebellion against the Government 
of the Republic of Uganda by: 
a) Actual participation in combat; 
b) Collaborating with the perpetrators of the war or armed rebellion; 
c) Committing any other crime in the furtherance of the war or armed 
rebellion; or 
d) Assisting or aiding the conduct or prosecution of the war or armed 
rebellion. 
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Article 3 provides grounds upon which an amnesty is granted. Article 3 (1) 
states that, ‘a reporter shall be granted the amnesty declared under section 2 if 
the reporter: 
a) Reports to the nearest army or police unit, a member of the executive 
committee of the local government unit, or magistrate or a religious 
leader within the locality; 
b) Renounces and abandons involvement in the war or armed rebellion; 
c) Surrenders at any such place or to any such authority or person any 
weapons in his or her possession; and 
d) Is issued with a certificate of amnesty …’ 
 
The Amnesty Act establishes the Amnesty Commission, whose major 
functions include, implementing programmes of demobilization; reintegration; 
and resettlement of reporters. The Commission is also charged with 
coordination of programmes including sensitization of the general public on 
the amnesty law; to consider and promote appropriate reconciliation 
mechanisms in the affected areas and promote dialogue and reconciliation. 
 
The Amnesty Act also creates the Demobilization and Resettlement Team 
(DRT) of the Amnesty Commission whose functions are: decommissioning of 
arms; demobilization; resettlement and reintegration of reporters who include 
the child soldiers. 
 
As discussed in Chapter Five, the Amnesty Act, through the Amnesty 
Commission, has demobilized and reintegrated several ex-combatants 
including the child soldiers in northern Uganda. It is also noted that the 
Amnesty Commission’s work has been greatly hampered by lack of adequate 
funding from the government which makes it dependant on external funding 
(interview with Draku). By far, the Amnesty Act is the foremost legal 
framework that has been used though with limited success in the RR of child 
soldiers in northern Uganda. 
 
Another legal framework that provides for the RR of child soldiers in northern 
Uganda is the Constitution. Article 34 (4) of the Constitution of Uganda 
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provides that children are entitled to be protected from social or economic 
exploitation and shall not be employed in or required to perform work that is 
likely to be hazardous or interfere with their education or to be harmful to 
their health or physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social development. This 
means that child soldiers and children’s rights advocates in northern Uganda 
could use Article 34 (4) of the Constitution to demand resources and any other 
support for their RR and development.  
 
More so, Article 5 of the Constitution of Uganda establishes the Uganda 
Human Rights Commission (UHRC), a body that is supposed to uphold, 
protect and promote respect for human rights in Uganda. In respect to the RR 
in northern Uganda, the UHRC is mandated among other functions under 
Article 5 to perform the following functions: 
1) to investigate, at its own initiative or on a complaint made by any 
person or a group of persons, about the violation of any human right; 
2) to establish a continuing programme of research, education and 
information to enhance the respect of human rights; 
3) to recommend to Parliament effective measures to promote human 
rights, including provision of compensation to victims of violation of 
human rights or their families  
 
It was established that the UHRC has not brought any case against 
government in respect to the violation of former child soldier’s rights or 
failure to protect them against the LRA. However, the constitution empowers 
the UHRC to exercise its mandate and assist victims of human rights violation 
such as former child soldiers whose lives were shattered by the LRA conflict. 
 
The UHRC is also mandated to formulate, implement and oversee 
programmes intended to create civic awareness among the citizens about their 
civic rights, duties and obligations and to monitor the government’s 
compliance with United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and 
other human rights treaties. The UHRC has been conducting human rights 
awareness and sensitization programmes in northern Uganda (interview with a 
staff of UHRC). However, the UHRC needs to design specific programmes 
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that address the challenges and needs of former child soldiers in northern 
Uganda. For instance, the UHRC needs to address the issues of landless 
children born in the bush, rejection of child mothers by their families and 
community stigmatization of former child soldiers which undermined their 
effective RR.  
 
Another important legal instrument for the RR of former child soldiers is the 
Children Act 1997. Beyond protection of the rights of the child in peacetime 
conditions, some sections of the Act can be relied upon to promote RR of 
former child soldiers in conflict situations. Article 10 of the Children Act 
mandates local government councils to safeguard children and promote 
reconciliation between parents and children. Article 10 (1) states that, ‘It is the 
duty of every local government council from the village to the district level: a) 
to safeguard and promote the welfare of children within its area; and b) to 
designate one of its members to be the person responsible for the welfare of 
children; and this person shall be referred to as the Secretary for Children’s 
affairs.  
 
Article 10 (3) enjoins the local government to mediate in any situation where 
the rights of a child are infringed upon especially with regard to the protection 
of a child, the child’s right to succeed to the property of his or her parents and 
all the rights accorded to a child in section 5. Critical for RR of former child 
soldiers who may have become disabled during the conflict is Article 10 (5) 
which provides that, ‘A local government council shall keep a register of 
disabled children within its area of jurisdiction and give assistance to them 
whenever possible in order to enable these children to grow up with dignity 
among other children and to develop their potential. 
 
The Children Act would be a useful instrument for assisting family 
reintegration in northern Uganda where there are reported cases of family 
breakdown after re-union due to disagreements between children and parents 
which has forced such children to street life (Liu Institute for Global Issues et 
al. (2005). The Children Act can assist in the RR of the disabled children who 
were maimed during the armed conflict. These face additional trauma in their 
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RR processes as a result of their disability making them seem more of a 
liability than assets to their families. Worth noting is that in spite of the 
existence of the Children Act, most local governments are not directly 
involved in the RR of former child soldiers, yet they are mandated to protect 
the rights of children generally. 
 
The final national legal framework relevant in the RR of child soldiers is the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) Act 2006. The ICC Act that was enacted 
on March 10, 2010 seeks to operationalize the ICC Statute; Uganda’s War 
Victims Court in Uganda and to facilitate the implementation of the ICC Trust 
Funds for Victims in northern Uganda. The ICC has a multi-faceted 
reparations scheme that is not widely known. The Rome Statute created a 
hybrid institution - The Trust Fund for Victims (TFV). One part of the ICC is 
the court itself, the other part is the Trust Fund for Victims, both established 
in 2002 (Stuart, 2009)131. The ICC Act 2006 also paves the way for the trial 
and conviction in Uganda of people accused of war crimes, genocide and 
crimes against humanity (Mufumba, 2010)132.  
 
Article 75 of the Rome Statute mandates the court to lay down the principles 
for reparations for victims, which may include restitution, indemnification and 
rehabilitation. The court has authority to order that this reparation be paid 
through the Trust Fund for Victims which was set up by the Assembly of 
States Parties in September 2002. 
 
                                                 
131 Stuart, V.H. (2009). The ICC Trust Fund for Victims: Beyond the Realm of the ICC. 
Available at: 
http://static.rnw.nl/migratie/www.rnw.nl/internationaljustice/specials/commentary/090204-
ICC-TFV-redirected. Accessed on 2/6/2010. 
 
132 The Independent Newspaper (2010) ICC Bill: Why did MPs trap Museveni and Save 
Kony? Available at: http://independent.co.ug/index.php/column/insight/67-insight/2702-icc-
bill-why-did-mps-trap-museveni-and-save-kony. Accessed on 2/6/2010. 
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Both President Museveni and the ICC Prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo have 
called for compensation of the LRA war victims in northern Uganda which is 
part of their RR (Daily Monitor, June 1 2010)133.  
 
In spite of what seems to be a robust body of national legal mechanisms to 
protect children’s rights in armed conflicts, children continue to be major 
victims of most conflicts in Uganda. Both the LRA and the government army 
stand accused of recruitment and use of children in armed conflicts (Global 
Report, 2008). Consequently, one can safely say that national legal 
mechanisms for protection of children’s rights in armed conflicts have largely 
remained paper protection mechanisms. 
Necessary Conditions for Reintegration and Rehabilitation of Child 
Soldiers 
There are a number of challenges that affect successful and long-term RR of 
child soldiers in most war-torn societies, particularly in northern Uganda. The 
findings of this study reveal that the most significant challenges facing RR of 
child soldiers in northern Uganda revolve around education, economic and 
employment opportunities, family and community acceptance and lack of 
committed long-term official RR programming. These challenges are 
discussed in detail below.  
 
Based on fieldwork research, most local organizations and agencies dealing 
with the RR of former child soldiers have tended to focus more on 
humanitarian and psychosocial needs with less emphasis on education and 
economic empowerment. For example, while reception centres provided the 
most secure environments to child soldiers escaping from LRA captivity 
which included counselling, treatment of diseases, wounds, provision of 
farming tools and home utensils during the re-unification with families, most 
                                                 
133  Daily Monitor (2010). LRA Victims should be Compensated - Ocampo, Tuesday June 1. 
Available at: http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/-688334/929644/-/x0ab2i/-
/index.html. Acessed on 2/6/2010. 
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former child soldiers complain of lack of follow up support and false promises 
by the reception centres (interview with members of KICA Ber Youth Group).  
 
Ker Kwaro Acholi, the apex Acholi cultural institution has conducted region 
wide cultural rituals and ceremonies to promote community reconciliation and 
acceptance (interview with Avola). In spite of these efforts some former child 
soldiers continue to be stigmatized as a result of other unmet needs. In order 
for effective RR of former child soldiers in northern Uganda there are certain 
material conditions that need to obtain.  
 
Education 
Most former child soldiers that were interviewed gave education as a priority 
for their effective RR into society. In fact for some of them who think they 
have already missed out on education such as child mothers, provision of 
education to their children is considered their top priority. A.P., 25 years old 
with a six year old daughter, employed as a security guard noted that her 
ambition is to enrol for an adult literacy course and learn how to read and 
write and be able to educate her daughter. A study by the World Bank 
revealed that increases in school enrolment of former child soldiers 
contributes to the safety of the community and reduces the probability of 
another civil war (Guyot, 2007).  
 
Scholars and analysts (Machel, 2001; Honwana, 2006) observe that education 
can promote respect for human rights and helps to bind communities by 
bringing together children, parents, educators and local officials for a shared 
purpose. Almost all the 25 former child soldiers interviewed for this study 
regard education as key to their secure future livelihoods. Some of them with 
school age children are already worried about their children’s educations. One 
former child soldier at the International Review Conference for the ICC in 
Kampala observed that, ‘My children are of school going age already, so I 
need help to see them through school (Daily Monitor, 2010)134. However as 
                                                 
134 Daily Monitor (2010). War Victims Turn to ICC for Compensation,  Thursday June 3. 
Available at: http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/-/688334/931164/931164/-/x0q6ix/-
/index.html. Accessed on 3/6/2010. 
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Brett et al. (2004:131) have noted, education should be tailored towards the 
current labour market. Most importantly, education opportunities should be 
sensitive of the special needs of female former child soldiers to avoid their 
marginalization.  
 
Economic Empowerment and Employment Opportunities 
The second necessary condition for effective RR of child soldiers is the 
availability of economic support or employment opportunities to enable them 
to start income generating activities to ensure sustainable livelihoods. Some 
scholars and analysts (Brett et al. 2004) observe that economic hardships 
among former child soldiers may drive them back into fresh rebellions and 
criminality and result in failure to reintegrate fully into society. Wessells 
(2006:179) points out that if poverty, conflict, and child soldiering linkage is 
worrying from a child rights perspective, it is of equal concern from a peace 
perspective. Research findings show that one of the greatest worries of most 
former child soldiers in northern Uganda is economic insecurity and 
widespread unemployment. It was found out that youths that have been 
supported by NGOs and their own associations such as, Can Rwede Peke 
Group and KICA Ber Youth Group to start their own income generating 
activities are more positive and optimistic about their future and are working 
hard to improve their lives.  
 
One former child soldier who is a member of KICA Ber Youth Group 
observed during a focus group discussion, 
These days’ people in the villages respect us because we no 
longer go around begging from them as before. With the loans 
from our group, we have been able to support ourselves and 
families.  
 
Members of KICA Ber Youth Group (both male and female) borrow money 
from the group and return it at a low interest rate. Majority of male members 
                                                                                                                               
 
304 
 
are engaged in brick making and agriculture while females are engaged in 
small scale businesses mostly selling farm produce and charcoal.135  
 
Other scholars point out that income generating activities for former child 
soldiers and youths in war-torn societies steer them away from risky 
occupations including joining criminal gangs (Guyot, 2007:9). While income 
generating activities for youth affected by the war are crucial to ensure 
effective RR and peacebuilding in northern Uganda, these activities are being 
offered by NGOs, CBOs and youth groups in a manner that is uncoordinated 
and unsustainable. The official Amnesty Commission that is charged with the 
RR of ex-combatants including child soldiers has been largely ineffective 
citing lack of funding and capacity limitations.136 It should be noted that 
economic empowerment for former child soldiers should take community-
based strategies rather than targeting them alone to avoid community 
resentment and conflict. However, socio-economic reintegration and 
rehabilitation programming should be gender sensitive to avoid 
marginalization of former female combatants. 
 
Participation of Former Child Soldiers in Designing RR Programmes 
A crucial condition for successful RR of former child soldiers is their 
participation in the planning and programming of the initiatives designed to 
assist thier transition into civilian life. Scholars such as Guyot, (2007:8) 
observe that programming for the RR of child soldiers should recognize their 
potential and should not treat them as mere passive recipients of donor 
support. Participation of former child soldiers in design and implementation of 
their RR programmes is also supported by Jareg (2005) who notes that 
participation of former child soldiers in planning and execution of RR 
programmes helps them neutralize the feelings of helplessness and distrust 
often associated with their traumatic experiences. It is further observed that 
participation turns around the ways in which children were trained to behave 
in military environments where they received orders that were not negotiable. 
                                                 
135 Interview with members of KICA Ber Youth Group conducted in northern Uganda in 
February 2010. 
136 Interview with Draku, Op Cit. 
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Involvement of former child soldiers in RR planning and programming would 
not only ensure ownership and skills transfer in planning and sustainability 
but also provides psychosocial therapy to them since it restores self 
confidence eroded by the conflict. In the case of northern Uganda, the design 
of PRDP which is the official peacebuilding programme never enlisted the 
participation of the target beneficiaries including former child soldiers.  
 
Addressing the Structural Causes of Child Soldiering 
Most analysts observe that as long as war persists, children will always be 
caught up in the fighting either as bystanders or as active combatants since 
they are so vulnerable to rebel commanders’ and government forces’ 
recruitment methods which may be coercive or voluntary (Singer, 2006). 
Honwana (2006:159) observes that regardless of community healing practices 
which seem to be effective with the RR of war-affected children, such 
practices cannot sustain long-lasting results if young people do not have jobs, 
are not going to school or have no skills to earn a living. If former child 
soldiers are not given a chance to improve their lives, they will be absorbed 
into violence, be it urban gangs, illicit business dealings, or rebel militias in 
new civil wars (Singer, 2006; Wessells, 2006). In northern Uganda, the 
conditions that caused the rebellion still exist including economic 
underdevelopment, widespread poverty and unemployment that were 
worsened by massive internal displacement of the population in camps, and 
ethnic hatred due to colonial distortions (PRDP, 2007). 
 
In fact some analysts note that effective RR of former child soldiers is 
possible only if it is done as part of a wider peacebuilding programme that 
seeks to comprehensively address the root causes of the conflict (Honwana, 
2006). The above analysis is confirmed by fieldwork interviews with some of 
the former child soldiers who live in fear of possible re-abduction by the 
rebels since they refused to sign a peace agreement and are still active in 
Sudan and DRC.  
 
306 
 
Family and Community Acceptance  
Family re-unification and community acceptance have been found to be 
crucial conditions in the RR of child soldiers (Boothby, 2006:170; Brett, 
2004; MacKay, 2006). One of the findings during field work, is that most 
former child soldiers were well received by their families and communities 
particularly those who were reintegrated by the reception centres. However, it 
was also established that some family re-unions have broken down parents 
complaining that their children don’t respect them. This has led to some of 
these youths ending on the streets especially in Gulu town and Kampala city 
doing odd jobs to survive. There are also some former child soldiers who 
complained of rejection and stigmatization by families and the community. 
They noted that some members of community call them rebels, wife of the 
rebel, and other bad names. B.A., 19, is an example of family rejection. She 
was seven years old when the LRA abducted her and spent six years in the 
bush. She escaped when they were attacked by the government army. B.A., a 
single mother of two children, returned home but found that her mother had 
died and the father remarried. She pointed out that,  
My step-mother does not want me at home. She made my life 
unbearable so I decided to take my children to go to my uncle. 
My uncle’s wife also did not want us there. That is how we 
ended in this town to look for work.  
 
Research findings also established that there are several cases of parents who 
refused their daughters back with children born in the bush. These child 
mothers have ended on streets doing odd jobs for a living. As Wessells 
(2006:202) observes, although returning child soldiers’ need for money is 
undeniable, it is intertwined with their burning desire to avoid stigma and to 
achieve a modicum of dignity and respect.  
 
RR Programming Should Target Communities 
Another important finding is that most communities in northern Uganda are 
unhappy at the material support that NGOs and CBOs are providing to former 
child soldiers as a special group when everybody else suffered during the war. 
Specifically, communities view the support to former child soldiers as a 
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reward for committing atrocities against their families and communities 
during the conflict (interview with staff of Caritas Gulu). This attitude is 
likely to lead to resentment and stigmatization and could render RR initiatives 
unable to achieve their objectives. The staff of Caritas pointed out that as a 
result of community complaints Caritas has since re-designed their 
programming to assist the entire communities in their areas of concentration. 
 
Consequently, it is advisable that RR initiatives for former child soldiers in 
northern Uganda either by government, NGOs and CBOs should also target 
entire communities as well as promoting community reconciliation and social 
healing between communities and former child soldiers. 
 
Harmonization of Psychosocial Support for Former Child Soldiers 
During fieldwork, it was established that most former child soldiers received 
psychosocial support in form of traditional rituals and healing ceremonies as 
well as Western counselling that involved one-on-one counselling, talking 
therapy, drama, music and dance. The majority of the former child soldiers 
who were interviewed said they found the traditional approaches more helpful 
to them. However, there are some who pointed out that they found Western 
approaches relevant. There are also reports where children refused traditional 
rituals and were being forced by their parents to accept them (interview with 
staff of CPA). Conflicting psychosocial supports to RR of child soldiers can 
be confusing and harmful to the intended beneficiaries. Consequently, it 
would be good to harmonize these approaches. Government, UNICEF and 
traditional institutions need to coordinate a process that would come up with a 
hybrid model of psychosocial support that embodies good elements from both 
approaches (Kostelny, 2006).  
 
Empower the Amnesty Commission  
The Amnesty Commission is mandated by the Amnesty Act, 2000 to disarm, 
demobilize, rehabilitate and reintegrate ex-combatants including child 
soldiers. Research findings show that the commission has implemented its 
mandate with limited success. There are many former child soldiers who 
returned to their homes without going through the army’s Child Protection 
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Unit and reception centres where they were given amnesty certificates and 
resettlement packages by the Amnesty Commission. Most of these children 
live in fear of being arrested by government since they were not officially 
reintegrated. The staff at the Amnesty Commission admitted that the 
institution has not been able to execute its full mandate due to underfunding 
and lack of expertise. Findings reveal that former child soldiers need the 
services of the Amnesty Commission - amnesty certificates as an assurance 
for their security and resettlement packages to settle down into civilian life. 
Consequently, government, the UN agencies and development partners should 
provide adquate funding to the Amnesty Commission to enable it implement 
its mandate. 
 
Long-term Support for RR of Child Soldiers   
Analysts note that the RR of child soldiers is the most difficult process 
because of the added psychological and physiological scars they carry (Singer, 
2006:193). Consequently, it is advised that RR programming should have a 
long-term perspective that ensures sustainability even after the conflict has 
ended. Unfortunately, the PRDP which is the official peacebuilding 
framework is short-term. Initially, the PRDP was designed to last three years 
(2007-2010) although it has now been extended to June 2012 which is still a 
short time to make a lasting impact (interview with Othieno). Also, most of 
the NGOs and CBOs involved in RR of former child soldiers are donor 
dependent, funded on a short-term basis. Successful RR of former child 
soldiers needs long-term programmatic support of five years and above 
(Guyot, 2007). 
 
Future Research Agenda 
This section examines critical areas that are relevant to this research but were 
beyond its scope and could constitute a future research agenda.  
 
Impunity and Traditional Approaches of Conflict Management  
Ugandans have been subjected to extensive human rights violations under 
successive regimes including Idi Amin’s reign of terror (1971-79) where close 
to half a million people are estimated to have been killed; the Obote 11 
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Government and now the LRA rebellion in northern Uganda (Kanyeihamba, 
2002:155). Unfortunately, no systematic efforts have ever been made to 
prosecute the perpetrators which can be partly blamed on weak governments 
or weak legal systems (Afako, 2002).  When the Government introduced the 
Amnesty Bill in 2000 which gave partial amnesty to the LRA and other 
fighting groups, the Acholi Religious Leaders submitted a memorandum 
which they claimed represented the views of the Acholi at home and in the 
diaspora advocating for general amnesty for the entire LRA leadership. 
Throughout the LRA conflict both the religious and traditional leaders in 
Acholi have voiced their support for peace through traditional justice 
mechanisms.  
 
The question here is whether or not traditional approaches of conflict 
management and reconciliation are promoting nation building or a culture of 
impunity which traps the country into a vicious circle of violence. New 
research could help to establish whether these amnesties advocated by 
traditional leaders are promoting national building or a culture of impunity.  
 
African Traditional Approaches and Gender Issues 
The research findings show that to some extent most of the African traditional 
approaches of conflict management and reconciliation violate or marginalize 
the rights of women or girls (Murithi, 2008; Denov, 2007). For example, Mato 
Oput; a justice and reconciliation system among the Acholi in northern 
Uganda provides for compensation of a virgin girl to the offended party who 
is expected to produce children and replace the murdered person of another 
clan. In the current application of Mato Oput, this element has been removed 
although these adjustments also raise questions of acceptance and validity. 
Further, the failure of the two peace processes led by Betty Bigombe to 
deliver a peace settlement in northern Uganda is largely attributed to the 
Acholi male dominated traditional system that cannot allow a woman succeed 
where men have failed (interview with Bigombe). Most scholars have 
observed that women and children suffer most during war and are also 
marginalized by peacebuilding processes (Pankhurst, 2008). It would be 
important to study in detail the relationship between African traditional 
310 
 
approaches and women’s rights and peacebuilding in respect to northern 
Uganda. 
 
Land Question and RR of Child Mothers and their Children 
Uganda is an agricultural based economy with the majority of the population 
dependent on agriculture and the environment for survival (Tumushabe et al. 
2004). Effective RR of former child soldiers in northern Uganda is going to 
depend on whether or not they access land for production. Land in most of 
northern Uganda, especially in Acholiland, is owned communally on a clan 
basis. There are serious cases where former child soldiers who are child 
mothers have been refused return to their homes simply because they have 
children who don’t belong to their parent’s clans and cannot inherit land 
(Allen et al. 2006:87). Rejection of such children makes them landless and yet 
access to land is crucial in agriculture dependent societies such as Uganda. It 
would be important to conduct research on the land question in northern 
Uganda in respect to the issue of child mothers and their landless children. 
Conclusion 
This chapter examined the national legal framework relevant for the RR of 
former child soldiers. The legal framework includes the Amnesty Act, 2000; 
The Ugandan Constitution; the Children Act 1997; and the ICC Act 2006. The 
chapter also discussed the necessary material conditions for effective RR of 
former child soldiers in northern Uganda. These include, availability of 
economic and employment opportunities, educational opportunities, 
community and family acceptability among others. The chapter also proposed 
a future research agenda relevant to this research which could not be covered 
due to its limited scope. This future research agenda included, the question of 
impunity and traditional approaches to conflict management and 
reconciliation; the gender issues and the land question in northern Uganda.   
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Chapter 8: General Conclusion 
Thesis Overview: General findings 
This thesis has used a conflict resolution framework which draws from 
various disciplines in order to have a deeper understanding of the complicated 
nature of new wars currently going on in the developing countries and their 
impact on communities especially the children who are drawn into these wars 
as combatants. This research cannot claim to have been exhaustive in 
addressing the issues that relate to the plight of child soldiers and their RR 
into civilian life in northern Uganda. However, the research contributes to the 
the debate and the understanding on how better to end violent conflicts and 
rebuild war-torn societies through RR of child soldiers based on the use of 
traditional and indigenous resources: the neglected element of the dominant 
liberal peace approach to peacebuilding (Richmond, 2007). As Richmond 
(2007:288) observes, the liberal peace approach to peacebuilding is a Western 
and Enlightment-derived discourse of peace which is far from culturally and 
socially sensitive, and has little chance of establishing a locally self-sustaining 
peace. This research established that traditional and indigenous resources in 
northern Uganda including traditional rituals and cleansing ceremonies, 
cultural leaders, families, women and youth groups have played a crucial role 
in the RR of former child soldiers.  
Chapter One provides the origins of the research, examines the statement of 
the problem under investigation and its significance in academic circles. The 
chapter also discusses the research methodology used in the study and why it 
was chosen. Chapter Two examined the literature on the child soldier 
phenomenon at the global and continental (Africa) levels with special 
emphasis on Uganda which is the focus for this research. The chapter also 
conceptualized and defined concepts - a child, childhood and a child soldier. 
The chapter further analyzed the methods of recruitment and use of child 
soldiers as well as the existing international legal mechanisms for the 
protection of children’s rights in armed conflicts. 
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Chapter Three conceptualized and discussed the DDRR of child soldiers as 
elements of peacebuilding. The chapter also discusses DDRR of child soldiers 
in the context of the neglected psychosocial element of peacebuilding. 
Chapter Four focused on the political history and political economy of 
Uganda linked to the on-going conflict in northern Uganda. This chapter also 
examined the emergence of the child soldier phenomenon in Uganda; the 
genesis of the LRA rebellion; LRA recruitment and use of child soldiers and 
the national legal mechanisms for protection of children in armed conflict in 
Uganda. Chapter Five examined the existing official and unofficial 
peacebuilding interventions for the RR of child soldiers in northern Uganda 
while Chapter Six focused on the relevance of psychosocial resources based 
on traditional and indigenous resources in the RR of child soldiers in northern 
Uganda. Chapter Six also discussed the advantages and limitations of 
traditional approaches of RR of child soldiers. Chapter Seven specifically 
examined the national legal framework in Uganda for the RR of child soldiers 
and proposed a future research agenda. Chapter Eight is the general 
conclusion and findings. 
This research was premised on a number of arguments. The first argument is 
that the effective reintegration and rehabilitation of former child soldiers into 
civilian and productive life would contribute to conditions of peace and 
security in northern Uganda. The second argument is that the neglect and 
marginalization of former child soldiers in most of the reintegration and 
rehabilitation processes causes more wars, long wars, increases criminality 
and hummpers any efforts towards building durable peace in war-torn 
societies (Singer, 2006; MacKay, 2004). The third argument is that the 
provision of psychosocial support based on traditional and indigenous 
resources, which is the neglected element of peacebuilding is very crucial in 
the RR of former child soldiers. 
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Based on field work and literature review, the following constitute the major 
research findings in respect to the RR of former child soldiers in northern 
Uganda.  
 
This research established that all the 25 former child soldiers selected for this 
research experienced traumatic experiences during their captivity by the LRA. 
These traumatic experiences included, witnessing killings; being forced to kill 
one’s friend or relative; being beaten senselessly as part of training, extreme 
hunger and long walks carrying looted food and medicine which sometimes 
took them into Sudan, sexual slavery and forced marriages. Children also 
participated in fighting with the government army where many of their 
colleagues were killed. All these events have left emotional and physical scars 
on former child soldiers. During the fieldwork, some former child soldiers 
revealed that they dream about killings and being pursued by the LRA who 
seek to kill them. Other examples of trauma established by this research 
include uncontrolled crying especially by child mothers who have been 
rejected by their parents and live in very difficult conditions; complaints about 
stigmatization by the community who call them abusive names; disagreements 
between children and parents that lead to breakdown of family re-unions and 
constant fights among former child soldiers.137 
 
It was also established that psychosocial support based on traditional and 
indigenous resources has been widely used in the RR of child soldiers in 
northern Uganda. Ker Kwaro Acholi, the main Acholi cultural institution has 
worked with traditional leaders to conduct regional wide traditional rituals and 
cleansing ceremonies such as Mato Oput and stepping on the egg to welcome 
children back and to sensitize communities to accept them. It was also 
established that some reception centres used Western approaches of 
psychosocial support in the RR of child soldiers while others combined both 
approaches. World Vision only used Western approaches and Christian 
prayers and discouraged any use of traditional rituals and ceremonies during 
reintegration with families. 
                                                 
137 Interview with a Social Worker with Watoto Community Church conducted at Watoto 
Church Church in Gulu in March 2010. 
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Most of the 25 former child soldiers that were interviewed during the 
fieldwork observed that they found traditional rituals and ceremonies which 
included Mato Oput, stepping on the eggs and sprinkling with water more 
useful and relevant in their RR. Traditional and indigenous resources in 
northern Uganda enjoy widespread support and respect rooted in the history 
and spirituality of the people (Latigo, 2008). However, it was also established 
that there are some former child soldiers especially those from Christian 
families who said they were greatly assisted by Western approaches of 
psychosocial support. It was also found that some former child soldiers resent 
traditional rituals since they remind them of similar blood rituals performed 
by the LRA in the bush. 
 
The research further established that while traditional and indigenous 
approaches of psychosocial support were widely used in the RR of former 
child soldiers in northern Uganda, they have been greatly weakened by the 
two decades of the civil war and the effects of colonialism. For example most 
people in northern Uganda particularly Acholi sub-region had forgotten most 
of the traditional approaches such as Mato Oput. Consequently, these 
traditional approaches have had to be recreated which makes them challenged 
by other people especially the elites. Secondly, Christianity and Western 
education which are linked to the British colonial legacy greatly undermined 
traditional rituals and ceremonies since they regarded them as backward and 
satanic. Above all, traditional and indigenous resources were found to be 
gender insensitive towards women and girls since the Acholi culture is male 
dominated. 
 
In spite of the identified weaknesses, indigenous and traditional resources 
including traditional rituals and ceremonies, and local institutions such as 
families, cultural leaders, youth and women’s groups were found to have 
contributed a great deal to the RR of former child soldiers. At the same time, 
Western psychosocial approaches were found to have been widely used by 
child reception centres whose contribution is greatly appreciated in the 
absence of a robust government response. As Kostelny (2006) has noted, there 
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are good elements in both approaches that should be harnessed. Consequently, 
an integrated and holistic model that blends both approaches is recommended.  
 
Furthermore, most organizations involved in the RR of former child soldiers 
in northern Uganda, observed that many members of the community among 
whom former child soldiers are being reintegrated, are traumatized due to the 
impact of the war.138. Community wide traumatization is said to be linked to 
widespread poverty and many years of IDP life that was dehumanizing and 
traumatic experiences. This is likely to make it difficult to successfully 
reintegrate and rehabilitate former child soldiers. Interviews conducted among 
25 former child soldiers revealed that even if these people were given 
psychosocial support by reception centres which were supplemented by 
traditional rituals by the cultural institutions, most of them remain 
traumatized. Former child soldiers continue to be traumatized by members of 
communities who call them bad names. Fear of re-abduction by the LRA, 
economic insecurity and fear that their children (in the case of young mothers) 
will suffer the same fate of missed education opportunities are further 
examples of traumatization. 
 
The young mothers who have been rejected by their families with their 
children and live in poor conditions in towns seem to be the most traumatized 
group. During the interviews, some of them were continuously sobbing. It was 
also established that associations of former child soldiers are very helpful to 
their members. These associations provide psychosocial support to members 
through counselling and encouragement in addition to offering savings and 
credit facilities. Most of the members interviewed said that their groups are a 
source of protection and security from society that sometimes does not 
understand their problems.139 
 
Additionally, the field work and literature review show evidence that children 
and women suffer most during civil wars going on in developing countries 
                                                 
138 Interview with Caritas staff, Op Cit. 
139 Interview with members of Can Rwende Peke Group in conducted in northern Uganda in 
February, 2010. 
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(Singer, 2006, Honwana, 2006, Machel, 2001). Children are systematically 
targeted for recruitment by armed groups and government forces. In Uganda, 
the LRA has greatly violated the children’s rights which prompted the ICC to 
indict top LRA commanders. Research findings also show that in spite of the 
existence of a robust international legal mechanism to protect the rights of 
children in armed conflicts, they have remained ineffective due to 
international politics, double standards and the different conceptualization of a 
child; childhood and child soldier across cultures.  
 
The field work revealed that educational opportunities, especially vocational 
training, are crucial for effective RR of former child soldiers. Most former 
child soldiers who were interviewed individually and collectively through 
focus group discussions look at education as the most immediate investment 
that they need to secure a bright future.140 Worth noting is that most of the 
leaders of former child soldiers’ associations that were visited during 
fieldwork, are those people who were able to pursue studies after returning 
from the bush. 
 
Income generating activities were also found to be crucial in the RR of former 
child soldiers. Most of the former child soldiers observed that their 
involvement in income generating activities has earned them respect among 
the communities since they are seen as being productive to society. More so, 
land ownership was found to be critical to successful RR. Culturally among 
the Acholi, land is owned communally by clans. Since the children who 
returned with young mothers do not belong to their mothers’ clans, they 
cannot be allowed to inherit other clans’ land. That is why young mothers 
have resorted to prostitution in towns. The land question is making RR of 
young mothers and their children difficult.  
 
Research findings also established that the assistance being provided to 
former child soldiers by some NGOs and CBOs is causing resentment by the 
communities which could hamper the RR processes. Two reasons are given 
                                                 
140 Ibid. 
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why communities resent preferential treatment of former child soldiers. First, 
communities still blame former child soldiers for committing atrocities against 
them during the war since the LRA forced children to kill relatives or people 
in their communities in order to alienate them. Second, as staff of Caritas 
observed, the communities are equally poor and needy like former child 
soldiers. 141 Consequently, it is important that any development assistance to 
former child soldiers should take a community wide approach to avoid 
creating more conflicts and stigmatization of child soldiers.  
 
It was also established that lack of follow up on former child soldiers by 
reception centres is hampering effective RR in northern Uganda. Most former 
child soldiers interviewed complained of empty ‘promises’ by reception 
centres. During the RR processes, reception centres seem to have raised a lot 
of expectations among former child soldiers. Interviews with some of the 
reception centres indicate that they too lack adequate funding to implement 
follow up activities.142 Since former child soldiers established strong bonds 
and trust with reception centres, follow up visits to assess how they are coping 
and further support are crucial for their successful transition into civilian life.  
 
Research findings further revealed that many organizations have mushroomed 
in northern Uganda involved in peacebuilding activities including RR of 
former child soldiers. The numerous organizations coupled with weak 
coordination of peacebuilding activities by government is likely to cause more 
harm than good including institutionalizing dependence of communities and 
former child soldiers, and duplication of services.143  Consequently, there is a 
need for government to take stock of all the organizations operating in the 
region with a view to streamlining their activities to ensure proper 
coordination, harmonization, effectiveness and accountability. Government 
also needs to review the PRDP and design specific projects targeting former 
                                                 
141 Interview with Rubangateke, Op Cit. 
142 Interview with the staff of CPA in Gulu in February 2009. 
143 Research conducted by Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment, Op Cit. 
The research paper that is still undergoing publication which was requested by the Office of 
the Prime Minister also found out that because of the existence of many organizations, it is 
making monitoring and coordination of their activities difficult. (The Policy Research paper is 
forthcoming). 
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child soldiers. Such projects should be designed in such a manner that benefits 
the communities to avoid resentment.  
 
Based on the finding of widespread traumatization of communities in northern 
Uganda (Liu Institute for Global Issues et al. 2006), it is important that 
government and the international community come up with an affirmative 
action for the region. Affirmative action should emphasize the integrated 
psychosocial support model that blends both the Western and indigenous 
approaches of psychosocial support. Such a model should be holistic in nature 
in the sense that it addresses broad issues of poverty, education, employment 
opportunities, reconciliation and good governance that are at the core of the 
conflict in northern Uganda. As Honwana (2006:159) observes, effective RR 
of former child soldiers cannot be possible without comprehensively 
addressing the root causes of child soldiering, which means addressing the 
root causes of the conflict in which these former child soldiers are trapped.  
 
Available information shows that the Government of Uganda has not treated 
the issue of RR of former child soldiers seriously. Yet as scholars have noted, 
failure to invest substantive financial and political resources in the RR of child 
soldiers could result in some of them resorting to criminal activities, as the 
case of Kamdulu who is currently in prison testifies, and the possibility of 
being re-recruited into fresh rebellions. Since the PRDP provides for 
continuous review, government should commit adequate funding for the 
DDRR of former child soldiers and also equip the Amnesty Commission to 
implement its mandate.  
 
In the final analysis, based on the findings of this research one can safely 
conclude that most of the arguments stated in the research were valid. For 
example, the research established that effective RR of former child soldiers is 
into civilian life greatly contributeS to successful peacebuilding in war-ton 
societies (MacKay, 2004) such as northern Uganda. It was established that 
marginalization or the neglect of former child soldiers in most of the RR 
processes causes more wars, long wars, increases criminality and hummpers 
any efforts towards building durable peace in post-conflict societies as was the 
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case in Sierra Leone and Mozambique (Honwana, 2006). The case of 
Kamudulu a former child soldier who is now a jail sentence for organizing a 
series of robberies in northern Uganda is a good example of poor RR process 
in northern Uganda. Furthermore, it was established that the provision of 
psychosocial support based on traditional and indigenous resources, is very 
crucial in the RR of former child soldiers evidenced by the situation in 
northern Uganda where they have been widely used. However, contrary to the 
research argument on the relevance of traditional and indigenous resources in 
the RR of former child soldiers, the research findings established that they 
also have limitations including being gender insensitive, promotion of 
impunity and the fact that they have been greatly been undermined by the war 
and the colonial legacy.  
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Appendices  
 
Appendix 1: Interview Schedule  
 
Interview Schedule Questions 
1. How old are you? 
2. Do you have parent(s)? 
3. When were you abducted by the LRA? 
4. How were you abducted? 
5. How old were you when you were abducted? 
6. How long did you stay in the bush? 
7. Did you witness any killings? 
8. What did it mean to you to witness the killings? 
9. Were you forced to kill someone? 
10. If yes, what did that mean to you? 
11. Were you trained in military skills? 
12. Did you participate in any fighting with the Government army? 
13.  How did you come out of the bush? 
14. How were you received from the bush? 
15. Did you pass through any reception centre? 
16. What is your experience at the reception centre? 
17. Were you given any counselling? By who? 
18. How did the counselling help you?  
19. Did you perform any cultural ceremony? If yes which one? 
20. In which way did your family, community and friends helping you? 
21. What kind of assistance were you given and by who when you went 
home? 
22. Are still receiving any assistance and from who? 
23. Are you a member of any youth, women or any group working 
together? 
24. Do you still meet some of your friends you had in the bush? 
25. Do you still talk to your friends about your time in the bush? 
26. Do you still hear about the LRA? 
27. Do you still remember any bad incidents that happened to you in the 
bush? 
28. How are you surviving? 
29. What is your marital status? 
30. In which way has your government assisted you? 
31. In which way would you like to be assisted by government? 
32. How were you assisted by the international agencies? 
33. Are you still receiving support from any agency- World Vision etc? 
 
Interview Questions with child mothers 
32. How were you treated in the bush?  
33. How did you meet your husband? 
33. Do you have any children with your husband? 
34. Are you staying with your husband? If not where is he? 
35. If you met your former husband today would you marry him? 
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36. Were you forced to kill any person in the bush? 
37. Do the memories of killing that person (s) torment you? 
38. How did you come out of the bush? 
39. How were you treated in the reception centre? 
40. How were you received by your family, community? 
41. Did you participate in any traditional ceremony and who organized it 
for you? 
43. Did you find the traditional ceremonies/rituals helpful?  
44. In which way were the traditional ceremonies/rituals helpful? 
45. How was Counselling offered to you by the reception centre helpful 
to you? 
46. Comparing the traditional ceremonies/rituals and counselling given by 
the reception centre which of the two was most helpful to you? 
47. Give reasons for your preferred choice. 
48. What do you do for a living? 
49. Do you belong to any organized group working on development? 
50. If Yes, what is the name of the group and what does it do? 
 
Questions for Institutions: 
51. When did your organization/agency begin its operations in northern 
Uganda? 
52. What kind of activities is your organization implementing in northern 
Uganda? 
53. Does your organization have specific activities supporting the RR of 
former child soldiers? 
54. If yes, what types of activities are being implemented for the RR of 
former child soldiers? 
55. What are the achievements of your organization in the RR of former 
child soldiers in northern Uganda? 
56. What specific challenges is your organization facing in the RR of 
former child soldiers in northern Uganda? 
57. What would you recommend to government for effective RR of 
former child soldiers in northern Uganda? 
 
Non-Governmental Organizations and CBOs to be interviewed  
 
a) Gulu Support the Children Organization (GUSCO); 
 
b) Caritas; 
 
c) Concerned Parents Association (CPA) Gulu; 
 
d) Civil Society Organizations for Peace in Northern Uganda 
(CSOPNU); 
 
e) Gulu District NGO Forum; 
 
f) Ker Kwaro Acholi; 
 
g) Watoto Community Church- Gulu; 
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h) War Affected Children Association (WACA); 
 
i) Gulu War Affected Children Training Centre; 
 
j) KICA Ber Youth Group (Forgiveness is Good); 
 
k) Can Rwede Peke Group. 
 
 
International Agencies to be interviewed 
l) Save the Children- Uganda; 
 
m) World Vision- Uganda; 
 
n) UNICEF; 
 
o) UNDP. 
 
Government Institutions 
 
p) Uganda Peoples Defence Forces; 
 
q) Amnesty Commission; 
 
r) Uganda Human Rights Commission; 
 
s) Office of the Prime Minister; 
 
t) Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development. 
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Appendix 2: Former Child Soldiers Interviewed for the Research 
 
No Name Gender 
(M or F) 
Age  
(yrs) 
Time  
in 
bush 
(yrs) 
Traumatic 
Experience witnessed 
Marital 
status 
Employment 
1. A.J F 21  6/12 Saw children killed 
for attempting to 
escape; Was burnt in 
a house by LRA and 
is permanently 
injured 
Not 
married 
Unemployed 
2. A.R F 29  11 Her two brothers 
killed in her 
presence; was 
involved in many 
battles with UPDF 
Single 
mother of 
5 
children 
Sells brooms in 
Gulu market 
3. M.J F 25  2 Was beaten into 
unconsciousness by 
rebels for trying to 
escape; fought 
several battles and 
saw many children 
killed 
Singer 
mother of 
3 
Subsistence 
farming and a 
member of a 
bead project 
4. L.M F 24  3 Forced to marry a 
rebel commander, 
saw children killed, 
forced to kill fellow 
children 
Single 
mother 
Subsistence 
farming 
5. S.A F 26  4. Participated in many 
battles; forced to kill 
children 
Married 
with 2 
children 
Unemployed 
6. M.O F 28  2/12 Witnessed killings of 
children, were 
attacked by UPDF; 
forced to marry a 
rebel commander 
Single 
mother 
Tailoring 
7. M.H F 22  2. Witnessed killings, 
trained in fighting, 
participated in 
fighting 
Single 
mother of 
2 
Unemployed 
8. A.N F 23  1/12 Witnessed killings, 
used to jump over 
dead bodies, made to 
carry heavy loads, 
Her two sisters still in 
the bush 
Single 
mother of 
3 
Unemployed 
9. A.P F 25  5/12 Forced to kill other 
children, her cousin 
killed in her presence 
Widow 
with a 
daughter 
Washing and 
cleaning jobs 
10.  B.A F 19  6  Forced to kill another 
child 
Single 
mother 
Unemployed 
11. A.M F 22  10  Participated in 
several battles where 
many people were 
killed, her LRA 
husband died in the 
bush 
Single 
mother 
Washing other 
peoples clothes 
and cleaning 
houses for a 
living  
12. A.A Female  28  7 Her mother was Single Does odd jobs 
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killed by rebels, 
father died of heart 
attack, two sisters 
killed in the bush 
mother of 
3  
for a living 
13. O.G M  19  1/12 Brother tied and 
beaten to death in his 
presence, witnessed 
fighting 
Single Unemployed 
14. J.M M 22  6 /12 Witnessed killings, 
carried heavy loads 
of looted food 
Single Motorcycle 
transportation 
business 
15 G.O M 20  6/12 Witnessed several 
killings, forced to 
loot and carry heavy 
loads of food 
Single Motorcycle 
transportation 
business 
16. F.F M 20  4 Participated in 
fighting, witnessed 
many killings 
Single Subsistence 
farming 
17. O.N M 26 2 Participated in many 
battles, witnessed 
killings, 
Was beaten and left 
to die but survived. 
Married 
with 3 
children 
Owns retail 
shop and 
practices 
farming 
18. K.N M 24 2 Witnessing children 
killed who failed to 
walk, participated in 
several battles 
Married Engaged in Bee 
keeping and 
subsistence 
farming 
19. O.J M 28 1/12 Witnessed killings of 
children, were 
attacked by UPDF 
and rebels died 
Married Unemployed 
20. O.D M 24  2/12 Rebels killed his 
father in his presence 
before abducting 
him; carried heavy 
loads, witnessed 
killings of children 
and trained in 
military skills 
Single Engaged in 
brick making to 
survive 
21. V.O M 28  3  LRA killed his 
mother; 
Witnessed mass 
murder of civilians at 
Bungatira IDP, 
fought many battles 
Single Unemployed 
22. O.D M 21  1/12 Witnessed an attack 
by UPDF; witnessed 
killings of children 
Single Subsistence 
farming 
23. B.O M 28  3 Witnessed killings of 
children and 
civilians, participated 
in fighting 
Single Employed by a 
CBO 
24 D.D M 23  3  Witnessed the killing 
of his father by 
rebels; witnessed 
children being killed, 
fought with UPDF. 
Single Unemployed 
25. O.M M  23  2/12  Forced to carry 
looted food; attacked 
by UPDF. 
Single Student 
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